single recovery for such loss of time, or, which is the same thing, decreased earning capacity. VI. Was error committed in allowing evidence as to plaintiff's loss of profits or earnings? The evidence tended to prove that the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing, among other things, his ordinary avocation, which, prior to his injury, had been that of a wholesale dealer in brooms in a small way; that he had purchased brooms from the manufacturers; that he had no storeroom, but kept such brooms at his dwelling house; that he went around and took orders for brooms, and then delivered them or shipped them to the purchaser; that he was in business alone; that he kept no books; that he had been in such business several years prior to his injury, and that his net profits or earnings the open door when, as she alleged, the swaying and lurching of the car as it passed rapidly over a section of rough track, caused her to be thrown through the doorway and onto the ground, and thus to sustain serious injuries. During the trial of the action a number of controversies arose, the disposition of which is not material here, but in the course of the opinion affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, the court approved the following instruction: "You are instructed that contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff cannot be presumed from the mere fact of injury, but must be proved. On the other hand, proof of the injury, coupled with proof that it proceeded from a sudden, unusual or violent jerking, or swinging or swaying of the car, while the plaintiff was preparing to alight, casts upon the defendant the burden of proving that the injury was occasioned by inevitable casualty or some other cause which human care and foresight could not prevent, or by the contributory negligence of the plaintiff.” Plaintiff, a passenger on one of the defendant's trolley cars, sued to recover damages for injuries sustained in a fall while she was passing from the body of the car into the vestibule thereof, in preparation for alighting at the next stop. Her statement of claim alleged that she was suddenly hurled backward and down upon the floor of the car with great force and violence by the unexpected and unusual jolting and jumping of the car." Her testimony was substantially to the same effect, and the trial court gave a judg ment of nonsuit, which, on appeal, was affirmed. Crawford v. Reading Transit & Light Co., Pa. - 116 Atl. 542 (1922). a C. Swaying due to efforts to stop. In reversing a judgment overruling demurrer in a passenger's action. against a street railway company, the court said: "The petition, construed (as it must be) most strongly against the plaintiff, shows that the plaintiff, a man 57 years old, voluntarily abandoned his seat in the car, a place of safety, and stood up in an open street car which was running very rapidly; and, while the efforts of the motorman to bring the car from a speed of 15 miles an hour to a dead stop within 50 feet were causing the car to wabble and sway from one side of the track to the other, he [the plaintiff] was voluntarily standing up in the car, and on one side thereof, and was not holding on to anything to protect himself from being thrown upon the floor of the car or from the car, although there were handholds upon the car to which he could have held and thereby kept himself from being thrown from the car. The petition, as we view it, be estimated would average $100 per month, or about $4 per day. The appellant objected to the admission of this testimony for the reason that such earnings were too speculative; that respondent kept no books, and there was no means of ascertaining with reasonable certainty, what the net profits or earnings of his business were. We do not regard the objections to this evidence well founded. In this case, plaintiff's loss was more in the nature of lost personal earnings than the loss of the profits of a regularly established mercantile business, because he alone conducted his business, and its profits depended wholly upon his ability to personally go around and solicit orders for and sell and deliver the brooms. The mere fact that plaintiff kept no books and could not tell precisely the net profits of his work or business should D. Slackening speed and then suddenly increasing it. Plaintiff, a passenger upon one of the defendant's street cars, signaled the conductor to stop at the next regular street crossing, at the same time leaving his seat within the body of the car and going upon the platform to be in readiness to alight when the car stopped. The car slowed down as it neared the corner, and then, when still 245 feet from the crossing, started suddenly ahead. The resultant jerk threw plaintiff headlong from the car, causing the injuries for which he sought damages in this action. No evidence was adduced tending to show that the car or track were defective, nor to show any special reason for the checking and then increasing of the car's speed. It was held that the evidence was insufficient to support an inference of negligence in operation of the car, and exceptions to a verdict for plaintiff were sustained. McGann v. Boston Elevated R. Co., 199 Mass. 446, 85 N. E. 570, 18 L. R A. (N. S.) 506, 127 Am. St. Rep. 509 (1908). As the street car upon which plain tiff's intestate was a passenger approached the corner where he desired to alight, he signaled the conductor, and, noting that the car began to slow up, assumed that it was soon to stop and arose in readiness to alight. He took a position in the doorway leading to the vestibule of the car, holding on to the handle of the car, and was 80 standing when the car suddenly jumped forward, causing him to fall first into the vestibule and then out upon the street. Thus, in substance, the intestate stated the circumstances of the accident upon which his administrator, plaintiff herein, sought damages from the street car company. The story thus related was corroborated in many particulars by other witnesses. The court held, affirming a judgment for plaintiff, that the weight and credibility of the deposition was for the jury, and that if they believed the narrative of the accident therein contained, they were warranted in inferring negligence in respect of the operation of the car proximately causing the injury, if not the death of the intestate. Sanson v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 239 Pa. 505, 86 Atl. 1069 (1913). Plaintiff was a passenger upon an open side street car. As the car approached the street where she desired to alight, she attempted to attract the conductor's attention. She testified that he was then standing near the motor not deprive him of any just claim for loss of time or earnings. This is well illustrated in the case of Devoy v. Transit Co., 192 Mo. loc. cit. 223, 224, 91 S. W. 140, where the plaintiff was an aged attorney who "thought his earnings were in the neighborhood of $2,500 a year if he could figure it up." But he kept no books, had no regular clientele or office, but kept his books and office "in his hat," and his business was that of assisting other attorneys to "settle" or "shore up" their cases. He, however, was allowed for lost earnings such sum as the jury might believe from the evidence he sustained, "however ambiguous the evidence." This case was recently cited and approved by this court in Ganz v. Railroad, 220 S. W. 495. So it is well settled that, in actions by parents for damages for the loss of services or earnings of minors, man; that she was not sure that he saw her signal, but she saw him say something to the motorman and thereafter the car came nearly to a stop as it drew near the street in question. She moved over along the seat near the side of the car SƠ as to be ready to step out when the car should stop, but suddenly there was a "terrible jerk" and she was thrown forward, one foot slipping down onto the running board and one remaining upon the floor of the car. She clung to the upright at the end of the seat and endeavored to regain her seat in the car, but before she could do so the car gave another jerk forward, whereby she was thrown out of the car and into the street. The car did not come to a stop until it had gone nearly 100 feet from that point. It was held that under this evidence a jury would have been warranted in finding that the car had been negligently operated, and that the plaintiff had been in the exercise of due care. Under the conditions of the appeal, therefore, judgment was entered for the plaintiff for $2,000. Rust v. Springfield St. R. Co., 217 Mass. 116, 104 N. E. 367 (1914). In appealing from a judgment for plaintiff for $2,500 in a passenger's action for personal injuries caused by being thrown from a street car by a sudden and violent jerk, while she was passing into the vestibule of the car in preparation for alighting, the motor man having received a stop signal and having started to slacken speed in response thereto, the defendant contended that the judgment should be reversed and the case remanded because of the failure of the trial court to sustain its demurrer to the evidence based upon plaintiff's failure to show that the operatives in charge of the car were aware of the fact that the plaintiff had arisen and was walking forward in the car at the time the car was caused to jerk, since the jerk was insufficient to injure a sitting passenger. In affirming the judgment it was held that the suggested condition was not absolute, but depended upon the circumstances of the case, and that since it herein appeared that the conductor knew that plaintiff intended to alight when the car stopped, and knew also that it was dark enough so that plaintiff could not have known, at the time she arose from her seat, but that the car was then at its expected stopping place, he and the motorman were chargeable with notice that the plaintiff might do just what she actually did, and were therefore under obligations to regulate the movement of the car accordingly. The defendant also argued that it was physically impossible for the plaintiff to have been caused to fall out through the door of the car by a jerk of the sort described, but the court held that "if plaintiff lost her balance by reason of the jerk, evidence of the minor's age, previous health, and condition in life is sufficient to enable the jury to determine the minor's earning capacity and the parent's loss, aided by the knowledge and experience of the jury. Meeker v. Union Elect. Light & Power Co., 279 Mo. 574, 216 S. W. 933. So that we must rule this contention against the appellant. VII. Appellant further insists, that the court erred in refusing to admit certain testimony of a witness, a passenger on the car, as to whether the jerk or jar complained of by the plaintiff was of sufficient force to throw a man down while standing in the car. The following colloquy took place: skirts in preparation for alighting. As she was standing there the motorman caused the car to start forward with a sudden and violent jerk, so that the plaintiff was thrown into the street. The appeal from a judgment for damages in her action to recover for the injuries thus sustained involved only the question of contributory negligence, it being claimed that plaintiff failed to exercise due care in coming to the platform before the car had stopped. Affirming the judgment the court held that in view of the general custom of passengers to do precisely as plaintiff did, and the further fact that such a practice was invited and encouraged by the street car company, it clearly could not be held that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Anderson v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 159 Mo. App. 449, 141 S. W. 461 (1911). "Q. Please describe what you saw occur there at that time. A. Well, a man there was no physical impossibility involved in her pitching to the platform 4 inches below and thence into the street. There is no one who says just how she fell, or what she struck on the way to the pavement; nor can any one determine what different forces acting upon her body caused it to fall from the platform instead of stopping there. The rebound of her body striking the side of the door, the sidewise motion and momentum given to her body by one of her feet going first to the floor-any number of causes-could have brought about the result which unquestionably did follow, namely, her fall to the pavement."' Modrell v. Dunham (Mo. App.), 187 S. W. 561 (1916). A suit by the husband of the plaintiff in the foregoing action, resulting in a judgment for $2,000 for his expenses and the loss of his wife's services consequent upon the same accident, was affirmed on the authority of the former case. Modrell v. Dunham (Mo. App.), 187 S. W. 564 (1916). E. Starting prematurely after full stop. 1. Passenger thrown from car. Plaintiff, a passenger upon the defendant's street car, signaled to have the car stop at the next corner, and, as the car began to slow down for the stop, arose from her seat and came forward to the platform gathering her 2. Passenger thrown against seat. Plaintiff recovered damages for injuries caused by a "sudden jerk" of one of defendant's electric cars upon which she was a passenger. Appealing, defendant argued that it was entitled to the general charge on the ground that proof of a sudden jerk," with consequent injury to the passenger, did not suffice to show negligence. In affirming the judgment the court said: "Here the allegation of the complaint was of negligence generally, and the got in the car with a bundle in his arm, and the car gave a little kind of a curve going across the intersection there, and his bundles went against the window. Q. Was there any violent jerking or lurching of the car at that time? A. Oh, no. "Q. Any motion more than they usually make? A. Only going over the crossing; when they go over a double crossing, that's all. "Q. Just the ordinary motion? A. It wasn't enough to throw a man; that is, to overbalance a man. "Mr. Hay: Well, I object to the conclusion of the witness. "The Court: All right; the objection will be sustained. (To which action and ruling of the court defendant, by his counsel, then and there duly excepted, and still excepts.) "Mr. Farley: Q. Well, compared with the way cars usually run at such a place, is that how this car ran? A. It ran very smooth to me. "Mr. Farley: Take the witness." We think the testimony was admissible as properly descriptive of the sufficiency of its proof depended upon the violence of the jerk, the situation of the passenger at the moment, and the carrier's duty to know that situation. The testimony on either part was that the car had stopped, or was just about to stop, at a street crossing, when plaintiff, who had risen from her seat for the purpose of leaving the car, was thrown across a seat and, according to her showing, injured. It is not clear whether plaintiff was thrown by an abrupt stop of the car, or by a sudden resumption of its motion forward, if that makes any difference, and the evidence is in conflict on the question of undue suddenness in either event; but the jury had the right to find with plaintiff on these contentions. On defendant's testimony-not to mention plaintiff's-the car was at a regular stopping place for letting off passengers, and did stop. It was then defendant's duty, through its agents operating the car, to inform itself whether plaintiff was in the act of leaving the car, and so in a position which would be rendered perilous by putting the car in motion-not to mention, again, a sudden jerk or abrupt stop and a failure to discharge that duty was negligence." Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Mayo, 181 Ala. 525, 61 So. 289 (1913). In Masicot v. New Orleans Railway & Light Co., 141 La. 622, 75 So. 490 (1917), plaintiff appealed from an ad verse judgment in her action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by her while a passenger upon one of the defendant's street cars. Her claim for damages was based upon the contention that as the car came to a full stop she and other passengers prepared to alight, but that while she was arising from her seat the car was ''suddenly, unexpectedly and violently started forward and suddenly stopped again, and so unexpectedly jolted" that she was thrown against the seat immediately in front of her, her left knee coming in violent contact with metal parts thereof and being thereby fractured in the kneecap. Defendant denied that the car started after it had stopped, and attempted to explain the accident on the theory that plaintiff bumped her knee against the seat while the car was at a standstill. The jury found for the defendant on the issue thus made, and on appeal the court held that the verdict was not so manifestly against the weight of the evidence as to require setting it aside. 3. Passenger thrown down in aisle. In Schwanenfeldt v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. (Mo. App.), 176 S. W. 1098 (1915), the plaintiff alleged, and her testimony tended to show that while she was a passenger on one of the defendant's street cars she signaled for a stop so that she might alight; that the car did stop, and that while |