*

*

mined by the act of God, and to this no suffi- | in other lands, known as the slave trade, was cient answer was given. *The plaint- also sanctioned by the latter code. 1 Wild. Int. iff's right vested when the bargain was made. Law, 70; Dana's Wheat., 199; The Antelope, 10 The subsequent interference of the colonial Wheat., 67; Le Louis, 2 Dod., 210. Legislature does not prevent his recovering what was then stipulated for."

Where the traffic was carried on by the subjects of governments which had forbidden it, a Williams, Justice, said: "The whole question different rule was applied. The Amedie, 1 Acis, who shall bear the loss occasioned by a ciston, 240; The Diana, 1 Dod., 95; The Fortuna,1 major? And that depends much upon the ques tion, who was the proprietor when that loss was occasioned? The property in the services of these laborers had been transferred to the defendant. Then the question is analogous to those which often arise in cases of loss by fire; as whether the goods were in transitu or the transit was ended. If the property had passed, and the residue of it was destroyed by a vis major, the loss must fall upon the proprietor of the thing, namely: of the services during the unexpired term." The other justices expressed them selves to the same effect, and the judgment was unanimously given.

If all the buildings upon leasehold premises be destroyed by fire, the lessee is, nevertheless, liable for the full amount of the rent during the residue of the term. Baker v. Holtpzaffell, 4 Taunt., 45. And if he has covenanted to repair, he must also rebuild. Phillips v. Stevens, 16 Mass., 238. So, if a fire occur after the contract of sale, but before the conveyance is executed, the loss must be borne by the buyer. Sug. Vend., 291.

All contracts are inherently subject to the paramount power of the sovereign, and the exercise of such power is never understood to involve their violation, and is not within that pro vision of the National Constitution which forbids a State to pass laws impairing their obliga tion. The power acts upon the property which is the subject of the contract, and not upon the contract itself. West River Bridge Co.v. Dix, 6 How., 582, 536.

Dod., 81. Humane and just sentiments upon the subject were of slow growth in the minds of publicists. 1 Phillmore's Law of Nations, 316. The institution has existed largely under the authority of the most enlightened nations of ancient and modern times. Wherever found, the rights of the owner have been regarded there as surrounded by the same sanctions and covered by the same protection as other property. Le Louis, 2 Dod., 250. The British Government paid for the slaves carried off by its troops from this country, in the war of 1812, as they did for other private property in the same category. Lawrence's Wheat., 496. The Constitution of the United States guarantied the return of persons held to service or labor in one State under the laws thereof, escaping into another." "The object of this clause was to secure to the citizens of the slaveholding States the complete right and title of ownership in their slaves as property in every State in the Union, into which they might escape.' Historically it is known that without this provision, the Constitution would not have been adopted, and the Union could not have been formed. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet., 611.

But without considering at length the several assumptions of the proposition, it is a sufficient answer to say that when the 13th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was adopted, the rights of the plaintiff in this action had become legally and completely vested. Rights acquired by a deed, will or contract of marriage, or other contract executed according Such, also, is the rule of the French law and to statutes subsequently repealed, subsist aftersuch was the Roman law. The seller is not wards, as they were before, in all respects as bound to warrant the buyer against acts of if the statutes were still in full force. This is a mere force, violence and casualties, nor against principle of universal jurisprudence. It is necthe act of the sovereign. 1 Domat. part 1,book essary to the repose and welfare of all commu. 1.tit. 2, sec. 10, paragraph 4. “After the bargain nities. A different rule would shake the social is completed, the purchaser stands to all losses.' fabric to its foundations and let in a flood tide Digest 2, 14, 77, Cooper's Justinian, 615. The of intolerable evils. It would be contrary to case is one in which the maxim applies, Res" the general principles of law and reason," perit suo domino. Meredith's Emerigon, 419; Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves., 349.

and to one of the most vital ends of government. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall., 388. The docIt has been earnestly insisted that contracts trines of the repeal of statutes and the destrucfor the purchase and sale of slaves are contrary tion of vested rights by implication, are alike to natural justice and right, and have no valid unfavored in the law. Neither is to be adity unless sustained by positive law; that the mitted unless the implication is so clear as to right to enforce them rests upon the same be equivalent to an explicit declaration. Every foundation, and that when the institution is doubt should be resolved against a construction abolished, all such contracts and the means of so fraught with mischiefs. There is nothing their enforcement, unless expressly saved, are in the language of the Amendment which in the thereby destroyed. Slavery was originally in- slightest degree warrants the inference that troduced into the American Colonies by the those who framed or those who adopted it inmother country, and into some of them against tended that such should be its effect. It is their will and protestations. In most, if not all wholly silent upon the subject. The proposi of them, it rested upon universally recognized tion, if carried out in this case, would, in ef custom, and there were no statutes legalizing fect, take away one man's property and give it its existence more than there were legalizing to another. And the deprivation would be the tenure of any other species of personal prop 'without due process of law." This is forbiderty. Though contrary to the law of nature it den by the fundamental principles of the social was recognized by the law of nations. The atro-compact, and is beyond the sphere of the legis cious traffic in human beings, torn from their lative authority both of the States and the Nacountry to be transported to hopeless bondage tion. Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 146; Wynehamer

Y. The People. 13 N. Y., 394; Wilkinson v. Le. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the Unit

used them as a line of steamers from New York | same as all coal was ordered and bought for the to Baltimore. The Patapsco was chartered by the company to run on the line, and registered at New York in the individual name of one Ba con, President of the Company; though the company controlled her. The company had an agent at Baltimore, and the course of dealing was as follows:

several steamers constituting the line.” “The owners or charterers (he added) were not known in the transaction, but the steamer was supposed to belong to the Commercial Steamboat Company, by the parties who furnished the coal." During the whole time that this coal was furnished, the steamboat company was in an emWhen the steamers would arrive at Baltimore, barrassed state, and on the 3d of February, on their engineers would inform this agent of the which day the first item of the coal for which amount of coal they needed for their different the steamer was libeled, was furnished, the vessels; whereupon the agent would fill up a steamship company executed six promissory printed calendar circular, directed to Boyce, re- notes of $7,500 each, $45,000 in all, to the Baltiquesting him to furnish" with invoice" to that more and Ohio Railroad Company; following steamer by name (in this case The Patapsco) them immediately and by the 6th, by mortgages so many tons of coal; saying nothing about on three of its steamers to secure payment. charging any body. Boyce would then fill up a And it owed a balance of $25,800 to the Nepprinted order to his clerk, directing him to furtune Steamboat Company on the 1st of Februnish the coal to the steamer named. On receipt of this latter order, the coal would be delivered on board the steamer. At the end of a month, a bill would be made of all deliverances to all the boats. The object of making out a general bill at the end of each month, it appears, was to avoid a multiplication of bills and for the sake of convenience.

The entries in the libelants' journal were thus -one example showing all:

ary, 1866, so much remaining due for money laid out, paid or advanced, in the preceding year.

On the 2d of April, 1866, nine days after the last item of coal furnished to The Patapsco, the registered owner, Bacon, executed a bill of sale of her to Borland, already mentioned as the claimant in the case, to secure to him a debt of $10,500, and on the 10th following the company failed entirely; the failure being followed by attachments to a very large amount, much of it like the $25,800 already mentioned, for money lent or debts due prior to the 3d of February, 1866; and the result being a general break 560 up of the company, in which the creditors got 294 but a small portion of the claims from the whole effects of the corporation.

BALTIMORE, March, 1866.

And in his ledger, they were thus:

Commercial St'b't Co.:

1866.

Jany. 30th, To Coal Ac..

Dr.

Feb.

Feb.

March

March

"Bituminous Ac.
Coal Ac...
"Bituminous Ac.
Coal Ac...
Bituminous Ac.
Coal Ac.
"Bituminous Ac..
"Cash

April

May 16,

Feb. 5, By Cash.

Cr.

$560

175

$1,589

It was in virtue of his bill of sale above mentioned that Borland contested the libelant's claim.

The district court dismissed the libel; hold. $2,896.36 ing that there was no credit to the vessel. The 2,963.60 circuit court, on appeal, held that there was, 790.00 and reversed the decree. From this reversal 2,416.10 Borland appealed to this court.

1,550. Whether the coal was furnished on the cred1,539. it of the vessel, or of the owners, is the only 1,462.50 point of inquiry in this case. The case itself 65. is not without its embarrassments, for the evi39.10 dence, in some of its aspects, is not consistent with either theory, but the weight of it, in our $13,761.66 opinion, enables us to assert the lien against the ship. $3,000. It is undisputed that The Patapsco was in a 1,000. foreign port, and that the coal was ordered for 1,849.96 her, specifically by name, and delivered to the 73.50 officers in charge of her. It is equally free 136.00 from dispute that the supply of coal was neces 3,008.41 sary-indeed, indispensable-to enable her to 4.693.79 make her voyage at all. In such a case the inference is, that the credit was given to the ves$13,761.66 sel, unless it can be inferred that the master had Dr. funds or the owners had credit, and that the $4,693.79 material man knew of this, or knew such facts The form of entries of the libelants' day-book as should have put him on inquiry. The Lulu, did not appear; the claimant waived the pro- 10 Wall., 192 [77 U. S., XIX., 906]. There is duction of it and the bills rendered to the com- no reason to suppose that the master had funds pany were not produced. or the owners of the line credit, nor that the li belant was guilty of laches. On the contrary it is in proof that the company which owned the line of steamships was, at the date of these transactions, hopelessly insolvent, and was borrowing large sums of money on a mortgage of its steamers, away from home, and in the very city where the libelant resided. It would

To Balance..

The coal was sold at the lowest price, and it was necessary for The Patapsco to make her trips, and was used by her in making them. The agent of the steamship company stated that The coal bought for The Patapsco was or dered for the steamer expressly, but on account of the Commercial Steamship Company, the

to disturb the decree of the circuit court in
any particular.
Decree affirmed.

14 Blatchf., 42; 5 Hughes, 484; 8 Ben., 23.

Cited-17 Wall., 669; 20 Wall., 164; 11 Blatchf., 242;

v.

Z. MONTGOMERY ET AL.

be strange if the libelant did not know this condition of things and, in the absence of proof on the subject, it is a reasonable inference that he did. If he had this knowledge it would be a violent presumption to suppose that he relied on the credit of the company at all for the supplies which he furnished. The company running the steamers was a distant corporation, of no established name, and without personal lia- REUBEN S. CARPENTIER, Plff. in Err., bility in case the enterprise recently undertaken should prove a failure, and it is hard to believe that a large and intelligent coal merchant in Baltimore, in dealing with this corporation, intended to renounce his claim against the steamers in case he was not paid. It is very clear that there was no credit to the com pany at the time of sale, because the coal was old for cash at the lowest market price. And when the libelant waived his privilege of cash on delivery, and put the coal on board the steam ship, the presumption of law would be that he thereby gave credit to the steamship, and not to the owners thereof, inasmuch as the supplies were furnished in a foreign port.

If the credit was to the vessel there is a lien, and the burden of displacing it is on the claim ant. He must show, affirmatively, that the credit was given to the company to the exclusion of a credit to the vessel. This he seeks to do by the form of charge in the libelant's jour nal and ledger. If it be conceded that these entries tend to support this position, they are far from being conclusive evidence on the sub ject. Entries in books are always explainable, and the truth of the transaction can be shown independent of them. The form of charge in any book of original entries does not appear, as the day book was not called for by the claim ants, nor are the "invoices" which the libelant was directed to furnish with the coal produced. But, from the form of entry in the journal it self (where the amount furnished to each ves sel is set opposite to its name), we are led to the conclusion that the day-book entries which are thus journalized were debited to each steamer by name. If this be so, the journal entries are not inconsistent with the idea of the

(See S. C., 13 Wall., 480-497.)

Survey, when necessary to identify Mexican lands -defective boundary-effect of confirmationequitable rights.

*1. Where a Spanish or Mexican grant of lands in California does not identify the precise tract of land granted, either by description or by reference, the title is an imperfect one, needing the further action of the United States Government to make it perfect.

undefined, or one of the exterior boundary lines

2. Such is the case where one side of the tract is cannot be located. An authoritative survey is required to demonstrate the particular tract of land granted.

of land in California segregates the land from the 3. A confirmation of a Spanish or Mexican grant public domain and invests the confirmee with the legal title. It entitles him to a patent for the land other title not clothed with equal solemnities can as soon as the requisite survey has been made. No be set up against the confirmee or his assigns, in an action of ejectment.

4. But the equitable rights of third persons under the same title are not cut off. They will be sustained in a court of equity as against the confirmee and his assigns, who are chargeable with knowledge of the said equity.

5. The position of a confirmee is analogous to that of a patentee under a preemption right. Equity will hold him as a trustee for those who have equitable rights in the land, to the extent of their in

terests.

6. Equitable interests must be sought, not in an action of ejectment, but in an equitable proceeding where they can be properly investigated, with a due regard to the rights of others which may have intervened, such as those of bona fide purchasers, etc., ignorant of the equities existing between the original parties. [No. 159.]

Argued Apr. 4, 5, 8, 1872. Decided May 6, 1872.

N

Medee being five on apparent when it is proven ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United

More especially is this

that the reason why monthly accounts were made out to the steamboat company in bulk was for the sake of convenience, and to save a useless accumulation of bills. There is nothing besides this journal entry to indicate that the coal was furnished on the personal credit of the company; and, as the other facts in the case are in favor of a charge direct to the steamship, we do not think the legal inference of credit to the ship is removed.

The lien of material men for supplies in a foreign port is of so high a character that, in the case of The St. Jago de Cuba, 9 Wheat., 409, it was protected, along with that of sea men's wages, against a forfeiture which had accrued to the United States; and the recent de cisions in this court have had the effect to place this lien on a more substantial footing than some previous cases seem to have left it. The Grape shot, 9 Wall, 129 [76 U. S., XIX., 651]: The Lulu, 10 Wall.. 192 [77 U. S., XIX.. 906]; The Kalorama, 10 Wall.. 204 [77 U. S., XIX., 941]. On the whole, while we concede that the case is not free from difficulty, we are not disposed

|

States for the of California.
The case is stated by the court.
Messrs. M. Blair, F. A. Dick and H. W.
Carpentier, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. S. O. Houghton, for defendants in

error.

Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court:

This was an action brought by the plaintiff in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California against a large num ber of defendants, to recover certain lands alleged to be in their possession, lying on the east side of the Bay of San Francisco and described in the petition. Answers were put in by the defendants, severally claiming distinct portions of the land.

On the trial the plaintiff deraigned title under the children of Maria Teodora Peralta, a deceased daughter of Luis Peralta, and proved mesne conveyances from them to the extent of an undivided five and a half ninths of one ninth

*Head notes by Mr. Justice BRADLEY.

Luis Peralta, the father of Maria Teodora, died in August, 1851, in possession of the rancho called San Antonio, of which the premises in question were a part, leaving four sons, four daughters, and several grandchildren by a de-a case depending merely on the local land laws ceased daughter, the said Maria Teodora.