MAXIM IV.

Actus Dei vel legis nemini facit injuriam: (5 Co. 87.) —— The act of God, or of the law, is prejudicial to no one. THE apportionment of rent in case of the death of the lessor,

tenant for life, or in tail, before the rent becomes payable; as also, the death of a judgment-debtor taken in execution; the debt not being thereby discharged, though it would have been otherwise had the debtor been set at liberty by the judgment-creditor himself, may be given to illustrate the first part of this maxim.

Formerly, where any lessor or landlord having only an estate for life in the lands happened to die before or on the day on which any rent was reserved or made payable, such rent, or any part thereof, was not recoverable by the executors or administrators of such lessor or landlord, nor was the person in reversion entitled thereto, other than for the use and occupation thereof, from the death of the tenant for life, whereby the under-tenants avoided payment: but now, where any tenant for life shall die before or on the day on which any rent is reserved or made payable upon any demise or lease of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments which determined on the death of such tenant for life, his executors or administrators may recover from such under-tenant, if such under-tenant for life die on the day on which the same was payable, the whole; or, if before such day, a proportion of such rent, according to the time such tenant for life lived of the last year, or portion of a year, or other time in which the rent was growing due. But where the lease made by the tenant for life does not determine with his death, the rent is not apportioned; as where it is made by virtue of some power.

If a defendant in an action of debt die in execution, the plaintiff may have a new execution by elegit, or fieri facias; and that, because the plaintiff shall not be prejudiced, nor the defendant

benefited, by any act or wrong of the defendant, in non-payment of the debt when no default is in the plaintiff. he having followed the due and ordinary course of law; nor is the taking of the body a satisfaction of the debt, but merely a pledge for its satisfaction; as is signified by the words of the writ, capias ad satisfaciendum. The death of the defendant also is the act of God, which shall not turn to the prejudice of the plaintiff of his execution, which is the act of the law, and which does no wrong to any.

So, on the other hand, the case of a tenant whose house is destroyed by fire or tempest, though he is not discharged from his tenancy to the injury of his landlord, yet, he is not bound to rebuild the house, to the injury of himself. Unless indeed there be a covenant or agreement on his part to repair and keep the premises in repair, in which case, if there be no exception in case of fire, tempest, &c., he will have to rebuild if the premises are destroyed by fire or other casualty. He must, however, continue to pay the rent, if a lessee, to the end of his term; or, if a tenant from year to year, until he determine the tenancy by notice. Neither is the landlord bound to rebuild in case of fire, though

he

may have insured the premises, and received the money from the insurance office. Against all these inconveniences to the tenant, he must provide by special stipulation in the lease or agreement. This, and similar cases, will show the application of the second part of the maxim.

11 Geo. 2, c. 19; 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 22; 5 Co. 87; 10 Co. 139; Paget v. Gee, Amb. 198; Cage 7. Acton, 1 Ld. Raym. 515; Cattley v. Arnold, 28 L. J. 352, Ch.; Calland v. Troward, 2 H. Bl. 324; Symons v. Symons, Madd. & G. 207; Nadin v. Battie, 5 East, 147; Vernon v. Vernon, 2 Bro. C. C. 659; Digby v. Atkinson, 4 Camp. 275; Bullock v. Dommitt, 6 T. R. 650; Parker v. Gibbons, 1 Q. B. 421; Weignall v. Waters, 6 T. R. 488; Leeds . Cheetham, Sim, 146; Loftt v. Dennis, 28 L. J. 168, Q. B.

MAXIM V.

Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea: (3 Inst. 107.)The act itself does not constitute guilt unless done with a guilty intent.

THIS maxim has reference chiefly to criminal proceedings, and

in such cases it is the rule that the act and intent must both concur to constitute a crime; yet, the law will sometimes imply the intent from the act, under the maxim, "Acta exteriora indicant interiora secreta." Those cases in which the law will imply the intent from the act are where an act is done in abuse of lawful authority; as where a man having by law authority, in the exercise of some public duty, to enter a railway station or other public building, and, being therein, commits a felony. it will be presumed that he entered the premises with a felonious intent. So, of a sheriff or other public officer acting in excess of his authority, he will, in respect of such excess, and upon the same principle, be deemed a trespasser ab initio. So, in cases where the act done is positively forbidden by express enactment to be done, the intention to do it will be implied.

The crime of murder furnishes at once an instance in illustration of both the maxims under consideration; for though, on the one hand, the act of killing does not of itself constitute the guilt, unless done with a guilty intent, yet a guilty intent will in such a case be presumed.

The question of malicious intent forms, also, an important feature in the actions of libel and slander. It is said, "the greater the truth the greater the libel;" meaning that the more true the matter published is, the more readily it will be believed, and in consequence, the more defamatory it will be: and that, therefore, the mere unauthorised publication of a truth reflecting upon a man's character is a libel-yet, the written or printed publication of the libellous matter is always attributed to a

malicious intent on the part of some person or other. There is a difference between libel and slander in this respect. Generally speaking, libel is a written or printed publication of defamatory matter; and the fact of writing or printing defamatory matter is of itself a sufficient indication of intention on the part of the writer or printer that it shall go to the world for as much as it is worth; and in that case the malicious intention in publishing must be taken to be equal in substance to the libel; and malicious intention in such case is not an essential ingredient to the support of the action. In slander, however, the words used are frequently the mere outbursts of a hasty temper, and though slanderous and actionable if spoken with a malicious intent, yet, without the malicious intent, in the absence of special damage, they are not actionable, unless indeed the words used would lead the bystanders to infer that the party slandered had been guilty of some criminal offence, sed quare, without special damage; in which case, as in that of libel, the intention must be implied..

In an action for libel against a railway company, it was held that the action would lie if malice in law might be inferred from ́ the publication of the libellous matter. It has been also held that to convict of larceny there must be not only an intention to commit the offence, but a means also of carrying it into effect. Therefore, where a man put his hand into the pocket of another with intent to steal, it was held that he could not be convicted of an attempt to steal unless there appeared to have been something in the pocket which he might have stolen.

3 Inst. 107; Reg. v. Woodrow, 15 M. & W. 404; Lee . Simpson, 3 C. B. 871; Clift . Schwabe, 3 C. B. 437; O'Brian v. Clement, 15 M. & W. 437; Barnett. Allen, 31 L. T. 217; Reg. . Collins, 10 L. T. (N.S.) 851; Hickinbotham v. Leech, 10 M. & W. 361; Lynch e. Knight, 5 L. T. (N.S.) 291; Reg. v. Hore, 3 F. & F. 315; Whitfield v. South-Eastern Railway Company, 31 L. T. 113; George e. Goddard, 2 F. & F. 689; Turnbull v. Bird, 2 F. & F. 50S.

MAXIM VI.

Ad ea quæ frequentius accidunt jura adaptantur: (2 Inst. 137.)-The laws are adapted to those cases which most frequently occur.

THE

HE meaning of this maxim is, that the laws are to be so construed as that they may be made to adapt themselves to those cases which, in the ordinary transactions of the world, most frequently occur, in preference to their being made to adapt themselves to any isolated or individual case. The phrase, "so far as the same is applicable," now so common in Acts of Parliament where forms of procedure are given, requires the aid of this maxim to explain its meaning; it is evidently directed to those cases which most frequently occur, and will not be permitted to be altered so as to suit every particular case, and in considering it the courts will so construe it.

case;

In the construction of all public general Acts of Parliament, also, that meaning must be put upon them which is applicable to cases which most frequently occur, and not to any particular for an Act of Parliament is like the common law, which adapts itself to the general in exclusion of the particular good, and is construed with the aid of the common law. The Legislature will be presumed to have in their contemplation those cases which most frequently occur, and a statute will be so construed. So where in an Act of Parliament there is given the form of an indorsement to be put upon a writ of summons, which by construction of the statute was intended to apply to all cases alike, and, there being a blank in such indorsement, the Court ordered it to be filled up so as to be generally applicable. Private statutes, however, are not so construed; they are construed strictly, and confined to the particular object for which they were made appearing upon the face of them, as an ordinary deed inter partes. Thus, where a private Act of Parliament,