intrastate commerce; Southern Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 179 Ind. 30, 31, 32, 35, 100 N. E. 339, 340, 341, upholding statute of 1907, requiring railroad cars and locomotives to be equipped with grab-irons or handholds in sides or ends thereof, as applied to intrastate shipment; Thornbro v. Kansas City etc. Ry. Co., 91 Kan. 694, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 314, 139 Pac. 413, allowing recovery under Federal Employers' Liability Act for death of brakeman killed by use of defective coupler on train made up largely of interstate cars; Sonsmith v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 173 Mich. 78, 138 N. W. 356, upholding Public Acts 1909, No. 104, withdrawing from carrier defenses of fellow-servant, assumed risk, and contributory negligence; Lloyd v. North Carolina R. Co., 162 N. C. 496, 78 S. E. 493, 494, denying removal to Federal court of action under Federal Employers' Liability Act for injuries to engineer inspecting and oiling engine preparatory to interstate trip, where charge of fraud is not necessary inference from allegations of joinder of resident defendant; dissenting opinion in In re Taylor, 204 N. Y. 146, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 276, 97 N. E. 505, majority holding action for death of employee killed while on interstate trip is governed by State Constitution and statute, not by Federal Employers' Liability Act, and under Code Civil Proc., §§ 1902, 1903, surviving spouse and father, who is only next of kin, share equally; Chicago Junction Ry. Co. v. King, 222 U. S. 223, 56 L. Ed. 174, 32 Sup. Ct. 79, arguendo.

As between two opposing views as to construction of statute, that one is preferred which is in accord with manifest purpose of Congress.

Approved in Southern Ry. Co. v. Crockett, 234 U. S. 737, 58 L. Ed. 1569, 34 Sup. Ct. 897, holding under Safety Appliance Act as amended in 1903, standard height of drawbars was made applicable to all railroad vehicles used upon interstate road, including locomotives; St. Joseph & G. T. Ry. Co. v. United States, 232 Fed. 352, 146 C. C. A. 397, holding Hours of Service Act of 1907, applies to employees on train loaded with material to repair roadbed, where train originated in another State and has arrived in State, but not at destination; Lloyd v. North Carolina R. Co., 162 N. C. 496, 78 S. E. 494, reversing nonsuit against resident railroad in action under Federal Employers' Liability Act for injuries to engineer inspecting and oiling engine preparatory to interstate trip; Hench v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 246 Pa. 8, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 230, L. R. A. 1915D, 557, 91 Atl. 1058, holding in action for death under Federal Employers' Liability Act and Safety Appliance Act of 1893, burden is on plaintiff to show that decedent was in interstate commerce at time of injury.

State regulation of relations between interstate railroads and their employees. Note, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 270.

Federal Employers' Liability Act. Note, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 42, 43.

What employees are within the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Note, 10 N. C. C. A. 160.

When an action is maintainable under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Note, 3 N. C. C. A. 794.

Miscellaneous.

Cited in Chicago etc. Ry. Co. v. Bradbury, 223 U. S. 711, 56 L. Ed. 625, 32 Sup. Ct. 520, dismissing for want of jurisdiction.

222 U. S. 28–31, 56 L. Ed. 75, 32 Sup. Ct. 13, FINLEY v. CALIFORNIA.

Penal Code of California, section 246, imposing death penalty upon life termer in State prison for assault with intent to kill, is not denial of equal protection of law because it does not impose like penalty upon other convicts.

Approved in People v. Swearingen, 168 Cal. 54, 141 Pac. 823, affirming conviction under Penal Code, § 246; Davis v. Florida Power Co., 64 Fla. 270, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 965, 60 South. 767, 5 N. C. C. A. 943, upholding statute giving right of action for death of minor child against corporations and associations, but not against individuals; Vandalia R. Co. v. Stillwell, 181 Ind. 291, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 258, 104 N. E. 397, 5 N. C. C. A. 502, upholding Employers' Liability Act of 1911, applying to employees of more than five men.

Validity of statute subjecting corporation to damages, but not including individual. Note, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 976.

222 U. S. 32-38, 56 L. Ed. 77, 32 Sup. Ct. 10, HELM v. ZARECOR.

Where controversy over control of corporation transcends rivalry of those claiming to be members of board of control, and corporation is mere title holder, it is properly made party defendant and should not be aligned as complainant merely because complainants belong to same faction that claims power to appoint members of board of control.

Approved in Sharpe v. Bonham, 224 U. S. 242, 56 L. Ed. 749, 32 Sup. Ct. 420, in controversy embracing rights of religious associations represented by respective parties to control church property held in trust, trustees as title-holders were properly made parties defendant, and cannot be realigned as complainants by court; Barkley v. Hayes, 208 Fed. 321, 324, 325, 334, and Duvall v. Synod of Kansas of the Presbyterian Church, 222 Fed. 670, 138 C. C. A. 217, but holding agreement between Presbyterian church and Cumberland Presbyterian church was valid, and vested church with all property rights of constituent churches; Helm v. Zarecor, 213 Fed. 651, 652, 653, 659, holding suit is class suit brought by representatives of Presbyterian church against representatives of original Cumberland Presbyterian church to determine question of right to use and control Board of Publication, and rival members of Board of Publication need not be made parties in their

capacity as such; Crawford v. Seattle etc. Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 923, in stockholder's suit in State court, corporation under control of codefendants is properly aligned with them, and where it is citizen of same State as complainant cause is not removable.

222 U. S. 39-41, 56 L. Ed. 81, 32 Sup. Ct. 9, TROY BANK v. G. A. WHITEHEAD & CO.

Where two or more plaintiffs having separate and distinct demands unite for convenience and economy in single suit, it is essential that demand of each be of requisite jurisdictional amount, but when several plaintiffs unite to enforce single title or right, in which they have common or undivided interest, it is enough that their interests collectively equal jurisdictional amount.

Approved in Simpson v. Geary, 204 Fed. 511, denying jurisdiction of Federal court to enjoin enforcement of Arizona Statute of 1912 requir ing flagmen to have one year's experience as brakemen at suit of employees each receiving salary of seven hundred and eighty dollars per year, aggregating seven thousand twenty dollars per year, as interests of complainants are separate; State v. Title Guaranty etc. Co., 27 Idaho, 759, 152 Pac. 191, and Title Guaranty etc. Co. v. Idaho, 240 U, S. 140, 60 L. Ed. 569, 36 Sup. Ct. 346, both denying right to remove cause t› Federal court, where State sues on behalf of depositors of bank an none of district judgments is large enough to confer jurisdiction; Bateman v. Southern Oregon Co., 217 Fed. 938, 133 C. C. A. 605, holding value of separate tracts of land claimed by complainants under same act of Congress cannot be aggregated to give Federal court jurisdiction. Distinguished in Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U. S. 596, 60 L. Ed. 818, 36 Sup. Ct. 417, holding in suit by two children of testator omitted from will, each alleging omission was through mistake, interests of complainants are separate and distinct and cannot be aggregated to give court jurisdiction.

222 U. S. 42-50, 56 L. Ed. 83, 32 Sup. Ct. 22, INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. DIFFENBAUGH.

Interstate Commerce Act does not attempt to equalize fortune, opportunities or abilities, but on contrary it in terms contemplates that carrier receiving services from owner of property transported, or using instrumentalities of such owner, shall pay for them, subject to restriction that payment shall be reasonable, and that Interstate Commerce Commission may determine maximum is only permissive element.

Approved in O'Keefe v. United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission, 240 U. S. 302, 60 L. Ed. 657, 36 Sup. Ct. 316, upholding order of 1914, of commerce commission requiring certain trunk lines to reopen through routes and publish joint rates to interstate destinations with certain tap lines, and prohibiting allowance to tap lines in excess

of maximum rate fixed by commission; Ellis v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 237 U. S. 445, 59 L. Ed. 1041, 35 Sup. Ct. 645, corporation, which is not carrier, furnishing iced cars for railroads, until such service is shown to be device for obtaining preferential rates, need not answer question in investigation by commission; United States v. Baltimore etc. R. R. Co., 231 U. S. 293, 58 L. Ed. 227, 34 Sup. Ct. 75, carrier may compensate shipper for terminal services rendered in connection with its own shipments, although not allowing other shippers to furnish such services; Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Updike Grain Co., 222 U. S. 219, 221, 56 L. Ed. 173, 32 Sup. Ct. 39, holding railroad may compensate owners of grain in transit for elevator services; Baltimore etc. R. Co. v. United States, 200 Fed. 792, fact that owners of terminal were paid for lightering their own product after it had become property of purchaser by delivery to carrier was not giving of rebate in violation of Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, nor is it undue preference as to other shippers making shipments from points not within lighterage limits; dissenting opinion in Arkansas Fertilizer Co. v. United States, 193 Fed. 677, majority holding under Interstate Commerce Act, § 16, cause of action accrued when shipment terminated and not when freight was actually paid, and action to recover overcharges on interstate shipment is barred by limitations.

Distinguished in Louisiana etc. R. Co. v. United States, 209 Fed. 253, 258, holding order of Interstate Commerce Commission relating to allowances to tap lines for services in transportation of lumber products from mills to trunk lines is void as making arbitrary distinctions; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 204 Fed. 477, 478, 479, dismissing suit involving no actual controversy but brought to have judgment as to validity of contract between railroad and corporation operating wharf for transferring cars to vessels, which judgment might be pleaded in defense of disapproval by commission of railway company's allowance for services.

Contracts of railroads to make allowances for elevation of grain at points of transshipment are not void as discriminatory, as applied to elevator company receiving allowance for elevating its own grain, where in no case is additional charge made to shipper for elevator service.

Approved in Louisville etc. R. Co. v. United States, 197 Fed. 64, upholding finding of commerce commission that reshipping privilege at Nashville, in view of water competition, is not discrimination against Atlanta and other Georgia points.

Distinguished in Louisiana etc. Ry. Co. v. United States, 209 Fed. 253, holding order of Interstate Commerce Commission relating to allowances to tap lines for services in transportation of lumber products from mills to trunk lines is void as making arbitrary distinctions.

Parties injuriously affected by orders of Interstate Commerce Commission may sue in Federal court to enjoin orders though they were not parties to proceeding before commission on which orders are based.

Approved in Louisiana etc. Ry. Co. v. United States, 209 Fed. 251, holding complainants, though not parties to order of commission to desist from illegal action, directly and financially affected by orders, have standing as complainants in equity court; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 194 Fed. 451, 452, holding interstate carriers, not parties to proceedings before commission nor named. in order, but competitors of carriers named and thereby affected by order, are entitled to maintain suit to enjoin enforcement of order; dissenting opinion in Arkansas Fertilizer Co. v. United States, 193 Fed. 678, arguendo. Miscellaneous.

Cited in Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. George H. McFadden & Bros. 232 Fed. 1003, holding shipments of cotton to point within State to be compressed and then shipped outside of State are interstate shipments, although not billed to ultimate destination.

222 U. S. 51–54, 56 L. Ed. 89, 32 Sup. Ct. 18, LENMAN V. JONES.

Vendor is not relieved of contract to sell, absolute as to him, because he thought it gave purchaser only option to purchase.

Approved in Abel v. Gill, 95 Neb. 284, 145 N. W. 639, granting specific performance of contract of sale of land which became absolute and material upon acceptance of its terms.

222 U. S. 55-63, 56 L. Ed. 92, 32 Sup. Ct. 20, KALEM CO. v. HARPER BROTHERS.

Pantomime of novel is dramatization, and exhibition of moving pictures founded on such dramatization of copyrighted novel is infringement of copyright under Revised Statutes, section 4952, as amended by act of 1891, securing to authors exclusive right to dramatize works.

Approved in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 236 U. S. 243, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 296, 59 L. Ed. 559, 35 Sup. Ct. 387 (affirming 215 Fed. 143), upholding Ohio Statute of 1913 (103 Ohio Laws, 399), creating board of censorship of motion-picture films; Harper Bros. v. Klaw, 232 Fed. 612, holding contract for dramatization of novel did not include its production as motion picture, but grant to another of motion picture rights in copyrighted novel is violation of implied negative covenant of grantor not to use ungranted portion of copyright to detriment of licensee.

Distinguished in Klien v. Beach, 232 Fed. 245, 246, holding contract by which novelist granted to dramatist rights to dramatize book "for presentation on the stage" did not include dramatization for motion pictures; Bachman v. Belasco, 224 Fed. 816, holding producer of play