kams v. Pritchard, 4 T. R. 2. and Rex v. Pitt, 3 Burr. 1338. Lord Mansfield's observations. The counsel on the other side observed that all these arguments relate to the policy of the law, or what it ought to be; not to the meaning of the law, or what it is. The words of the statute are certainly in favour of the construction we contend for: and quoties in verbis nulla ambiguitas, ibi nulla constructio contra verba fienda est. On an appeal to the common sense of mankind 999 out of 1000 would be of opinion that the legislature intended what they said. Neither does that construction lead to the absurd consequences imagined. Why should the words curtesy, dower, &c. be interpolated as to personal property, when such words are altogether unnecessary, and would be absurd? And, as to the incongruity of extending and diminishing the rights of the widow in the same section, there is 'none: her rights are extended in one respect, and diminished in another, so as to put them on a reasonable footing. The want of reciprocity in the provisions of the act proves nothing: for, in law generally, the rights of husband and wife are not reciprocal: yet the Courts must obey the law. Nor should the decision of the question be affected by the difficulty of identifying the property; since greater difficulty often occurs in cases of executory devises of personal estate. The tenant for life takes and uses it at plea sure; and, after his death, if he lives a hundred years, the identity must be proved. II. As to the second point; that the opinion heretofore expressed did not preclude the Court from reconsidering the subject; the counsel for the appellants admitted the general rule that a final decision, by any Court of competent jurisdiction within the Commonwealth, (not appealed from or reversed,) is a bar as to the same point. This principle is universal; and does not apply to the Court of Appeals only. On a scire facias or action of debt on a judgment, the original judgment is not examinable. So, APRIL, 1810. Dilliard V. Tomlinson. V. Muse and Wife. APRIL, 1810. Dilliard V. v. Muse and Wife. when this Court decides on a final decree, its decree is final: but the case is otherwise where it decides on an interlocutory decree: in that case, this Court stands in the Tomlinson. place of the Chancellor, and is clothed with all his priviWyatt leges. At common law no appeal lies from a judgment not final: but not so in Chancery. This Court is authorized by the act of assembly to take cognisance of interlocutory decrees, which the Chancellor can alter whenever he pleases. He has power to revise them; why not then this Court Suppose a plain case of mistake; a receipt lost, and afterwards found. The Chancellor would surely have a right to alter his interlocutory decree according to the document so found. When the Court of Appeals has decided on an interlocutory decree, the cause is not ended, though it goes off the docket here; for either party, at pleasure, may bring it here again. Though a new appeal bond is given, the whole record is sent up, and the whole case is before the Court. The decision, therefore, in Tomlinson v. Dilliard, being interlocutory, does not operate as a bar to a different decision at this time. Neither is it a binding precedent. The Court, it is true, ought not to retract its decisions, except on such grave and weighty grounds as apply to this case. But those decisions ought not to be irrepealable and irreversible, however erroneous. This Court must be conscious of not being exempt from the lot of humanity; and the country would be better satisfied, if it should pursue the course of correct-· ing its decrees when discovered to be certainly wrong. In (a) 1 Call, 1. the cases of Cutchin v. Wilkinson, (a) The Commonwealth v. (6) 3 Call, Beaumarchais,(b) Barnet v. Darnielle, (c) and Murray v. (c)3 Call, Carrotte, Costars and Co.(d) the decisions were reconsidered at subsequent terms, and not regarded as binding precedents.* 122. 413. (d) M S. *Note. It does not appear from the reported cases, but from the Orderbecks, that this observation was correct. On the other side it was urged that, according to this doctrine, the decisions of this Court would be perpetually fluctuating; and great mischiefs would arise from the uncertainty of the law. This subject has been discussed between these very parties; and Tomlinson is now in possession of the property under the deeree of this Court. Nothing was said in the petition for the supersedeas about bringing the merits of the case on the main point into controversy again. The decision excited universal attention, and was generally acquiesced in. A vast deal of property must change its owners if that decision be now reversed; and, after all, a future Court might reverse the reversing decision. APRIL, 1810. Dilliard V. Tomlinson. V. Muse and Cases may, indeed, be reargued, during the same term, or afterwards, before the opinion of the Court is finally entered. But precedents when once established are obligatory upon the Court. The general assembly, by the act "concerning the distribution of unbequeathed personal estate," passed January 22, 1802,(a) shewed that they considered (a) 1 Rev. the case of Tomlinson v. Dilliard as a binding authority as Code, 426. to past cases, and not to be shaken but by a legislative act. They therefore passed a prospective law to provide for future cases only. The Court should pause before it establish a principle which would detract from the solemnity of its own decisions. If the gentlemen succeed in what they contend for, the question, instead of being more at rest, will be more unsettled. There being two opposite decisions of this tribunal, who is to decide which is to prevail? Would we be precluded from applying for a rehearing? We should have a better right than they had; since the circumstance of two conflicting decisions would be in our favour. That this was an interlocutory decree does not vary the question. It is admitted that interlocutory decrees not acted upon by this Court are always under the control of the Chancellor until his final decree. But why was an appeal allowed to this Court if not to settle the principle? Is not APRIL, 1810. the decision here on an interlocutory decree equally solemn as on any other? Can the Chancellor, after an affirmance by the Court of Appeals of such a decree, alter it? -No: Tomlinson. it is obligatory on him, as well as on all other persons. A Dilliard Y. Wyatt V. Muse and Wife. contrary doctrine would make this Court merely assistant to the Chancellor, and produce perpetual litigation. A bill of review for matter of law would lie to a decree of this Court; and, if refused by the Chancellor, an appeal might be taken, and the whole matter gone over again. This practice would be intolerably burthensome. When a decree has been affirmed, the money paid and properly charged, a reversal would have terrible effects. In this case, the Court decided the title to be with Tomlinson: yet, after all, it is attempted to take it from him; even though he may have sold the property. So much upon principle: now for authorities. Bampfield (a) Colles's v. Popham,(a) Lord Peterborough v. Germain,(b) Le Guen Rep. of Parl. v. Gouverneur,(c) and Hartshorne, Rhinelander, & Co. v. Cus. p. 1. (6) 1 Bro. Sleght,(d) are strong cases in our favour. The same Parl.Cas.281. Y. Cas. 520. (p)2 Call,376. (J) MS. (c) Johns. N. principle, that decisions of the Supreme Court ought not to (d) 3 Johns. be disturbed, is recognised in White v. Atkinson,(e) which N. Y. Rep. 554. was a case of an interlocutory decree. In Price v. Campbell,(f) an error of inserting current money, instead of sterling, was overlooked by this Court, and afterwards corrected by the Chancellor: on appeal, this Court (notwithstanding justice required the correction of the error) said the Chancellor had no power to correct it; the decree of this Court being final and obligatory as fate. as fate. Triplett v. Dunlop(g) was a case to the same effect. (5) MS. (h) Colles's Rep. p. 74. In reply, the cases cited were commented upon, and said not to support the doctrine contended for. Bampfield v. Popham shews that cases may occur in which former decisions of the Supreme Court might be changed; though that case was not such a one. Woodman v. Willoughby,(a) is to the same purport. Lord Peterborough v. Germain does not apply. Le Guen v. Gouverneur would have been APRIT 1810. Dilliard v. V. Muse and decided by this Court as it was in New-York; but is only a decision upon the common point that the Chancellor had not a right to take up a question which might have been brought before a Court of common law. Hartshorne, &c. Tomlinson. v. Sleght was as erroneous a decision as ever was made: Wyatt and, moreover, being a common law case, does not apply to this, which is an equity case. White v. Atkinson only shews that the Chancellor cannot alter his interlocutory decree on the same evidence, after this Court has affirmed it. And in Price v. Campbell the error was acquiesced in; the counsel having failed to except to the report. The Court, therefore, refused to give relief, in obedience to the maxim "volenti non fit injuria." The following additional points were made on behalf of the appellant Dilliard; besides those stated in the exceptions to the Commissioner's report. 1. That the estate of the infant had not been divided, but that of the father only. 2. A number of negro children had been born in the estate; some of whose births must have been after the death of the father: yet these had been considered as belonging to the father, and derived to the infant from him. 3. So, also, the profits of the real estate accruing after the death of the father, though belonging to the infant in his own right, had been considered as part of the personal estate of the father. On the other side it was said that no proof appeared of the infant's having any property not derived from his father; that the increase of the negroes had been properly disposed of, according to the ordinary rule of "partus sequitur ventrem," and that the profits regularly went to the person entitled to the estate generally. The counsel for Wyatt, Adm'r of Curtis, v. Muse and Wife, contended that, even if they were wrong on the |