fendant was a railroad company, doing both an interstate and intrastate business. Deceased, at the time he sustained the injury which caused his death, was attempting to open a valve on the top of an oil tank car, so that the oil in the tank could be run into the reservoir tank of the defendant company, later to be used by the defendant in supplying oil for filling lamps, torches, etc., for the engines and cabooses of the defendant company's trains. Held, that deceased was not engaged in interstate commerce when killed; hence not within the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and the state Workmen's Compensation Act applied to the case. Lindway v. Pennsylvania Co., 268 Pa. 491, 112 Atl. 40 (1920).

2. Returning home on employer's hand

car.

Deceased was one of a gang of four oilers working for the defendant railroad company in its Wolf Lake yard, in the state of Indiana. This yard was known as the receiving yard, where cars from western roads were received, oiled and then switched to another yard, where they were put into trains for the east. Deceased and his fellow workmen lived in a shanty owned by the defendant and located in South Chicago in the state of Illinois. The four men, with their foreman, were accustomed to ride from South Chicago to the Wolf Lake yard and return on a hand car provided by the defendant. It was while thus riding on the hand car to South Chicago that the deceased was killed in a collision between the

hand car and a switch engine belonging to the defendant. It was conceded by the defendant that the employees engaged in the repairing and oiling of cars in the Wolf Lake yard were engaged in work so closely related to interstate transportation as to be practically a part of it; but it was contended that deceased's employment ended when he left the Wolf Lake yard, and that he was not in the employ of the company when he was killed. This contention was not upheld and a judgment based upon that theory was reversed. Ramsay v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 301 Ill. 169, 133 N. E. 703 (1921), rev'g 221 Ill. App. 349 (1921).

D. Ash pit cleaner.

Plaintiff was an employee of the defendant railroad company and on the day of the accident in question he and other employees were summoned by the foreman from their bunk car in the railroad yards to go with him to clean out the cinder or ash pit located near the roundhouse. Between the latter and the ash pit was а turntable. Double tracks ran over the turntable to the ash pit. As plaintiff came within 6 feet of the ash pit, and when some of his crew were already in the pit er gaged at their task, a locomotive backing in upon the pit without a lookout in front and without ringing the bell or giving any other signal, struck plaintiff from behind, hurled him into the pit, and inflicted the injuries for which he sued. It appeared that in the ash pit were dumped the ashes and cinders from engines engaged both in

en

interstate and intrastate traffic. It was held that the pit was a necessary facility in the operation of the railway, and also an instrumentality of interstate commerce, and that plaintiff when injured was engaged in interstate commerce and was therefore within the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Stavros v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., Minn. —, 186 N. W. 942 (1922). E. Crane operator unloading coal supply.

In Kozimko v. Hines, 268 Fed. 507 (1920), it was held that a crane used in unloading and storing coal in the storage yard of a railroad company, which coal was to be used to accumulate a reserve supply of coal in view of a threatened coal strike, was not an instrumentality of interstate commerce, although it was possible that some of the coal thus stored might be used for coaling engines engaged in interstate commerce, and hence one employed in operating the crane was not employed in interstate commerce so as to give a right of action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for his accidental death when walking along the railroad tracks on his way to work on the crane.

F. Miscellaneous.

1. Testing steam in yard pipes. Decedent was assisting another railroad employee at work in the yards at or near a switch, which was connected with tracks used for both, interstate and intrastate commerce, in testing the steam in the switch pipes used to

supply steam at the yard switches on cold nights. Held, that the switch was a part of the tracks, and thus became an instrumentality as permanently devoted to commerce as the tracks themselves, and determined the character of the employment of the deceased as interstate, giving his administrator the right to recover under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Smith v. Payne, 269 Fed. 1 (1920).

2. Directing yard fuel car.

In Pullman Car Lines v. Riley, Del. Super. Ct., 114 Atl. 920 (1921), it appeared that claimant at the time of his injury was engaged in the performance of his duties in directing the movement of a car containing coal from one point to another point in the yards of a sleeping car company, which was engaged in interstate traffic. The car in question was used only for hauling coal and freight between different points within the yards, and was not used outside. The car at the time of claimant's injury was carrying fuel for heating the plant boilers. It was held that claimant was not engaged in interstate traffic and the industrial accident board of the state had jurisdiction of the case.

3. Operation of car-heating plant.

pipes to cars standing on its tracks, with which connection was made by means of steam plugs. The steam so generated was supplied to cars operated in both interstate and intrastate commerce. The deceased operated the boiler of the heating plant, and five or six times an hour brought the coal to the boiler room from coal cars standing on the track near the boiler house. He was required to keep the pathway from the boiler room to the coal cars open and free from snow in order to get the coal from the cars. Because of his subjection to striking changes of temperature and unusual conditions of exposure through working in the cold and then in the heat of the boiler room, he contracted lobar pneumonia, from which he died. It was held that he was engaged in interstate commerce at the time he contracted pneumonia, and was therefore subject to the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act.

4. Replacing derailed engine. In Stice v. Hines, Kan. 205 Pac. 616 (1922), which was an action to recover for injuries to plaintiff while assisting in replacing upon the tracks a switch engine that had been derailed, there was some evidence that the track was being used at the time of the derailment in interstate commerce and to indicate that plaintiff at the time of his injury was assisting in restoring an instrumentality to interstate commerce, and it was held that the case should have been submitted to the jury on the

1. Hauling repair material. In Hines v. Industrial Commission, 295 Ill. 231, 129 N. E. 175 (1920), wherein it appeared that the deceased, at the time he was killed, was engaged in hauling stringers for the repair of a railroad bridge used by the railroad company for both interstate and intrastate commerce, it was held that the employment was in interstate commerce, and that the remedy for the death was under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and not under the state Workmen's Compensation Act.

2. Unloading repair material. Plaintiff was a member of a bridge gang employed in maintaining and repairing bridges constituting part of lines of railway in use by the defendant in interstate commerce. When he was injured he was assisting in unloading timbers and crossties from a car at a point near a bridge over a river on defendant's line of railway; the purpose being to use the timber and ties so placed in the reconstruction or repair of the bridge as soon as the required material could be assembled, without causing an interruption of the

the building. The primary wires were I cut off at or near the point where they entered the room, and provided with a disconnecting switch, which, when open, arrested the current and enabled the employees to work with safety in all parts of the room. For a period of 8 or 9 months the substation room remained dismantled of its electrical equipment, and no use was made therein of the current. It appears, however, to have been the custom of the foreman to open the switch after the day's work was ended, and to disconnect it again each morning before work was resumed. During all the time this work of reconstruction was in progress no part of the work of operating the railway or controlling the movement of cars or trains was carried on in or through said substation, but all work and business of that nature was done or carried on in and through the temporary or portable substation by employees other than plaintiff. The plaintiff had been sent by the defendant to help in the completion of the work on the substation. At the time of the accident he was assisting in putting up an iron pipe rack at or near the place of the disconnecting switch above mentioned. It was yet early in the morning, and it so happened that the foreman, contrary to his custom, had failed to disconnect the switch, and plaintiff, not noticing the failure, undertook to climb to his place of work on the pipe rack, thus coming in contact with some wire or other conductor heavily charged with electricity, and

3. Baggage-room painter.

In Culp v. Atlantic City R. R., 93 N. J. L. 244, 110 Atl. 115 (1919), it was held that a painter who was injured while painting a baggage-room which was used by the defendant railroad company for the reception and storage of both interstate and intrastate baggage, was engaged in interstate commerce, although at the time of the accident there was no interstate baggage in the room.

C. Ripping timber for caboose.

Claimant was a millwright in the employ of the defendant, and was engaged in ripping a piece of timber when he sustained the injury for which an award was made under the Workmen's Compensation Law. It appeared that the piece of timber, when ripped, was to be used in repairing a caboose which was operated on a run between points in Vermont and New York. It did not appear, however, that the work was ever completed, or that the piece of timber was ever so used. Held, that the piece of timber could not be said to be an instrumentality of interstate commerce until it was at least on its