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the exaction has its situs, is not a regulation of commerce within
the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, nor is such
tax or fee a duty of tonnage if it be not graduated by the tonnage
of the boats or by the number of times they cross the river or land
within the limits of the State. Id.
FINES, PENALTIES, AND FORFEITURES. See Customs, Sur-
veyor of; Ferry, 1.
FORECLOSURE. See Appeal Bond; Jurisdiction, 12; Receiver.
FRAUD. See Criminal Law, 1-5; Customs Duties, 2; Equity, 1; National
GARNISHMENT. See Appeal, 2.
GEORGIA. See Corporation, 2; Will, 2, 5, 6, 10.
GIFT. See Charitable Gifts and Devises.
1. A certificate of deposit in these terms:
“ EVANSVILLE NATIONAL BANK,
"EVANSVILLE, Ind., Sept. 8, 1875.
“H. M Chaney has deposited in this bank twenty-three thousand five
hundred and fourteen 10% dollars, payable in current funds, to the order
of himself, on surrender of this certificate properly indorsed, with interest
at the rate of six per cent per annum, if left for six months.
HENRY Reis, Cashier,"
may, as a subsisting chose in action, be the subject of a valid
gift, if the person therein named indorse and deliver it to the donee,
and thus vest in him the whole title and interest therein, or so
deliver it, without indorsement, as to divest the donor of all present
control and dominion over it, and make an equitable assignment of
the fund, which it represents and describes. Basket v. Hassell, 602.
2. A donatio mortis causa must, during the life of the donor, take effect
as an executed and complete transfer of his possession of the thing
and his title thereto, although the right of the donee is subject to
be divested by the actual revocation of the donor, or by his surviv-
ing the apprehended peril, or by his outliving the donee, or by the
insufficiency of his estate to pay his debts. If by the terms and
condition of the gift it is to take effect only upon the death of the
donor, it is not such a donatio, but is available, if at all, as a testa-
mentary disposition. Where, therefore, during his last illness, and
when he was in apprehension of death, the person named in the
above certificate made thereon the following indorsement:
“Pay to Martin Basket, of Henderson, Ky.; no one else; then not till
my death. My life seems to be uncertain. I may live through this spell.
Then I will attend to it myself.
“ H. M. CHANEY,"
- and then delivered it to Basket, and died at his home in Ten-
nessee, - Held, that Basket by such indorsement and delivery
acquired no title to or interest in the fund.' Id.
GUARANTY. See Railroad, 6.
HYPOTHECATION. See Maritime Law.
ILLINOIS. See Ferry, 1; Municipal Bonds, 5–10; Navigable Waters.
IMPORTS. See Constitutional Law, 3; Court of Claims, 1; Customs
INDIANS. See Oregon, 1.
INDICTMENT. See Civil Rights ; Criminal Law; Jurisdiction, 6.
INDORSEMENT. See Gift; Jurisdiction, 12.
INFRINGEMENT. See Letlers-patent.
INSANITY. See Witness, 1.
INSOLVENT DEBTOR. See Bankruptcy; United States, Claims by and
INSPECTION LAWS. See Constitutional Law, 14.
1. Section 41 of chapter 346 of the laws of Maryland of 1864, as amended
and re-enacted by chapter 291 of the laws of 1870, provides as fol.
lows: “After the passage of this act, it shall not be lawful to carry
out of this State, in hogsheads, any tobacco raised in this State,
except in hogsheads which shall have been inspected, passed, and
marked agreeably to the provisions of this act, unless such tobacco
shall have been inspected and passed before this act goes into opera-
tion; and any person violating the provisions of this section shall
forfeit and pay the sum of three hundred dollars, which may be
recovered in any court of law of this State, and which shall go to
the credit of the tobacco fund: Provided, that nothing herein con-
tained shall be construed to prohibit any grower of tobacco, or
any purchaser thereof, who may pack the same in the county or
neighborhood where grown, from exporting or carrying out of this
State any such tobacco without having the same opened for inspec-
tion; but such tobacco so exported or carried out of this State with-
out inspection shall in all cases be marked with the name in full of
the owner thereof, and the place of residence of such owner, and
shall be liable to the same charge of outage and storage as in other
cases, and any person who shall carry or send out of this State any
such tobacco, without having it so marked, shall be subject to the
penalty prescribed by this section.” Under that proviso, no re-
quirement of the act of 1864 is dispensed with, except that of having
the hogshead opened for inspection. The hogshead must still be
delivered at a State tobacco warehouse, and there numbered and
recorded and weighed and marked, and be found to be of the dimen-
sions prescribed by statute, and to have been packed and marked
as required. Held, 1. That said section 41, as so ainended and re-
enacted, is not, in its provisions as to charges for outage and storage,
in violation of clause 2 of section 10 of article 1 of the Constitution
of the United States, as respects any impost or duty imposed by it
INSPECTION LAWS (continued).
on exports, or of the clause of section 8 of article 1 which gives power
to the Congress “to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several States; nor is it a regulation of commerce or
unconstitutional, as discriminating between the State buyer and
manufacturer of leaf tobacco and the purchaser who buys for the
purpose of transporting the tobacco to another State or to a foreign
country, or as discriminating between different classes of exporters
of tobacco. 2. That the charge for outage, thereby made, is an in-
spection duty, within the meaning of the Constitution, and it is not
foreign to the character of an inspection law to require every hogs-
head of tobacco to be brought to a State tobacco warehouse. 3. That
dispensing with an opening for inspection of the hogsheads men-
tioned in the proviso does not, in view of the other provisions of the
tobacco inspection statutes of the State, deprive those statutes of the
character of inspection laws. Turner v. Maryland, 38.
2. The characteristics of inspection laws considered, with references to
the legislation of the American colonies and the States on the sub-
3. Quære, Is it not exclusively the province of Congress to determine
whether a charge or duty, under an inspection law, is or is not ex.
4. The charge for outage in this case appears to be a charge for services
properly rendered. Id.
INSURANCE. See Appeal, 3.
1. It is the duty of the assured to communicate all material facts, and
he cannot urge as an excuse for his omission to do so that they were
actually known to the underwriters, unless the knowledge of the lat-
ter was as full and particular as his own information. Sun Mutual
Insurance Company v. Ocean Insurance Company, 485.
2. The exaction of information in some instances may be greater in a
case of reinsurance than as between the parties to an original insur-
ance. In the former, the party seeking to shift the risk he has taken
is bound to communicate such information within his knowledge as
would be likely to influence the judgment of an underwriter. Id.
INTEREST. See Appeal Bond, 1; Customs, Collector of, 1; Jurisdiction, 4;
Louisiana; Municipal Bonds, 10; National Banks, 4; Tax and
INVENTION. See Equity, 1; Letters-patent.
IOWA. See Swamp and Overflowed Lands, 3.
JUDGMENT. See Customs, Collector of, 2; District of Columbia.
A judgment entered by consent for a specific amount, subject to any
credits which the defendant may produce vouchers for, is good as
between the parties themselves and their privies. Burgess v. Selig-
JUDICIAL DISCRETION. See Receiver, 1:
I. OF THE SUPREME Court. See District of Columbia, 2; Missouri, 2;
1. This court has jurisdiction to re-examine the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of a State, rendered adversely to the right and title
which a party to the suit specially sets up to land under a patent
issued by the United States to another under whom he claims.
Baldwin v. Stark, 463.
2. This court has no jurisdiction to re-examine the judgment of a State
court recognizing as valid the decree of a foreign court annulling a
marriage. Roth v. Ehman, 319.
3. This court will not re-examine the order of the Circuit Court, refus-
ing to set aside the verdict upon the ground that the jury awarded
excessive damages. Wabash Railway Company v. McDaniels, 454.
4. Where a cause has been finally disposed of here, by the dismissal of
the writ of error, this court has no power, at a subsequent term, to
alter its judgment to one of affirmance, although, if there had been
a judgment of affirmance, interest during the pendency of the writ
would have been allowed on the amount of the judgment below,
and in the judgment of dismissal no such interest was allowed.
Schell v. Dodge, 629.
II. OF THE CIRCUIT COURT. See Attorney; Causes, Removal of;
Wharves and Wharfage, 5.
5. The Circuit Court cannot take jurisdiction of a suit removed from a
State court under the third subdivision of sect. 639 of the Revised
Statutes, on account of “prejudice or local influence," unless all the
necessary parties on one side of the suit are citizens of different States
from those on the other. Myers v. Swann, 546.
6. Where the Circuit Court quashes an indictment, found against the
prisoner in a State court, wherefrom the cause was on his petition
removed, it has no jurisdiction to proceed against him for the crime :
against the State wherewith he was charged. Bush v. Kentucky, 110.
III. IN GENERAL. See Attorney; Louisiana, 2.
7. The courts of the United States, in the administration of State laws
in cases between citizens of different States, have an independent
jurisdiction co-ordinate with that of the State courts, and are bound
to exercise their own judgment as to the meaning and effect of those
laws. Burgess v. Seligman, 20.
8. Where, however, by the course of the decisions of the State courts,
certain rules are established which become rules of property and ac-
tion in the State, and have all the effect of law, - especially with
regard to the law of real estate and the construction of State consti,
tutions and statutes, - the courts of the United States always regard
such rules as authoritative declarations of what the law is. But
where the law has not been thus settled, it is their right and duty
to exercise their own judgment; as they also always do in reference
to the doctrines of commercial law and general jurisprudence: and
when contracts and transactions have been entered into and rights
have accrued thereon under a particular state of the decisions of the
State tribunals, or when there has been no decision, the courts of the
United States assert the right to adopt their own interpretation of
the law applicable to the case, although a different interpretation
may be given by the State courts after such rights have accrued. Id.
9. But even in such cases, for the sake of harmony and to avoid confu-
sion, the courts of the United States will lean towards an agreement
of views with the State courts, if the question seems to them bal.
anced with doubt. Id.
10. Acting on these principles of comity, the courts of the United States,
without sacrificing their own dignity as independent tribunals, en-
deavor to avoid, and in most cases do avoid, any unseemly conflict
with the well-considered decisions of the State courts. Id.
11. As, however, the very object of giving to the national courts juris-
diction to administer the laws of the States in controversies between
citizens of different States was to institute independent tribunals
which it might be supposed would be unaffected by local prejudices
and sectional views, it is their duty to exercise an independent
judgment in cases not foreclosed by previous adjudication. Id.
12. The indorsee of “ a promissory note negotiable by the law merchant,"
which the maker secured by a mortgage of land to the payee, is not
precluded from maintaining a foreclosure suit in a court of the
United States by the fact that the maker and the payee are citizens
of the same State. T'redway v. Sanger, 323.
13. Where, in an action brought in a court of Virginia against an in-
dorser of promissory notes, payable August, 1861, at Alexandria in
that State, the point in controversy being as to the sufficiency of the
notices of dishonor, and the court decided in substance that by the
gencral principles of commercial law, if, during the late civil war,
he abandoned his residence in loyal territory and went to reside per-
manently within the Confederate lines before the note matured, a
notice left at his former residence was not sufficient to charge him,
if his change of residence was known, or by the exercise of reason-
able diligence might have been known, to the holder of the note
when it matured, Held, that no Federal question was raised by
the decision. Allen.v. McVeigh, 433.
14. Where the plaintiff's prayer for instructions relates also to the Vir-
ginia ordinance of secession and the proclamations of the President
of April, 1861, and Aug. 16, 1861, but, as the case stood upon the
evidence, neither of them was involved, and no title, right, privi-
lege, or iminunity thereunder was claimed by either party, — Held,
that the prayer was properly refused; and, the only Federal question
thereby sought to be raised having been correctly disposed of, this
court cannot consider the other errors assigned. Id.
JURY. See Civil Rights ; Contract, 3; Jurisdiction, 3; Railroad, 4.
The jury may be controlled in their determination of a question by a
peremptory instruction, if the testimony is of such a conclusive