234 U. S. 342-360, 58 L. Ed. 1341, 34 Sup. Ct. 833, HOUSTON, EAST & WEST TEXAS R. R. CO. v. UNITED STATES.

Wherever interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers are so related that government of one involves control of other, Congress, and not State, has power to prescribe final and dominant rule.

Approved in Fleming v. City of Mexico, 262 Mo. 435, 171 S. W. 321, holding sale by agent for foreign corporation was interstate commerce and not subject to license tax imposed by city ordinance.

Distinguished in Manufacturer's Light etc. Co. v. Ott, 215 Fed. 951, holding rate for natural gas fixed by State commission cannot be held confiscatory because it would require company under its contracts to supply gas to consumers in other States at loss.

Congress having paramount power to regulate relation between interstate and intrastate rates of interstate carriers, to prevent discrimination, may intrust execution of that power to subordinate body.

Approved in State ex rel. Dawson v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., 94 Kan. 100, 145 Pac. 833, holding interstate and intrastate shipments of stockyards company are not so intermingled as to cause State to lose control of latter, and granting decree ousting railroad from intrastate business.

Distinguished in Chicago etc. Ry. Co. v. State Public Utilities Com., 268 Ill. 54, 108 N. E. 731, order of commission fixing intrastate rates on coal is not void as interference with interstate commerce because carrier cannot discriminate and charge more for car hauled between same points in interstate commerce.

Finding of commission of unreasonable discrimination by interstate carrier against interstate trade after due investigation was within authority of commission and is binding upon court.

Approved in Pennsylvania Co. v. United States, 236 U. S. 361, 59 L. Ed. 623, 35 Sup. Ct. 370, upholding order of interstate commerce commission regulating transportation of interstate carrier over terminals to prevent discrimination; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 95 Kan. 626, 148 Pac. 674, upholding commission's order of 1913 establishing intrastate rate on coal in carload lots.

234 U. S. 360-369, 58 L. Ed. 1352, 34 Sup. Ct. 806, CITIZENS' BANKING CO. v. RAVENNA NAT. BANK,

Failure by insolvent judgment debtor for period of one day less than four months after levy of execution upon real estate, to vacate or discharge levy, is not final disposition of property affected by such levy, under Bankruptcy Act, section 3a (3).

Approved in In re Moark-Nemo Consol. Mining Co., 219 Fed. 342, failure to vacate levy of execution where chattel mortgagor's equity of redemption was not subject to execution levy was not final disposition of property and was not act of bankruptcy.

Insolvent debtor does not commit act of bankruptcy rendering him subject to involuntary adjudication as bankrupt, under act of 1898, merely by inaction for period of four months after levy of execution upon his real estate.

Approved in In re Irish, 228 Fed. 574, holding petition for involuntary bankruptcy stating confession of judgment to wife in amount equal to value of real estate states no act of bankruptcy under Bankruptcy Act, § 3a, cl. 3; Larkin-Green Logging Co. v. Sabin, 222 Fed. 816, 138 C. C. A. 240 (affirming 218 Fed. 986), petition alleging as only act of bankruptcy inaction of bankrupt for four months after attachment is not void and is not subject to collateral attack in suit to enjoin attachment; In re Fisher, 219 Fed. 640, holding confession of judgment and allowing sale of mortgaged real estate subject to lien of preferred creditor is act of bankruptcy.

234 U. S. 369–380, 58 L. Ed. 1356, 34 Sup. Ct. 810, LOUISVILLE & N. R. R. CO. v. WESTERN UNION TEL. CO.

Jurisdiction of particular Federal District Court is personal privilege and may be waived.

Approved in Klink v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 219 Fed. 462, 135 C. C. A. 169, holding defendant by removing cause to Federal court waives objection to particular district on ground that all plaintiffs in error are not citizens of that district.

Judicial Code, section 57, contemplates that suit to remove cloud upon title to real or personal property shall be cognizable in District Court of district in which property is located.

Approved in Thompson v. Emmett Irr. District, 227 Fed. 564, 142 C. C. A. 192, upholding Federal equity jurisdiction under Judicial Code, $ 57, of suit by holder of irrigation bonds to remove cloud on title thereof.

Federal court in suit to remove cloud upon title to real property may look to legislation of State in which court sits to ascertain what constitutes cloud upon title, and what State laws declare constitute such cloud, Federal court may remove.

Approved in Clark-Montana Realty Co. v. Butte etc. Copper Co., 233 Fed. 576, where ore was mined under agreement by adjoining mine owners for accounting upon determination of ownership, taking was not conversion, and remedy is to compel accounting under contract.

234 U. S. 380-384, 58 L. Ed. 1361, 34 Sup. Ct. 778, GILSON v. UNITED STATES.

Concurrent finding of two lower courts will not be disturbed by Federal Supreme Court, unless clearly erroneous.

Approved in Causey v. United States, 240 U. S. 401, 60 L. Ed. 712, 36 Sup. Ct. 366, following findings of both courts below that patentee under homestead laws agreed that title when acquired should inure to benefit of another; De Villanueva v. Villanueva, 239 U. S. 298, 60 L. Ed. 296, 36 Sup. Ct. 111, applying rule in suit to review judgment. of Supreme Court of Philippines denying divorce to wife for adultery of husband; Wright-Blodgett Co. v. United States, 236 U. S. 402, 59 L. Ed. 639, 35 Sup. Ct. 339, applying rule in suit to determine validity. of land patents issued under homestead laws.

Quaere, as to effect of agreement for alienation made after entry and before commutation on homestead entry under Revised Statutes, section 2301.

Cited in Causey v. United States, 240 U. S. 401, 60 L. Ed. 712, 36 Sup. Ct. 366, holding agreement to obtain land for benefit of another disqualifies homestead entryman from acquiring title either by residence of five years or by payment of minimum price under commutation provision of homestead law.

234 U. S. 385-398, 58 L. Ed. 1363, 34 Sup. Ct. 779, GRANNIS v. ORDEAN. Where State has jurisdiction over res, as in case of partition of land within its borders, judgment to be binding with respect to interest of nonresident not served with process in State must be based upon constructive notice given by publication in manner prescribed by State law.

Approved in Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 425, 59 L. Ed. 1032, 35 Sup. Ct. 625, holding void Gen. Stats. Fla. 1906, § 2677, as amended in 1909, allowing execution against stockholder's property without notice after return of "no property" against corporation.

Summons in partition suit served by publication and mailing in compliance with State statute does not deprive defendant of due process because name was spelled "Guilfuss" instead of "Geilfuss."

Approved in King Tonopah Mining Co. v. Lynch, 232 Fed. 492, holding service of process upon Secretary of State under Rev. Laws Nev., § 5024, was denial of due process where no effort was made to notify company, and it had no knowledge of suit prior to judgment or within six months thereafter.

234 U. S. 399-411, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 754, 58 L. Ed. 1370, 34 Sup. Ct. 785, DALE v. PATTISON.

Legal effect of transaction involving pledge or hypothecation of certificates depends upon local law.

Cited in Stellwagen v. Clum, 218 Fed. 732, 134 C. C. A. 408, arguendo.

234 U. S. 412-422, L. R. A. 1915E, 942, 58 L. Ed. 1377, 34 Sup. Ct. 790, MISSOURI, K. & T. R. R. CO. v. HARRIS.

Carmack Amendment of 1906 supersedes special regulations or policies of particular States upon subject of carrier's liability for loss or damage to interstate shipments and contracts of carriers with respect to such shipments.

Approved in Southern Ry. Co. v. Prescott, 240 U. S. 640, 60 L. Ed. 840, 36 Sup. Ct 472, under stipulation in interstate bill of lading that carrier is liable as warehouseman only, burden of proof is on plaintiff to show negligence where it was admitted that loss occurred by fire; Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U. S. 603, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 333, 59 L. Ed. 1139, 35 Sup. Ct. 715, 100 S. C. 229, holding South Carolina Civil Code of 1912, § 2573, imposing penalty on carrier for failure to settle claim within forty days, conflicts with Carmack Amendment; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. United States, 227 Fed. 915, holding void order of Interstate Commerce Commission requiring carrier to furnish tank-cars for use by oil refinery, where carrier does not possess such cars; Stellwagen v. Clum, 218 Fed. 736, 134 C. C. A. 408, certifying to Supreme Court questions as to supervision of State bankruptcy law by Federal Bankruptcy Act of 1898 before deciding whether trustee or claimant is entitled to proceeds for lumber; Smith v. Industrial Accident Commission, 26 Cal. App. 567, 147 Pac. 603, Federal Employers' Liability Act is exclusive, and railroad watchman injured just after removing trespasser from train cannot recover under Workmen's Compensation Act; Harold v. Atchison etc. Ry. Co., 93 Kan. 462, 144 Pac. 826, upholding provision of Gen. Stats. 1909, § 7107, allowing attorney's fees upon prosecution of railroad for shortage on shipment of grain, seed or hay; Blalock Hardware Co. v. Seaboard etc. Ry. Co., 170 N. C. 398, 86 S. E. 1027, Revisal 1905, § 2644, imposing penalty on carrier for failure to refund. overcharge, is void as applied to interstate shipment; Elliott v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 35 S. D. 62, 69, 150 N. W. 779, 781, holding Carmack Amendment does not deprive shipper of right to sue connecting carrier for its negligence in interstate shipment.

Validity of statute imposing penalty on carrier of goods or livestock for failure to pay claim within certain time. Notes, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 336; Ann. Cas. 1915D, 824.

234 U. S. 422-448, 58 L. Ed. 1383, 34 Sup. Ct. 794, JOHNSON v. GEARLDS. It is within constitutional power of Congress to prohibit manufacture, introduction or sale of intoxicants upon Indian lands, including not only lands reserved for special occupancy, but also lands outside of reservations to which they may naturally resort, even, with respect to lands lying within boundaries of State.

Approved in United States v. Nice, 241 U. S. 598, 60 L. Ed. 1195, 36 Sup. Ct. 696, upholding Act of 1897, c. 109, prohibiting sale of intoxicating liquor to Indian allottee during trust period; Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States, 236 U. S. 545, 59 L. Ed. 711, 35 Sup. Ct. 291, holding acts of 1892 and 1897 prohibiting introduction of liquor into Indian country were not repealed by Oklahoma Enabling Act, with respect to interstate or intrastate commerce, and indictment failing to allege introduction of liquor was from without State is sufficient; Katzenmeyer v. United States, 225 Fed. 523, 140 C. C. A. 507, upholding Act of 1897, c. 109, prohibiting sale of liquor to Indian, who is ward of government under charge of Indian superintendent or agent.

234 U. S. 448-458, 58 L. Ed. 1394, 34 Sup. Ct. 803, EQUITABLE SURETY CO. v. UNITED STATES USE OF W. MCMILLAN & SON.

Act of 1899 of District of Columbia modeled upon act of Congress of 1894 for protection of persons furnishing material and labor for public works was designed to furnish obligation of bonds as substitute for security through attachment by lien.

Approved in National Surety Co. v. United States, 228 Fed. 581, 143 C. C. A. 99, as to liability of surety on public contractor's bond under act of 1894, as amended in 1905; United States v. Illinois Surety Co., 226 Fed. 660, 141 C. C. A. 409, holding public contractor's surety bond under act of 1894 is equivalent to bond to government and to each claimant, and materialman's assent to contractor's assignment was not such change as to release surety; United States v. Mitchell, 215 Fed. 264, holding in suit on public contractor's bond, surety is not released by changes by United States not affecting general character of contract; Columbia Digger Co. v. Rector, 215 Fed. 631, where contract for purchase of sand and rock provides for payment as soon as contractor got his money under contract for street improvement, contractor was entitled to delay payment until he got all of his money.

Right of one furnishing labor or material to sue on bond given by contractor to property owner. Note, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 761.