I understand, it consists of a Federal District, which may be likened in some respects to our District of Columbia, — of twenty-seven states and one territory, called Lower California. A civil code was adopted by the federal authority in 1871. It could extend by its own force only to the Federal District and to Lower California; but it was a work of such manifest merit that it was adopted by almost all the states I believe by twenty-five out of twentyseven-so that uniformity of jurisprudence was largely secured. It was amended in 1884, and, as amended, constitutes an important and scientific body of law, resembling the modern civil codes of other countries in its principles, with some provisions, of course, of local character. Generally speaking, it may be said that it treats of the law of persons, their domicile and status, of artificial or legal persons, of property and its various modifications, and of obligations. We need not dwell on further details in regard to Central America and South America, and must leave that part of the subject with the remark, simply, that Roman and civil law, as handed down by Spain, may be considered as fundamental in those countries. It would seem that students of law in our country may well begin to acquaint themselves with the elements, at least, of this legal system, which, as we have seen, prevails in so many regions of the western hemisphere, and in the thousand islands we have acquired in the East. The task is not so difficult as it may seem. Assuming that the student has a fair knowledge of the leading principles of Roman law, and comprehends the meaning of its technical terms, which appear sometimes alien and mystical, he may read the codes of France, Canada, Louisiana, and Spain with interest and understanding. And he will find that, after all, the difference between the civil law and the common law is by no means so great as some persons imagine. About a year ago in reply to some questions by Professor Maitland, submitted to me by our lamented friend Professor Thayer, I tried to express this idea. in these words: - "If you eliminate from the English law the peculiarities of the tenure and transmission of real estate which are largely feudal or social in origin; if you further eliminate, as they are doing in England, the technicalities of common law pleading; if you leave out some rules of evidence, which, as you well know, have grown up around the practice before the English common jury, — the rest of English common law will be found not to differ very much from the civil law in those elementary principles which are essential to the administration of justice between man and man. There are differences of terminology, which, to some, seem strange and alien, but when they are once understood, the leading doctrines are found to be much the same. And to me it is very interesting to notice how the English judges continually fall back on the Roman and civil law as a ground of refuge in time of mental perplexity. You will doubtless recall the case of Berchervaise v. Lewis, L. R. 7 Common Pleas, where neither counsel nor court could find any English precedent in point, and the decision was finally made on the authority of a text from the Pandects. We might inquire why the court should cite the Pandects unless in some perhaps sub-conscious way the doctrines of the classical jurists underlie even English law." NEW ORLEANS. William Wirt Howe. HARVARD LAW REVIEW. Published monthly, during the Academic Year, by Harvard Law Students. AMENDMENTS TO THE BANKRUPTCY ACT. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was probably more favorable to an insolvent debtor than any other bankruptcy law ever enacted. Any debtor, except a corporation, could become a voluntary bankrupt and gain the privileges of the Act if he wished; but if he did not wish to become a bankrupt the acts of bankruptcy rendering him liable to be adjudicated a bankrupt on petition of his creditors were few. Moreover, the causes for opposing the discharge of a bankrupt were narrowly limited, and in practice the proportion of bankrupts who have failed to get a discharge must be very small. In the main the law has worked successfully, but some provisions have been found ambiguous, and others have been thought unjust to creditors. The amendatory act which has just become a law for all cases not already pending is an attempt to remedy some of these defects. The amendments, unlike the original act, seem to have been drawn by the hands of creditors and court officials rather than by those to whom the interests of the debtor are of paramount concern. The fees of both the referee and the trustee are increased, and a number of changes are made in the interest of creditors. Probably the most important of these is the amendment of section 57. Hereafter a creditor who has received a preference innocently may prove other claims without surrendering his preference. A new act of bankruptcy is created and mining corporations are made subject to involuntary bankruptcy. Four new objections to the discharge are added to the two created by the Act of 1898, and one of the two specified in the original act is made more stringent. The debts not affected by a discharge are also slightly increased in number. The wife of a bankrupt may be compelled to give testimony in regard to transactions to which she was a party. The jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is enlarged by the addition to section 23 b, of a proviso which permits suits for the recovery of property under sections 60 b and 67 e to be brought in that court. A few amendments, but not so many as might be wished, have for their object rather to make clear ambiguities in the original act than to make a change in the law. This is apparently the primary object in the amendment to section 17, which specifies what debts are not affected by a discharge. Another question on which there are conflicting decisions is settled by the provision that where a preference consists in a transfer, the period of four months shall not expire until four months after the date of the recording or registering of the transfer, if by law such recording or registering is required. It is provided that the bankruptcy of a corporation shall not release its officers, directors or stockholders, as such, from any liability under the laws of a state or territory or of the United States. This is presumably meant to overrule such cases as Train v. Marshall Paper Co., 180 Mass. 513. It may well be questioned whether the intention has been effectuated. Congress cannot change the conditions of a director's liability in Massachusetts or any state, and if the state law requires as a condition of charging a director that not only shall judgment be given against the corporation, but that execution shall issue and be returned unsatisfied, these conditions must be fulfilled, and if the corporation is discharged it seems impossible to fulfill them. For precisely such a reason in Massachusetts while the Act of 1867 was in force sureties on attachment bonds were held to be discharged by the discharge of the principal debtor, though the bankruptcy law provided that sureties should not be discharged. A state statute had to be passed to remedy the injustice. See Hill v. Harding, 130 U. S. 699. The difficulty might easily have been met by denying a bankrupt corporation a discharge. The present act is the first to allow a corporation a discharge, and there is little to be said in favor of the innovation. A definite provision allowing proof of contingent claims should also have found a place in the amendatory act. The amendments as a whole improve the law. They strengthen the hand of the creditor, but an honest debtor is not materially affected by them. S. W. RIGHTS OF SPECIAL TAX-PAYERS IN LOCAL IMPROVEMENT CONTRACTS. A question of apparently first impression has recently been raised in the Kentucky courts, involving a determination of the relation of a city to its inhabitants with respect to contracts for local improvements. The city of Louisville let out a paving contract upon which there was a reliable surety. On the contractor's becoming embarrassed the city released both him and his surety, and relet the contract at a great increase in expense. The abutting owners, who had been specially assessed for the cost under the first contract, successfully sued the city for repayment of the extra assessments levied to meet the additional cost under the second contract. Barfield v. Gleason, 63 S. W. Rep. 964; Louisville v. Kentucky, etc.. Bridge Co., 70 ibid. 627. The obvious result of the cases is to shift the burden caused by the improper action of the council from those specially assessed to the general tax-payers. That a city does not hold such contracts strictly in trust for the special class to be benefited is shown by the fact that though the abutting owners have a right of action if the city permits defective construction, yet if the work has been completed and payment made the right of action is gone. Schumm v. Seymour, 24 N. J. Eq. 143; Liebstein v. Mayor, ibid. 200. It seems clear that the Kentucky court too was of this opinion, as it held that the cause of action accrued, not when the surety was released, but when the extra assessment was paid. The city furthermore cannot justly be said to be an agent, because the so-called principals have no control in the matter. Yet undoubtedly a fiduciary relationship of some sort does exist, as is indicated by the fact that a city, by way of mere gift, cannot release a debtor to the detriment of any tax-payer. Wells v. Putnam, 169 Mass. 226; see 16 HARV. L. REV. 211. The court considered that the city was exercising a "statutory power of attorney"; but it is a little odd to find the power granted by the attorney and not by the principal. Technically the case may be worked out thus. At the outset the council has full legislative discretion to determine whether an improvement is advisable. But when that discretion has been exercised and the contracts have been made, a duty, ministerial in its nature, arises to have the betterment properly executed. If the cost is fraudulently increased the abutters need pay only the fair value of the work done. Matter of Livingston, 121 N. Y. 94. The same is true in the case of gross negligence. Matter of Anderson, 109 N. Y. 554. In the principal case to release the solvent surety was not a legislative or discretionary act, because the council made no pretence of determining that the paving should be abandoned altogether. It was in fact a ministerial tort causing damage to the abutters; and the latter should recover under the general rule of liability for torts committed by municipal agents in the execution of ministerial duties. See 2 DILL. MUN. CORP., § 980. NATURE OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS. A policy insuring property is generally asserted to be a contract for the personal indemnity of the insured. See 1 MAY, INS., § 6. There is a tendency, however, to depart from this proposition, and an illustration of it may be seen in a recent South Carolina case. Property had been insured by a grantee under a voluntary conveyance which later at the suit of the grantor's creditors was declared fraudulent. After a loss all the parties appeared before the court and the proceeds of the policy, in amount equalling the actual damage to the property, were given to the grantee under the fraudulent conveyance. Steinmeyer v. Steinmeyer, 42 S. E. Rep. 184. The court professed to base its decision on the general principle, reasoning that the creditors could not reach the proceeds since they resulted from the personal contract for indemnity between the company and the grantee. Cf. Forrester v. Gill, 11 Col. App. 410; Bernheim v. Beer, 56 Miss. 149. But in emphasizing the personal nature of the insurance contract the court slighted the other essential characteristic, indemnity. Only by a fiction can the damage to the grantee be regarded as more than nominal, and hence in allowing him substantial damages the decision clearly departs from the rule which it professedly adopts. The departure in other classes of cases takes a contrary direction, and disregards the personal element for the sake of indemnifying the actual sufferer. Where a grantee of a conveyance constructively fraudulent as against the |