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MARITIME LAW (continued).
3. Where it appears that from the port where the vessel entered in dis-
tress the cargo could be forwarded by another vessel, and that it was
for the interest of the shipper that it should be so forwarded, instead
of being hypothecated to pay for the repairs of the vessel, and that
they could not have been effected without an expense to him of
very much more than it would cost to reclaim his property, pay all
lawful charges on it, and forward it by another vessel, Held, that
the master had no authority to pledge the cargo without the consent
of the shipper or the consignee. Id.
4. Although the bottomry bond cannot be enforced against the cargo,
the latter will not be held in that suit for any charges which the
vessel may have thereon, where a claim for them is not made in the
MARRIAGE. See Jurisdiction, 2.
MARYLAND. See Inspection Laws.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See Railroad, 1.
MEMPHIS AND CHARLESTON RAILROAD COMPANY. See
Causes, Removal of, 3.
MINERAL LANDS. See Patent for Land, 2, 3.
MISSIONARY STATION. See Oregon, 1, 2.
MISSOURI. See Constitutional Law, 5.
1. By a statute of Missouri, stockholders of a corporation at its dissolu-
tion are liable for its debts; but it is provided that no person holding
stock as executor, administrator, guardian, or trustee, and no person
holding stock as collateral security, shall be personally subject to
such liability, but the persons pledging such stock shall be con-
sidered as holding the same, and liable; and the estates and funds
in the hands of executors, &c., shall be liable. Held, 1. That per-
sons to whom a corporation pledges its stock as collateral security
are within the exemption of the statute. 2. That certificates of the
stock absolute on their face, issued in trust or as collateral security
to a creditor, may be shown to be so held by evidence in pais.
3. That the person holding such stock in trnst, or as collateral secu-
rity, is not, by his voting thereon, estopped from showing that it
belongs to the company, and that he holds it as collateral security.
Burgess v. Seligman, 20.
2. The Supreme Court of Missouri, after the Circuit Court had decided
this case, made a contrary decision against the same stockholders,
at the suit of another plaintiff, holding that the clause of exemption
in the statute does not extend to persons receiving from the corpora-
tion itself stock as collateral security. Held, that this court is not
bound to follow the decision. Id.
MORTGAGE. See Appeal Bond; County; Equity, 4; Jurisdiction, 12;
Receiver ; Trust Deed.
1. The township of Montclair in the county of Essex, New Jersey, had
authority to issue bonds to be exchanged for bonds of the Montclair
Railway Company. Montclair v. Ramsdell, 147.
2. The Coustitution of New Jersey provides: “ To avoid improper in-
fluences which may result from intermixing in one and the same act.
such things as have no proper relation to each other, every law shall
embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title.”
Held, 1. That this provision does not require the title of an act to
set forth a detailed statement, or an index or abstract, of its con-
tents; nor does it prevent uniting in the same act numerous pro-
visions having one general object fairly indicated by its title.
2. That the powers, however varied and extended, which a township
may exercise, constitute but one object, which is fairly expressed in
a title showing nothing more than the legislative purpose to estab-
lish such township. Id.
3. The conflict between the Constitution and a statute must be palpable,
to justify the judiciary in disregarding the latter upon the sole
ground that it embraces more than one object, or that, if there be
but one, it is not sufficiently expressed in the title. Id.
4. The holder of the bonds is presumed to have acquired them in good
faith and for value. But if, in a suit upon them, the defence be
such as to require him to show that value was paid, it is not, in
every case, essential to prove that he paid it; for his title will be
sustained if any previous holder gave value. Id.
6. The General Assembly of Illinois enacted, March 27, 1869, a statute
as follows: “The acts of the city council of the city of Quincy,
from June 2, 1868, to August 28, 1868, in ordering an election on
the proposition to subscribe $100,000 to the capital stock of the
Mississippi and Missouri River Air Line Railroad Conmpany, and
the subscription of said stock, and all other acts of said council in
connection therewith, are hereby legalized and confirmed.”
formity with the vote of the citizens of Quincy cast at such an elec-
tion, the council had, by an ordinance of Aug. 7, 1868, subscribed
for that amount of said capital stock; but neither the election nor
the subscription was authorized by law. After the statute took
effect, negotiable coupon bonds were, by virtue of it and the ordi-
nance, issued in the sum of $100,000 to the company, by the city,
and the latter received therefore an equal amount of said stock. In
a suit by A., a bona fide holder of coupons detached from the bonds,
· Held, that they are valid obligations of the city. Quincy v. Cooke,
6. The act of the General Assembly of Illinois, approved Feb. 24, 1869,
amendatory of an act entitled “ An Act to incorporate the Illinois
Southeastern Railway Company,” approved Feb. 25, 1857, removed
the limitation of $30,000 imposed upon the amount which, by the
latter act,“ any town in any county under township organization is
authorized and empowered to donate to said company.” Pana v.
MUNICIPAL BONDS (continued).
7. The court reaffirms the ruling in Harter v. Kernochan, 103 U. S. 562,
that the duly signed and countersigned township bonds, payable to
the company or bearer, which recite that they are duly issued in
compliance with the vote of the legal voters of the township, cast at
an election held by virtue of the above-mentioned acts of Feb. 25,
1867, and Feb. 24, 1869, are valid in the hands of a bona fide
8. An irregularity in conducting the election will not defeat a recovery
on the bonds, or on the coupons thereto attached, nor overcome the
presumption that the plaintiff, in the usual course of business, be-
came at their date the holder of them for value. Id.
9. A decree in personam, rendered by a court of the State of Illinois,
declaring the bonds to be void, does not bind a non-resident holder
of them who was not named as a party to the suit and did not
appear therein, and who had no notice of the pendency thereof
other than by a publication addressed to the “unknown holders
and owners of bonds and coupons issued by the town of Pana."
10. Coupons after their maturity bear interest at the rate prescribed by
the law of the place where they are payable. Id.
u. Negotiable coupon-bonds were, without authority of law, issued in
October, 1872, by a city in Nebraska, for the purpose of raising
money wherewith to construct a high-school building within her
limits. They were sold, and the proceeds applied accordingly. The
legislature, by an act approved Feb. 18, 1873, ante, p. 571, legalized
the proceedings of the city in the premises. The Constitution of
the State then in force declares that “the legislature shall pass no
special act conferring corporate powers,” and that “no bill shall
contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in
its title.” A purchaser of the bonds for full value, without notice
of any informality in their issue, to whom the city paid the interest
thereon for four years, brought suit to recover the amount of the
coupons then due and unpaid. Held, 1. That as by force of the
transaction the city was bound to refund the moneys he paid it in
consideration of its void bonds, and as the act, by confirming them,
merely recognizes the existence of that obligation, and provides a
medium for enforcing it according to the original intention of the
parties, no new corporate powers were thereby conferred. 2. That
the title of the act is a full and apt description of its contents.
Read v. Plattsmouth, 568.
i2. Under the second section of the act of Nebraska approved Feb. 25,
1875, ante, p. 573, the bonds are valid obligations, and neither it nor
the said act of Feb. 18, 1873, is in conflict with the Constitution of
the State which was then in force. Id.
(UNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Equity, 4; Evidence; Ferry, 1, 3;
Municipai Bonds; Navigable Waters.
NATIONAL BANKS. See Criminal Law; United States, Claims by and
1. At the time of borrowing money from a national bank, A. delivered
to it, as collateral security for the debt thereby created, the certifi.
cate of his shares of its capital stock. On his failure to pay at the
stipulated time, the bank sold the stock at its full market value, and
applied the entire proceeds to his credit. On the ground that sect.
5201 of the Revised Statutes prohibited a loan by the bank “ on the
security of the shares of its own capital stock,” A. brought an ac-
tion for the proceeds. Held, that he is not entitled to recover.
National Bank of Xenia v. Stewart, 676.
2. Where the holder of shares of stock in a national bank, who is pos-
sessed of information showing that there is good ground to appre-
hend the failure of the bank, colludes with an irresponsible person,
with the design of substituting the latter in his place, and thus
escaping the individual liability imposed by the provisions of sect.
12 of the act of June 3, 1864, c. 106, and transfers his shares to
such person, the transaction is a fraud on the creditors of the bank,
and the liability of the transferrer to them is not thereby affected.
Bowden v. Johnson, 251.
3. A bill in equity filed by the receiver of the bank against the trans-
ferrer and transferee to enforce such liability will lie where it
is for discovery as well as relief, the transfer being good between
the parties, and only voidable at the election of the complain-
4. A letter of the Comptroller of the Currency, addressed to the receiver,
directing him to bring suit to enforce the personal liability of every
person owning stock at the time the bank suspended, is sufficient
evidence that the decision of the Comptroller touching such personal
liability preceded the institution of the suit. The liability bears
interest from the date of the letter. Id.
5. The decree below, dismissing the bill, was entered after a new receiver
had been appointed.' An appeal to this court was taken in the name
of the old receiver, as the complainant, the new receiver becoming a
surety in the appeal bond. In this court the new receiver was, on his
motion, substituted as the complainant and appellant, without preju-
dice to the proceedings already had; and the motion of the appellees
to dismiss the appeal' was denied. Id.
NAVIGABLE WATERS. See Ferry; Wharves and Wharfnge.
1. The Chicago River and its branches, although lying within the limits
of the State of Illinois, are navigable waters of the United States
over which Congress, in the exercise of its power under the com-
merce clause of the Constitution, may exercise control to the extent
necessary to protect, preserve, and improve their free navigation;
but until that body acts, the State has plenary authority over bridges
across them, and may vest in Chicago jurisdiction over the construc-
tion, repair, and use of those bridges within the city. Escanaba
Company v. Chicago, 678.
NAVIGABLE WATERS (continued).
2. There is nothing in the ordinance of July 13, 1787, or in the subse-
quent legislation of Congress, that precludes the State from exercis-
ing that authority. Id.
NEBRASKA. See County; Municipal Bonds, 11, 12.
NEGLIGENCE. See Railroad, 1.
NEGROES. See Civil Rights ; Constitutional Law, 4.
NEW JERSEY. See Municipal Bonds, 14.
NEW YORK. See Constitutional Law, 1, 2.
NON-RESIDENTS. See Municipal Bonds, 9; Tax and Taxation.
NOTARY PUBLIC. See Criminal Law, 6.
NOTICE. See Jurisdiction, 13; Maritime Law, 2; Municipal Bonds, 9;
Trust Deed, 1.
OFFICER OF THE ARMY.
The rank and pay of retired officers of the army are subject to the con-
trol of Congress. Wood v. United States, 414.
OFFICERS OF NATIONAL BANKS. See Criminal Law.
OFFICIAL BONDS. See Appeal Bond, 3; Public Lands, 2.
1. Under the act of Aug. 14, 1848, c. 177, entitled “ An Act to establish
the territorial government of Oregon," a religious society acquired
no title to public lands by reason of its occupation of them as a
missionary station among the Indian tribes, unless such occupation
actually existed at that date. Missionary Society v. Dalles, 336.
2. Where, therefore, a religious society appropriated certain lands in
the Territory of Oregon, erected improvements thereon and occu-
pied them for such a missionary station, but its occupation ceased
before that date, and a portion of them, after the town-site acts took
effect, was, pursuant to their provisions, entered and paid for, and
another portion was claimed by a party who had fully complied with
the requirements of the act of Sept. 27, 1850, c. 76, commonly called
the Donation Act, – Held, that the society to which by reason of
such occupation a patent had been issued held the title to such
portions in trust for the parties claiming respectively under the
donation and the town-site acts. Id.
3. Prior to the said act of Sept. 27, 1850, no person could, by entry or
pre-emption settlement, acquire as against the United States any
right or title to public land in Oregon. Stark v. Starrs, 6 Wall.
402, cited upon this point and approved. Id.
PACIFIC RAILROAD ACTS. See Patent for Land, 2.
PATENT. See Letters-patent.