commonly meant by that word, infinitesimal or evanescent entities, in the pursuit of which, imagination herself is quickly lost. "The prosecution of this remark would, if I am not mistaken, open a view of the subject widely different from that which modern materialists have taken. But as it would lead me too far aside from my present design, I shall content myself with observing here, that the reasonings which have been lately brought forward in their support, by their new philological allies, have proceeded upon two errors, extremely common even among our best philosophers;-first, the error of confounding the historical progress of an art with its theoretical principles, when advanced to maturity; and, secondly, that of considering language as a much more exact and complete picture of thought, than it is in any state of society, whether barbarous or refined. With both of these errors, Mr. Tooke appears to me to be chargeable in an eminent degree. Of the latter, I have already produced various instances; and of the former, his whole work is one continued illustration. After stating, for example, the beautiful result of his researches concerning conjunctions, the leading inference which he deduces from it is, that the common arrangement of the parts of speech, in the writings of grammarians, being inaccurate and unphilosophical, must contribute greatly to retard the progress of students in the acquisition of particular languages: whereas nothing can be mare indisputable than this, that his speculations do not relate in the least to the analysis of a language, after it has assumed a regular and systematical form; but to the gradual steps by which it proceeded to that state, from the inartificial jargon of savages. They are speculations, not of a metaphysical, but of a purely philological nature: belonging to that particular species of disquisition which I have elsewhere called theoretical history.* To prove that conjunctions are a derivative part of speech, and that, at first, their place was supplied by words which are confess edly pronouns or articles, does not prove, that they ought not to be considered as a separate part of speech at present, any more than Mr. Smith's theory with respect to the gradual transformation of proper names into appellatives, proves, that proper names and appellatives are now radically and essentially the same; or than the employment of substantives to supply the place of adjectives (which Mr. Tooke tells us is one of the signs of an imperfect language), proves, that no grammatical distinc tion exists between these two parts of speech, in such tongues as the Greek, the Latin, or the English. Mr. Tooke, indeed, has not hesitated to draw this last inference also; but, in my own opinion, with nearly as great precipitation, as if he had concluded, because savages supply the want of forks by their fingers, that therefore a finger and a fork are the same thing." See the Account of the Life and Writings of Mr. Smith, prefixed to his Posthumous Essays. ON "NOT ON THE BEAUTIFUL. [From the Same.] [OTWITHSTANDING the greater variety of qualities, physical, intellectual, and moral, to which the word beauty is applicable, I believe it will be admitted, that, in its primitive and most general acceptation, it refers to objects of sight. As the epithets sweet and delicious literally denote what is pleasing to the palate, and harmonious what is pleasing to the ear; as the epithets soft and warm denote certain qualities that are pleasing in objects of touch or of feeling;-so the epithet beautiful literally denotes what is pleasing to the eye. All these epithets, too, it is worthy of remark, are applied transitively to the perceptions of other senses. We speak of sweet and of soft sounds; of warm, of delicious, and of harmonious colouring, with as little impropriety, as of a beautiful voice, or of a beautiful piece of music. Mr. Burke, himself, has somewhere spoken of the soft green of the soul. If the transitive applications of the word Iauty be more numerous and more heterogeneous than those of the words sweetness, softness, and harmony,. is it not probable that some account of this peculiarity may be derived from the comparative multiplicity of those perceptions of which the eye is the common organ? Such, accordingly, is the very simple principle on which the following speculations proceed; and which it is the chief aim of these speculations to establish. In prosecuting the subject, however, I shall not fetter myself by any regular plan, but shall readily give way to whatever discussions may natu. 1810. rally arise, either from my own conclusions, or from the remarks I may be led to offer on the theories of others. by the mind, are, in all probability, "The first ideas of beauty formed derived from colours. Long before infants receive any pleasures from the beauties of form or of motion, (both of which require, for their perception, a certain effort of attention and of thought) their eye may be caught and delighted with brilliant colouring, or with splendid illumination. I am inclined, too, a peasant, this ingredient of beauty to suspect, that in the judgment of in his estimate of the perfections of predominates over every other, even the female form; and, in the inanimate creation, there seems to be little else which he beholds with any rapture. It is, accordingly, from the effect produced by the rich painting of the clouds, when gilded by a setting sun, that Akenside infers the existence of the seeds of taste, where it is impossible to trace them to any hand but that of na ture. "Ask the swain "Long labour, why, forgetful of his toils, "O'er all the western sky; full soon, I ween, of the infant or of the peasant, that N spectacle spectacle alluded to by Akenside, in the foregoing lines, as it forms the most pleasing of any to the untutored mind, so it continues, after the experience of a life spent in the cultivation of taste, to retain its unundiminished attractions: I should rather say, retains all its first attractions, heightened by many stronger ones of a moral nature. "HIM have we seen, the greenwood side along, "As o'er the heath we hied, our labour done, "Oft as the wood-lark piped his evening song, "With wishful eye pursue the setting sun.' "Such is one of the characteristical features in a portrait, sketched for himself, by the exquisite pencil of Gray; presenting an interesting counterpart to what he has elsewhere said of the poetical visions which delighted' his childhood. --"Oft before his infant eye would run "Such forms as glitter in the muses ray, "With orient hues.". "Among the several kinds of beauty," (says Mr. Addison)" the eye takes most delight in colours. "We nowhere, meet with a more glorious or pleasing shew in nature, than what appears in the heavens, at the rising and setting "of the sun, which is wholly made "up of those different stains of light, that shew themselves in "clouds of a diferent situation, "For this reason we find the poets, "who are always addressing them"selves to the imagination, borrow almost without exception, express, when they see gardens laid out after the Dutch manner; and hence the justness of the epithet childish, ot puerile, which is commonly employed to characterize this species of taste;-one of the earliest stages of its progress both in individuals and in nations. "When, in addition to the pleasures connected with colours, external objects present those which arise from certain modifications of form, the same name will be naturally applied to both the causes of the mixed emotion. The emotion appears, in point of fact, to our consciousness, simple and uncom pounded, no person being able to say, while it is felt, how much of the effect is to be ascribed to either cause, in preference to the other, and it is the philosopher alone, whe ever thinks of attempting, by a series of observations and experiments, to accomplish such an analysis. The following expressions of Virgil shew how easily the fancy confounds these two ingredients, of the beau tiful under one common epithet. Edera formosior alba." "O for 66 mose puer, nimium ne crede co"lori." That the adjective formosus originally referred to the beauty of form alone, is manifest from its etymology; and yet it would appear that, even to the correct taste of Virgil, it seemed no less applicable to the beauty of colour. "In another passage the same epithet is employed, by the same poet, as the most comprehensive which the language afforded, to describe the countless charms of nature, in the most beautiful season of the year: On the Beautiful. "Similar remarks may be extended to the word Beauty, when applied to motion, a species of beauty which may be considered as in part a modification of that of form; being perceived when a pleasing outline is thus sketched, or traced out, to the spectator's fancy. The beauty of motion has, however, beside this, a charm peculiar to itself; more particularly, when exhibited by an animated being; above all, when exhibited by an individual of our own species. In these cases, it produces that powerful effect, to the unknown cause of which we give the name of grace; -an effect which seems to depend, in no inconsiderable degree, on the additional interest which the pleasing form derives from its fugitive and evanescent existence; the memory dwelling fondly on the charm which has fled, while the eye is fascinated with the expectation of what is to follow. A fascination, somewhat analogous to this, is experienced when we look at the undulations of a flag streaming to the wind;-at the wreathings and convolutions of a column of smoke;or at the momentary beauties and splendours of fireworks, amid the darkness of night. In the human figure, however, the enchanting power of graceful motion is probably owing chiefly to the living expression which it exhibits; - an expression ever renewed and ever "From the combination of these results, who can ascertain the re- "In this enlargement, too, of "It is not necessary for any of the purposes which I have at present in view, that I should attempt to investigate the principles on which colours, forms, or motion, With the give pleasure to the eye. greater part of Mr. Alison's remarks, on these qualities, I perfectly agree; although, in the case of the first, I am disposed to ascribe more to the mere organic impression, independ ently of any association or expression whatever, than he seems willing to allow. "The opinion, however, we may adopt on this point is of little importance to the following argument, provided it be granted that each of these clauses (comprehended under the generic term Beautiful) ought, in a philosophical inquiry into the N2 nature nature of Beauty, to form the object of a separate investigation; and that the sources of these pleasing effects should be traced in analytical detail, before we presume to decide how far they are all susceptible of explanation from one general theory. In this respect, Mr. Alison's work seems to me to be peculiarly valuable. It is eminently calculated to awaken and to direct the observation of his readers to particular phenomena, and to the state of their own feelings; and whoever peruses it with due attention, cannot fail to be satisfied, that the metaphysical generalizations which have been so often attempted on this subject, are not more unsuccessful in their execution, than they are unphilosophical in their design. "Mr. Hogarth and Mr. Burke are also entitled to much praise, for a variety of original and just remarks, with which they have enriched this part of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. But although they appear to have aimed at a plan of inquiry founded on the rules of a sound logic; and although their good sense has kept them at a distance from that vague and mysterious phraseology concerning Beauty in general, in which so many of their predecessors delighted, they have, nevertheless, been frequently misled by the spirit of system; attempting to erect the critical inferences which their good taste had formed in some particular depart ments of the fine arts, into established maxims of universal application. The justness of this criticism, so far as it refers to Hogarth, has been shewn in a very satisfactory manner by Mr. Alison; and it will appear, in the course of our present speculations, that Mr. Burke falls, at least in an equal degree, under the same censure. Before, how ever, I proceed to any comments on the conclusions of this eminent writer, it is necessary for me, in the first place, to follow out, a few steps farther, the natural progress or history of the mind, in its conceptions of the Beautiful. "I have already taken notice of the pleasure which children very early manifest at the sight of regular forms, and uniform arrangements. The principles on which these produce their effects, and which render one regular form more pleasing than another, have engaged the attention of various authors; but it is sufficient for my purpose if the general fact be admitted; and about this there cannot possibly be any room for dispute. With respect to the theories which profess to account for the phenomena in question, I must own, that they appear to me more fanciful than solid; although I am far from being disposed to insinuate, that they are totally destitute of foundation. "The same love of regular forms, and of uniform arrangements, continues to influence powerfully, in the maturity of reason and experience, the judgments we pronounce on all works of human art, where regularity and uniformity do not interfere with purposes of utility. In recommending these forms and arrangements, in the particular circumstances just mentioned, there is one principle which seems to me to have no inconsiderable influence; and which I shall take this opportunity of hinting at slightly, as I do not recollect to have seen it anywhere applied to questions of criticism. The principle I allude to is, that of the sufficient reason, of which so much use is made, (and in my opinion sometimes very erroneously made) in the philosophy of Leib |