MAXIM LXXXIX.

Salus populi est suprema lex: (13 Co. 139.)-The welfare of the people, or of the public, is supreme law.

IN

N all cases of necessity the interests of an individual must give way to the interests of the multitude, even though it extend to his life. This is shown in the experience of every nation and people upon the face of the earth. The principle governing this rule extends to private, as well as to public interests. And from the peasant to the sovereign, all are amenable to its illimitable sway.

If a public road be rendered impassable by floods or otherwise, the public have a right of way over the adjoining property. Or, if there be but one road to a place, and no other mode of going, that is a public road and a common highway of necessity, and the public are entitled to use it as such. Nor will an obstruction be permitted to be erected in a public highway, without the authority of Parliament, where it is a nuisance to the general public, though it may be advantageous to some portion of the public. If a man's house be on fire, both it and other property not on fire, may be pulled down to prevent the fire spreading to other more valuable property. So in time of war, any and every man's property may be taken for the defence or preservation of the kingdom generally. It is upon this principle that private individuals are bound to perform certain public duties when called upon, as to prevent a breach of the peace, serve as jurors, soldiers, sailors, &c. It is upon this principle, also, that public officers acting in the proper discharge of their duties are not liable for injury to private individuals.

The payment of taxes by burgesses and citizens for the support of a particular municipality, and by owners and occupiers of property generally to defray the expenses of the nation at large, are apt instances of the liability of individuals to contribute to

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the support of the whole nation, and to sacrifice private interests to the public good. And when it is considered that the general taxes of this country are imposed by the people themselves through their representatives in Parliament, it is not difficult to understand how intimately connected individual is with the general welfare, nor how highly the principle of this maxim is esteemed in this country.

All persons who are called upon to make individual sacrifice for the public good know that they receive a corresponding benefit in the protection afforded to them in their person and property by the laws of the country, and in other privileges thereby accorded to them.

The most arbitrary demand made upon an individual in this country now-a-days is where, contrary to the rule, "Nemo cogitur rem suam vendere, etiam justo pretio," he is by Act of Parliament compelled, at the instance of a few speculating individuals, to give up his private property for some commercial undertaking, as to give up some cherished country residence for the purpose of a line of railway, or his business premises for some so called town improvement, professedly of course, but often questionably, for the public good. In these cases, however, the principle said to be adopted is, that private interest is not to be sacrificed to a greater extent than is necessary adequately to secure the public interests, and that private interests are duly considered in all such cases, not only by Parliament in the making of such laws, but also by the courts of law and equity in the construction of them.

13 Co. 139; Jenk. Cent. 85, 223; 4 Inst. 275; Denn v. Diamond, 4 B. & C. 245; Re Laws, 1 Exch. 447; Chichester v. Lethbridge, Willes, 72; Gosling v. Veley, 12 Q. B. 407; Stracey v. Nelson, 12 M. & W. 540; Taylor v. Loft, 8 Exch. 278; Webb v. Manchester & L. Rway. Co. 4 My. & Cr. 116; Simpson v. Lord Howden, 1 Keen, 598; Reg. v. Train, 31 L. J. 169, M. C. Hutchinson v. Manchester & R. R. C. 14 M. & W. 694,

MAXIM XC.

Sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas: (9 Co. 59.)-So use your own property as not to injure your neighbour's.

THE

HE principle of this maxim applies to the public, and to public rights, as well as to individuals and to individual rights, and in such a manner as that when any such right is violated whereby damage is sustained, a right of action arises.

The maxim may be briefly illustrated by the following, out of many similar instances, viz.: the obstruction of ancient lights; the stopping, by obstruction or diversion, on your own land, of a flow of water on to your neighbour's; the erection of public works, brick-kilns, &c., emitting large quantities of smoke, offensive smells, &c., near to a private dwelling-house; all cases of nuisance, negligence, &c.

In an action for building a pig-sty and keeping pigs in it, so near to the plaintiff's house as that the smell from them was offensive to the plaintiff and the inmates of his house, and a nuisance; it was held that the action was well maintainable for the injury done to the plaintiff's house by the erection of the sty and keeping pigs, whereby the air entering the plaintiff's house was infected and corrupted. And this was conceded upon the principle that houses are necessary for the habitation of man, and the chief object of a house is that it should be fit for habitation, and anything depriving it of that necessary quality is an injury to the house and actionable; as, infecting the air, stopping up wholesome air, shutting out the light, &c.

The maxim applies as well to a right, as to property; as, where injury is done to one by the negligent use by another of his property. Upon this principle, the lessee and occupier of refreshment-rooms at a railway station, and of a cellar underneath, who employed a coal dealer to put coals into the cellar, and who, in so doing, left open a trap door in the platform of the station,

over which passengers had to go on their way out, and through which the plaintiff, a passenger, fell and was injured, was held liable in damages for the injury sustained by such passenger; it being his obvious duty to use the trap door in such a manner as not necessarily to create such danger, but to use reasonable precautions to see that there was no injury to travellers using the platform.

Where one in exercise of his private rights over his own property, on a portion of his own land, does what interferes with his neighbour's right to the enjoyment of pure air, and causes injury to his neighbour's property, which might be avoided by the acts complained of being done on other part of his own property, a court of equity will interfere, by injunction, to prevent a continuation of such acts. As, where the defendant, having entered into a contract with Government for the supply of a large quantity of bricks, obtained a lease of a tract of land, and began brick-burning operations, by constructing a line of kilns or clamps at a distance of about 340 yards south of the plaintiff's mansion house, and thirty from the boundary fence; the court restrained the defendant, by injunction, from lighting or firing any kilns within a distance of 650 yards from the plaintiff's house.

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The maxim, Edificare in tuo proprio solo non licet quod alteri noceat"—It is not lawful to build upon your own land to the injury of another, is also applicable here.

Aldred's case, 9 Co. 58 & 59; 3 Inst. 201; 3 Bla. Com; Corley v. Hill, 4 C. B. (N.S.) 536; Jeffries v. Williams, 5 Exch. 797; Humphries v. Brogden, 12 Q. B. 739; Bradbee v. Mayor of London, 5 Scott N. R. 120; Chasemore v. Richards, 2 H. & N: 168; Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N. C. 468; Broadbent v. Imp. Gas Co. 34 L. T. 1; Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 H. L. Cas. 195; Hole v. Barlow, 31 L. T. 134; Walter v. Selfe, 17 L. T. 103; Pickard v. Smith, 4 L. T. (N.S.) 470; Beardmore v. Tredwell, 7 L. T. (N.S.) 207.

MAXIM XCI.

Summa ratio est, quæ pro religione facit: (Co. Litt. 341.)— The highest rule of conduct is that which is induced by religion.

THIS is the golden rule of every nation. All perfect laws are

founded upon religion. The laws of all nations are supposed to be so founded. No people will deny this. The only question is, what is religion? and to the difference of opinion upon this question, is owing the difference in the customs, habits, and laws of the universe. The laws of England are

supposed to be, in every respect, consistent with the religion there established.

By reason of this rule, the law gives to the church many privileges in order to favour religion. So upon a question as to in whom is the fee simple of glebe lands holden to the parson and his successors, it is said not to be in the patron or ordinary, but in abeyance; being vested in the parson and his successors, which the patron and ordinary are not, and this, because the parson has curam animarum, and is bound to celebrate divine service, and to administer the sacraments, and, therefore, no act of the predecessor can take away the entry of the successor, and drive him to a real action whereby he shall become destitute of maintenance in the meantime.

It is also said that a parson, for the benefit of the church and of his successor, is in some cases esteemed in law to have a qualified estate in fee simple; but, to do anything to the prejudice of his successor, in many cases, as to commit waste, he is considered as having only an estate for life. For, though a parson may make the living better for his successor, he is, otherwise, as a minor, he cannot make it worse. "Ecclesia fungitur vice minoris; meliorem facere potest conditionem suam, deteriorem nequaquam ;" and, "Ecclesia meliorari non deteriori potest."