applied to animals within city, and cannot be applied to animals outside city, rests upon sufficient basis.

Approved in Butler v. Perry, 67 Fla. 413, 66 South. 153, upholding Laws 1913, c. 6537, §§ 10-12, requiring able-bodied male persons between ages of twenty-one and forty-five to work on roads and bridges for six days of ten hours each in each year; Thorpe v. Mayor etc. of City of Savannah, 13 Ga. App. 772, 79 S. E. 952, upholding ordinance of 1909 requiring permit from health officer for keeping of cows within city limits; Commonwealth v. Libbey, 216 Mass. 358, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 659, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 879, 103 N. E. 924, upholding statute of 1910, requiring employer advertising for employees during strike to mention. existence of strike in advertisement; Hopkins v. Richmond, 117 Va. 726, 86 S. E. 148, upholding segregation ordinances of Richmond and of Ashland.

Statutory regulations as to infected animals. Note, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1072.

Destruction of milk is the only available and efficient penalty for violation of ordinance regulating milk supply of city, and hearing before seizure and condemnation is not necessary.

Approved in Durand v. Dyson, 271 Ill. 390, 111 N. E. 146, upholding Laws of 1915, §§ 2, 8, authorizing destruction of diseased cattle by board of livestock commissioners, and providing for method of appraisement as basis of compensation.

Who may raise objection to constitutionality of statute or ordinance. Note, Ann. Cas. 19150, 59.

228 U. S. 585–592, 57 L. Ed. 978, 33 Sup. Ct. 607, BUGAJEWITZ v. ADAMS. Congress has power to deport aliens whose presence is deemed hurtful, and determination by facts that might constitute crime under local law is not conviction of crime, nor is deportation punishment; it is simply refusal of government to harbor persons not wanted. The coincidence of local penal law with policy of Congress is an accident.

Approved in Choy Gum v. Backus, 223 Fed. 491, 139 C. C. A. 35, proceeding to deport alien prostitute is not criminal prosecution within fifth and sixth amendments, and taking of testimony on affidavit without notice and without giving opportunity to answer was not denial of fair hearing.

Effect of striking out three year clause from section 3 of Act of 1907 by amendment of 1910 is not changed by reference to sections 20 and 21, as change in phraseology of reference indicates narrowed purpose, prostitute being deported not "as provided" but in the manner provided in sections 20, 21.

Approved in Ex parte Woo Jan, 228 Fed. 933, holding section 219, Act of 1907, does not authorize immigration authorities to deport alien Chinese laborer who is in United States in violation of Chinese Exclusion Acts, but such deportation must be by judicial department; Choy Gum v. Backus, 223 Fed. 491, 139 C. C. A. 35, holding alien Chinese prostitute may be deported under act of 1907, as amended in 1910, although proceeding is not begun within three years; United States v. Czeslicki, 209 Fed. 498, under act of 1910 omitting three-year limitation of act of 1907, alien may be deported, without reference to length of residence in country, for importing woman for immoral purposes.

Miscellaneous. Cited in Schwartz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 592, 57 L. Ed. 980, 33 Sup. Ct. 609, generally.

228 U. S. 592, 57 L. Ed. 980, 33 Sup. Ct. 609, SCHWARTZ V. ADAMS. Not cited.

228 U. S. 593–596, 57 L. Ed. 980, 33 Sup. Ct. 609, NORFOLK & WESTERN RY. CO. v. DIXIE TOBACCO CO.

Carmack Amendment of 1906 to Interstate Commerce Act making initial carrier liable for loss on interstate shipment occurring on its line or that of connecting carrier is valid as applied to carrier not voluntary party to through route and rate but required by statute to accept shipment and give through bill of lading.

Approved in Alabama etc. Ry. Co. v. American Cotton Oil Co., 229 Fed. 22, 143 C. C. A. 313, holding action in State court against connecting carrier for non delivery of interstate shipment delivered to initial carrier in good condition at point outside of State, involving construction of Carmack Amendment of 1906 to Interstate Commerce Act, is removable to Federal court; Cleveland etc. R. Co. v. Blind, 182 Ind. 412, 105 N. E. 489, denying recovery for value of racehorse shipped under limited liability contract without request for unlimited liability contract; Cleveland etc. Ry. Co. v. Hayes, 181 Ind. 107, 103 N. E. 839, holding amendment of 1910 to Interstate Commerce Act providing that shipper may select route of interstate shipment where two or more through routes have been established does not apply to shipment made in 1907.

Liability of initial carrier of goods under Carmack Amendment.
Note, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 84, 85, 86.

228 U. S. 596-603, 57 L. Ed. 982, 33 Sup. Ct. 605, CONSOLIDATED TURNPIKE CO. v. NORFOLK & O. V. R. R. CO.

Claim that judgment takes property without compensation is not enough to justify Supreme Court in taking jurisdiction, unless it appears from averments of fact upon which claim depends that question is real and sub

stantial, and not so utterly without merit as to be frivolous, or question concluded by previous decisions of Supreme Court.

Approved in White v. Wyoming, 241 U. S. 655, 60 L. Ed. 1224, 36 Sup. Ct. 726, Dunham v. Kauffman, 241 U. S. 653, 60 L. Ed. 1223, 36 Sup. Ct. 723, Kansas City etc. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 241 U. S. 651, 60 L. Ed. 1222, 36 Sup. Ct. 553, Filler v. Steele, 241 U. S. 648, 60 L. Ed. 1220, 36 Sup. Ct. 550, United Railways Co. v. St. Louis, 241 U. S. 648, 60 L. Ed. 1220, 36 Sup. Ct. 550, Seekatz v. Medina Valley Irr. Co., 241 U. S. 646, 60 L. Ed. 1219, 36 Sup. Ct. 451, South Dakota v. Whisman, 241 U. S. 643, 60 L. Ed. 1218, 36 Sup. Ct. 449, Broussard v. Baker, 241 U. S. 639, 60 L. Ed. 1216, 36 Sup. Ct. 285, Bradley v. Spokane etc. R. R. Co., 241 U. S. 639, 60 L. Ed. 1215, 36 Sup Ct. 285, Minneapolis etc. R. Co. v. Alexander, 239 U. S. 635, 60 L. Ed. 479, 36 Sup. Ct. 283, Diener v. Lane, 239 U. S. 632, 60 L. Ed. 477, 36 Sup. Ct. 219, York & Whitney Co. v. New York etc. R. Co., 239 U. S. 631, 60 L. Ed. 477, 36 Sup. Ct. 166, Zodrow v. Wisconsin, 239 U. S. 629, 60 L. Ed. 476, 36 Sup. Ct. 165, Lancaster v. Thacker, 239 U. S. 625, 60 L. Ed. 473, 36 Sup. Ct. 162, Cowan v. Illinois, 235 U. S. 693, 59 L. Ed. 428, 35 Sup. Ct. 206, Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp. v. Minshew, 235 U. S. 686, 59 L. Ed. 424, 35 Sup. Ct. 202, Prenica v. Bulger, 234 U. S. 750, 58 L. Ed. 1576, 34 Sup. Ct. 676, Shultz v. Ritterbusch, 232 U. S. 720, 58 L. Ed. 813, 34 Sup. Ct. 601, all dismissing for want of jurisdiction; United States v. Lane, 232 U. S. 600, 58 L. Ed. 749, 34 Sup. Ct..449, dismissing for want of jurisdiction. where formal question as to right of Secretary of Interior to remove member of council under act of 1906, providing for division of Osage lands and giving Secretary of Interior right to appoint members of council and to remove such members, is clearly frivolous.

Distinguished in In re Luken, 216 Fed. 892, 133 C. C. A. 94, claim of validity of lien obtained by distress warrant prior to bankruptcy proceedings, as lien obtained in legal proceeding under section 67f of Bankruptcy Act, is not so void of color as to authorize bankruptcy court to dispose of it in summary proceeding.

Rule of common law that fixtures annexed to realty become part thereof and subject to existing liens is subject to exception that corporation possessing right of eminent domain entering under deed of mortgagor and placing improvements upon land for public purposes in good faith may later condemn interest and title of mortgagee without paying more than value of land without improvements.

Cited in Perley v. Cambridge, 220 Mass. 512, L. R. A. 1915E, 432, 108 N. E. 495, arguendo.

228 U. S. 603–609, 57 L. Ed. 985, 33 Sup. Ct. 602, BAILEY v. SANDERS. Entering into forbidden agreement to alienate homestead entered under Revised Statutes, sections 2289, 2290, 2291, ended further right of entryman

to make proof and payment and rendered him incompetent to further proceed with his entry.

Approved in Causey v. United States, 240 U. S. 401, 60 L. Ed. 712, 36 Sup. Ct. 366, holding agreement to obtain land for benefit of another disqualifies homestead entryman from acquiring title either by residence of five years or by payment of minimum price under commutation provision of homestead law; McGoldrick Lumber Co. v. Kinsolving, 221 Fed. 828, 137 C. C. A. 377, where homestead entryman agreeing to convey undivided interest in land fails to make final proof because of failure to live on land makes application to purchase under Timber and Stone Act, in contest on ground that entry was speculative and money was furnished by other parties for their own profit, agreement should have been admitted to show entryman's intent to obtain land regardless of regulations of law; Gilson v. United States, 234 U. S. 384, 58 L. Ed. 1363, 34 Sup. Ct. 778, arguendo.

228 U. S. 610-618, 57 L. Ed. 989, 33 Sup. Ct. 599, LEWIS PUBLISHING CO. V. WYMAN.

Suit which has become moot will not be retained by equity court to secure accounting respecting transactions antedating suit where larger amounts involved were paid prior to suit and smaller amounts only would be within fair scope of inquiry, and it would still be necessary to resort to action at law to recover previous payments.

Approved in Childs v. Missouri etc. Ry. Co., 221 Fed. 223, 136 C. C. A. 629, suit failing as one to remove cloud from title is not maintainable as bill for discovery and accounting where under section 724, Revised Statutes, discovery and accounting may be obtained in action at law.

228 U. S. 618-633, 57 L. Ed. 993, 33 Sup. Ct. 717, SOUTHERN PAC. R. R. CO. v. UNITED STATES.

Not cited.

228 U. S. 634-645, 57 L. Ed. 998, 33 Sup. Ct. 725, MERCHANTS' NAT. BANK OF NEW YORK v. SEXTON.

Miscellaneous. Cited in In re Hartzell, 209 Fed. 777, 126 C. C. A. 499, proceeding by trustee in bankruptcy to sell mortgaged property free from encumbrance which resolves itself into controversy between lienholders is appealable under Bankruptcy Act, § 24a.

228 U, S. 645-652, 57 L. Ed. 1003, 33 Sup. Ct. 722, WILLIAM CRAMP & SONS SHIP & E. BLDG. CO. V. INTERNATIONAL CURTISS MARINE TURBINE CO.

Where judge who heard case in first instance sat in Circuit Court of Appeals in violation of proviso to section 120, Judicial Code, duty of Su

preme Court is not to hold case upon docket for ultimate decision upon merits, but to reverse and remand to court below, so that case may be heard by competent court conformably to statute.

Approved in Brown v. Fletcher, 237 U. S. 587, 59 L. Ed. 1130, 35 Sup. Ct. 750, where District Court takes jurisdiction on ground that diversity of citizenship exists and decides case on merits, and Circuit Court of Appeals reverses with directions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, but not on merits, Supreme Court, upon finding that diversity of citizenship exists, remands case to Circuit Court of Appeals for decision on merits.

226 U. S. 652-664, 57 L. Ed. 1010, 33 Sup. Ct. 709, IN RE SPENCER.

Only in exceptional cases will Supreme Court interfere by habeas corpus with course or final administration by State courts of criminal justice of State.

Approved in Walters v. McKinnis, 221 Fed. 751, 752, discharging on habeas corpus one committed to insane asylum under act of Pennsylvania of 1895, with approval of Court of Quarter Sessions, without notice or opportunity to be heard, where Court of Common Pleas refused, in habeas corpus proceeding, to pass upon legality of proceeding.

Where sentences imposed were not void but erroneous only, and subject to change or modification by State Supreme Court, or reversal, and resentence, Federal Supreme Court will not, upon habeas corpus, determine legality of that part of sentence alleged to be illegal.

Approved in Bryant v. United States, 214 Fed. 53, 130 C. C. A. 491, affirming correction of sentence for perjury in violation of Revised Statutes, § 5392, under provision of Revised Statutes, § 761, requiring Federal Court in habeas corpus proceeding "to dispose of the party as law and justice require"; Minto v. State, 9 Ala. App. 98, 99, 64 South. 370, refusing to discharge on habeas corpus person convicted of gaming and illegally sentenced to imprisonment in penitentiary for six months, where court may at same term correct judgment; In re Allen, 91 Ohio, 327, 110 N. E. 538, where person convicted of crime under statute prescribing definite term of imprisonment is given indeterminate sentence, validity of statute authorizing indeterminate sentence cannot be determined in habeas corpus proceedings.

Distinguished in Stevens v. McClaughry, 207 Fed. 22, 26, 28, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 390, 125 C. C. A. 102, releasing on habeas corpus person convicted on indictment on two counts under Revised Statutes, § 5469, of larceny of mail-pouch and of larceny of registered letters, and held under excess punishment above maximum that may be imposed for single offense.

Under indeterminate sentence law, maximum sentence is only portion which has legal validity; and minimum sentence is merely notice to execu