CORPORATIONS-continued.

1918) the six months' period of time within which a corporation may rein-
state its charter of record starts from the time of cancelation provided by
statute when the secretary of state shall cancel the charter of the corpora-
tion on the records of his office. Missouri Slope Agri. & Fair Asso. v. Hall,
300.

2. In a mandamus action seeking to compel the secretary of state to reinstate
a corporation, where the corporation, a fair association, has failed to file its
annual reports or pay the annual filing fees required for the years 1911 to
1919, inclusive, and the secretary of state has not given notice of its de-
fault in that regard by registered letter as required by the statute, and
did not enter until May 24, 1919, upon the records of his office the cancela-
tion of such charter, and the corporation thereupon, within six months from
the time of such statutory act of cancelation of record by the secretary of
state, offered to file all of its annual reports required and tendered pay-
ment of the filing fees and a reinstatement fee as required within such six
months' period, it is held that the corporation complied with the statutory
provisions above cited. Missouri Slope Agri. & Fair Asso. v. Hall, 300.

COUNTIES.

1. In proceedings for the removal of a county seat, it is for the county commis-
sioners, and not the court, to pass on the sufficiency of the petition for
removal. When the county commissioners decide against the sufficiency of
a petition, the court may not, by mandamus or otherwise, compel them to
undo or reverse their decision. Bailey v. Pugh, 130.

2. In proceedings for the removal of a county seat, it is for the county commis-
sioners, and not the court, to pass on the sufficiency of the petition for re-
moval. When the county commissioners decide against the sufficiency of a
petition, the court may not, by mandamus or otherwise, compel them to un-
do or reverse their decision. It may not appoint a special commission to
act in place of the county commissioners. Pugh v. Hempftling, 579.

COURTS.

1. In the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the supreme court may frame its
process as the exigencies require. State of North Dakota ex rel. Lofthus v.
Langer, 462.

COVENANTS.

1. Where the grantor is not seised of property which his deed purports to con-
vey, the covenant of seisin is broken as soon as the deed is made and de-
livered, and an immediate right of action accrues to the grantee for its
breach. Beulah Coal. Min. Co. v. Heihn, 646.

COVENANTS-continued.

2. If there is merely a technical breach of the covenant, the grantee is entitled
to merely nominal damages; but in cases where the grantor, at the time of
the execution and delivery of the deed, is not in fact or in law seised of
the premises to which the covenant relates, a cause of action, for substantial
damages, accrues immediately upon the delivery of the deed. Beulah Coal
Min. Co. v. Heihn, 646.

3. In cases where the conveyance passes nothing to the grantee, the measure of
damages for the breach of the covenant of seisin is prima facie the con-
sideration paid by the grantee and interest on such sum. Beulah Coal Min.
Co. v. Heihn, 646.

DEEDS.

1. In an action to set aside a certain deed on the ground that the execution
thereof was procured by fraud and conspiracy, the trial court found that
there was neither, and that the deed was valid and effective, and refused to
set it aside. Held, for reasons stated in the opinion, that the trial court
was not in error. Latzke v. Krause, 380.

2. As the heirs of Brederick Becker, deceased, the plaintiffs and appellants
claim some title to a quarter section of land which, about a year prior to
his decease, Becker conveyed to his sister, the defendant. She did not
record the deed or take possession of the land until after the decease of
the grantor, and there is some evidence that she had in her mind a secret
purpose to give back the title to her brother in case he should survive her.
Hence it is contended that the delivery of the deed was conditional and not
effectual. However, the clear, positive, and uncontradicted testimony shows
that the delivery of the deed was absolute, and not conditional. Cale v.
Way, 558.

3. In an action to determine adverse claims to certain land, plaintiff claimed
title under a certain warranty deed from one Andrew Anderson, his father.
Nine years after the date of the deed and a few months after his father's
death, plaintiff recorded the deed. The defendant, administrator of the
father's estate with the will annexed contended that no grant ever was
made by the deed. It is conceded that it was signed and acknowledged.
The sole issue in the case was whether or not it was delivered. The answer
denied the delivery of it. There was evidence by and on behalf of the
plaintiff, tending to show delivery, and evidence on behalf of the defendant,
tending to show there was no delivery. The trial court made its finding of
fact to the effect that there was no delivery. Held, that such finding is
sustained by the evidence, and hence the judgment should be and is af
firmed. Anderson v. Overby, 631.

DIVORCE.

1. This is an appeal from an order made by Judge Cooley denying a motion to
vacate a judgment of divorce. In 1907, some thirteen years ago, the plain-
tiff being fifty-nine and the defendant sixty-three, this action was com-
menced. From the complaint and the answer it appears that each party
charged the other with cruelty and desertion. On the trial each party was
represented by distinguished counsel. Many witnesses were sworn. The
testimony covers 500 pages, and it sustains the judgment. The moving
affidavits, which impute bribery to the trial judge, are in no way convincing.
And it appears that for twelve years the defendant has accepted the benefits
of the judgment; she has been receiving $300 a month. In 1909 an appeal
from the judgment was dismissed because the plaintiff had then accepted
some of the benefits awarded her. (Tuttle v. Tuttle, 19 N. D. 748). Tuttle
V. Tuttle, 79.

2. In 1915 there was duly entered in this case a judgment dissolving the mar-
riage between the plaintiff and the defendant and awarding to the plaintiff
a liberal alimony, giving to her the custody of the minor child, and making
for its future support a special and generous allowance of $500 a year
for twenty years. In 1919 the court made an order forbidding the plain-
tiff to move from her residence into an apartment house and from per-
mitting the child to go in company with Mrs. Grant, a teacher in the pub-
lic schools, and a lady of the highest repute. Held, that there is no
sufficient reason for the order and it is reversed. Thorp v. Thorp, 113.
3. In an action for divorce, where the plaintiff alleged as grounds for divorce
wilful neglect and extreme cruelty, the evidence is examined and it is
held that the grounds alleged are not established. Johnson v. Johnson, 606.

DOMICIL.

1. Under ¶ 6 of § 2501, Comp. Laws 1913, the residence of an individual in a
given county is lost by voluntary absence from the county for one year or
more, regardless of the receipt by such person of poor relief during a part
of the period of absence. Kost v. Sheridan County, 75.

ELECTIONS.

1. For reasons stated in the opinion it is held that a woman may be a candidate
for nomination as delegate to a national nominating convention. State ex
rel. Rudd v. Hall, 294.

2. Candidates whose names appear upon a general election ballot in a column
devoted to "individual nominations" may properly object to the printing at
the head of the same column of the names of candidates (also nominated
by individual petitions) in such a way as to indicate that the latter repre-
sent a national political party with which the plaintiffs do not affiliate.
State ex rel. Baier v. Hall, 395.

ELECTIONS—continued.

3. Where, pursuant to chap. 117, Laws 1919, candidates for a county office have
been selected upon a nonpartisan ballot at a primary election, sec. 501,
Rev. Codes 1899 (Sec. 97 1a, Comp. Laws 1913) has no application, and
certificates of nomination of a person as a candidate for such county office,
to be voted on at a general election, were properly refused by the county
auditor. State ex rel. Luhman v. Hughes, 399.

ESTOPPEL.

1. In a subsequent action, to determine adverse claims to the real estate
involved, in the alleged trust deed, where the defendants and intervener,
through such void judgment, and the plaintiff, as the grantee of the vendee
in such trust deed, claim title or liens upon the land, it is held that all
parties are affected with notice of the void judgment and of the unsettled
and undetermined nature and administration of the alleged trusteeship,
upon which the equities of the parties, or their successors in interest, and
the questions of laches and of estoppel, must depend. Hughes v. Fargo
Loan Agency, 26.

EVIDENCE.

1. An attorney representing a party in litigation in a foreign state may give
competent testimony relating to the fact of the continued pendency of the
suit without proving the contents of the court records. First National
Bank v. Carroll, 62.

2. That bonds of the United States government are presumed to be worth
par value unless the contrary be shown. Dakota Nat'l Bank v. Hughes,

247.

3. The written contract being silent on the question of possession, for the
reasons and under the authority cited in the opinion, oral testimony with
reference thereto was properly received. Fechner v. Finseth, 348.

4. It is held that the introduction of evidence to show the conditions under
which, and the special purpose for which, the note was delivered, did not
tend to vary the terms of a written instrument, the note, in view of the
right, under the above statute, to show that it was delivered conditionally
or for a special purpose. First National Bank v. Miller, 551.

5. In an action to recover moneys alleged to have been fraudently obtained
through the issuance of grain checks, where the plaintiff in its complaint
has alleged that the defendant forged signatures of payees' names in such
checks, and where further in its proof it has sought to establish that the
defendant did sign and forge in his own handwriting the names of payees
on the backs of such checks, testimony of bankers to the effect that such
signatures so indorsed on such check were not in the handwriting of the
defendant, and that some of them were in the handwriting of plaintiff's

EVIDENCE-continued.

manager, was both competent and material. Farmers Elevator Co. v. Weil,
602.

6. In a civil action to recover damages for assault and battery, cross-examina-
tion of the defendant with reference to arrests for prior offenses of a
similar nature is improper. Piechotta v. Fried, 620.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

1. In an action brought by an administrator to recover money loaned by the
decedent to the defendant, the evidence is examined and held sufficient to
support the verdict for the plaintiff. Hieb v. Hoff, 456.

EXEMPTIONS.

1. The rule of liberal construction applies as to the time when a claim for
exemption must be filed in a garnishment action in justice's court. Jessen
v. Schiller, 41.

2. Under this rule of liberal construction, the time fixed for an appearance or
answer in the garnishee for the filing of a claim for exemptions (Comp.
Laws 1913, § 9068), in justice's court is the time when an appearance
or answer can be made from the hour specified in the garnishee summons
so long as such garnishee action is open or awaiting the call of the court
for an appearance or answer. Jessen v. Schiller, 41.

FRAUDS.

1. Section 4, chap. 202, Laws 1917 (Statute of Frauds embodied in Uniform
Sales Act), which provides that "a contract to sell or a sale of any goods

so contracted to

or unless some

of the value of $500 or upwards shall not be enforceable by action
unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods
be sold or sold, and actually receive the same,
note or memorandum in writing of the contract or sale be signed by the
party to be charged or his agent, in that behalf," does not render a con-
tract falling within the statute absolutely illegal or void, but renders it
merely voidable at the election of one or either of the parties thereto.
Abraham v. Durward, 611.

2. A party sought to be charged upon a contract within such statute must in-
voke its protection in some appropriate manner, or he will be deemed to
have waived his rights under it. Abraham v. Durward, 611.

3. Where the complaint alleged the contract generally without stating whether
it was in writing or not, the Statute of Frauds is not available as a
defense unless specially pleaded. Abraham v. Durward, 611.