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The judgment of the appellate division must be reversed, and that of the trial court affirmed, with costs in this court and in the appellate division.

MCLAUGHLIN, J. (dissenting). I am of the opinion that at the time of the collision Tallon occupied the status of an employee, and therefore relief should have been sought under the Workmen's Compensation Law.

the ground his hand slipped, so that he struck the ground with sufficient force to break a bone in his left heel. Some years before, the employee had had experience in climbing ropes at sea, but at the time of the accident he was 65 years old. It did not appear that the rope had ever been used for the purpose to which the employee put it, or that it was intended for such use. It was held, therefore, that the accident did not arise out of the employment, and an award of compensation was set aside on the ground of a lack of supporting evidence. DeCosta's Case, Mass. 135 N. E. 135 (1922).

B. Taking dangerous route across tracks.

Claimant's son, employed by defendant, having sustained an injury to his finger was directed to report three times a week to a certain physician until the wound should heal. In accordance with these instructions he started, on a certain day, towards the office of the physician, and because a snowstorm had interrupted the usual means of transportation he was compelled to go on foot. At the suggestion of his daughter he attempted to take a short cut across tracks of a railroad company, but while so doing he was struck by a train and killed. It did not appear that the place where he attempted to cross the tracks was regarded as a permitted crossing, and in fact the railroad company had posted a special notice warning against such use. Neither did it appear that the defendant had any reason to anticipate

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C. Meddling with dangerous machine.

The applicant, a boy 14 years old, was employed in the defendant's print shop as an errand boy for other odd jobs about the place. He had no duties connected with any machinery and was specifically forbidden to touch any of it. Undertaking, in the absence of anyone in authority, to use a paper cutting machine while making a tablet for his own use, he cut the ends off of two of his fingers. In reversing an award of compensation, the court held that in undertaking to use this machine the applicant took himself out of the scope of his employment, and hence the resultant injury did not arise in the course of his employment and was not compensable. Radtke Bros. v. Industrial Commission, Wis. 183 N. W. 168 (1921).

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At the time of the accident he was riding on a pass which entitled him to free transportation to and from his work. Such transportation was an incident of the employment. It was a part of the contract of employment and enforceable by him as such.

The facts bring the case directly within the principle laid down in Matter of Littler v. George A. Fuller Co., 223 N. Y. 369, 119 N. E. 554. There a bricklayer was injured in an accident to an automobile truck which was furnished by his employer to carry him and other

place of work. For some reason not disclosed by the evidence he went near the saw while it was in operation and was injured thereby. The court held that since the plaintiff had clearly exposed himself unnecessarily, after abandoning his post of duty for purposes of his own, it could not be said that he had sustained an accidental injury arising out of or in the course of his employment. A judgment for defendant was accordingly affirmed. Pierre v. Barringer, 149 La. 71, 88 So. 691 (1921).

E. Crossing area on overhead beam.

Claimant, employed in the defendant's gas works, had occasion to go, in the course of his employment, from one building of his employer's plant to another. The natural and usual way involved descending certain stairs and walking across the yard between the two buildings. Needing a raincoat, he stepped out upon a beam about a foot square and 20 feet long running from the building he was in to another near by, where his raincoat was hanging. Putting on the raincoat he attempted to walk on across the beam, instead of retracing his steps and taking the usual route. It did not appear that by crossing on the beam he would have shortened his route to his destination. While crossing the beam he fell through an opening, sustaining the injuries for which he herein sought compensation. In reversing an award the court held that the claimant had voluntarily and unnecessarily subjected himself to a risk not within the contemplation of

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A. Extinguishing fire.

1. Started by victim of injury.

Claimant was employed as chambermaid in the defendant's hotel. She sought compensation for injuries caused by being burned while attempting, as she alleged, to extinguish a fire in her room which in some way started while she was using an alcohol lamp to curl her hair while preparing to retire at the close of her day's work. The evidence as to the cause of the fire and the conduct of the claimant in respect thereto was more or less in dispute, but it was fairly inferable from the testimony that her allegations as above stated were substantially correct. It was held that the injury was due to an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, and an award of compensation was affirmed. Kraft v. West Hotel Co., Iowa-, 185 N. W. 895 (1921).

2. Started by others.

While claimant, employed as a roustabout on an oil lease, was waiting for fellow employees to bring certain necessary tools before resuming his usual work after lunch, he fell asleep. Waking, he found that a fire had in some way started in the grass near the oil well and was burning up to within 5

workmen from a railroad station to and from a building which they were constructing. It was held the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment and that—

"The day's work began when he entered the automobile truck in the morning and ended when he left it in the evening.'

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It is sought to distinguish that case from this by reason of the fact that the automobile had been furnished for the specific purpose of

feet of the well. In attempting to extinguish the flames he was burned, and for the injuries so sustained he was awarded compensation. On appeal it was urged that the work for which claimant was hired did not include fighting fire. Affirming the award, the court held that the claimant, by thus attempting to preserve his employer's property in an emergency, had not taken himself out of the course of his employment, although he was not specifically responsible for the property, and in the absence of a showing that the injury was due to the claimant's wilful misconduct, compensation was properly awarded. Associated Employers' Reciprocal v. State Industrial Commission, Okla. -, 200 Pac. 174 (1921).

B. Stopping runaway on employer's premises.

Plaintiff's husband was employed at defendant's milk condensing plant. While employees of a public drayman were unloading cans of cream from a truck on to defendant's receiving platform, the team attached to the truck started to run away, leaving the men in charge of them standing on the platform. Plaintiff's husband, who was then raking the lawn near the horses, attempted to stop them, but was thrown in such a way as to cause him fatal injuries. In affirming an award of compensation the court held that the injury to the employee arose out of and in the course of his employment, regardless of whether the

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fendant. The delivery of the cream, the court pointed out, was the business of the employer, and the evidence warranted an inference that the injured employee was hurt while acting in an emergency, upon a sudden impulse, to prevent a runaway upon his employer's property, and to prevent a loss of his employer's property, and hence acted in furtherance of the employer's business. Sebo v. Libby, McNeil & Libby, 216 Mich. 351, 185 N. W. 702 (1921).

1.

X. Assault.

A. Injury to participant in quarrel. Between superior and subordinate. a. Foreman injured or killed. Claimant was employed as top foreman at the defendant's mine, and his claim for compensation was based upon injuries sustained when he was shot by a subordinate employee in the course of a dispute between them concerning the alleged docking of the subordinate by claimant some 3 weeks prior to the date of the shooting. At the time of the shooting the claimant was on his way down from the tipple to the office of the employer, to eat his lunch. The court held that since the dispute arose out of and in the course of the employment, the injury consequent thereupon was compensable. Taylor Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 301 Ill. 548, 134 N. E. 172 (1922).

Plaintiff's husband was foreman in defendant's mill. While he was at work he had a quarrel with two sub

carrying workmen to and from the place of employment, while here others beside Tallon were permitted to ride in the coach in which he was at the time of the accident. But what possible difference can it make, if free transportation be an incident of the employment, whether others are permitted to ride in the same conveyance? The underlying feature in each case is that free transportation is an incident of the employment. The transportation is the same whether it be in a private or public conveyance.

ordinates concerning a matter connected with his employer's business. About 2 hours later, while he was on his way home after work, and outside of the employer's premises, he was met and assaulted by the two men, who had armed themselves with pieces of iron pipe at the mill for the purpose. His death having resulted from the injuries thus sustained, the widow sought and obtained compensation. The award was set aside, on appeal, on the ground that the assault, although it grew out of the employer's business, did not occur while the employee was "actually engaged in" the employer's affairs, which was a condition of liability under the act where the accident took place off of the employer's premises. Maguire v. James Lees & Sons Co., 116 Atl. Pa. 679 (1922).

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Claimant was employed as foreman of a number of laborers in defendant's service. He reprimanded one of them for absenting himself from work too long, and the upshot was that the man demanded his time. Plaintiff wrote out the order and was turning away, when the other man made a remark which plaintiff resented, responding by saying that the other lied and telling him to get out. Instead of complying, the man started towards the plaintiff who, believing himself in danger of attack, struck the man with a broom. At the same time, or immediately thereafter, the man struck plaintiff in the eye with his fist, causing the injury for which plaintiff herein sought an award. It was held that

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b. Subordinate injured. Plaintiff, employed for some time by defendant, was discharged by his superintendent and told to take his clothes and go home. He went to the office where numbered brass checks of the employees were hung to secure the one assigned to him, it being necessary to present a check to pass through the gates. When he attempted to take his check the superintendent, who had followed him, directed the employee in charge of the checks not to let plaintiff take his, and to hold plaintiff. At the same time he and that employee seized plaintiff, threw him down and took a revolver from his person. Two special police officers present then handcuffed plaintiff and took him away in a patrol wagon. He was subsequently tried on charges of disturbing the peace but was discharged. He then brought this action to recover damages, alleging assault, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, and from a verdict in his favor defendant brought exceptions. As to the assault charge the answer of the defendant set up the claim that whatever injury plaintiff had sustained thereby occurred by reason of an acci

The case is much like Donovan's Case, 217 Mass. 76, 104 N. E. 431, 4 N. C. C. A. 549, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 778. There Donovan was employed by one McGreevy in cleaning out catch-basins about two miles from his home. It had been and was his custom, in common with other employees, and with the knowledge and consent of his employer, to ride to and from the vicinity of the catch-basins in a wagon furnished by his employer; the wagon meeting the employees on the street at the beginning of the day. It was also at the service of the employees

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dent arising out of and in the course of his employment, and hence no recovery at common law could be had, plaintiff not having signified his intention not to be bound by the compensation act at the time of his employment. This contention was sustained. It was held that on the facts disclosed by the record it could be found that the injury arose in the course of the employment and, since the whole trouble was incidental to his employment, that it arose out of the employment as well. It followed that the trial court erred in refusing to direet a verdict for defendant, so far as the counts charging assault were concerned. Zygmuntowicz v. American Steel & Wire Co. of New Jersey, Mass.-, 134 N. E. 385 (1922).

A foreman of the defendant company, finding a certain machine operating defectively because of an excess of oil, summoned the claimant, who was in charge of oiling the machinery of the plant, and accused him of having supplied the machine in question with too much oil. Claimant responded by calling the foreman a liar, whereupon the foreman struck claimant, knocking him down, and then threw him down the stairs. Claimant was wearing glasses at the time, and the foreman's blow broke them, causing a piece of glass to so injure the claimant's eye that he lost the sight thereof. It was held that the injury so sustained arose out of and in the course of the employment. Knocks v. Metal Package Corp., 231 N. Y. 78, 131 N. E. 741 (1921).

2. Between employees of equal rank.

a. Growing out of horse play. While the claimant was performing his usual services as an employee of the defendant, a fellow employee playfully grabbed claimant's arm. Claimant resented this act, and attempted to strike the fellow-servant with a milk bottle, and when this failed, to bite him. Finally as claimant was stooping to pick up a cobblestone to throw at the other man, the latter struck claimant, knocking him against a radiator with such force that four of claimant's teeth were knocked out and he sustained injuries to his hand and arm. It was held that claimant, in attempting a vicious assault upon the coemployee had taken himself out of the scope of his employment to such an extent that the injury then sustained was not compensable, particularly in view of the fact that the injury was sustained while claimant was carrying out an intention to injure another, within the meaning of section 10 of the compensation act. Stein v. Williams Printing Co., 195 N. Y. App. Div. 336, 186 N. Y. Supp. 705 (1921).

b. Dispute over division of work.

Applicant was one of three men employed in shoveling coal into certain bents for use in connection with the operation of a railroad. They worked in successive 8-hour shifts, applicant's tour of duty being from 6 a. m. to 2 p. m. On a certain day, at the close of the applicant's tour of duty, he and the man who was to then take up

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