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sion of the case for final determination, which determination called for a judgment on the merits. Our Code has provided under what circumstances a motion of nonsuit may be granted, and that the granting of such a motion shall not be an adjudication on merits, nor shall the overruling of such a motion preclude the moving party from thereafter offering evidence, as was the case on a demurrer to evidence. The court may, at the close of plaintiff's evidence, on plaintiff's motion, grant a voluntary, and on the defendant's motion an involuntary, nonsuit. The court may do the same thing at the close of all the evidence, and before the case has been submitted for final determination. In each of such cases the judgment is not on the merits. The plaintiff, however, at the close of his evidence may rest and submit the case for final determination. The defendant may do likewise without offering any evidence. So, too, at the close of all the evidence offered by both parties, the plaintiff may still submit the case for final determination, as also may the defendant. Whenever a party “rests” his case, he indicates that he has produced all the evidence he intends to offer, and submits the case, either finally, or subject to his right to afterwards offer rebutting evidence. When both parties have "rested,” they indicate a submission of the case for final determination. The determination on such a submission is on the merits. If the facts are in dispute, the case must be sent to the jury for their finding, upon which a judgment on merits is entered accordingly. If the facts are not in dispute, the determination presents a mere question of law, to be decided by the court, upon whose decision, or upon the rendition of a verdict directed by him, a judgment is also entered on the merits. Upon a final submission of the case, when there is no evidence to sustain the case of the party having the affirmative, it is proper for the court to direct a verdict against him. It is as proper for the court to direct a verdict against the plaintiff, in the absence of proof to establish a fact essential to his case, as to direct a verdict against him when the proof, either upon his own evidence or that of the defendant, conclusively establishes some affirmative defense. We do not understand the statute to mean that the court is authorized to direct a verdict in the one instance, but not in the other, or that the court is unauthorized to direct a verdict in any case. In the case in hand, upon the evidence adduced by both parties, the case was submitted for final determination without the making of a motion of nonsuit or dismissal by either party. Upon such a submission the defendant urged that the facts were not in dispute, and that, on the established facts, it, as matter of law, was entitled to a judgment in its favor. On the other hand, the plaintiff urged that the facts were in dispute, and that the question of the defendant's negligence was one of fact, and not of law, and hence the determination of the case required a finding by the jury. In such case the determination, whether made by the court as matter of law, or by the jury as matter of fact, called for a judgment on the merits. We are therefore of the opinion that the court was fully authorized to direct such a verdict and to enter such a judgment. Whether the ruling was erroneous remains to be considered.

It is urged that the court erred in directing a verdict because no grounds were stated for such action. This court has repeatedly held that the particular grounds upon which a motion for nonsuit is based must be stated in order that the attention of the court and counsel may be called thereto, and that thc defects in the proof may be obviated and corrected, if such defects admit of correction. Frank v. BullionBeck, etc., M. Co., 19 Utah 35, 56 Pac. 419; Skeen v. 0. 8. L. R. R. Co., 22 Utah 413, 62 Pac. 1020; Lewis v. Mining Co., 22 Utah 51, 61 Pac. 860; Wild v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 23 Utah 266, 63 Pac. 886, and other cases there cited. From the above cases it will be seen that a judgment of nonsuit in a number of them was reversed because the grounds upon which the motion was based were not sufficiently specified, regardless of the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to send the case to the jury. The general rule, when a motion is denied or an objection overruled, the moving party is permitted, on appeal, to urge only such grounds for a reversal as were specifically pointed out or made by him before the trial court, but when the motion or objection is sustained, because of the presumption against error coming to his aid, a party is permitted, on appeal, to defend the ruling on any ground inhering in the record, was, either in effect or expressly, held, in a number of cases in this jurisdiction, not applicable to a motion of nonsuit. In the case of White v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 22 Utah 138, 61 Pac. 568, it was expressly decided that there is no difference with respect to the rule requiring a specification of grounds when the motion is denied and when the motion is sustained. In McIntyre v. Ajax Min. Co., 20 Utah 332, 60 Pac. 552, this court held that “an appellate court will not sustain a motion for nonsuit, except on the grounds alleged in the motion,” and approvingly quoted the syllabus, in the case of Palmer v. Marysville Dem. Pub. Co., 90 Cal. 168, 27 Pac 21, that

"It is error for the trial court to grant a nonsuit, unless the grounds therefor are called to the attention of the trial judge and the plaintiff at the time the motion is made; and, where none of the grounds upon which the nonsuit is asked are sufficient to warrant the court in granting the motion, the order granting it will be reversed, although another ground, not specified in the motion, might have warranted the order."

We think the reasons given by courts, requiring the grounds upon which a motion for nonsuit is based to be specified, in order that the court may know upon what question of law the case is asked to be taken from the jury, and the party against whom the motion is directed may be afforded opportunity to correct the defects, if they admit of correction, and can be obviated by additional evidence, apply with equal force to a motion for a direction of a verdict. If such opportunity should be afforded him on a motion of nonsuit, which, if granted, not being an adjudication on the merits, and not a bar to another action, for much stronger reasons should such opportunity be given him on a motion for a direction of a verdict, which, if granted, would be a bar to another action. However, in the case of Owens v. San Pedro, etc., R. Co., 32 Utah 208, 89 Pac. 825, this court, in speaking through District Judge Ritchie, said:

"Reversal of the case is asked also because the defendant did not specify why a verdict should be directed, and because the court did not give its reasons for directing a verdict for the defendant. We see no reason for extending the rule requiring that a motion for a nonsuit should be based upon specific reasons to include a motion to direct à verdict. A trial court, when asked to direct a verdict, may require the moving party to state his reasons if the circumstances of the particular case require it; but there is no merit in the proposition that the court should be required to specify its reasons for directing a verdict.”

If by these expressions it was intended to hold that a specification of grounds upon which the direction of a verdict is based need not be made in any case, we disapprove the holding. To be in harmony with the prior decisions of this court requires a holding that a sufficient specification of grounds must be made, either in the motion or by the court in directing the verdict, to indicate the question of law that takes the case from the jury. If, in a case based on negligence, where the answer puts in issue all the material allegations of the complaint, and contains affirmative allegations of contributory negligence, fellow service, assumption of risk, and settlement, the court may, at the conclusion of all the evidence, direct a verdict for the defendant upon a mere general motion, without specifying grounds therefor, counsel have not, nor have we on appeal, any means of knowing upon what principle of law the case was taken from the jury. In such case there would be no means of knowing whether the direction was made upon the ground that the evidence was insufficient to show negligence on the part of the defendant, or upon the ground that the evidence conclusively established one or more of the affirmative defenses pleaded in the answer. The court may not thus hurl a mere brutum fulmen in the midst of the case, and leave counsel in the dark to speculate upon the point or points struck at, and cast the burden on the appellate court to examine the entire record to ascertain if there is anything upon which such a ruling could properly have been based. In such case it can well be said, as was said by the court in the case of Demill v. Moffat, 45 Mich. 410, 8 N. W. 79:

“This court reviews the judgments of the circuit court in law cases on questions of law only. What question of law is involved in this charge of the circuit judge? Was he of opinion that the plaintiffs had given no evidence tending to the proof of their heirship? If he had said that, we could have reviewed the evidence on that point, and should probably have had no difficulty in pointing out his error. Did he think adverse possession was satisfactorily made out? If so, as that is a defense resting wholly upon facts, it is plain he should have taken the opinion of the jury, unless the facts were unmistakable in their import and were undisputed. Did he think the defendants had proved title out of Thorn through the alleged deed of Hamilton? This again was a question of fact, and the existence of the fact was denied and vigorously contested. But we need not proceed from point to point in the case, and endeavor to surmise on what ground the plaintiffs were turned out of court. The circuit judge has given us no light on that point, and the record can afford none. What we are asked to do in this case is to examine an elaborate record in order to ascertain whether the plaintiffs made out such a case as entitled them to go with it to the jury, and if so, whether the defendant met it by any defense that was so entirely unquestionable as to leave to the jury no discretion to do otherwise than give him a verdict. In other words, we invited to review this case upon all the facts. It is sufficient for us to say in reply that the law has given us no such authority."

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There, and in subsequent cases from that court, it was held that when a judge takes a case from the jury, he should specify the particular ground or grounds that appear to bim to justify it. Rayl r. Estate of Hammond, 95 Mich. 22, 5+ N. W. 693; Tillotson v. Webber, 96 Mich. 144, 55 N. W. 837; Hanley v. Balch, 106 Mich. 46, 63 N. W. 981. To the same effect are the decisions of the Supreme Court of South Dakota. In the case of Tanderup v. Hansen, 8 S. D. 375, 66 N. W. 1073, it was said:

"Where such a motion is made, the specific ground upon which the motion is made must be stated. It is due to the court and the opposing counsel, that their attention should be called to the precise defect in the evidence, or the omission of evidence, that the party claims entitles him to the direction of the verdict. It is due to the court to enable it to pass understandingly upon the mo tion, and it is due to counsel that he may, if possible, supply the defective or omitted evidence if permitted to do so by the court.”

The same doctrine is stated in 6 Pl. & Pr. 699, in the following language:

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