as to
When proper.
In an action for damages for per-
sonal injuries against several defend
ants, where certain evidence as to one
of the defendants was properly ex-
cluded, and, without such evidence.
there was no evidence to sustain
judgment against him, a motion to set
aside a nonsuit as to such defendant
was properly denied. Kelly v. City
of Waterbury,
Conn.,
114 Atl. 530
(1921)
21:155-163

a

of

3. Order of evidence-Exclusion
hearsay until necessary to under-
standing of other evidence.

In an action against the superin-
tendent of police and a patrolman who
was driving a patrol wagon which in-
jured plaintiff, testimony of plaintiff's
sister as to what she told the superin-
tendent she had heard officers say as
to the competency of the driver, was
properly excluded until such time as
it should become admissible to make
the superintendent's reply understand-
able. Kelly v. City of Waterbury,
Conn. -
114 Atl. 530 (1921)....
21:155-163

It is the province of the court to
determine in the first instance whether
the facts offered in evidence, tending
to prove an injury to plaintiff, are too
remote from defendant's act of negli-
gence to constitute an element of plain-
tiff's recovery, but where the trial
court found itself unable to make the
ascertainment of remoteness, it prop-
erly instructed the jury to determine
from the evidence whether defendants
failed to exercise ordinary care and
whether such failure was the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury. Judy v.
Doyle, Va. - 108 S. E. 6 (1921)

9. Striking from

showing speed ordinance unreason-
able.

Where a city speed ordinance is
pleaded as an element of negligence
charged in a personal injury case, and
the defendant by way of defense ad-
mits the existence of the ordinance,
but denies its validity, setting out
facts which if true would tend to show
the ordinance to be unreasonable in its
application to the facts of the case,
the action of the court in sustaining
a motion to strike out such matters is
error. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry.
Co. v. Grambo, Ohio St. -
E. 648 (1921)....

VEHICLES.

See also MOTOR VEHICLES.

134 N.
.21:466-481

Annotation: Liability of owner of
vehicle for injury to guest..21:38-71
Annotation: Measure of damages for
negligent injury to vehicle..21-72-102

Annotation: Liability for damage
to streets, highways or bridges by ve-
hicle or heavy load........21:138-154

Annotation: Liability for injury by
street car striking standing vehicle...
21-432-459

Annotation: Lack of legal registra-
tion of vehicle as affecting action by
driver, owner or occupant for loss or
injury, or recovery for loss or dam-
age to others...
.21:509-517

Annotation: Liability for injury by
object protruding from vehicle.....
21:686-701

WATERS.

Annotation: Assumption of risk of
injury to property.... ...21:286-300

1. Building dam as negligence con-
tributing to damage by flood caused
by another.

The owner of land upon a creek was
not contributorily negligent in build-
ing a mill and dam thereon because of
the possibility that a reservoir con-
structed by a city in a stream on the
opposite side of the watershed might
cause large quantities of water to seep
through the glacial moraine separating
the two streams and cause a disastrous
flood in the stream upon which his mill
and dam were located. North Bend
Lumber Co. v. City of Seattle,
Wash. 199 Pac. 988 (1921).....
21:286-301

-

-

2. Negligence-Construction of reser-
voir-Sufficiency of evidence.

Where a city constructed a reservoir
in a stream so that one bank was com-
posed of a glacial moraine, as to which
there was a question whether such mo-
raine formation would permit large
quantities of water to pass from the
reservoir into a stream on the other
side of the moraine, there was suffi-
cient evidence of negligence to war-
rant submission to the jury of the neg-
ligence of such city in an action by
the owner of a mill on the other stream
for damages caused by a flood alleged
to have originated in such reservoir.
North Bend Lumber Co. v. City of
Seattle, Wash. -,199 Pac. 988
(1921)
21:286-301

-

WITNESSES.

Annotation: Testimony by expert
automobile drivers as to correct prac-
tices in operation of cars as opinion
evidence, and limitations thereon....
21:155-162

Annotation: Conviction for viola-
tion of law as affecting credibility of
witness in action for negligence in
operation of automobile....21:219-221

1. Cross-examination-Questioning de-
fendant in negligence action as to
convictions of misdemeanors.
Under a statute providing that a
person who has been convicted of any
crime shall be admitted to testify
like any other witness, except that con-
viction or sentence for any crime or
misdemeanor may be shown to affect
his credibility," the crimes and misde-
meanors which may be shown are not
limited to infamous offenses, and a de-
fendant in an action for damages for
negligence in driving his automobile
may be questioned as to convictions for
violations of the statutes regulating
the speed of automobiles on the public
highways. Brown v. Howard, R. I.
- 114 Atl. 11 (1921)......21:219-222

the original memorandum is imma-
terial. Norman v. Utah Hotel Co.,
Utah 206 Pac. 556 (1922).21:877-890

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION.

Annotation: Employees within Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act..21:1-37
Annotation: Statutory and common-
law liability for death or disability
due to disease proximately caused by
employment
.....21:200-218

Annotation: Effect of provisions in
compensation acts respecting liability
of third persons for negligence causing
injury to employee...... 21:401-431

Annotation: Time, place or particu-
lar manner of injury or death as affect-
ing question whether accident arose
out of and in course of employment..
21:634-667

Annotation: Provisions in compensa-
tion acts as to furnishing medical and
hospital services and payment there-
for
....21:672-684
Annotation: Nature and extent of
liability under the Federal Safety Ap-
pliance Act.....
.21:756-792
Annotation: Common-law actions
against master for injuries by his wil-
ful, deliberate or intentional act to
employee subject to compensation acts
21:856-861

Annotation: Workmen's compensa-
tion acts as affected by admiralty jur-
isdiction
.21:862-869

1. Accident arising out of and in
course of employment—Railway em-
ployee killed while riding to work
on a pass.

Where a railroad employee was killed
while riding on a pass on one of de-
fendant's regular passenger trains to
reach the point where the train on
which he worked started, his pay be-
ginning from the time of his reporting
at such place for work, he was, at the
time of his death, a passenger, so that
the injury did not arise out of and in
the course of his employment, and an

7. Death-Disease aided by exposure to
bad air.

Where a mine worker died of
septicæmia or pyæmia and the evi-
dence tended to show that the breath-
ing of foul air in the mine over a
period of weeks rendered deceased less
capable of resisting those diseases and
thus contributed to his death, his death
was not an accident within the mean-
ing of the compensation act because it
was not traceable to a definite time,
place or cause. Prouse v. Industrial
Commission, 69 Colo. 382, 194 Pac. 625
(1920)
.21:200-218

12. Hazardous employments.

Section 2, art. 1, c. 246, of the Work-
men's Compensation Act, provides in
substance as follows: Compensation
provided for in this act shall be pay-
able for injuries sustained by em-
ployees engaged in the following haz-
ardous employments, to wit, printing
plants where machinery is used, and
subdivision 1 of section 3 provides that
"hazardous employment" shall mean
manual or mechanical work or labor
connected with or incident to one of
the industries, plants, factories, etc.,
mentioned in section 2. Okmulgee
Democrat Pub. Co. v. State Industrial
Commission, Okla. 206 Pac. 249
(1922)
.21:672-685

13.

-

There is evidence in the record rea-
sonably tending to show that the claim-
ant was engaged in hazardous employ-
ment within the meaning of the fore-

Upon approval by the industrial acci-
dent board of a contract for compensa-
tion entered into by the employer and
employee under the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act it oper-
ates as an election by the employee
which extinguishes his right to main-
tain an action against a third person
whose negligence caused the injury,
and amounts to an assignment of such
right of action to his employer, a sub-
rogation, which may be enforced by the
employer in his own name for indem-
nity only. Smith v. Port Huron Gas
& Electric Co., 217 Mich. 519, 187 N.
W. 292 (1922)..
.21:401-431

16. Intentional injury by employer-
Action at law.

A provision of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act that if the injury to a
workman results from "deliberate in-
tention of his employer to produce
such injury, or death, the workman
*** shall have the privilege to take
under this act, and also have cause of
action against the employer" is not
applicable to an injury due to the neg-
ligence of the employer however
gross; there must be a specific intent
to injure the employee. Delthony v.