MUNICIPAL BONDS (continued).

7. The court reaffirms the ruling in Harter v. Kernochan, 103 U. S. 562,
that the duly signed and countersigned township bonds, payable to
the company or bearer, which recite that they are duly issued in
compliance with the vote of the legal voters of the township, cast at
an election held by virtue of the above-mentioned acts of Feb. 25,
1867, and Feb. 24, 1869, are valid in the hands of a bona fide
holder. Id.

8. An irregularity in conducting the election will not defeat a recovery
on the bonds, or on the coupons thereto attached, nor overcome the
presumption that the plaintiff, in the usual course of business, be-
came at their date the holder of them for value. Id.

9. A decree in personam, rendered by a court of the State of Illinois,
declaring the bonds to be void, does not bind a non-resident holder
of them who was not named as a party to the suit and did not
appear therein, and who had no notice of the pendency thereof
other than by a publication addressed to the "unknown holders
and owners of bonds and coupons issued by the town of Pana.”
Id.

10. Coupons after their maturity bear interest at the rate prescribed by
the law of the place where they are payable. Id.

11. Negotiable coupon-bonds were, without authority of law, issued in
October, 1872, by a city in Nebraska, for the purpose of raising
money wherewith to construct a high-school building within her
limits. They were sold, and the proceeds applied accordingly. The
legislature, by an act approved Feb. 18, 1873, ante, p. 571, legalized
the proceedings of the city in the premises. The Constitution of
the State then in force declares that "the legislature shall pass no
special act conferring corporate powers," and that "no bill shall
contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in
its title." A purchaser of the bonds for full value, without notice
of any informality in their issue, to whom the city paid the interest
thereon for four years, brought suit to recover the amount of the
coupons then due and unpaid. Held, 1. That as by force of the
transaction the city was bound to refund the moneys he paid it in
consideration of its void bonds, and as the act, by confirming them,
merely recognizes the existence of that obligation, and provides a
medium for enforcing it according to the original intention of the
parties, no new corporate powers were thereby conferred. 2. That
the title of the act is a full and apt description of its contents.
Read v. Plattsmouth, 568.

12. Under the second section of the act of Nebraska approved Feb. 25,
1875, ante, p. 573, the bonds are valid obligations, and neither it nor
the said act of Feb. 18, 1873, is in conflict with the Constitution of
the State which was then in force. Id.

IUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

See Equity, 4; Evidence; Ferry, 1, 3;

Municipal Bonds; Navigable Waters.

NATIONAL BANKS. See Criminal Law; United States, Claims by and

against.

1. At the time of borrowing money from a national bank, A. delivered
to it, as collateral security for the debt thereby created, the certifi-
cate of his shares of its capital stock. On his failure to pay at the
stipulated time, the bank sold the stock at its full market value, and
applied the entire proceeds to his credit. On the ground that sect.
5201 of the Revised Statutes prohibited a loan by the bank "on the
security of the shares of its own capital stock," A. brought an ac-
tion for the proceeds. Held, that he is not entitled to recover.
National Bank of Xenia v. Stewart, 676.

2. Where the holder of shares of stock in a national bank, who is pos-
sessed of information showing that there is good ground to appre-
hend the failure of the bank, colludes with au irresponsible person,
with the design of substituting the latter in his place, and thus
escaping the individual liability imposed by the provisions of sect.
12 of the act of June 3, 1864, c. 106, and transfers his shares to
such person, the transaction is a fraud on the creditors of the bank,
and the liability of the transferrer to them is not thereby affected.
Bowden v. Johnson, 251.

3. A bill in equity filed by the receiver of the bank against the trans-
ferrer and transferee to enforce such liability will lie where it
is for discovery as well as relief, the transfer being good between
the parties, and only voidable at the election of the complain-
ant. Id.

4. A letter of the Comptroller of the Currency, addressed to the receiver,
directing him to bring suit to enforce the personal liability of every
person owning stock at the time the bank suspended, is sufficient
evidence that the decision of the Comptroller touching such personal
liability preceded the institution of the suit. The liability bears
interest from the date of the letter. Id.

5. The decree below, dismissing the bill, was entered after a new receiver
had been appointed. An appeal to this court was taken in the name
of the old receiver, as the complainant, the new receiver becoming a
surety in the appeal bond. In this court the new receiver was, on his
motion, substituted as the complainant and appellant, without preju-
dice to the proceedings already had; and the motion of the appellees
to dismiss the appeal was denied. Id.

NAVIGABLE WATERS. See Ferry; Wharves and Wharfage.
1. The Chicago River and its branches, although lying within the limits
of the State of Illinois, are navigable waters of the United States
over which Congress, in the exercise of its power under the com-
merce clause of the Constitution, may exercise control to the extent
necessary to protect, preserve, and improve their free navigation;
but until that body acts, the State has plenary authority over bridges
across them, and may vest in Chicago jurisdiction over the construc-
tion, repair, and use of those bridges within the city. Escanaba
Company v. Chicago, 678.

NAVIGABLE WATERS (continued).

2. There is nothing in the ordinance of July 13, 1787, or in the subse-
quent legislation of Congress, that precludes the State from exercis-
ing that authority. Id.

NEBRASKA. See County; Municipal Bonds, 11, 12.

NEGLIGENCE. See Railroad, 1.

NEGROES. See Civil Rights; Constitutional Law, 4.

NEW JERSEY. See Municipal Bonds, 1-4.

NEW YORK. See Constitutional Law, 1, 2.

NON-RESIDENTS. See Municipal Bonds, 9; Tax and Taxation.

NOTARY PUBLIC. See Criminal Law, 6.

NOTICE. See Jurisdiction, 13; Maritime Law, 2; Municipal Bonds, 9;
Trust Deed, 1.

OFFICER OF THE ARMY.

The rank and pay of retired officers of the army are subject to the con-
trol of Congress. Wood v. United States, 414.

OFFICERS OF NATIONAL BANKS. See Criminal Law.

OFFICIAL BONDS. See Appeal Bond, 3; Public Lands, 2.
OREGON.

1. Under the act of Aug. 14, 1848, c. 177, entitled "An Act to establish
the territorial government of Oregon," a religious society acquired
no title to public lands by reason of its occupation of them as a
missionary station among the Indian tribes, unless such occupation
actually existed at that date. Missionary Society v. Dalles, 336.
2. Where, therefore, a religious society appropriated certain lands in
the Territory of Oregon, erected improvements thereon and occu-
pied them for such a missionary station, but its occupation ceased
before that date, and a portion of them, after the town-site acts took
effect, was, pursuant to their provisions, entered and paid for, and
another portion was claimed by a party who had fully complied with
the requirements of the act of Sept. 27, 1850, c. 76, commonly called
the Donation Act, -Held, that the society to which by reason of
such occupation a patent had been issued held the title to such
portions in trust for the parties claiming respectively under the
donation and the town-site acts. Id.

-

3. Prior to the said act of Sept. 27, 1850, no person could, by entry or
pre-emption settlement, acquire as against the United States any
right or title to public land in Oregon. Stark v. Starrs, 6 Wall.
402, cited upon this point and approved. Id.

PACIFIC RAILROAD ACTS. See Patent for Land, 2.
PATENT. See Letters-patent.

PATENT FOR LAND. See Jurisdiction, 1; Oregon, 2; Pre-emption;

Public Lands.

1. Where a bill was filed in the Circuit Court by the District Attorney
in the name of the United States, to vacate a patent for lands, but
no objection touching his authority to bring the suit was made,
and a duly certified copy of a letter whereby he was directed by
the Attorney-General to institute the requisite proceedings was filed
here, Held, that the decree for the complainant will not be re-
versed on such an objection raised here for the first time. Mc-
Laughlin v. United States, 526.

2. The patent in question, bearing date May 31, 1870, and issued to a
railroad company, in professed compliance with the terms and con-
ditions of the grant made by the acts commonly known as the
Pacific Railroad Acts, covers lands which, the bill alleges, contain
valuable quicksilver and cinnabar deposits, and were known to be
"mineral lands" when the grant was made and the patent issued.
This court, being satisfied that the material allegations of the bill
are true, that as early as 1863 and since cinnabar was mined upon
the lands, and that at the time of the application for a patent their
character was known to the defendant, the agent of the company,
who now claims them under it, affirms the decree cancelling the
patent and declaring his title to be null and void. Id.

3. Quære, What extent of mineral, other than coal and iron, found in
lands will exclude them from the said grant; and can the United
States maintain a suit to set aside a patent, if, before it was issued,
the lands therein mentioned were not known to be mineral; and,
if so, what are the rights of innocent purchasers from the pat-
entee. Id.

PENSION.

By a special act, B. was allowed a pension of fifty dollars per month,-
which was paid to him until he claimed and received, under a sub-
sequent general act, seventy-two dollars per month. Held, that he
is not entitled to take under both acts. United States v. Teller, 64.
PERJURY. See Criminal Law, 6.

PERPETUITY. See Will, 9.

PLEADING. See Admiralty, 1; Court of Claims, 3.

POLICE POWER. See Ferry, 2.

POOR-FARM. See County.

POST-OFFICE. See Customs Duties, 1, 2.

PRACTICE. See Admiralty, 1; Appeal; Attorney; Equity Pleading and
Practice; Evidence; Jurisdiction; Jury; Letters-patent, 1, 6; Na-
tional Banks, 5; Witness, 2.

PRE-EMPTION. See Oregon; Patent for Land; Public Lands.

1. Where the Land Department rejected the claim of a party to pre-
empt a tract of public land, it appearing from the evidence sub-

PRE-EMPTION (continued).

mitted that he had previously exercised the "pre-emptive right,"
Held, that the finding of that fact by the department is conclusive.
Baldwin v. Stark, 463.

2. A person is not entitled, under existing statutes, to more than one
such "pre-emptive right," nor, after filing a declaratory statement
for one tract, can he file such a statement for another tract. Id.
PRIORITY OF PAYMENT. See Trust Deed, 1; United States, Claims
by and against.

PRIZE.

A final decree of acquittal and restitution to the only claimant in a prize
cause determines nothing as to the title in the property, beyond the
question of prize or no prize; and another person, who actually con-
ducts the defence in the prize cause in behalf and by consent of the
claimant, without disclosing his own title under a previous bill of
sale from the claimant, is not estopped to contest the claimant's title
in a subsequent suit brought by creditors attaching the property or
its proceeds as belonging to the claimant. Cushing v. Laird, 69.
PUBLIC LANDS. See Oregon; Patent for Land; Pre-emption Swamp
and Overflowed Lands.

1. The local land-officers are not required to meet and jointly consider
the proof of settlement and cultivation offered by claimants under
the pre-emption laws. Potter v. United States, 126.

2. In his accounts with the government, a receiver of public moneys in
a land district charged himself with money which he, or, during his
absence, his authorized agents, had received as the purchase price
of public lands entered pursuant to the pre-emption laws. The
United States, on his failure to pay over the money, brought suit
on his official bond. Held, that neither he nor his sureties can
defeat a recovery by setting up irregularities in the proceedings by
which the entry of the lands was allowed.
PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH. See Municipal Bonds, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11;
Patent for Land, 3.

Id.

RAILROAD. See Causes, Removal of, 3; Tax and Taxation.

1. The same degree of care which a railroad company should take in pro-
viding and maintaining its machinery must be observed in selecting
and retaining its employés, including telegraphic operators. Ordi-
nary care on its part implies, as between it and its employés, not
simply the degree of diligence which is customary among those
intrusted with the management of railroad property, but such as.
having respect to the exigencies of the particular service, ought rea-
sonably to be observed. It is such care as, in view of the conse-
quences that may result from negligence on the part of employés, is
fairly commensurate with the perils or dangers likely to be encoun-
tered. Wabash Railway Company v. McDaniels, 454.

2. In the absence of a special contract, a railroad company, by receiving
cattle for transportation over its own line and other lines therewith