look to the preamble of a statute before he can understand the meaning of any part of it; to those learned in the law, though proper at all times to be done, yet it is not necessary where the language is plain and obvious. It must be borne in mind that where the language of a statute is plain and obvious, no extrinsic evidence must be sought for whereby to put a construction upon it, however much the words used may be supposed to differ from the intention of the Legislature. For instance, a judge, having been intrusted to prepare a Bill in Parliament, cannot, where the consideration of it comes before him judicially, refer to his intention at the time of framing the Bill; for his intention may not have been the subsequent intention of the Legislature, nor the construction they put upon the words used by him; nor, in this case, can even the intention of the Legislature be considered. But, if any plain defect appear upon a statute, it must be construed as it plainly appears, and any such defect must be remedied also by statute. Where, however, the language of the statute is doubtful, the intention of the Legislature is to be considered, and that construction adopted which those learned in the law did put upon it at the time it was made, or which those learned in the law shall afterwards put upon it by reference to the time when and circumstances under which it was made.

All documents between parties will bear the like rule of construction as Acts of Parliament. The precedents in the law and practice of our courts of law and equity, and their application to constantly recurring similar cases, form the best instances of the application of this maxim.

2 Inst. 11, 136, 181; The Bank of England v. Anderson, 3 Bing. N. C. 666; Weld v. Hornby, 7 East, 195; Gorham v. Bishop of Exeter, 5 Exch. 630; Barbot v. Allen, 7 Exch. 609; Corporation of Newcastle v. AttorneyGeneral and others, 12 Cl. & Fin. 402; Sharpley v. Overseers of Mablethorpe, 3 E. & B. 906; Jones v. Brown, 2 Exch. 329; Abley v. Dale, 11 C. B. 378; Arnold v. Ridge, 13 C. B. 763; Drummond v. AttorneyGeneral, 2 H. L. Cas. 861; Reg. v. Sillem, 11 L. T. (N.S.) 223.

MAXIM XXII.

Cuicunque aliquis quid concedit concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potuit: (11 Co. 52.)—The grantor of anything to another, grants that also without which the thing granted would be useless.

WHERE a lessor excepts trees from a demise, and afterwards

during the continuance of the lease wishes to sell them, the law gives to him and to the intended purchaser power, as incident to the exception, to enter and show the trees with a view to their sale; for without entry none could see them, and without sight none would buy them. So where a man seised of a house devised it to a woman in tail, upon condition that if the woman died without issue his executor might sell; in that case it was held that the executor might by law enter into the house to see if it were well repaired, in order to know at what value to sell the reversion. So the law gives power to him who ought to repair a bridge, and to him who has a drain or sewer within the land of another, to enter upon the land when necessary to repair them. So, again, if the owner of trees in a wood sell them, the purchaser may go with carts over the land of the owner to carry them.

In the grant of land or buildings, or a portion of a building— as an office, or apartments—a right of way to it or them is incident to the grant, as being directly necessary for the enjoyment of the thing granted. Also, if a man grant a piece of land in the middle of other land of his, he at the same time impliedly grants a way to it, and the grantee may cross the grantor's land for that purpose without being liable in trespass. So, also, the right to get and carry away mines and other minerals, water, &c., and to do all things necessary to their enjoyment, follow as incident to the grant or reservation of them.

Upon the same principle is the maxim relating to judicial

authority: "Quando aliquid mandatur, mandatur et omne per quod pervenitur ad illud"-When anything is commanded, everything by which the thing commanded can be accomplished is also commanded. For, a sentence of authority would be useless if there were not an executive power to carry the sentence into effect. The maxim is of universal application, and applies to all delegated authority; and there is, of course, no power upon earth which is not delegated, and thus it is that, in pursuance of the supreme will of the people, laws are made by Parliament for the government of the commonwealth, and that Parliament, judges, sheriffs, and other inferior officers are in their several degrees and offices clothed with all necessary authority to enable them to carry into effect that supreme will. The Queen by virtue of her authority calls together Parliament, who make laws and appoint officers to carry them into effect; but without such power to appoint such officers, and without such officers to carry the laws into effect, they would, when made, be useless. A practical case which may be given in illustration of the maxim is, where a sheriff, being resisted by force in the execution of a writ, calls to his aid the posse comitatus, or power of the county, in order to assist him in carrying the law into effect, and which by virtue of his writ he is authorised to do. The maxim, "Quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur omne per quod devenitur ad illud"-When anything is prohibited, everything relating to it is also prohibited, may also be referred to as illustrating conversely that cited in the

text.

11 Co. 52; 5 Co. 115; 2 Inst. 48, 148; Hob. 234; F. N. B. 183; Shepp. Touch. 89; Cholmondy v. Clinton, 2 B. & Ald. 625; Dand v. Kingscote, 6 M. & W. 174; Clarance Railway Company v. Great North of England Railway Company, 13 M. & W. 706; Finks v. Edwards, 11 Exch. 775; Robertson v. Gauntlett, 16 M. & W. 289; Evans v. Rees, 12 A. & E. 57; Hodgson v. Field, 7 East, 622; Hinchcliffe v. Earl of Kinnoul, 5 Bing. N. C. 1; Hill v. Grainge, Dyer, 130; Bayley v. Wilkins, 7 C. B. 886.

A

MAXIM XXIII.

Cuilibet in sua arte perito est credendum: (Co. Litt. 125.)—– Whosoever is skilled in his profession is to be believed.

VIDENCE of a fact relevant to the matter at issue between

EVIDENCE

the parties, within the personal knowledge of a witness, is allowed to be given as of right; as, where the witness himself stated an account between the parties, paid a sum of money or delivered certain goods. But, the opinion of a witness upon a fact, or state of facts, is only received when it comes within the meaning of this maxim; as, the opinion of a surgeon, architect, &c., upon questions relating to surgery, architecture, &c. So, where in an action the question was whether or not an embankment erected to prevent the overflowing of the sea had caused the choking up of the harbour, the opinions of scientific men as to the effect of such an embankment upon the harbour were held to be admissible. So a physician, though he may not have seen the patient, may, after hearing the evidence of others at the trial, be called upon to speak to the nature of the disease described by them; as, whether or not the facts proved are symptoms of insanity; but this opinion must not go to the fact that the patient is insane, but merely that the symptoms detailed by the witnesses are those of insanity. The opinion of insurance brokers as to whether the communication of certain facts would have varied the terms of the insurance, has been admitted in actions on the policy; but not in matters of mere opinion only; as where, in an action on a policy the opinion of the broker that, had certain letters been disclosed at the time of underwriting the policy, it would not have been underwritten, was sought to be given as evidence, this was held to be mere opinion and not evidence. Where the question is whether or not a seal has been forged, seal engravers may be called to show the difference between the impressions made by the original scal and those

made by that supposed to be forged. So the opinion of a student of the law of a foreign country to prove that law, is inadmissible, as being opinion merely, he not being within this rule; though the opinion of a person versed in the laws of a foreign country is admissible. Evidence of handwriting lies between proof positive and scientific knowledge. Ancient M.S. documents may be proved by a witness expert in comparing writing by the same author; but handwriting generally, must be proved by some person who has either seen the person write, or who has such an acquaintance with his writing, through correspondence acted upon or admitted, as leaves no doubt upon his mind that the writing in question is that of the party by whom it is said to have been written.

This maxim may be properly associated with that of "Ad quæstionem facti non respondent judicis, ad quæstionem juris non respondent juratores"-To questions of fact judges, and to questions of law the jury, do not answer. The judges, jury, and witnesses have each their special prerogative, but they cannot exceed its limits. The judges apply the law to the facts; the jury judge the facts; but even they cannot give an opinion without having facts whereon to found their judgment, the truth of which facts it is their special province to determine. The witnesses depose to the facts. Witnesses are, however, of two kinds-one deposing to the facts merely, and the other giving an opinion or judgment upon the facts for the information of the jury; and these latter are called "perita," who give their opinion according to their skill in their profession in matters of art and science.

Co. Litt. 125; Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Doug. 157; Campbell v. Richards, 5 B. & Ald. 840; Durrell v. Bederley, Holt N. P. C. 285; The Sussex Peerage Case, 11 C. & F. 85; Baron de Bode v. Reg., 8 Q. B. 208; M'Naughton's Case, 10 C. & F. 200; Chapman v. Walton, 10 Bing. 57; Bristowe v. Sequeville, 5 Exch. 275; Tracy Peerage Case, 10 C. & F. 154; Chaurand v. Angerstein, Peake Ca. 44; Berthon v. Loughman, 2 Stark. 258; Doe v. Luckermore, 5 A. & E. 730.