Constitutionality of statutes making taking of usury criminal. State or municipal regulation of personal property loan brokers. Constitutionality of statutes restricting right to assign salary or Miscellaneous. Cited in Rat Portage Lumber Co. v. Minnesota, 220 U. S. 606, 55 L. Ed. 606, 31 Sup. Ct. 718, Venner v. Denver Union Water Co., 219 U. S. 583, 55 L. Ed. 346, 31 Sup. Ct. 472, and Hunter v. South Carolina, 219 U. S. 583, 55 L. Ed. 346, 31 Sup. Ct. 470, all dismissing for want of jurisdiction; Loeb v. Jennings, 219 U. S. 582, 55 L. Ed. 345, 31 Sup. Ct. 469, and Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U. S. 572, 54 L. Ed. 1155, 31 Sup. Ct. 132, both affirming judgment on authority of principal case. 218 U. S. 572, 54 L. Ed. 1155, 31 Sup. Ct. 134, GRIFFITH V. CONNECTICUT. Not cited. 218 U. S. 573–591, 54 L. Ed. 1155, 31 Sup. Ct. 127, HUNTER v. MUTUAL RESERVE LIFE INS. CO. Few isolated acts of foreign insurance corporation after its withdrawal from State, all relating to existing policies do not constitute doing business in State so as to preclude revocation of power of attorney of State officer to receive service of process. Approved in Provident Sav. etc. Society v. Kentucky, 239 U. S. 114, 115, L. R. A. 1916C, 572, 60 L. Ed. 171, 172, 36 Sup. Ct. 38, Kentucky statute imposing taxes on premiums collected on policies of residents of Kentucky after company has ceased to do business in State is void; Riverside etc. Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 194, 59 L. Ed. 912, 35 Sup. Ct. 579, judgment of State court in action for personal injuries against foreign corporation not transacting business within State and having no agent therein to accept service, is void; Chehalis River Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Empire State Surety Co., 206 Fed. 560, 561, under Session Laws of Washington of 1911, requiring foreign insurance companies to appoint insurance commissioner as attorney to receive service of process, appointment is not revocable upon company's withdrawal from State, but remains in force so long as it has outstanding contracts; Noel Const. Co. v. George W. Smith & Co., 193 Fed. 495, 496, service of process in action for breach of contract on vice-president of foreign corporation in State to effect settlement of dispute as to contract is insufficient, where corporation is not doing business within State; Commonwealth v. Provident Savings Life Assur. Society, 155 Ky. 199, 159 S. W. 699, insurance company by withdrawing agents and ceasing to solicit new business in State does not cease to do business in State, and it cannot revoke insurance commissioner's authority to accept service of process so long as it has liabilities in State; dissenting opinion in Brown-Ketcham Iron Works v. George B. Swift Co., 53 Ind. App. 655, 100 N. E. 861, majority holding service of process upon former agent of foreign corporation after its withdrawal from State in action to recover balance on account under contract for construction of building within State before its withdrawal was sufficient to give court jurisdiction under sections 4085, 4086, Burns' Annotated Statutes of 1908. cess on Distinguished in Bankers' Surety Co. v. Town of Holly, 219 Fed. 102, 134 C. C. A. 536, under Colorado Laws of 1907, requiring insurance companies before transacting business in State to appoint insurance commissioner as their agent to accept service of process, service of prosurety company after its withdrawal from State in suit on bond to secure performance of contract with Colorado town is sufficient; Meixell v. American Motor Car Sales Co., 181 Ind. 159, 161, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 375, 103 N. E. 1073, 1074, under Burns' Annotated statutes 1.908, § 4086, 4089, service of process on foreign corporation's agent after its withdrawal from State gives court jurisdiction of action arising out of contract made in State before its withdrawal; Brown-Ketcham Iron Works v. George B. Swift Co., 53 Ind. App. 647, 653, 100 N.E. 590, 592, under Burns' Annotated statutes of 1908, §§ 4085, 4086, service of process on foreign corporation in action by citizen of State to recover balance on account for material furnished under contract with citizen during time foreign corporation was doing business within State, gives court jurisdiction; State v. Grimm, 239 Mo. 159, 162, 143 S. W. 490, 491, 493, under Rev. Stats. 1909, § 7042, service of process on superintendent of insurance, in action against foreign insurance company doing business in State, brought by nonresident on policy executed and delivered in sister State to resident thereof, gives court jurisdiction. 16. Liability to suit within State of foreign corporation which has re voked designation of agent for service of process and has ceased to do business within State. Note, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 379, 382. Revocation by foreign corporation of appointment of agent to receive service. Note, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 680. 218 U. S. 591-601, 54 L. Ed. 1163, 31 Sup. Ct. 122, CALDER v. MICHIGAN ex rel. ELLIS. Supreme Court does not inquire into motives of legislation; and where statute, passed in due form, repeals charter of corporation under reserved power of repeal, only question is whether statute goes beyond power expressly reserved. Approved in United States v. Johnston, 232 Fed. 977, and Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S. 330, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 317, 60 L. Ed. 310, 36 Sup. Ct. 132, both upholding act of Congress of July 31, 1912, prohibiting improtation of photographic films of prizefights. A corporation contracts subject to reservations in charter and cannot remove such reservations by contract. Approved in Ramapo Water Co. v. City of New York, 236 U. S. 583, 59 L. Ed. 734, 35 Sup. Ct. 442, New York statute of 1905 empowering New York City to acquire lands for water supply is not void as impairing contract rights of water company under its charter to acquire property in same watershed, where nothing had been done beyond filing of map, and State Constitution reserves right of repealing charter; dissenting opinion in Owensboro v. Cumberland Tel. etc. Co., 230 U. S. 79, 81, 57 L. Ed. 1398, 1400, 33 Sup. Ct. 988, majority holding ordinance requiring telephone corporation to remove from streets poles and wires placed there under former ordinance, or to pay rental not required by original ordinance, is void. 218 U. S. 601-610, 54 L. Ed. 1168, 31 Sup. Ct. 124, UNITED STATES v. KISSEL. Conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of Sherman Anti-trust Act of 1890 is partnership in criminal purposes and continues, so far as statute of limitations is concerned, so long as further action is taken in furtherance of conspiracy. Approved in Hyde v. United States, 225 U. S. 367, 369, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 614, 56 L. Ed. 1126, 1127, 32 Sup. Ct. 793, holding conspiracy to defraud government of school lands in California and Oregon in violation of section 5440, Revised Statutes, was continuing one, and was not barred by statute of limitations; Brown v. Elliott, 225 U. S. 400, 56 L. Ed. 1140, 32 Sup. Ct. 812, holding conspiracy in violation of section 5440, Revised statutes, to defraud persons of money through use of post office, was continuing crime and every overt act was act of all conspirators by reason of terms of plot; United States v. Rintelen, 233 Fed. 796, indictment charging conspiracy in violation of Sherman Antitrust Act to interfere with commerce in war munitions between United States and Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy by organizing strikes and fomenting labor troubles, is sufficient; Cooper v. United States, 232 Fed. 85, 146 C. C. A. 273, under indictment for conspiracy to use mails to defraud in sale of bonds of real estate company alleging acts continuing to date within two years of filing indictment, evidence that office was kept open to that date was admissible to show prosecution was not barred; Patterson v. United States, 222 Fed. 626, 630, 138 C. C. A. 123, indictment charging monopoly of interstate commerce in violation of Sherman Anti-trust Act of 1890 by holding business previously obtained within period of limitations, is insufficient, where it does not allege doing of anything to continue monopoly within such period; Meyer v. United States, 220 Fed. 803, 135 C. C. A. 564, conspiracy to defraud government by selling zinc to it at exorbitant price is not barred by limitations, where negotiation of check and securing its payment by government were within three-year period; Houston v. United States, 217 Fed. 859, 133 C. C. A. 562, conspiracy to defraud state more government by fraudulent bids for furnishing coal formed more than three years prior to indictment is not barred where, acts in pursuance thereof were done within three-year period; Ryan v. United States, 216 Fed. 33, 34, 132 C. C. A. 257, indictment for conspiracy to transport dynamite and nitroglycerin in interstate passenger trains was for continuing conspiracy and was not barred by limitations; Breese v. United States, 203 Fed. 830, 122 C. C. A. 142, conspiracy to embezzle and misapply funds and credits of national bank formed more than three years before indictment is not barred, where overt acts were committed within three-year period; United States v. Patterson, 201 Fed. 721, 724, 727, continuance of monopoly of interstate commerce after conspiracy to establish it has ceased to exist is offense under Sherman Anti-trust Act of 1890 and is not barred; United States v. Winslow, 195 Fed. 580, 592, holding count of indictment for conspiracy to restrain intertrade in violation of Sherman Anti-trust Act invalid as alleging than one transaction in single count; Stanley v. United States, 195 Fed. 903, 115 C. C. A. 584, indictment for conspiracy to defraud persons of money by use of postoffice charging more than one overt act does not charge distinct and separate offenses rendering it bad for duplicity; Hedderly v. United States, 193 Fed. 569, 114 C. C. A. 227, prosecution for conspiracy to defraud government of its lands begun within three years of last overt act is not barred by limitations; Wilson V. United States, 190 Fed. 435, 436, 111 C. C. A. 231, conspiracy to defraud by sales of corporate stock through postoffice was continuing of fense and not barred until three years from last overt act; United States v. Stern, 186 Fed. 855, conspiracy by bankrupts to conceal property continues to date of refusal to turn over property to trustee on his election and indictment properly charges commission of offense as of such date; United States v. Swift, 186 Fed. 1013, conspiracy to restrain monopolize interstate commerce in violation of Sherman Anti-trust Act of 1890 is continuing one, and judgment of acquittal on ground of immunity for testimony given which formed basis of indictment in 1905 is not bar to subsequent prosecution for carrying forward same conspiracy; United States v. Pacific etc. Nav. Co., 4 Alaska, 690, indictment charging conspiracy to restrain trade and alleging accomplishment of its object is not duplicitous; State v. Dufour, 123 Minn. 452, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 792, 143 N. W. 1126, affirming conviction for keeping disorderly house on proof of keeping such house at time earlier than that fixed by indictment; State v. Unsworth, 85 N. J. L. 242, 88 Atl. 1100, indictment for conspiracy to obtain money from contractors for construction of public highway alleging one overt act within two-year period of limitation is sufficient; State v. Coyle, 7 Okl. Cr. 95, 122 Pac. 263, indictment under Anti-trust Act of 1908, charging conspiracy in restraint of trade is not bad for duplicity as charging more than one distinct offense. or Distinguished in Gompers v. United States, 233 U. S. 610, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1044, 58 L. Ed. 1119, 34 Sup. Ct. 693, holding section 1044, Revised statutes, that no person shall be prosecuted for offense not capital unless indictment is found within three years, applies to acts of contempt in violation of injunction; Warren v. United States, 199 Fed. 756, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 278, 118 C. C. A. 191, where bankrupt did nothing to conceal property within twelve months of indictment, conspiracy was not continuing one, and prosecution is barred by Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 29d; United States v. Phillips, 196 Fed. 576, 577, prosecution of bankrupt for concealing property from his trustee is barred by oneyear period of limitation under Bankruptcy Act of 1898; United States v. Pacific etc. Nav. Co., 4 Alaska, 578, 579, 580, 582, indictment, returned in 1912, for conspiracy to restrain trade by securing control of transportation facilities is barred where trains and toll-road were discontinued and dismantled in 1899; dissenting opinion in Hyde v. United States, 225 U. S. 385, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 614, 56 L. Ed. 1133, 32 Sup. Ct. 793, majority holding overt acts performed by party conspiring in another district in violation of section 5440, Revised Statutes, gives court, in district where overt acts are performed, jurisdiction as to all conspirators. What are illegal combinations within Sherman Anti-trust Act. Whether indictment charges continuing conspiracy with technical sufficiency is not before court on appeal taken under Criminal Appeals Act of 1907 from judgment sustaining special plea of limitation in bar. Approved in United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 535, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 325, 57 L. Ed. 338, 33 Sup. Ct. 141, Federal Supreme Court under act of 1907 is bound by lower court's construction of indictment, and where decision shows court assumed every element of combination was present, Supreme Court has jurisdiction to determine illegality of corner in cotton under Federal Anti-trust Act; United States v. Miller, 223 U. S. 602, 56 L. Ed. 569, 32 Sup. Ct. 323, under Criminal Appeals Act of 1907, where Circuit Court sustains demurrer to indictment for violation of act of 1906, prohibiting rebates on interstate shipments, Supreme Court must accept that court's construction of indictment and review only construction of statute involved. Allegations in indictment that conspiracy continued until date of filing must be denied under general issue and cannot be met by special plea in bar. Approved in United States v. Barber, 219 U. S. 78, 55 L. Ed. 102, 31 Sup. Ct. 209, defense of statute of limitations to indictment for conspiracy under section 5440, Revised Statutes, containing allegations of continuance of conspiracy to date of filing, must be made under general issue, not by special plea in bar. Miscellaneous. Cited in Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 140, 57 L. Ed. 454, 33 Sup. Ct. 226, incidentally. |