had been at all foreseen before we sailed. When it was found that lord Huntley's division could neither land nor proceed by the Weel ing passage up the Scheldt, as I had intended they should, it was determined to withdraw them; but from the boisterous state of the weather, it was some days before this could be effected. As soon as it was accomplished, they were passed over to South Develand. With respect to sir John Hope's operation, it was more prosperous. It was conceived that, by landing on the north side of South Beveland, the island might be possessed, and all the batteries taken in reverse, and thereby the position of the French fleet, if they ventured to remain near Flushing, would be, as it were, turned, and their retreat rendered more difficult, while the attack on them by our ships would have been much facilitated; and for this object the division of sir John Hope rather preceded, in sailing from the Downs, the rest of the fleet. This division was landed near Ter-Goes, from whence they swept all the batteries in the island that could impede the progress of our ships up the West Scheldt, and possessed themselves, on the 2d of August, of the important post of Batz, to which it had been promised the army should at once have been brought up.-Sir John Hope remained in possession of this post, though not without being twice at tacked by the enemy's fotilla, for nine days before any of the gunboats under captain sir Home Popham were moved up the Scheldt to his support. Your majesty will be pleased to recollect, that the troops which sailed from Portsmouth, under lieutenant-general sir Eyre Coote, were destined for the service of Walcheren, and had been considered as sufficient for

that object, according to the intelligence received, and the supposed strength of the enemy; though at the same time certainly relying for the first efforts against Flushing on the promised cooperation of the navy, and on their establishing, as was held out in the first instance, a naval blockade, except on the side of Veer and Rammekins. Unfortunately, however, this did not take place; and for several nights after the army was before Flushing, the enemy succeeded in throwing from the opposite coast, probably from the canal of Ghent, considerable reinforcements into the place, which enabled him constantly to annoy our out-posts and working parties, and finally to attempt a sally in force, though happily, from the valour of your majesty's troops, without success. I have already stated that Rammekins surrender. ed on the evening of the 3d of Au gust. Immediately upon this event, feeling, as I did, great uneasiness at the delay which had already taken place, and the departure from the original plan, I wrote a letter to the admiral then at Ter Veer, expressing my hope that the ships would now be able to enter the West Scheldt by the Sloe pas sage, and that no time should be lost in pressing forward as speedily as possible our further operations; and I requested at the same time that he would communicate to me the extent of naval co-operation he could afford, as well for the future blockade of Flushing, as with a view to protecting the coast of South Beveland, and watching the passages from the Meuse to the East Scheldt, as this consideration would govern very much the extent of force I must leave in South Beveland, when the army advanced. To this letter he did not reply fully till the 8th of August; (K2) but

but I had a note from him on the 5th, assuring me the transports should be brought forward without delay; and I had also a very long conversation with him on the morning of the 6th, on the arrangements to be taken for our further operations; when I urged, in the strong est manner, the necessity of not losing a moment in bringing up the cavalry and ordnance ships, transports, store-ships, victuallers, &c. in order that the armament might proceed without delay to its destination; and I added my hopes, that they would receive the protection of the ships of war, none of which had yet entered the West Scheldt. The frigates, however, did not pass Flushing till the even ing of the 11th, and the line of battle ships only passed to the anchorage above Flushing on the 14th, the second day of the bombardment. These ships began to proceed up the river on the 18th, and arrived on the 19th; one division as high as the bay below Waerden, the other off the Hanswent, where they remained; the Courageux passed above Batz; the cavalry ships only got through the Sloe passage into the West Scheldt from the 20th to the 23d, and arrived off Batz on the 22d.and 24th: the ordnance ships and store ships passed through from the 22d to the 23d, and arrived at their destination off Batz on the 24th and 25th; the transports for lieutenant-general Grosvenor's division only came up to receive them on the 19th, on which day they embarked; and those for major-general Graham's division, on the 20th and 21st; and they arrived off Batz on the 24th. The corps of brigadier-genéral Rottenburgh, and the light battalions of the German legion, proceeded to join the earl of Rosslyn's division in South Beveland.

From this statement your majesty will see, that notwithstanding every effort on my part with the admiral, the armament was not assembled at the point of its destination till the 25th, and, of course that the means of commencing operations sooner against Antwerp were never in my power. It now became at this advanced period my duty to consider very seriously the expediency of landing the army on the continent. On comparing all the intelligence obtained as to the strength of the enemy, it appeared to be such as to leave (as stated in my dispatch of the 29th of August) no reasonable prospect of success to the force under my command, after accomplishing the prelimina ry operations of reducing Fort Lillo as well as Liefkenshoek, on the opposite side of Antwerp, without the possession of which the destruction of the ships and arsenals of the enemy could not be effected; and in addition to this, the sickness which had begun to attack the army about the 20th, and which was hourly increasing to an alarming extent, created the most serious apprehensions in the minds of the medical men, as to its further progress, at that unhealthy season, and which fatal experience has since shown to have been too well founded. Your majesty will not be sur prised if, under these circumstances, I paused in requiring the admiral to put the army on shore. That a landing might have been made, and that any force which had been opposed to us in the field would have yielded to the superior valour of British troops, I have no doubt: but then, any such success could have been of no avail towards the attainment of the ultimate object; and there was still less chance that the enemy would have given us the opportunity. Secure in his fortress,

he

he had a surer game to play; for if ever the army, divided as it must necessarily have been in order to occupy both banks of the river, exposed to the effects of inundation on every side, and with all its communications liable to be cut off, while the force of the enemy was daily and hourly increasing, had once sat down before Antwerp, it is unnecessary for me to point out to your majesty how critical must in a short time have been their situation. But when, added to this, sickness to an alarming extent had begun to spread itself among the troops, and the certain and fatal progress of which, at that season, was but too well ascertained, it appeared to me that all further advance could only tend to commit irretrievably the safety of the army which your majesty had confided to me, and which every principle of military duty, as well as the direct tenour of my instructions, alike forbade.

into a long, and, we think, satisfactory explanation. He says that the original determination of landing in Zoutland Bay was laid aside while at Deal, and another plan for land ag on Domburgh Beach adopted; but in consequence of a strong westerly wind, the landing there was impossible, and it became necessary to take shelter in the Roompot and Veergat, where the constant succession of gales for many days made it impossible, independently of other obstacles, to recur to the original intention of entering the western mouth of the Scheldt. The disembarkation was ultimately effected. Sir Richard then proceeds: "When, therefore, lord Chatham contends in his statement, that the second point, namely, why the army was not brought up sooner to the destination from whence all its operations were to commence, is purely a naval consideration,' his position is certainly true in words, but as certainly incorrect in its implied meaning. It is obvious that the army might have marched to Batz in the course of a

In answer, contains many pointed observations, general charges of inaccuracy, and a refutation of the insinuations both against the gallant admiral and the navy, contained in his lordship's statement. After the first point to which his majesty's attention was called, namely," that after the army was assembled near Batz, a landing in prosecution of the ulterior objects of the expedition was not deemed advisable," sir Richard declines making any remark, because the reasons which are said to have rendered it "so clear and evident" were not such as he was competent to appreciate, Upon the second point, Why the army was not sooner assembled at Batz, to recommence further operations, the gallant admiral enters

few days; but it is also obvious that it could not be conveyed on board a fleet of 400 transports, besides frigates, sloops, and flotilla, through a very intricate channel, without some delay. The difficulty of conducting such a feet at all through the mazes of such a navigation, can only be appreciated by profes sional men; it was very greatly increased by an adverse wind, blowing for some time with such violence as to render the expedient of warping (the only means of proceeding) totally impracticable: such obstacles to our progress were only to be overcome by great exertions and perseverance, by a considerable, but not, as I trust, an unnecessary expenditure of labour and time."-The gallant admiral (K3)

totally

totally denies the assertion that an agreement was entered into for a simultaneous attack by sea and land upon Flushing, for the purpose of avoiding the delay of a regular siege: it was impossible, he says, for such an agreement to have been made; as, under the well-ascertained circumstances of the garrison, it was too desperate an enterprise to be entertained. He thinks, however, that if the plan he had suggested had been adopted, namely, to land the cavalry on South Beveland, and select a limited number of transports-that a delay of only a few days would have re. sulted from the adverse accident which gave a different course to the direction of our operations. The first part of the flotilla which got through the Slough were applied to the cutting off the communication between Cadsand and Flushing. It was not until the 7th August that the sea blockade of Flushing could be established, owing to the adverse winds; and all the other parts of the naval service were expedited as soon as the various difficulties could be overcome, Sir Richard then concludes: "From this period I considered myself bound implicitly to accede to the wishes of the commander-in-chief. With him alone was there an option between a march of 36 hours and a voyage of indefinite length. I trust that it was owing to no defect of zeal on my part, and I am sure it was owing to no want of exertion on the part of the many excellent naval officers whom have the honour to command, that the progress of a fleet which it was necessary to warp, or, in less technical language, to haul by human labour, through the windings of a most intricate channel, and often directly in the teeth of the wind, appeared so tardy, that lord Chat

ham saw no movement making to push forward a single vessel to the West Scheldt.' The exertions of the naval officers and men were not rendered less irksome by the persuasion that the labour which, though incessant, often proved unavailing, might have been spared to them at the expense of a short march across the island of South Beveland. To impute to me or to the navy, under the name of delay, the loss of time which was passed by me in constant solicitude, and by the men in unremitting toil, is not what I should have expected from lord Chatham.-It would have been more agreeable to myself to have offered to their lordships a simple journal of the daily transactions of the fleet, as that course would have afforded me that of paying a just tribute of gra titude to the numerous, able, and zealous officers, by whom I was aided in the different branches of the service under my directions, and who may possibly consider themselves as unjustly subject, to gether with myself, to some imputation from the marked, and perhaps invidious, accuracy with which the particular days of arrival of diffe. rent divisions are specified in lord Chatham's statement. But I am convinced that it was not the intention of his lordship, in collecting such a multitude of dates, to attri bute any blame to those officers. He has closed his report by pointing me out as the only object of his animadversions. He leaves me to account for the difficulties which prevented the investment of Flushing, as well as to show the obsta cles which presented themselves to the early progress of the armament up the West Scheldt.-He was not aware, it seems, that the first point was rendered impossible by the state of the winds; he was not even

aware

aware that the circumstances of his being blown into the East Scheldt had impeded his early progress up the West Scheldt. Concerning lord Chatham's opinions, I have now ceased to be solicitous; but I am and ever shall be sincerely anxious that your lordships should not see cause to regret the confidence with which you have been pleased to honour me upon this occasion."

PROCLAMATION FROM THE SUPE

RIOR JUNTA.

The superior junta at Castile has addressed the following to the soldiers of the enemy; it has been circulated in the French language.

"FRENCHMEN,-How long will you suffer a foreign tyrant to abuse your docility and patience? How long will you expose yourselves, shed your blood to ensure still more slavery, and satisfy the voracious and criminal ambition of an adventurer? It is time that you should undeceive yourselves, and recover from an error fatal to yourselves and to all Europe.

"At the time when you fought for your liberty, your friends, your allies, your enemies themselves applauded your triumphs; your cause was just, and every where you had admirers; but now-what cause is it that you defend? That of the most tyrannical despotism, and the most perfidious usurpation. Against whom do you make war? Against a nation which has long been your ally, and which has made for France the most generous sacrifices. What do you propose? or rather, what does the monster who rules over you propose? The debasement, the enslaving of this nation. And what advantages do you expect from so unjust, so wild a project? Turn your eyes towards your coun

Be

try, enter into the bosoms of your families, hear the lamentations of your mothers, your wives, your brothers, and your sons! Look on those desolate widows, those deserted orphans, those afflicted mo thers, and aged fathers, from whom despotism has torn the only support of their decrepitude: every where you will meet with mourning, misery, and despair. Yes, we repeat it, recover from your error, suffer not yourselves to be blinded by a vain glory, only useful to the tyrant who oppresses you. convinced, that every victory, every conquest, is a link which adds to the chain in which you are bound by Napoleon. Remem. ber you are Frenchmen; and cease to obey an adventurer, a Corsican. Abandon the standard of your op pressor, and enlist under the banners of liberty. Come over to us; the Spaniards are not your ene mies, they are only the enemies of the usurper of a crown disgraced by his brow. They make no war against the French; they only make war against the Corsican and his slayes. Come then, and from us you shall receive the most generous hospitality; every one of you shall receive 100 livres Tournois, besides the value of his arms and horses. Our allies shall give you every kind of succour, and convey you in their vessels wherever you may wish to go."

SERGEANT-AT-ARMS'

STATEMENT