their guns in such positions that, from the foliage and other obstacles, they were unobservable from the walls of the fort. After about a fortnight of this battering, the rebels resolved to attempt an escalade. They brought forward huge ladders on wheels, affording room for four men abreast, and placed them against the walls of the fort; but here they were met by such steady and continuous volleys of musketry that not a man could enter. A Beloochee Mohammedan, belonging to the 12th Bombay native infantry, doing duty in Neemuch, performed an act of gallantry that won for him much and well-deserved applause. One of the besiegers, in retreating from the withering musketry-fire from the fort, dropped a splendid Mussulman green flag on the ground. The Beloochee at once offered to capture this flag. Under cover of a tremendous fire of musketry, he and a havildar were lowered by a rope from one of the enclosures; quick as lightning the flag was secured, and in a few minutes waved on the walls of Neemuch. The movements of Brigadier Stuart, recorded in the last paragraph, now disturbed the rebels; they departed, and Neemuch was for a time spared further molestation.

This narrative may pass over without particular mention the other regions of the vast empire of India. Disturbances there were in November and December, but not of such grave importance as to call for record. At Saugor and at Jubbulpore, the Europeans cried loudly for more troops, but

they were still able to defend themselves against actual attacks. At Gwalior and at Bhopal, at Indore and at Mhow, although the vexations were many, the continued fidelity of Scindia and Holkar lessened the calamities that might otherwise have befallen the British. In Rajpootana and Gujerat, petty chieftains would from time to time unfurl the flag of rebellion, and collect a band of fighting retainers around them; but these territories were within practicable reach of Bombay, whence columns marched for the pacification of the upper country. Some portions of the Nizam's territory were occasionally troubled by insubordinate troops belonging to the contingent; as the Nizam and his prime-minister, however, remained firm in their alliance with the British, and as the distance was very great to the turbulent regions of the Jumna, serious danger was averted. In the South Mahratta country, around Kolapore, Sholapore, Satara, and Poonah, indications once now and then appeared that fanatic Mohammedans were ready to unfurl the green flag against the infidel Feringhees; but the near vicinity of the presidential city of Bombay, and the quiet demeanour of the natives further south, prevented the intended conspiracies from becoming serious in magnitude. In the Madras presidency, tranquillity was almost wholly undisturbed.

Thus ended the extraordinary year 1857-the most momentous that the English had ever experienced in India.

Proposed Re-organisation of the Indian Army.-In closing the narrative for the year 1857, it may be useful to advert to two important subjects which occupied the attention of the East India Company-the state of the army, and the causes of the mutiny. Instead of rushing to conclusions on imperfect data, the Court of Directors instructed the governor-general to appoint two commissions of inquiry, empowered to collect information on those two subjects. The letters of instruction were both dated the 25th of November; the first ran as follows:

1. We trust that when success, by the blessing of Divine Providence, shall have attended your efforts to put down the mutiny of the native army of your presidency, and to re-establish the authority of the government in the disturbed districts, you will be enabled to take advantage of the services of select officers of ability and experience, to assist you, by investigation and by practical counsel founded thereon, in forming wise conclusions on the most important subject which must soon press for decision-namely, the proper organisation of our army in India.

2. To this end we authorise you to appoint, as soon as circumstances will permit, a commission, composed of military officers of the armies of the three presidencies (with whom should be associated officers of the Queen's army who have had experience of Indian service), on whose knowledge, experience, and judgment you can rely; together with one or more civil servants, whom you may consider to be specially qualified for such a duty by their knowledge of the native character and general administrative experience. 3. In framing instructions for the guidance of this

3d, Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of a native regiment?

4th, What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations relating to tribes and castes, with a view to determine the future composition of the native army?

'5th, Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for service in India, with the natives of the country; and if so, should they be formed in separate regiments, or in companies, or otherwise?

'6th, Whether, in native infantry regiments, the discontinuance of the grades of native commissioned officers, and the substitution of a European sergeant and corporal to each company, is advisable; and if so, whether, in lieu of the prospect of distinction and emolument arising out of these grades, it would be advisable to establish graduated scales of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service?

'7th, Whether the system of promotion generally, by seniority, to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained), should not be altered and assimilated to the systems in force at Madras and Bombay?

'8th, If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, what will be the best organisation for each branch respectively?

'9th, Have the powers of commanding officers of native corps, and the powers of officers in charge of companies, been diminished? What consequences have been the result? Is it desirable that those powers should be increased, or what other measures should be adopted for the improvement of discipline?

10th, Should cadets be trained and drilled in European regiments before they are posted to native regiments; or what would be the best mode of drilling and training cadets before they are posted to native regiments?

'11th, Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained; or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army; or ought there to be any, and what, changes in those rules, or in the system of punishment?

'12th, How can the demands for European officers for staff and detached employments be best provided for, without injuring the efficiency of regiments?

4. It is to be understood that the inquiries to be made by the commission, and the opinions to be offered by them, are to have reference to the several branches of the native army-infantry, regular and irregular; cavalry, regular and irregular; artillery, and Sappers and Miners; and, with respect to the artillery, and Sappers and Miners, whether they should be composed, as heretofore, of Europeans and natives, or be entirely European?

5. To aid your government in forming an opinion as to the proportion which the European should bear to the native portion of the army in India generally, and at each presidency separately, we would recommend that your government should call upon the commission to give their opinions on this very important question; and we can entertain no doubt that the enlarged knowledge and experience of the members of the commission will enable them to furnish you with valuable information on this head.

6. Having obtained opinions on all these heads of inquiry, and on such other heads as you may deem to be essential to the thorough development of the important questions at issue, you will refer the views of the commission for the consideration of the commander-in-chief, and will then furnish us with the results of your careful deliberation upon the whole of the measures which should, in your judgment, be taken for the organisation and maintenance, in the utmost practicable state of efficiency, of whatever military force you may think it desirable to form.

7. The commission itself may be instructed to make to the governor-general in council any suggestions or recommendations which occur to them, although not on matters comprised in the specified heads of inquiry.'

Proposed Inquiry into the Causes of the Mutiny.-The second letter adverted to above was in the following terms: '1. Although we are well aware that, from the period when the mutiny of the Bengal army assumed a formidable aspect, your time must necessarily have been too much engrossed by the pressing exigencies of the public service during each passing day, and in taking provident measures for the future, to admit of your directing much of your attention to past events, we have no doubt that you have not omitted to take advantage of all the means and opportunities at your command for the important purpose of investigating the causes of the extraordinary disaffection in the ranks of that army, which has, unhappily, given rise to so much bloodshed and misery.

2. In this persuasion, and as a review of the voluminous records containing the details of the events which have occurred since the first display of disaffection at Barrackpore, has entirely failed to satisfy our minds in regard to the immediate causes of the mutiny, we desire that you will lose no time in reporting to us your opinions on the subject, embracing the following heads, together with any others which you may deem it necessary to add, in order to the full elucidation of the subject:

'1st, The state of feeling of the sepoy towards the government for some time preceding the outbreak.

2d, Any causes which of late years may be thought likely to have affected their loyalty and devotion to the service.

'3d, Whether their loyalty had been affected by the instigations of emissaries of foreign powers, or native states, or by any general measures of our administration affecting themselves or any other classes of our subjects?

4th, Whether the proposed use of the new cartridges was to any, and what, extent the cause of the outbreak? 5th, Whether the objects which the mutineers are supposed to have had in view were directed to the subversion of the British power in India, or to the attainment of pecuniary or other advantages?

6th, Whether the progress of the mutiny can be traced to general combination or concert, or was the result of separate impulses at the several stations of regiments; and, if the former, how the combination was carried on without any knowledge or suspicion of it on the part of the regimental officers ?

3. If, however, you should not feel yourselves to be in possession of information sufficient to form a wellgrounded opinion upon the causes and objects of the mutiny, we authorise you to appoint a special mixed commission for a preliminary investigation into the same, to be composed of officers selected from all branches of the services of India, in whose personal experience and soundness of judgment you have entire confidence. In that case, you will lose no time in reporting to us your sentiments upon the conclusions arrived at by the commission.'

W

HEN, at the opening of 1858, the stirring events of the preceding year came to be passed in review, most men admitted that the progress of the Indian Revolt had outrun their expectations and falsified their hopes. Some had believed that the fall of Delhi would occur after a few days of besieging, bringing with it a pacification of the whole country. Some, allowing that this capture might very probably be retarded several weeks, did not the less look to a general pacification as a natural result. Others, relying on the heroic Havelock and the energetic Neill, prepared to date the termination

of the rebellion from the expected capture of Lucknow. Others, recognising Sir Colin Campbell as 'the right man in the right place,' strengthened themselves in the belief that he would march at once from Calcutta to Cawnpore, and put down all the rebels before the summer was well over. Some believed that the sepoys, lamenting the ill success of their treachery to the British government, would return to their allegiance without inoculating other portions of the Indian community with the virus of lawlessness. Others had fondly hoped that, under the pressure of public opinion in England, such large numbers of fine troops would have been sent over in the summer and autumn,

as would suffice to quell the mutiny even though the sepoys remained obstinate.

All these hopes were dashed. The gloomy prophets, on this occasion, were in the ascendant. The mutiny had spread to almost every native regiment in the Bengal army. It had been accompanied by an unexpected display of military organisation among the revolted sepoys. It had incited many ambitious chieftains to try their chance for an increase of power. It had been encouraged and extended by the long delay in the conquest of Delhi. It had further received a certain glow of triumph from the extraordinary events at Lucknow, which left the rebels perfect masters of the city at the end of the year. It had been permitted to grow to unwonted magnitude by the extreme slowness with which British troops arrived at Indian ports. Lastly, it had become surrounded by very un-English attributes, in the savage feeling of vengeance engendered in the minds of English officers and soldiers by the sepoy atrocities.

It is true that Englishmen had much to be proud of, in the achievements of their countrymen during the past year. They could point to the sagacity of Sir Henry Lawrence, in quietly fortifying and provisioning the Residency at Lucknow at a time when less acute observers saw no storm in the distance. They could admire, and wonder while they admired, the heroism with which Sir Hugh Wheeler and his companions had so long maintained a wretchedly weak position against a large army of mutineers headed by an arch-traitor. They could follow with delight the footsteps of Sir Henry Havelock, winning victory after victory over forces five or ten times as strong as his own. They could shew how, in a hot climate, Neill had advanced from the east and Nicholson from the west, fighting energetically against all obstacles, and dying like true soldiers at the head of their columns. They could ask the world whether a garrison was ever more nobly defended, under circumstances of trying difficulty, than the Residency under Inglis; and whether a garrison was ever brought away from the middle of a hostile city under more extraordinary conditions, and with more complete success, than was achieved in the Exodus from Lucknow' under Campbell, Outram, and Havelock. They could point to Sir John Lawrence for an example of what a civilian could do, maintaining a large and recently conquered country at peace by the energy of his own individual character, raising regiment after regiment of trustworthy native troops, and sending an army to reconquer Delhi before a single additional soldier could arrive from England. They could point to the exertions of numerous individuals, any one of whom would have been a hero if his heroism had not been eclipsed by that of men better known to fame.

These recollections afforded some consolation under the disappointment occasioned by the long continuance of the war waged by the mutineers. Yet were they far from being an adequate reward

for the blood and treasure expended; the prevailing natural feeling was one of disappointment. Nor were theorists less at fault in their estimate of causes, than practical men in their expectation of results. Still was the question put, 'What was the cause of the mutiny?' And still were the answers as diverse as ever. From May to December the theories multiplied faster than the means of solving them. On the religious side, men banded themselves chiefly into two parties. One said that the native troops in India had revolted because we, as a nation, had tampered with their religion. We had nearly put down infanticide and suttee; we paid less respect than formerly to their idols and holy places; we had allowed pious officers to preach to the sepoys in their regiments, and missionaries to inveigh against brahmins and temples; and we so clumsily managed a new contrivance in the fabrication and use of cartridges, as to induce a suspicion in the native mind that a personal insult to their religious prejudices was intended. On the other hand, religious Christians contended that the revolt was a mark of God's anger against the English nation. They urged that a people possessing the Bible ought long ago, by government as well as by individual efforts, to have distributed it throughout the length and breadth of India; that we ought to have encouraged churches and chapels, ministers and missionaries, Bibleclasses and Scripture-readers; that we ought to have disregarded caste prejudices, and boldly proclaimed that Hindooism and Moslemism were worse than mockeries, and that no expectations of happiness in this life or the next were sound but such as rested on Biblical grounds—in short, that England had had a magnificent opportunity, and a deep obligation, to teach with all her power the way of salvation to two hundred million benighted beings; and that, failing this, the Revolt had been a consequent and deserved calamity. Another class of reasoners attributed the outbreak to the want of sympathy between the Europeans and the natives in the general relations of life. A young man was sent out to India by the Company, either as a writer in the civil service or as a cadet in the army; he learned the immediate duties of his office, studied just so much of the vernacular languages and customs as were absolutely needed, rose in the middle years of his life to higher offices and emoluments, and returned to end his days in England. He held the natives in contempt; he neither knew nor cared what passed in their inmost hearts; he treated India as a conquered country, held especially for the benefit of the Company's servants. Hence, according to the view now under notice, the natives, having nothing for which to love and respect the British, were glad to avail themselves of any pretext to expel the foreign element from their land. Military men, acquainted with the Bombay and Madras armies, insisted that the mutiny had arisen from the organisation of that of Bengal; in which the Brahmin sepoys and Rajpoot sowars had been so pampered and petted,

that they began to deem themselves masters instead of subjects, and to aim at a sort of military despotism on their own account. Other speculators, pointing to the fact that Mohammedans have in all ages been intensely fanatical, regarded the mutiny as only one among many indications of an attempt to revive the past glories of the Moguls, when the followers of Mahomet were the rulers in India. Others again, keeping clear of the larger questions of creed and race, attributed the troubles to the policy of annexation, which had been pursued to so extraordinary a degree in recent years. These reasoners urged that, whatever may have been the faults and follies of the King of Oude, five million natives unquestionably looked up to him as their sovereign, and felt their prejudices shocked and their alarm excited, when, in 1856, he was rudely hurled from his throne, and made a pensioner dependent on a company of merchants. Another class of theorists, impressed with a horror of taxation, pitied the poor Hindoos who had to pay so much to the Company for permission to live on the soil, so much for the salt monopoly, so much for other dues; and sought to find a reason for the mutiny in the desire to throw off these imposts. Commercial men, estimating nations and countries by a standard familiar to themselves, had long complained that the Company did not encourage independent commerce in India; and now they said: 'If you had acted with English good sense, the revolt would never have occurred. Afford facilities for the construction of railways, canals, and docks; build ships and steamers; develop your mineral wealth in coal and iron; sell or let plots of land to men who will bring English experience and English machinery to bear on its cultivation; grow tea and coffee, sugar and cocoa, timber and fruits, cotton and flax, corn and pulse, on the soils favourable to the respective produce-do all this, or afford facilities for others to do it, and the natives of India will then have something more profitable to think of than mutiny and bloodshed.'

The

We point to these various theories for the purpose of remarking, that the controversies relating to them were as warmly conducted at the end of the year as when the news of the cartridge troubles first reached England. higher the position, the more extensive the experience, of public men, the more chary were they in committing themselves to any special modes of explanation; it was by those who knew little, that the boldest assertions were hazarded. An opinion was gradually growing up among cautious reasoners, that the revolt must have been the composite resultant of many co-ordinate or coexistent causes, each of which contributed towards it in a particular way; but such reasoners would necessarily perceive that a true solution could only be a

when all the separate items were rly estimated. Hence the autholand and in India, recommended

and followed a plan that may thus be enunciated

first suppress the mutiny; then collect gradually evidence of its various predisposing causes; and, finally, make use of that evidence in remodelling the institutions of British India on a firmer basis. The NOTES at the end of the last chapter shewed that the Company took the common-sense view, of inquiring into the probable causes of the mutiny before planning the re-organisation of Indian affairs. The candid acknowledgment by the Directors, that the voluminous documents hitherto produced had 'entirely failed to satisfy their minds in regard to the immediate causes of the mutiny,' was full of significance, and, it may be added, of caution to others.

So far as concerns the present Chronicle, the treatment will necessarily be affected by the character of the struggle. At the beginning of 1858, scarcely any symptoms of further mutiny were presented. The Bengal army was gone, scattered in anarchy; the armies of Bombay, Madras, and the Punjaub, were almost wholly sound; and the daily events consisted mainly of military operations against the revolted sepoy regiments of the Bengal army, and against such chieftains as had brought their retainers into the field for selfish purposes. Hence the narrative may march on more rapidly than before.

All the interest of the military operations in India, at the opening of the new year, grouped itself around the commander-in-chief. Slow as had been the arrival of British troops in India, during the months when Wheeler, Havelock, Neill, Ontram, Inglis, Barnard, Wilson, and Nicholson were struggling against difficulties, the disembarkations were very numerous in November and December. When the old year gave place to the new, it was estimated that 23,000 British troops had landed at Calcutta since the troubles began, besides others put on shore at Bombay, Madras, and Kurachee.* They had advanced