At mitted to travel outside that very circum- |cordance with the wishes of the European and native mercantile world of India. "I do not mean that Votes should be taken in regard to the various items of the Budget, or that the heads of expenditure should be submitted in detail for the examination of the Council, but simply that an opportunity should be given for a full, free, and thorough criticism and examination of the financial policy of the Government. Some such change as this would, I think, be as beneficial to the Indian administration as it would be in ac Mr. Curzon 1889, Lord Lansdowne signified his this House. Now, a few words as to the Parliamentary history of this measure. It has been in no ordinary degree a victim to the vicissitudes of Parliamentary existence. Its career up to this point has been one of mingled success and disappointment. It was introduced for the first time in the House of Lords by the Secretary of State in 1890, and a very important discussion-if I may venture humbly to express the opinion, the model of what such a discussion should be took place on the Second Reading of the Bill. In Committee a number of important and valuable Amendments were introduced in it by noble Lords who have had experience in the Government of India, and it passed through that House. It came down in the same Session to the House of Commons but did not succeed in getting beyond a First Reading. In the ensuing year, 1891, it was again introduced into this House and again it fell a victim to that fate which hon. Members, according to their political feelings, will be disposed to ascribe to the hardships of fortune or to the immoderate interest displayed by their opponents in other topics of Parliamentary interest. So much for 1891. This year the present Bill, in its amended form of 1890, has again been introduced into the House of Lords, and subject to some speeches implying strong approval from a number of noble Lords it has passed without alteration through its various stages, and thus it comes about that it is now my duty to bring it before the House of Commons. This delay which I have been describing has naturally been the source of considerable disappointment in India, where there has been good deal of murmuring at the tardy arrival of this long-promised reform, and at the apparent willingness of this House to postpone the consideration of a non controversial Constitutional change for India to the perennial and unprofitable discussion of changes of a highly controversial character for other parts of the Empire nearer home, which, from the Indian point of view are infinitesimally small and unimportant. I think this disappointment has been a perfectly legitimate feeling, and it undoubtedly has been felt by the noble Lord the present Viceroy of India, who, having inaugurated his term of office by signifying his hearty approval of this Bill, is naturally looking forward to being able to carry it into execution before the termination of his period of office. This anxiety has been shared in this House, if I may judge from the numerous questions addressed to my right hon. Friend who preceded me in the office I now hold. These feelings of disappointment and interest are, moreover, I believe shared by those who hold more extreme views, and who, while they regard this Bill as in some respects an inadequate measure, are desirous that it should pass into law. In July of last year the British Committee of the Indian National Congress, who may be supposed to be the representatives of extreme views in India, wrote a letter to the Secretary of State in which occurs the following passage They express the deep regret with which they view the withdrawal by Her Majesty's Minister of the Indian Councils Amendment Bill, and respectfully bring to your notice that out India by the abandonment for yet another bitter disappointment will be caused throughyear of any action in a matter of such paramount importance to our Indian fellow citizens." In the present year Lord Kimberley, who has himself been Secretary of State for India, has elsewhere expressed himself in the same sense in a paragraph which I propose to read. He says "I echo most sincerely the hope that this measure will be pressed by Her Majesty's Government and will pass into law. It is kind should be hung up Session after Session. really a misfortune that a measure of this However important to us may be our domestic legislation, let us not forget that we have an immense responsibility in the Government of that great Empire in India, and that it is not well for us to palter long with questions of this kind. And I am more desirous that this measure should be dealt with, because I have observed, with great pleasure, that in India the tone has much moderated, and that very sensible views have been expressed at meetings held in India, and there is now reasonable promise that there will be an agreement as to a tentative and must not look for it all at once, but if we can commencing measure on this subject. make a beginning, I believe we shall lay the foundation for what may be a real benefit, and a real security to our Indian Empire." I hope I may draw from the extracts I have read to the House, and from the expressions of opinion to which I have alluded, the inference that this Bill We will be welcomed on both sides of this House, and subject to the expression of opinion by those who hold more advanced views, will as rapidly as possible be passed into law. So much in explanation of the history of the measure and the circumstances under which it falls to my lot to introduce it to this House. Now briefly turning to the Bill itself I will give an outline of the manner in which it is proposed to carry out the recommendations of successive Viceroys and of the present Secretary of State. The changes which it is proposed to introduce by this Bill are broadly speaking three in number. The first is the concession of the privilege of financial criticism both in the Supreme and Provincial Councils; the second the privilege of interpellation or the right of asking questions; and the third an addition to the number of Members in both classes of Councils. First, as regards the financial discussion. I have already pointed out to the House that under the existing law this is only possible when the Finance Minister proposes a new tax. At other times the Budget in India is circulated in the form of a pamphlet and no discussion can take place upon it at all, and as an illustration of the practical way in which this works, I may mention that during the 30 years since the Councils Act of 1861 there have been 16 occasions on which new legislation has been called for and on which discussion has taken place, and there have been 14 on which there has been no discussion at all. In this Bill power will be given for a regular annual discussion of the Budget both in the Supreme and Provincial Councils. It is not contemplated, as the extracts I have read from the Despatch of Lord Dufferin will show, to vote the Budget in India item by item in the manner in which we do it in this House, and to subject it to all the obstacles and delays which Party ingenuity or loquacity can suggest. That is not contemplated, but it is proposed to give opportunities to Members of the Councils to indulge in a full, free and fair criticism of the financial policy of the Government, and I think all Parties will gain by such a discussion. The Government will gain, because they will have an opportunity of explaining their financial policy, of Mr. Curzon removing misapprehension, of answering calumny and attack; and they will also profit by the criticism delivered in a public position, and with a due sense of responsibility, by the most competent Representatives of non-official India. The native community will gain, because they will have the opportunity of reviewing the financial situation independently of the mere accident of legislation being required for any particular year, and also because criticism of the financial policy of the Government, which now finds its vent in anonymous and even scurrilous articles in the newspapers, will be uttered by responsible persons in a public position. Lastly, the interests of finance themselves will gain by this increased publicity, and by the stimulus of a vigorous and instructive scrutiny; and the application of the external aid that I have described cannot have any other result than the promotion of sound and economical administration in India. It is now 20 years since Lord Mayo, that wise and enlightened Viceroy, first proposed the submission of Provincial Budgets to the Provincial Councils. At that time he was overruled by the Government at home, which, I believe, was one of the Governments of the right hon. Gentleman opposite. However that may be, I hope both sides of the House will now co-operate in introducing this change, which speaks for itself, and requires no further defence from me. The second change introduced by the Bill is the concession of the right of interpellation, or of asking questions. That is a system with which we are tolerably familiar, and which is sometimes severely attacked in this House. It is not for me to say whether the right is or is not abused, but I have observed that those who denounce the system most savagely when they are its victims, view it with a benevolent regard when they are in a position to become its masters. It is proposed to give to Members of both classes of Councils. the Supreme and Provincial Councils, this right of asking questions on matters of public interest. But both this privilege and the one to which I have previously alluded will be subject, under the terms of the Act, to such conditions and restrictions as may be impracticable and unmanageable proportions. Under his first Bill their totals would have amounted to more than 260, and under the second to more than 230. It is within the knowledge of everyone who is acquainted with India that the number of persons who are competent and willing to take part in the functions of these Councils is nothing like adequate to supply the extravagant expectations of those Bills. prescribed in rules made by the eight and the maximum to 20. The Governor General or the Provincial Council of Bengal consists at present of Governors. In answer to the hon. twelve nominated Members, of whom Gentleman who cheers somewhat one third are non-official, and we proironically, I may observe that we pose to raise the number to 20. In the are not altogether unfamiliar with North-West Provinces the number is such rules and restrictions in nine, of which one-third are also nonthis House, and if they are needed official, and under the Bill the number here, where we have, perhaps, the will be raised to 15. The object of these most perfect and highly elaborated additions is very easily stated, and will system of Parliamentary Government be as easily understood by this House. that has ever been known, how much It is, by extending the area of selection more will they be needed in India, where in each case, to add to the strength and Parliamentary institutions cannot be representative character of the Counsaid to exist. The merits of this procils. The late Mr. Bradlaugh, who at posal are self-evident. It is desirable different times introduced two Bills in the first place in the interest of the dealing with the reform of the India Government, which is at the present Councils into this House, proposed in moment without the means of making those measures to swell the numknown its policy, or of answering bers on these Councils to quite criticism or animadversions, or of silencing calumny, and which has frequently suffered from protracted misapprehension, which it has been powerless to remove; and it is also desirable in the interests of the public, who, in the absence of correct official information, are apt to be misled, and to entertain erroneous ideas, but who, within the limits dictated by the judgment of the responsible authorities, will henceforward have opportunities of making themselves acquainted with the real facts. I hope this liberty may provide a wise and necessary outlet in India for feelings which are now apt to smoulder below the surface because there are no public means for their expression, but which might often be allayed a little if timely information were given from the right quarter. The third proposal is to add to the number of Members on these Supreme and Provincial Councils, and I will state the numbers to which, under this Bill, the Members will be increased. The Supreme Legislative Council consists at present, in addition to its ex officio Members, who number seven, of a minimum of six and a maximum of twelve nominated Members, of whom half must be nonofficial. The Bill proposes to raise the minimum to ten and the maximum to 16. The Madras and Bombay Councils now consist, independently of their four ex officio Members, of a minimum of four and a maximum of eight nominated members, of whom half are non-official. In the Bill the minimum is raised to MR. SCHWANN: Do the figures just quoted refer to the Councils separately or are they clubbed together? *MR. CURZON: I was speaking of the five Councils I have mentioned and the totals for those five Councils. As I was saying, you could not get the number of persons; but still, the number is sufficient to justify a not inconsiderable addition to the present totals. Every year the number of native gentlemen in India who are both qualified and willing to take part in the work of Government is increasing, and every year the advantage of their co-operation increases in the same ratio. More especially in the case of the Provincial Councils it has been found that more effective means are needed of reinforcing native and non-official opinion. The Government believe that this moderate addition which they propose to the numbers will have the effect which I contemplate, and at the same time that it will be compatible with efficiency. This House does not need to be told by me that the efficiency of | On another occasion he said : make arrangements by which certain persons may be presented to him, having been chosen by election if the Governor General should find that such a system can properly be estab MR. MAC LEAN (Oldham): Does the Government accept this view of Lord Kimberley? *MR. CURZON: Undoubtedly the opinions expressed by Lord Kimberley are those which are also shared by the Secretary of State. Under this Act it would be in the power of the Viceroy to invite Representative Bodies in India to elect or select or delegate representatives of themselves and of their opinions to be nominated to those Houses, and thus by slow degrees, by tentative measures, and in a matter like this measures can not be otherwise than tentative, we may perhaps approximate a deliberative body is not necessarily "I myself believe that under this clause it commensurate with its numerical will be possible for the Governor General to strength. We have instances in this country of public bodies prevented from working well in consequence of the large number of their members.lished." Overlarge bodies do not necessarily. work well. They do not promote economical administration, but are apt to diffuse their force in vague and vapid talk. And if this be true of deliberative bodies in England it is still more true of deliberative bodies in a country like India. I hold in fact that it would be better that competent men should be left outside than that incompetent men should be included. Now we will look at the question of how these additional Members are to be appointed. I notice that the hon. Member for North Manchester (Mr. Schwann) has placed on the Paper an Amendment declaring that no re-in some way to the ideal which the hon. form of the Indian Councils which does not embody the elective principle will prove satisfactory. But in reply I should like to point out that our Bill does not exclude some such principle, be the method election, or selection or delegation or whatever be the particular phrase that you desire to employ. I would with the permission of the House read the very important Sub-section of Clause 1, which deals with that question : "The Governor General in Council may from time to time with the approval of the Secretary of State in Council make such regulations as to the conditions under which such nominations (that is the nomination of additional Members), or any of them, shall be made by the Governor General, Governors and Lieutenant Governors respectively, and shall prescribe the manner in which such regulations should be carried into effect." I should say that this clause was introduced into the Bill as an Amendment by Lord Northbrook in the House of Lords, and was gladly accepted by the Secretary of State with the avowed object of giving considerable latitude in this respect. Let me call the attention of the hon. Member to the fact that Lord Kimberley has thus expressed himself elsewhere on this Clause: "I am bound to say that I can express my own satisfaction because I regard this as to a certain extent an admission of the elective prin-ciple." Mr. Curzon I Member for North Manchester has in view. With respect to the character of such Bodies and Associations as those to which I have alluded, I may mention, only as indicating what may be possible, such Bodies as the well-known Association of the Zemindars of Bengal, the Chambers of Commerce of India, the Municipalities of the Great Cities, the Universities, the British India Association, and perhaps even more important than any, the various great religious denominations in that country. believe that the House will hold that this method of dealing with the question is a wise method, since it leaves the initiative to those who are necessarily best acquainted with the matter and does not lay down any hard-and-fast rule by which they may find themselves unfortunately bound. I cannot myself conceive anything more unfortunate than that this House should draw up and send out to India a cast-iron elective scheme within the four walls of which the Government would find itself confined, and which, if it proved at some future period inadequate or unsuitable, it would be impossible to alter without coming back to this House and experiencing all the obstacles and delays of Parliamentary procedure in this country. But I am well aware that these proposals may not altogether suit those hon. Members on the other side, whose |