general statutes of a state. The text quoted above is sustained by the overwhelming weight of authority, and we refer the reader for the numerous cases upon the subject to the note under the section above quoted from.

Referring, now, to section 141 of the same volume, in speaking of the particularity required of titles in amending a particular section or sections, the author states:

"It is held by the great majority of cases that it is sufficient for the title of an act to amend a Code or Revision to specify the section to be amended, without giving the title of the chapter or division to which it belongs or in any way indicating the subject-matter of the section. Under such a title any legislation is proper which is germane to the section specified."

And in section 139 of the same volume, in referring to the plurality of titles, it is said:

"An act to amend several sections of a Code, which are cognate or related to each other, is not open to the objection that it embraces a plurality of subjects."

From what has been said we may safely deduce the following propositions as guides, namely: That any one or more scetions of a Code or Compilation may be amended by simply stating in the title that the act is to amend the sections designated; that all sections the subject-matters of which are germane or related to one another may be included in one amendatory act specifying the sections to be amended; that the subject of such an act, within the constitutional provision, is contained in the statement which refers to the sections by numbers and asserts a purpose of amending them; that the legislators and all persons inust take notice from such a title that the subject- matter of the sections specified is open for amendment by excision, by substitution, or by the addition of any new matter which is germane or directly related to the subject-matter of the sections proposed to be amended.

The title to the act in question stated the subject clearly and in unmistakable terms, but matter was added which, as we shall attempt to show, performed no function whatever, and

was useless for any purpose. So that we may afford the reader a better conception of our meaning we shall not treat the title as a whole, but will segregate the real title from the other parts. The material and controlling part of the title is as follows: "An act to amend section 2583, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898, as amended by chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1901, and section 2050, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898." Then follows an epitomized statement or synopsis of what the two sections contain. Section 2583 is referred to as "creating a State Board of Equalization," including organization and duties and fixing the salaries of its members; and of section 2050 it is said that it fixes the salaries of certain other state officers. Considering it as a whole the title is profuse, but the extraneous matter added to what constitutes the actual title is harmless. The whole title is contained in the italicized words above given. What follows these neither adds anything to nor in any way restricts or modifies what is said in the title proper. It is merely a description of what is contained in the two sections sought to be amended. This was wholly unnecessary, and the elimination of this surplus matter is not only justified, but is required of us in order to preserve what we conceive to be a law constitutionally framed and passed. If what is contained in that part of the title which follows the italicized words had in any way restricted or modified the real title the case would be different. We would then have a case of a restricted title. To simply explain, however, what is contained in the sections sought to be amended without expressing a purpose to restrict the amendment to any particular part still leaves any part of those sections open to amendment under the general title. One of the matters contained in section 2583 was the salary provided for the several members of the State Board of Equalization, while the whole of section 2050 dealt with the salaries of some other appointive state officer. In amending section 2583 the salaries of the members of the State Board of Equalization were increased, while the salaries of the other officers mentioned in section 2050 were either increased or diminished with one or two exceptions. It is

asserted that while it may have been proper to have dealt with the salaries of the members of the State Board of Equalization by amending section 2583 in that regard, to do this with respect to the other state officers named in section. 2050 was improper, because the matters in the two sections were incongruous, and thus constituted a plurality of subjects. It cannot successfully be maintained that the salaries or compensation of a large or small number of state officers may not be fixed or changed in one act. In such an act the subject would clearly be salaries or compensation. Nor can we question the propriety of amending several sections in which the salaries or compensation of different state officers are designated, by one act amendatory of those sections. If this be so, why was it improper for the Legislature to amend in one act the two sections, one of which affected the salaries of the members of the State Board of Equalization, and the other one which affected those of other appointive state officers? Are the two so clearly incongruous or inconsistent as to make the subject plural within the purview of the constitutional provision? We think not.

But it is insisted that the subject of the amendatory act in question was not salaries; that it was, rather, "the State. Board of Equalization and its duties and organization.” It is with regard to this contention that the confusion, if any, arises. While it is true that section 2583 dealt with the organization and duties of the State Board of Equalization, it, however, also dealt with their salaries. Under a title to amend this section by its number any amendment germane to any matter in the section was proper, because the matters therein contained were all correlated. Under another provision of our Constitution, in order to change, add to, or eliminate a single phrase or word, the whole section as amended must be re-enacted. If it were intended to amend section 2583 by changing the salaries therein provided for, it would have been necessary to re-enact the whole section; and this would likewise be true if any other change were to be effected. The only material change the Legislature made in section 2583 by the act in question was to increase the salaries of

the members of that board. It is true that an addition was inserted in the amendment which required that board to "inspect and examine annually all property it is required to assess." It requires no argument to demonstrate that all this, while not expressed in the original section before it was amended, was, nevertheless, clearly implied. As a general rule any board or individual is assessing—that is, in valuing property for taxation-acts in a quasi judicial capacity. It is presumed, therefore, that the assessor inspects the property to be valued or assessed. The additional words, therefore, requiring inspection added no special duty which was not imposed by implication before.

But there is still another reason why the added words are of but small, if any, importance. These words were directory merely, although mandatory in form, for the reason that if an assessment were made without such inspection it would be as valid as one where the inspection was actually made. Would any one be bold enough to assert that an assessment made by the board without inspection would be void or vulnerable to attack for that reason alone? No such contention could prevail. It seems quite reasonable, therefore, that the subject-matter contained in the amendatory act is not so incongruous nor inconsistent as to prevent it from being incorporated in one amendatory act. This also disposes of the claim of duplicity or plurality of subjects. While it may be conceded that an argument could be presented from a different point of view from which one may reason out a plurality of subjects, yet, as we have pointed out, we are not permitted to indulge such an argument for the purpose of invalidating an act of the Legislature. This is but just and reasonable. Both officers and laymen usually act, and are justified in acting, upon the law as passed by the lawmaking power. We should not, therefore, for slight and unsubstantial causes, declare a law regularly passed invalid. To do this it should be clearly and unmistakably made to appear that the law is contrary to some constitutional requirement. This,

in view of all the circumstances, we cannot say of the law in question.

The judgment is therefore affirmed, with costs to respond

ent.

MCCARTY, C. J., and STRAUP, J., concur.

In re BEDFORD'S ESTATE.

COMMERCIAL NAT. BANK v. BEDFORD et al.

No. 1881. Decided April 9, 1908 (95 Pac. 518).

1. HOMESTEAD ALLOWANCE-INCREASE IN VALUE-EFFECT-CONCLUSIVENESS OF ALLOTMENT. Revised Statutes 1898, sec. 2829, provides that a homestead of land and appurtenances not exceeding the sum of $2,000, and $250 additional for each minor child, shall be wholly exempt from the payment of debts of the decedent, and shall be the absolute property of the surviving husband or wife and minor children, to be set apart on petition and notice at any time after the return of the inventory. Held that, where real estate was set apart as a homestead to the surviving wife and a minor child, it became theirs absolutely, subject only to the valid liens or mortgages with which it might be incumbered, and the estate was not subject to be reopened and further administered because at a subsequent time the value of the property set aside exceeded the limit of the statutory homestead exemption.

2. SAME "ABSOLUTE." The word "absolute," as used in Revised Statutes 1898, sec. 2829, providing for the setting apart of a homestead as the absolute property of the surviving husband or wife and minor children, means complete, final, perfect, unconditional, unrestricted, not relative, not limited, independent of anything extraneous; and in the sense of complete, and not limited, it distinguishes an estate in fee from an estate in remainder, and characterizes a pure estate, unmixed and unconnected with any peculiarities or qualifications; a naked estate, freed from any qualifications and restrictions in the donee.

APPEAL from District Court, Second District; J. A. Howell, Judge.