The views expressed in these cases are well supported by authority. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 95 Ind.; 12 S. C.; 48 Am. Rep. 692; Cooley's Const. Lim. 572; Barker v. Connelly, 113 U. S. 27; Soon Hing v. Crowley, Id. 703; Live Stock Association v. Crescent City, 1 Abbott Sup. Ct. Rep. 38.8; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36. The practice of medicine and surgery is a vocation that very nearly concerns the comfort, health and life of every person in the land. Physicians and surgeons have committed to their care the most important interests, and it is an almost imperious necessity that only persons possessing skill and knowledge should be permitted to practice medicine and surgery. For centuries the law has required physicians to possess and exercise skill and learning, for it has mulcted in damages those who pretend to be physicians and surgeons, but have neither learning nor skill. It is therefore no new principle of law that is asserted by our statute, but if it were it would not condemn the statute, for the statute is an exercise of police power inherent in the State. It is, no one can doubt, of high importance to the community that health, limb and life should not be left to the treatment of ignorant pretenders and charlatans. It is within the power of the Legislature to enact such laws as will protect the people from ignorant pretenders, and secure them the services of reputable, skilled and learned men, although it is not within the power of the Legislature to discriminate in favor of any particular school of medicine. When intelligent and educated men differ in their theories, the Legislature has no power to condemn the one or approve the other, but it may require learning and skill in the school of medicine which the physician professes to practice. White v. Carroll, 42 N. Y. 161. one. The rule requiring physicians to possess learning and skill is a very ancient Bonham's Case, 8 Coke Rep. 107; College of Physicians v. Lovett, 1 La Rahm, 472. This rule of the common law has been incorporated in many of the State statutes, and these statutes have always been upheld. The statute of Minnesota is very similar to ours, and it was held to be valid in State v. State Medical Association, 32 Minn. 324, the Court saying: "In the profession of medicine, as in that of the law, so great is the necessity for special qualification, and so injurious the consequences that are likely to result from it, that the power of the Legislature to prescribe such reasonable conditions as are calculated to exclude from the profession those who are unfitted to discharge its duties can not be doubted." Speaking of a statute like ours, another Court says: "We are of opinion that all of the provisions of the act under consideration, and independent of any constitutional warrant for its enactment, would be maintainable under the police powers of the State; that under this general power the Legislature is the proper judge as to what regulations are demanded in dealing with property and restraining the actions of individuals." Logan v. State, 5 Tex. Appeal, 306. The subject was examined in all its important phases in Ex parte Finney, 19 Nev. 323, and the statute declared valid. A like result was reached by the Court in Hewett v. Carrier, 16 Pick. 353. A full discussion of the question will be found in Fox v. Washington Territory, 75 West. Court Rep. 339, where a similar result was reached. Judge Cooley strongly and unequivocally affirms the validity of statutes like ours. Cooley on Forts, 289-290. The question received a very careful consideration in State v. Dent, 25 W. Va. 1, and it was held that the statute was valid in every part. For more than eighty years a similar statute has been in force in New York, and the courts of that State have uniformily regarded it as valid. Sheldon v. Clark, 1 Johns. 513; Alcott v. Barber, 1 Wend. 526; Turneman v. Morrison, 14 Johns. 369; The appellant is right in asserting that the departments of government are separate and distinct, and that a clerk of a county can not exercise judicial powers. Smith v. Myers (this term) and cases cited. But he is wrong in affirming that the act under examination confers upon the clerk judicial powers. The power to accept or reject an application for license under the statute is not a judicial one, although it may involve some exercise of discretion. Elmore v. Overton, 104 Ind. 548; Cooley on Torts, 411. If an exercise of discretion constituted a clerk a judicial officer, then he would be such in every case in which he issued a writ, files a paper or approves a bond, for all these acts involve some exercise of discretionary power. The statute does not require the clerk to sit in judgment upon the sufficiency of the application for a license, for the affidavits prescribed and the diploma required constitute the evidence upon which the clerk must act. The diploma and affidavits compel him to grant the license, and it is therefore not possible to regard his duty as a judicial one. Flonny v. City, 17 Ind. 169; Betts v. Denon, 3 Conn. 107; State ex rel. v. Doyle, 40 Wis. 188. Whether the statute is a wise one or not is purely a legislative question, and so is the question whether it is reasonable or unreasonable. This doctrine was thus expressed in Hendricks v. State, 101 Ind. 564. "Whether a statute is or is not a reasonable one, is a legislative and not a judicial question. Whether a statute does or does not unjustly deprive the citizen of natural rights is a question for the Legislature, and not the courts. There is no certain standard for determining what are or are not the natural rights of the citizen. The Legislature is just as capable of determining the question as the courts. Men's opinion as to what constitute natural rights greatly differ, and if courts should assume the function of revising the acts of the Legislature on the ground that they invaded natural rights, a conflict would arise, which could never end, for there is no standard by which the question could be finally determined.” Judge Cooley says: "Nor can a court declare a statute unconstitutional and void solely on the ground of unjust and oppressive provisions or because it is supposed to violate the natural, social or political rights of the citizen, unless it can be shown that such injustice is prohibited or such rights guaranteed or protected by the constitution." Cooley Const. Lim. (5th ed.) 197. At another place this author says: "The judiciary can only arrest the execution of a statute when it conflicts with the constitution. It can not run a race of opinions upon points of right, reason and expediency with the law-making power." Ibid. 201. The offense is charged in the language of the statute, and this is sufficient. State v. Miller, 98 Ind. 70, and cases cited; Gratter v. State, 105 Ind. 272; Autle v. State, 6 Texas App. 202. In discussing the evidence counsel assert that as the terms of the statute are broad and sweeping, courts must create exceptions in order to give it a just and reasonable effect. There are perhaps extreme cases when exceptions may be created by the courts, but these cases are very rare, and the authority to create exceptions is one to be exercised with great delicacy. It can never be exercised where the words of the statute are free from ambiguity and its purpose plain. It is only where the necessity is imperious and when absurd and manifestly unjust consequences would otherwise result, that the courts can create exceptions. This is not such a case. It is the purpose of the statute to prevent persons who do not possess the necessary qualifications to practice medicine or surgery from inflicting injury upon the citizens by undertaking to treat diseases, wounds and injuries. It is the plain intention of the statute to keep out of the professions of medicine and surgery all who do not possess learning and skill sufficient to enable them to properly dis charge the duties incumbent upon members of those honorable professions, and courts have no right to create an exception which will defeat that intention. It is immaterial whether the person who undertakes to treat diseases or wounds does it for hire or not, for unless he is qualified as the statute requires, he must not undertake the treatment of diseases or wounds at all. The courts can not divide professional persons into classes and assert that one class is within the law, and the other not, for the law applies to all who assume the responsible duty of treating the sick, wounded or injured citizens, as well as those who expect compensation for their services as those who do not. The great object of the law is to allow none but skilled and learned persons to attempt to exercise functions and duties which require knowledge and skill, and it is not material whether reward is paid or promised, or the services are rendered without compensation or the promise of it. The State has an interest in the life and health of all its citizens, and the law under examination was framed, not to bestow favors upon a particular profession, but to discharge one of the highest duties of a State, that of protecting its citizens from injury and harm. It has been for ages a ruling principle of jurisprudence, " that regard be had for the public welfare is the highest law," and that principle. is here of controlling force, for few things, if indeed any, are more important than that the health, limbs and lives of the citizens should not be intrusted to the care of persons who lack the knowledge and skill requisite to enable them to render proper medical and surgical treatment to the citizens afflicted by disease, wounds or injuries. Judgment affirmed. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE BOARDS OF HEALTH. WASHINGTON, D. C., September 7, 1887. The fourth annual meeting of the Conference of State Boards of Health was held in the parlors of Willard's Hotel, Washington, D. C., September 7, 1887. The Conference was called to order by the President, Dr. J. N. McCormack, at 9:30 A. M. The Secretary, Dr. Conn, of New Hampshire, being absent, Dr. Lindsley, of Connecticut, was elected Secretary pro tempore. The minutes of the last meeting having been published and sent to members, it was, on motion, voted to dispense with reading them. At the invitation of the President, Dr. Peter H. Bryce, of the Province of Ontario, opened the discussion on the subject of Inter-State Notification of Infectious and Contagious Diseases. He said: MR. CHAIRMAN-Although not presenting any formal report from the Committee on Inter-State Notification of Diseases, I desire, in the name of the Committee, to state that, succeeding the meeting of last year I drew up, as Chairman of said Committee, a form of notification, and forwarded it to all State Boards, suggesting its adoption either as made or in some modified form which would fulfil the purposes intended. I have much pleasure in reporting that nearly all the States having commercial relations with Canada supplied with much regularity throughout the year reports of cases of infectious diseases, especially outbreaks of small-pox. It is somewhat unfortunate that New York State, with so extended and important a seaboard and so many avenues for the entrance of disease from without and for distribution therefrom, should not have fallen in with the resolution of the Conference. From newspaper reports and other sources, I am, and I presume the Conference is aware of there having been a considerable number of cases of small-pox in New York during the year, and further, that the Conference has had no knowledge of where they were located, of their origin or their relationships. The advantages of a like form of notification and its general approval and adoption is apparent to every one, since we are enabled thus in some degree to connect cases when nature, residence, nationality, where exposed, etc., have been indicated in the form of notification. Indeed, except for information regarding number of outbreaks, and thereby supplying to other States some estimate of the prevalence of the disease, and for enabling the signatory States to investigate outbreaks along certain lines of communication, or to explain the outbreak of cases of otherwise mysterious origin, all will agree that with the present limited inter-state means for co-operative work, any notification will have but little practical value. Regarding the question of notification of diseases other than small-pox, cholera and yellow fever, it is a matter for the Conference to consider whether any practical necessity exists therefor, and whether any satisfactory method for carrying it out can be elaborated. I thank the Conference for its indulgence in listening to my remarks. Dr. Baker said he had not employed a specially-prepared blank because of the greater expense and trouble, and a belief that his weekly bulletin, especially when a marked copy was sent, would be accepted as sufficient. If it was not satisfactory he would be glad to know it. In reply to Dr. Rauch, he said that, in his opinion, the mortality statistics prove that small-pox is of small consequence compared with scarlet fever or diphtheria, and he suggested the question whether the same principle of notification should not apply to each of these diseases which involve greater danger. Dr. Rauch objected that such notification often lost its value by the slowness of transmission. The facilities for rapid traveling sometimes required the most prompt information of danger to prevent the transmission of infection, and instanced the ease with which small-pox can be conveyed from one State to another. Dr. Baker rejoined, saying that in his opinion small-pox was an unimportant disease as compared with scarlet fever and diphtheria. That, as a matter of fact, they were far more dangerous and fatal than small-pox, and therefore their restriction was deserving of more attention. Dr. Lindsley, of Tennessee, thought Dr. Baker's point was well taken. A case of small-pox in Maine was of no consequence to the people in Tennessee. He did not think it necessary to notify every State in the Union of each case of smallpox, but the matter was quite different in regard to yellow fever or cholera. He believed the occurrence of either of these diseases ought to be published widely. After Dr. J. B. Lindsley had spoken, Dr. Baker urged the value to families about to travel or locate, of information relative to the presence of scarlet fever or diphtheria in places which it was intended to visit, saying, if the places where these diseases are present are published, the information is sometimes useful in preventing the taking of children directly into danger. He would be glad to be able to inform citizens of Michigan as to the presence or absence of these really dangerous diseases not only in places in Michigan, as is now done by means of a weekly bulletin, but also relative to important places in other States. On lines of travel where inter communication is constant and rapid, telegraphic reports, he thought, might sometimes be useful, even between places as distant as New York and Michigan. Dr. Rauch said, the idea of inter-state notification originated in the discussion of the means of preventing the spread of yellow fever. In regard to such notification concerning diphtheria and scarlet fever, he believed it to be impracticable. Dr. E. M. Hunt, of New Jersey, believed the importance of inter-state notification depended largely upon the prevalence of a given disease. Any disease prevailing as a wide-spread and destructive epidemic deserved notification. Dr. F. F. Gary, of South Carolina, spoke of the importance of notification as relative chiefly to yellow fever, cholera, etc. He did not regard it necessary in those diseases that are prevalent in some portion of the country all the year round, such as diphtheria, etc. |