IMPORTATION OF SLAVES.

in execution, whether it belongs to the debtor
or not. Stone v. Pointer, pl. 1. p. 287.

1. If the case made by a Bill of Exceptions be,
that the plaintiffs, suing for freedom, were
brought into this state subsequent to the

2.

INDEMNITY.

claim to them on the ground that the oath,
prescribed by the fourth section of the Act of
1792, (1 R. C. ch. 103,) was duly taken by
him or those under whom he claims; the
other grounds of claim authorized by the last
clause of the same section, (not being
mentioned,) must be considered as excluded.
Garnett v. Sam and Phillis, pl. 1. p. 542.
The right of freedom prima facie acquired
by a slave imported into this state, subsequent
to the year 1786, could only be obviated by
evidence adduced to shew, or by circum-
stances authorizing a presumption, that the
oath required by law had been taken by the
importer. Ibid. pl. 2.

3. In the trial of a suit for freedom, declara-
tions of a person who imported the plaintiff's
are not evidence in their favour; if it do
not appear that those declarations were
made during the time when he claimed them
as his slaves, and that the defendant claims
under him. Ibid. pl. 3.

INDEMNIFYING BOND.

1. By virtue of the Act of Assembly, concerning
Sheriffs, passed the 8th of February, 1808,
(Rev'd. Code, 2d vol. p. 160.) any person
claiming the property sold under an execu-
tion, may prosecute an action of debt on the
bond of indemnity, in the name of the
Sheriff or other officer to whom it was taken,
without proving that any damage has been
sustained by such officer. Carrington v.
Anderson, pl. 1. p. 32.

2.

2.

3.

4.

5.

The Deputy Sheriff, who sold the property
under the execution, is not a competent
witness, in an action in the name of the
High Sheriff upon the bond of indemnity, to
prove that, in fact, the property was that of 6.
the person against whom the execution was
issued. Ibid. pl. 2.

3. Under the Act of Assembly concerning
Sheriffs, (Rev'd. Code, 2d vol. p. 160,) the
Sheriff, having received the bond of in-
demnity, is bound to sell the property taken

187.

INDORSERS.

On a Bill exhibited by the holder of a
promissory note against the maker and all
the indorsers; to avoid circuity of action,
the Court of Equity may fix the debt on the
person first responsible. Chalmers, Jones
and Co. v. M Murdo, pl. 1. p. 252.

The first indorser of a note in point of time
is not of course first responsible. Ibid. pl. 2.
If the payee of a note write his name ever
that of a person, who indorsed it in blank,
but refused to do so except upon the ground
of the responsibility of the payee as first
indorser; he thereby makes himself responsi
ble, as such, in point of contract. Ibid. pl.

3.

If a promissory note, negotiable at bank, be
made and indorsed, for the purpose ouly of
obtaining accommodation for the maker, and,
being left by him with a second endorser to
be lodged in the bank for discount, be
fraudulently put into circulation by such
second indorser, to raise money thereupon
for his own use; a third indorser, knowing
nothing of such fraud, may cause the note,
(if lodged in the bank for collection, and not
paid when due,) to be protested as to the
maker and prior indorsers, pay it himself, and
thereupon maintain his action against the
maker and first indorsers, notwithstanding no
valuable consideration passed, or was con-
tracted for, between him and the second
indorser, but he made the indorsement
merely from the motive of enabling such
second indorser to get the note discounted at
the bank. Robertson and Co. v. Williams
and Smith, pl. 1. p. 381.

The holder of a bill of exchange with several
indorsements in blank, has a right to strike
out the names of the indorsers subsequent to
the first, and to write over the name of the
first indorser an assignment to himself; or
the bill, without such assignment, will be
considered as his property, by his having

it in his power to make it. Ritchie and
Wales v. Moore, pl. 1. p. 838.

INFANT.

1. It is not a sufficient ground for reversing an
interlocutory decree, that no day was given
to an infant defendant to shew cause against
it after he should come of age; because such
omission may be corrected in the final 8.
decree. Pickett and Wife v. Chilton, pl. 5.
p. 467.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

INJUNCTION.

See Equity; and Royall's Administrators v.
Royall's Administrator, pl. 2. 82.
See Equity; and Medley v. Jones, pl. 1. p.

98.

A person entitled to a remainder in fee
expectant upon a life estate in slaves, taking
them into his own possession to prevent the
tenant for life from carrying them out of the
state, is bound to account for and pay their
hire or profits while he detains them; and is
not entitled, upon the ground of the tenant's
refusing to give bond and security for their
production at the expiration of the life estate,
to an injunction to stay proceedings upon a
Judgment against him for such hire or profit.
Medley v. Jones, pl. 2. p. 98.

9.

1.

If a fieri facias against the goods of a Testa-
tor be levied on slaves which by his will
were specifically bequeathed, and after his
death were allotted to the legatees by the 1.
executor, who thereupon held them, and
hired them out, as guardian for such legatee,
a Court of Equity ought by injunction to
stop the sale, until an account of the assets
unadministered shall be taken; and, upon
such account, to decree, that the creditor
shall be satisfied out of those assets; or, (if
there be a deficiency,) out of the residue of
the estate of which the Testator died pos-
sessed; having regard to the rights of the
several legatees under the will. Scott and
Wife v. Halliday and Hinton, pl. 1. p.

103.

See Legacy; and Sampson v. Bryce, pl. 2.
P. 175.

An injunction of a Court of Chancery in 1.
hibiting the defendants, and all other persons,
from selling certain slaves until the farther
order of the Court, is conclusive, while in
force, to prevent their being lawfully sold
to satisfy an execution against him, even in
favour of a person not a party to the suit in
Chancery. West v. Belches, pl. 2. p.

187.

7. It is not equitable that a defendant to a Bill
of Injunction, (in whose favor a Judgment
at law was rendered, for a sum of money
which he had paid as security for the com-
plainant) to except a Commissioner's state-

2.

ment of the debits and credits between them,
"to the time of the Judgment:" on the
ground that," from the circumstances of the
case, and conduct of the parties, they con-
sidered their accounts as closed, and nothing
due on either side ;" and, yet, to select, and
rely upon the Judgment, as an Item in his
favor, in exclusion of the other Items in the
account. Foster v. Clarke, pl. 1. p. 430.
It is a sufficient ground of Equity for a per-
petual Injunction to a Judgment in Slander,
that at the time of speaking the defamatory
words, and when the Judgment was obtained,
the complainant in the Bill (who was de-
fendant at law) was insane, or in a state of par-
tial mental derangement on the subject to which
those words related. Homer v. Marshall's
adm'x. pl. 1. p. 466.

See Interest; and Mayo v. Judah, pl. 2. p.
495.

INSANITY.

It is sufficient ground of Equity for a per-
petual Injunction to a Judgment in slander,
that, at the time of speaking the defamatory
words, and when the Judgment was obtained,
the complainant in the Bill (who was defend-
ant at law) was insane, or in a state of partial
mental derangement on the subject to which
those words related. Homer v. Marshall's
adm'x. pl. 1. p. 466.

INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES.

Where the extent of the plaintiff's right under
a Covenant depends, in part, upon extrinsic
testimony; the Court ought not to instruct
the Jury" that if, upon the said evidence,
they shall be of opinion that certain facts are
established, then the defendant has broken his
covenant as charged in the declaration;" for
it is not competent for the Court to say whe-
ther such facts are sufficient, or not, to war-
rant such conclusion, unless the sufficiency
thereof had been duly submitted to its Judg
ment by a demurrer to the evidence. Hol-
lingsworth v. Dunbar, pl. 1. p. 199.

INTENTION.

The addition of a Codicil to a Will is not
sufficient to operate as a devise of lands pur-
chased by the Testator between the date of
the Will and the date of the Codicil; there
being no words in the Codicil indicating such
to be the intention of the Testator. Ken-
dall's Ex'or. &c. v. Kendall &c. pl. 1. p.

272.

To effect the manifest intention of a Testator,
the word "children" may be taken as sy-
nonymous with issue. In this case, there-
fore, a devise of slaves to a married woman,
"to her and her children for ever," was con-
strued as a devise to her issue, the Court

being of opinion that the word, "children,"
was not intended to denote the devisee, or
devisees, who were to take, nor to reduce the 8.
portion of the interest of the mother in and
to the slaves before given to her by the same
clause, but to declare the duration of her
interest therein. Merrymans v. Merryman
and others, pl. 1. p. 440.

INTEREST.

1. Though Interest ought not to be given, as of
course, in actions for the recovery of rent in
arrear, it may nevertheless be given, under
circumstances to be judged of by the Jury;
and, in case of a general verdict allowing In-
terest, it shall be intended that sufficient
circumstances existed to justify the allow-
ance thereof. Don v. Adams's adm'rs. pl. 1.
p. 21.

2.

3.

4.

But if the Jury state the circumstances in a
special Verdict, the Court should disallow
the Interest, if, under those circumstances,
it ought not to be allowed. Ibid. pl. 2.
Interest on Rents in arrear ought not to be
allowed, the circumstances being that there
always were effects on the premises, liable to
distress, sufficient to have satisfied the Rents,
which were not paid, though demanded by
the landlord. Ibid. pl. 3.

Under the circumstances of this case, one of
the persons entitled to partition having been
in possession and enjoyment of the whole
land for many years, through want of know-
ledge of the title of the other partners, to
whom he made their title known immediately
after it was discovered by himself, upon a
Bill filed by them for partition; it was con-
sidered equitable that he should account for
their proportion of the rents received by him,
deducting his disbursements for securing the
title that all the leases, and agreements of
lease, he had made of the land should be
acquiesced in by the plaintiffs; and that, for
a part which he had sold, he should pay the
price received with interest from the time of
the sale; the time when he received it not
appearing to be different from that of the
sale. Carters Ex'or. v. Carter and others,
pl. 2. p. 108.
5. Interest also would have been allowed the

9.

10.

11.

12.

1.

2.

1.

2.

Monies directed to be invested by Executors
in Government securities should be accounted
for, as if invested after a reasonable time for
that purpose: but the Executors ought to be
charged with Interest during such reasonable
time, nor with Interest upon dividends of 1.
stock, if such dividends have not been actually

When a person, who bought a slave with
lawful notice of a better title, is decreed to
deliver him and pay profits; Interest ought
to be charged against him, upon the hires
actually received by him from other persons,
from the dates of his receipts; but not upon
the profits of such slave while in his own pos
session without being hired; the same being
unliquidated and merely conjectural sums,
and which he was in no default in not pay-
ing. Baird v. Bland and others, pl. I. p.

492.

Where Principal and Interest, due on a
Bond, amount to more than the penalty;
and damages are found by a Verdict, Judg-
ment ought not be entered for the penalty
and costs, to be discharged by the principal
and interest, with the damages so assessed
and the costs; but for the penalty and dams-
ges (if not exceeding those laid in the Wri
and the costs. Tennant's Ex'or. v. Gray,
A stipulation in a Bond or Deed of trust,
pl. 1. p. 494.
that, upon the debtors failing at any
time to pay the annual Interest, the princi-
pal sum (which otherwise would not be pay-
able until a distant day) shall be considered
due, is in the nature of a penalty, against
which it is the province of a Court of Equity
In such case, the payment or tender of the
to relieve. Mayo v. Judah, pl. 1. p. 495.
Interest, at any time before the sale under
the Deed of Trust authorizes the debtor to
call upon the Court of Chancery to prevent
the sale. And by virtue of the Act of As-
sembly concerning Executions, passed No-
vember, 25th, 1814, the debtor was author-
ized to substitute Bond and security in lieu of
payment. Ibid. pl. 2.

INTERLOCUTORY DECREE.

See Decree; and Birchett and others v. Bel-
ling, pl. 3. p. 442.

See Infant; and Pickett & Wife v. Chilton,
pl. 5. p. 467.

INVESTMENT.

See Executors and administrators; and Car-
ter's Ex'ors. v. Cutting & Wife, pl. 7. p.
223.

Where an Executor is directed to invest
money in stock, he ought to have the invest-
ment made in his own name as Erecutor, in
order that, if necessary, the stock may be
readily converted into money to pay the
debts of his Testator. Ibid. pl. 8. p. 224.

IRREGULARITY.

Whenever there is an issue in fact, and also
a demurrer, the demurrer ought first regu-

2.

3.

4.

2.

larly to be decided; but an irregularity in
this respect is not sufficient to reverse a Judg. 4.
ment to which there is no other objection.
Jones v. Stevenson, pl. 4 p 1.

A partition which has long been acquiesced
in and acted upon by the parties generally,
ought not to be disturbed at all on the
ground of irregularity only; though, if un-
just or illegal, it may be impeached by a
party who never acquiesced. Carters Ex'ors.
v. Carter and others, pl. 1 p. 103.

See Lands; and M'Clean v. Tomlinson, pl.
1. p. 220.

ISSUE.

See Assumpsit; and Jones v. Stevenson, pl.
2. p. 1.

Quare, whether it is competent to the plain-
tiff, in any action other than Replevin, to
tender an issue in fact by a Replication, and
an issue in law by a demurrer, to the same
plea? Ibid. pl. 3. p. 1

3. Whenever there is an issue in fact, and also
a demurrer, the demurrer ought first regu-
larly to be decided; but an irregularity in
this respect is not sufficient to reverse a Judg.
ment to which there is no other objection.
Ibid. pl. 4. p. 1.

4.

5.

1.

See Equity; and Sims's administrator v.
Lewis's Ex'or and others, pl. 2. p. 29.
See Intention; and Merrymans v. Merry-
man and others, pl. 1. p. 440.

J

JEOFFAILS.

See Issue; and Jones v. Stevenson, pl. 4. p. 1.
See Jurisdiction; and Buster v. Ruffner, pl.
1. p. 27.

JOINDER IN DEMURRER.

5.

6.

7.

1. If the case be clear against the party tender- 1.
ing a demurrer to evidence, the Court may
refuse to compel the other party to join.
Dunbar v. Beale, pl. 1. p. 24.

1.

2.

3.

A high sheriff, against whom a Judgment is
rendered for the default or misconduct of his
deputy, is entitled to recover of such deputy,
not only the amount of the original Judgment,
but all additions thereto, arising from coro-
ner's commissions included in a forthcoming
bond, costs of a Judgment on that bond, and
costs and damages on appeals, or writs of 2.
supersedeas, until its final affirmance by the
Court of Appeals. Stowers Ex'or. of Bragg
v. Smith's Ex'x., pl. 2. p 401

But a Judgment in his favour against the
deputy, if rendered for more damages than
have heen recovered against himself, ought to

It is not equitable that a defendant to a Bill
of Injunction, (in whose favour a Judgment at
law was rendered for a sum of money which
he had paid as security for the complainant,)
should except to a commissioner's statement
of the debits and credits between them,
to
the time of the Judgment, on the ground that,
from the circumstances of the case, and con-
duct of the parties, they considered their
accounts as closed, and nothing due on either
side;" and yet should select, and rely
upon, the judgment as an item in his favour,
in exclusion of the other items in the account.
Foster v. Clarke, pl. 1. p. 430.

If, pending a suit, the parties, by an order of
Court, refer the matter in controversy to
arbitrators, whose award is to be made the
Judgment of the Court; and, afterwards, by
an agreement under seal, appoint a substitute
for one of them; agreeing that an award to
be made by the remaining referees and such
substitute, shall be entered as the Judgment of
the Court, such award may be entered, with-
out any previous order of Court confirming
the appointment of such substitute. Manlove
v. Thrift, pl. 1. p. 493.

See Interest; and Tennant's Ex'or. v. Gray,
pl. 1. p. 494.

In a suit for freedom, the validity of a Will,
under which the plaintiff claims, ought not to
be questioned; the same, (or a copy thereof,
the original being destroyed,) having been
admitted to record, as and for the last Will
of the Testator, by the proper Court, whose
judgment remains unappealed from, and the.
validity of such Will not contested by Bill in
Equity. Lemon v. Reynolds Adm'r. of
Holmes, p. 552.

JURISDICTION.

A man indebted by bond, executed a convey-
ance of all his property, in trust, for payment
of his just debts, in the first place; for his
own support during life, in the second; and,
afterwards, for the benefit of his wife, &c.
He died, without a Will, or property acquired
after the date of such conveyance; and no
person administered on his estate. It was
held that an assignee of the bond was not
restricted to his remedy at law against the
assignor; but, without bringing any action at
law, might obtain relief in equity, by a decree
for a sate of the property in the hands of the
Trustee. Taylor v. Ficklin & others, pl. 1.
P. 25.

In such case, if the fund in the possession of
the Trustee prove insufficient, the plaintiff' in
equity may recover the balance of his claim,
from a debtor of the obligor; and, in default
of both these funds, in whole or in part,
he may proceed against the assignor. Ibid.
pl. 2. p. 25.

4.

5.

12.

1.

3. And, it seems, that, all the persons concerned
being made parties, the Court may do com-
plete justice in one suit, and make a full end
of the whole controversy. Ibid pl. 3. p. 25.
In an action of Assumpsit in the Superior
Court of a County, the declaration's laying
the venue in a different County, and omitting
to state that the cause of action arose within
the jurisdiction of the Court, is not error
sufficient in arrest of Judgment. Buster v.
Ruffner, pl. 1. p. 27.
In such case the proceeding in Equity is
proper, also because it avoids circuity of
action, and the Court has the power of di-
recting an issue, to try by a Jury the justice
of the plaintiff's claim. Sims's Adm'r. v.
Lewis's Ex'or. and others, pl. 2. p. 29.
6. A purchaser of land, suing for breach of a
contract to make a good title, may with pro-
priety come into a Court of Equity for pecu-
niary compensation, instead of proceeding at
law in the first instance; if the vendor has
conveyed away his property in trust, whereby
there might be a difficulty in obtaining
satisfaction of his judgment when recovered;
the vendor, or his lawful representatives, 1.
together with the Trustees and cestuys que
trust being made defendants to the bill.
Sims's Adm'r, v. Lewis's Ex'or. & others, pl.
1. p. 29.

7.

8.

9.

See Equity; and Royall's Administrators v.
Royall's Administrator, pl. 2 p. 82.

A Court of Equity has jurisdiction to decree
the repayment of money paid by mistake;
notwithstanding the plaintiff's remedy by
assumpsit for money had and received.
Wilkin's v. Woodfin Adm'r. of Pearce, pl. 1.
p. 183.

A bill for relief against a writing purporting
an acknowledgment of a gift of property by
the complainant to the defendant, on the
ground of its having been obtained by fraud,
presents a proper case for equitable jurisdic-
tion though a suit at law, founded
upon such
writing, might be defeated without coming
into equity. Johnson v. Hendley, pl.1. p 219.
10. In an action on the case for consequential

damages occasioned by the erection of a mill,
if the damages recovered be less than one
hundred dollars, the defendant cannot appeal
to the Court of Appeals; notwithstanding it
appears from the Record that the right to
erect the mill was drawn in question. Skip-
with v Young, pl 1. p. 276.

2.

2.

2.

11. The Clerk of this Court being required, by
an Act of Assembly enacted since he came
into office, to give hond and security for
performance of his official duty, the Court 1.
considered it not proper to dispense with or
sanction the non-execution of such bond, or
to pronounce any opinion as to the conse
quences of his failing to do so; but left it to
him to execute the same, or not, at his own
peril, to be adjudged of in case of failure, by
a Court having competent jurisdiction of the

3.

4,

Though interest ought not to be given, as of
course, in actions for the recovery of rent in
arrear, it may nevertheless be given under
circumstances, to be judged of by the Jury;
and, in case of a general verdict allowing
interest, it shall be intended that sufficient
circumstances existed to justify the allowance
thereof. Don v. Adams's Adm'rs. pl. 1. p. 21.
But if the Jury state the circumstances in a
special verdict, the Court should disallow the
interest, if, under these circumstances, it
ought not to be allowed. Ibid. pl. 2. p. 21.

JUSTIFICATION.

Whether, in an action for words, circumstances
of suspicion, not amounting to full justifica
tion, may be proven in mitigation of damages.
Cheatwood v. Mayo, pl. 1. p. 16.

66

In an action of slander, for saying of the
plaintiff, that he had taken the defendant's
slave, and that the defendant would have him
sent to the penitentiary for it," the plea
being justification, "because the plaintiff
did take a certain female slave, the property
of the defendant, out of his possession, in
such manner and with such intention, as
would subject him to such pun shment ;" to
which the plaintiff replied generally, and
issue was thereupon joined, it was decided,
that, to support this plea of justification, it
was sufficient for the defendant to shew that
the slave, so averred to be his property, had
been a long time in his possession as his slave,
and was purchased by him as such, notwith-
standing the pendency of a suit at that time
in her behalf for freedom; for, if her right
to freedom could be enquired into in this
action, an issue thereupon ought to have
been tendered by the plaintiff, whereby the
defendant might have known to what point
to apply his evidence. Hook's adm'rs. v.
Hancock, pl. 1. p. 546

L

LANDS.

See Jurisdiction; and Sims's administrator
v. Lewis's Ex'or. and others, pl 1. p. 29.
See Escheats; and the Commonwealth v.
Martin's Ex'ors. and Devisees, pl. 1. p. 117.
See Escheats; and the Commonwealth v.
Selden & Seddon, pl. 1. p. 160.

See Mistake; and Graham v. Hendren, pl.
1. p. 185.