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only to his power of disaffirmance under the provisions of this Title, and to the provisions of the Title on Marriage. N. Y. C. C.. Sec. 16; Magee vs. Walsh, 18 Cal., 155.

When minor

may dis

SEC. 29. In all cases other than those specified by Secs. 30 and 31, the contract of a minor may, upon restoring affirm the consideration to the party from whom it was received, be disaffirmed by the minor himself, either before his majority or within a reasonable time afterwards, or, in case of his death within that period, by his heirs or personalrepresentatives.

N. Y. C. C., Sec. 17; Hastings vs. Dollarhide, 24 Cal., 195.

SEC. 30. A minor, or a person of unsourd mind of whatever degree, cannot disaffirm a contract, otherwise valid, to pay the reasonable value of things necessary for his support, or for that of his family, entered into by him when not under the care of a parent or guardian able to provide for him.

N. Y. C. C., Sec. 18.

Cannot distract for

affirm con

necessaries.

obligations.

SEC. 31 A minor cannot disaffirm an obligation, other- Nor certain wise valid, entered into by him under the express authority or direction of a statute.

N. Y. C. C., Sec. 19.

SEC. 32. A person entirely without understanding has no power to contract, except in the case mentioned in Sec. 30, unless expressly authorized by statute.

N. Y. C. C., Sec. 20.

Contracts withont understanding.

of persons

other insane persons.

SEC. 33. A person of unsound mind. but not entirely Contracts of without understanding, may make a conveyance or other contract, before his incapacity has been judicially deter mined, subject to recision, as provided in the chapter on Recision.

SEC. 34.

N. Y. C. C., Sec. 21.

After his incapacity has been judicially determined, a person of unsound mind can make no conveyance or other contract, nor delegate any power, nor waive any right, until his restoration to capacity is judicially determined. But if actually restored to capacity, he may make a will, though his restoration is not thus determined.

N. Y. C. C., Sec. 22.

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Minors liable for wrongs.

Not liable for exemplary damages.

Minors may enforce their rights.

SEC. 35. A minor, or a person of unsound mind of whatever degree, is liable for a wrong done by him, in like manner with any other person.

N. Y. C. C., Sec. 23.

SEC. 36. A minor or person of unsound mind cannot be subjected to exemplary damages, unless at the time of the act he was capable of knowing that it was wrongful.

N. Y. C. C., Sec. 24.

SEC. 37. A minor may enforce his rights by civil action or other legal proceedings, in the same manner as a person of full age, except that a guardian must be appointed to conduct the same.

N. Y. C. C., Sec. 25.

PART II.

PERSONAL RIGHTS.

SECTION 43. General personal rights.

44. Defamation, what.

45. Libel, what.

46. Slander, what.

47. What communications are privileged.

48. Protection to personal relations.

49. Right to use force.

sonal rights.

SEC. 43. Besides the personal rights mentioned or re- General percognized in the POLITICAL CODE, every person has, subject to the qualifications and restrictions provided by law, the right of protection from bodily restraint or harm, from personal insult, from defamation, and from injury to his personal relations.

There is no doubt that persistent public insults, e. g., continually shouting at a person in the street, or even silently dogging him, are personal injuries, against which he ought to be protected. Why is not an act which the law admits almost to justify, certainly to mitigate, the crime of assault and battery, sufficient foundation for a civil action? Compare Adams vs. Rivers (11 Barb., 390), where an action for use of insulting words, by one standing in the highway in front of plaintiff's land, was sustained on the ground of the trespass involved in standing in the highway after being ordered to depart, for the malicious purpose evinced.

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In all definitions of libel or slander at common law, malice
is treated as a necessary ingredient. But in the absence of
a proper notice for the publication, malice is conclusively
presumed, and the publisher of a libel is responsible, although
clearly free from actual malice (Hunt vs. Bennett, 19 N. Y.,
173; Lewis vs. Chapman, 16 id., 369). In the definitions

of both classes of defamation, therefore, the Commissioners
omit the ingredient of malice, and consequently the rules
concerning presumption of malice.

N. Y. C. C., Sec. 28.

Defamation, what.

SEC. 45. Libel is a false and unprivileged publication, Libel, what. by writing, printing, picture, effigy or other fixed repre

Slander, what.

sentation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation.

SEC. 46.

The law of libel has passed, in the last hundred years, from one extreme to another; from excessive severity to excessive laxity. The abuse of the freedom of the press, not only in the wantonness of its attacks upon public men, but in its assaults upon private citizens, has become so great, that a remedy for the evil must be sought or violence will take the place of law. The license into which this freedom has degenerated leads, not only to the frequent invasion of private rights, but to the corruption of public morals. If the Commissioners had been certain of the true remedy, they would have proposed it in the text of the Code. They will venture only to suggest that a more certain punishment for wanton or careless defamation being needed, a remedy may perhaps be found in affixing to it a penalty, to be recovered in every civil action for libel, in addition to the damages which the jury may find. This would at least render it unsafe for libellers to rely upon the caprice or prejudice of juries as the means of escape with nominal damages. Requiring the name of the writer to be signed to every personal article, might also have a salutary effect. If the Legislature should think these provisions desirable, two sections like the following would answer the purpose:

SEC.. Any article published in a newspaper, containing matter which would be libellous if it were false, must be signed by the writer, and his name must be published at the foot of the article. A violation of this section is a misdemeanor.

SEC. -. In every civil action for libel, if the plaintiff recovers a verdict, he shall be entitled to judgment against the defendant for dollars, as a penalty, in addition to the damages found by the jury, and the costs of the action.

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Slander is a false and unprivileged publication, other than libel, which—

1. Charges any person with crime, or with having been. indicted, convicted or punished for crime.

2. Imputes in him the present existence of an infectious, contagious or loathsome disease.

3. Tends directly to injure him in respect to his office, profession, trade or business, either by imputing to him. general disqualification in those respects which the office or other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to his office, profession, trade or business that has a natural tendency to lessen its profit. 4 Imputes to him impotence or a want of chastity; or, 5. Which, by natural consequence, causes actual damage.

N. Y. C. C., Sec. 30; Cool. Bl. Comm., I, 153; ib., III,
123; McDaniel vs. Baca, 2 Cal., 326; Butler vs.
Howes, 7 Cal., 87; Bradley vs. Gardner, 10 Cal.,
371; Scott vs. Harbor, 18 Cal., 704.

SEC. 47. A privileged publication is one made1. In the proper discharge of an official duty.

2. Ia testifying as a witness, in any proceeding authorized by law, to a matter pertinent and material, or in reply to a question allowed by the tribunal.

3. In a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, by one who was also interested, or who stood in such a relation to the former as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing his motive innocent, or who was requested by him to give the information.

4. By a fair and true report in a newspaper, without malice, of a judicial, legislative or other public official proceeding, or of anything said in the course thereof.

N. Y. C. C., Sec. 31.

SEC. 48. The rights of personal relation forbid

1. The abduction of a husband from his wife, or of a parent from his child.

2. The abduction or enticement of a wife from her husband, of a child from a parent, or from a guardian entitled to its custody, or of a servant from his master.

3. The seduction of a wife, daughter, orphan sister or

servant.

4. Any injury to a servant, which affects his ability to serve his master.

N. Y. C. C., Sec. 32; Cool. Bl. Comm., III, 138, 141.

What com. munications

are privi

leged.

Protection to personal relations.

SEC. 49. Any necessary force may be used to protect Right to use from wrongful injury the person or property of oneself, force. or of a wife, husband, child, parent or other relative to the third degree, a ward, servant or master.

N. Y. C. C., Sec. 33.

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