(100 So.) periosteum. He was confined to his bed for about two weeks and was unable to return to his work for four and a half months, but his employer continued to pay his salary at the rate of $2,100 per year, or $175 per month. However, he had also made commissions upon his sales as a traveling salesman, which had run his income up the year before to $4,500; and the lower judge decided that he was entitled to recover in round figures at the rate of $200 per month for loss of these commissions, He also allowed plaintiff $800 for his pain and suffering, and $40 for doctor's bills, or a total of $1,440. We find these figures substantially correct. DAWKINS, J. Alleging that he was a member in good standing of defendant union, plaintiff prayed that it be placed in the hands of a receiver, because of mismanagement of its affairs, and for a moneyed judgment in the sum of $15, claimed to have been collected from him as an alleged illegal fine, and for the further sum of $165, as damages caused by his having been deprived of work during an alleged wrongful suspension. A rule nisi was issued by the court below, directing defendant to show cause at a fixed time why a receiver should not be appointed. On the day fixed, defendant appeared and pleaded: First, prematurity, in that the processes of the order for dealing with the controversy had not been exhausted, because it had prosecuted an appeal to the executive board from the adverse decision of the gener al president; second, in the alternative, that plaintiff had mistaken his remedy; and third, further, alternatively, that the petition Plaintiff also claimed to have developed sciatica as a result of the accident, but the court below concluded that he had failed to prove that this was due to his said injuries. A careful review of the evidence on this point does not convince us that his finding was wrong. For the reasons assigned, the judgment is disclose no cause of action. Answer was then affirmed, with costs. Rehearing refused by Division C, composed of Justices OVERTON, ST. PAUL, and THOMPSON. (156 La.) No. 24236. made in the return specifically to the allegations of the petition. Attached to the answer was a copy of the petition for appeal to the general executive board. There was judgment below sustaining "said exceptions," dismissing the suit, and plaintiff appealed. Opinion. Petitioner alleges, in substance: That the NYLAND v. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF officers of the local union are mismanaging (Supreme Court of Louisiana. Feb. 18, 1924. (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) Trade unions 9-Petition against labor unlon held Insufficient for failing to aver exhaustion of remedies and processes of order. Petition against a labor union by a member seeking a receivership and money judgment for fine wrongfully collected and damages for suspension held insufficient to state a cause of action because it failed to allege that controversy between him and the union had been finally decided and that the remedies and processes of order were exhausted. its affairs by refusing to carry out the "orders and decrees of the national officers" directing the refunding to him of a fine of $15 paid under protest; and that the "local has been threatened by the national organization with a disruption of its membership, which will leave the assets of the association (alleged to amount to $2,500), in which petitioner has an undivided interest, in jeopardy, and will cause serious loss and damage to petitioner." That during his suspension he was deprived of work, "which caused him a loss of $165, and the officers of said association have refused to pay him the amount of said claim and are going around to the employers, with whom your petitioner is secking work, with a view of preventing him from earning a livelihood." He prayed for the appointment of a receiver, and for judgment in Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of the sum of $180. Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge. Suit by John Nyland against the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local No. 1960. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Reduced to its final analysis, plaintiff's petition recites that he has had a controversy with the defendant, of which he alleges he is a member in good standing, the exact nature of which is not disclosed, and that it is threatened with disruption because of the refusal to refund him $15 alleged to have been wrongfully collected as a fine; and that he was occasioned a loss of $165 by the suspension, which defendant refused to pay; and .. By Division B, composed of Justices DAW- that the officers of the local union are goKINS, LAND, and LECHE. Paul W. Maloney, of New Orleans, for appellant. Daly & Hamlin, of New Orleans, for appel lee. ing around to employers "with a view of pre For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes venting him from earning a livelihood." Nowhere is it alleged that the controversy has been finally decided in his favor and the remedies and processes of the order exhausted. Nothing seems to be better settled than that a member of a voluntary organization of this kind must first exhaust its processes, to which he has agreed to submit when becoming a member, before he can appeal to the courts. Braden v. Lewis, 149 La. 837, 90 South. 214. And it is necessary, in order to state a cause for relief that he should allege that course, as well as the finality of its results. The claim for a money judgment is necessarily linked with and grows out of the alleged official action of defendant, and it cannot be said to be due until final decision of the appellate bodies of the order. Non constat, but that they might sustain the ruling of defendant; and such a decision would not be subject to review by the courts until it became final. Otherwise, the petition does not state a serious ground for a receivership; the allegations being mainly general conclusions of the pleader, without a sufficient assertion of facts upon which to base them. The Frank H. Owen and others, as the City ComProceeding by Henry I. Sirmans against mission of the City of Jacksonville. circuit court quashed a writ of certiorari, and discharged respondents, and the petitioner brings error. Affirmed. W. C. Kent and W. M. Bostwick, Jr., both of Jacksonville, for plaintiff in error. P. H. Odom and. L. W. Strum, both of Jacksonville, for defendants in error. ELLIS, J. Henry I. Sirmans, in SeptemJacksonville. He was employed as sergeant of detectives of the police department. For the reason assigned, the judgment ap-ber, 1921, was an employee of the city of pealed from is affirmed with costs. The chief of police, A. J. Roberts, suspended Serg. Sirmans for conduct unbecoming an officer, and so advised the acting mayor by written communication, dated September 25, 1921, requesting the mayor to send the case to the city commission for trial if he deemed the matter sufficient to warrant such action. The mayor investigated the charges against Sirmars, and deeming them of such nature as to warrant a trial of Sirmans upon them before the commission, requested the commission, in writing, to give Sirmans a fair and speedy trial upon the charges as prescribed by the city charter and the rules and regulations for the government of the police force, and if the commission should find the charges to be true that Sirmans "be removed from office." On October 5, 1921, the city commission, by its secretary, notified Sirmans, in writing, of its purpose to hear and consider the evidence in the matter on October 7th, and furnished him with a copy of the charges as filed by the acting mayor with the commission. Sirmans appeared before the commission 3. Certiorari 25-Appointment of municipal at the appointed time and pleaded not guilty officers not judicial proceeding. to the charges. Upon the conclusion of the The appointment of municipal officers is not testimony the commission, by resolution, took a judicial proceeding. 4. Municipal corporations 185(13) — Power of removal of police officer neither judicial nor quasi judicial. The power of removal of a police officer, which power is vested in the executive depart the matter under advisement, and on October 11th announced its decision by unanimous vote to be that the accused was guilty. The mayor of the city was advised of the commission's action, and on October 12th he notified the commission that he had dis (100 So.) missed Detective Serg. Sirmans from the police force of the city. The dismissed police officer, through his attorneys, petitioned the commission for a rehearing. The petition was denied. Later a motion to set aside the verdict was made in this behalf, and that motion was denied. The commission suggesting that the matter might be referred to the mayor for reinvestigation. Sirmans, by his attorneys, then applied to the circuit court of Duval county for a writ of certiorari. The writ was issued, directed to the city commission, and on February 22, 1922, return was made. In March, upon order of the court, an amended return was made which included the testimony and certain affidavits taken before the commission upon the hearing. The court, after consideration of the return and amended return, entered its order quashing the writ of certiorari and discharging the respondents. To this judgment the petitioner took a writ of error from this court. The circuit judge rested his decision upon the case of Owens et al. v. Bond et al., 83 Fla. 495, 91 South. 686, in which this court held that the action of the city council or city commission of the city of Jacksonville in approving or rejecting the act of the mayor in suspending a person occupying the `position of chief of police is not a judicial or a quasi judicial function. [1] The writ of certiorari lies only to re-, view the actions of courts, boards, or officers exercising functions clearly judicial or quasi judicial. It will not lie to review administrative acts. 1 Bailey on Habeas Corpus, 172; 4 Stand. Ency. Proc. 919. A judicial act determines the law applicable and the rights and obligations of parties in relation to past transactions. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 25 L. Ed. 496; People ex rel. Schau v. McWilliams, 185 N. Y. 92, 77 N. E. 785; People ex rel. Cochran v. Board of Education of Oakland, 54 Cal. 375. [2] But the above definition is too narrow. Not every act which involves judgment or discretion is a judicial act. The exercise of judgment is not the criterion by which a proceeding must be viewed to determine whether it is judicial. [3] The appointment of municipal officers is not a judicial proceeding. Attorney General v. Mayor, etc., of Northampton, 143 Mass. 589, 10 N. E. 450. In some jurisdictions it is held that the power to remove municipal officers by municipal corporations is judicial. But such cases hold that, where the power to remove is not discretionary, but only for cause after notice and hearing, the proceedings are judicial, and may be reviewed by certiorari. [4] But in this state this court has defi nitely held that the power of removal of a police employee vested in the executive department of the city of Jacksonville is neither judicial nor quasi judicial, and therefore the action of the city authorities in the removal of such an employee is not reviewable. Owens et al. v. Bond et al., supra. [5] Under the charter of the city of Jacksonville the board of police commissioners had exclusive power to appoint, organize, and remove the members of the police force. Under chapter 7659, Laws of 1917, this power became vested in the city commission, which was required to establish general provisions and requirements for the control and suspension of members of the police department. While a police employee who has served one year may not be removed from office without cause and without a hearing before the commission on written charges, the action by the commission, involving this power, this court has determined to be ministerial. The circumstance of potential benefits to be derived from a pension or relief fund for faithful services for a definite period of time gives a member of the police force no vested interest in the position he occupies that renders his removal by the proper authorities a judicial act. The judgment of the court was correct, and is affirmed upon the authority of Owens et al. v. Bond et al., supra. Section 1827, Revised General Statutes 1920, in relation to forming a municipal corporation, does not require that the notice to the registered voters shall be signed by 25 or any other number of persons. 2. Municipal corporations 12(6)-Notice of organization of corporation held advertised for not less than 30 days. A notice to the registered voters within the proposed corporate limits of a meeting to be held on April 30th for the purpose of organizing a municipal corporation, which is first published on the 30th of March and weekly thereafter, until and including April 27th, is advertised for not less than 30 days. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes [1] Section 1827 provides: 3. Municipal corporations 12(6) - Publica- ( the qualifications hereinafter prescribed, to estion of notice of organization held sufficient. tablish for themselves a municipal government Under the provisions of the statute pro- with corporate powers and privileges as hereviding for publication of notice to the register- inafter provided." ed voters for the purpose of organizing a municipal corporation one insertion of the advertisement of such meeting in each calendar week, during a period of 30 days immediately preceding the date of the meeting, is a compliance with the statute; provided the first insertion appeared at least 30 days before the date of the meeting. Action in the nature of quo warranto by the State, on the relation of Rivers Buford, Attorney General, against the town of Forest Park in the County of Hillsborough, and others. Judgment dismissing the petition was entered, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed. "Whenever any community of persons shall desire to form a municipal corporation under the provisions of this chapter, they shall, for a period of not less than thirty days, cause to be published in some newspaper of the county, or by posting in three places of public resort in the immediate vicinage, a notice requiring all persons who are registered voters, residing in the proposed corporate limits, which shall be stated in this notice, to assemble at a certain time and place to select officers and organize a municipal government." Section 1825 merely fixes the minimum "community of persons" authorized to form a municipal government. We find nothing in these statutes that re quires the notice to be signed by 25 or any other number of persons. The language of the statute, "they shall cause to be published," seems to be complied with if the notice is signed by any one residing within the proposed corporate limits. The object of the notice is to advise all G. B. Wells, of Plant City, for plaintiff in the qualified electors residing within the limits of the proposed town that a meeting E. P. Martin, of Plant City, for defendants is to be held for the purpose of organizing in error. error. BROWNE, J. This is an information in the nature of a writ of quo warranto brought by the Attorney General to test the right of the city of Forest Park to exercise the franchises and corporate powers of a city, and of the mayor and other officers of the city to act as such. Motions to strike the answer of the defendants, and for an order of dissolution against the corporation, and a judgment of ouster against its officers, were denied. No further proceedings were taken by the Attorney General. The court entered final judgment holding that the answer of the respondents was sufficient, and showed "a complete and perfect right to exercise the offices, franchises, liberties, and powers of the town of Forest Park," and the petition of the Attorney General was dismissed. The first ground of attack is that the notice to the registered voters residing within the proposed corporate limits to assemble at a certain time and place to select officers and to organize a municipal government was not signed by 25 qualified electors residing within the proposed corporate limits. Section 1825, Revised General Statutes 1920, provides: "It shall be lawful for male inhabitants of any hamlet, village or town in this state, not less than twenty-five in number, who shall have a town. That object is accomplished by a notice signed by 1 as well as by 25 persons. The case of West End v. State, 138 Ala. 295, 36 South. 423, is not in point, as the Alabama Code (Code 1896, § 2942) expressly provides that "proceedings to incorporate towns shall be begun by petition in writing signed by fifty or more qualified electors who reside within the boundaries of the proposed town." Our statutes are silent as to the number of persons who shall sign the notice, and we cannot read 25 into the law by implication, as plaintiff in error would have us do. The next attack is that the notice to all the registered voters residing within the proposed corporate limits was not published "for a period of not less than thirty days." [2] The meeting was called for the 30th day of April, and the notice was first pub lished on March 30th. It is contended by the plaintiff in error that the notice was only published 28 days. To sustain such a contention we would have to hold that between the 27th and 30th of April the notice was not published. To hold that it was not published between those dates would be equivalent to holding that it was not published between the 20th and 27th of April, or on any of the days intervening between the days when the newspaper was issued; it being issued only weekly. It would then follow that, not be (100 So.) ing published on the intervening days, it | vote to publish a notice for 30 days, as rewas published only on the days of the issue of the paper, or 5 days, in this instance. Such was the contention in the case of Scally v. Meminger, 64 Fla. 464, 60 South. 180, where this court said: "The only defect alleged in the proceedings leading up to the bond issue is at least unique. The special charter requires that the proposed bond 'election shall be advertised for not less than thirty days prior to the date upon which it shall be held, in a newspaper published in the city of Lakeland.' The publication was made once a week for five successive weeks immediately prior to the election, but the novel statement is made that this constitutes an advertisement for five days only. We are not favored with citation of authority for this construction, and we shall content ourselves by citing one adjudged case precisely to the contrary. Montford v. Allen, 111 Ga. 18, 36 S. E. Rep. 305." The sworn answer alleges that "On the 26th day of March, A. D. 1923. at a place within the territory sought to be incorporated, there was a meeting held for the purpose of laying plans for the establishment of the municipality to be known as Forest Park, Fla., 47 of the 50 registered voters of said territory sought to be incorporated being present and voting, that it was agreed by those present that said organization should be had at as early a date as possible. All voting to proceed as provided by law to organize said municipal government." The answer in substance alleges that at that meeting it was decided by unanimous 100 SO.-47 quired by law, to all the registered voters residing within the proposed corporate limits, to meet at the home of C. S. Gardner, which is situated in about the center of the territory proposed to be incorporated, and that, pursuant to that notice, 47 of the 50 registered voters met at the place designated in the advertisement, and each took part in the organization of the meeting, and that the name of Forest Park was adopted for the municipality by unanimous vote; that a secret election was held at that time and place, and that they elected by secret ballot a mayor, city clerk, chief of police, city treasurer, tax assessor and collector, and five councilmen or aldermen. The motion to strike the portions of the answer setting out the foregoing proceedings admits the allegations of the answer as to what occurred, and it appears therefrom that the proceedings for the organization to establish a municipal corporation were in accordance with the controlling statutes, and there was no error in the ruling of the court denying the motion to strike. It is further contended that the answer does not show that at the meeting on the 30th of April a vote was taken to incorporate the town of Forest Park. It is true that the answer does not specifically state that at that meeting a vote was taken to incorporate the town of Forest Park, but it appears from the answer that the meeting was called for that purpose, and that at the meeting on March 26th 47 of the 50 registered voters in the territory sought to be incorporated voted to organize a municipal corporation, and that in pursuance to the notice to the registered voters of the territory a meeting was held on the 30th day of April, A. D. 1923, at the time and place designated in the notice, for the purpose of establishing and organizing a municipal government, which was participated in by 47 of the 50 registered voters of the territory proposed to be incorporated, and each took part in the organization of the town: that the name of Forest Park was adopted for the municipality by a unanimous vote; that a secret election was there and then held for the election of the officers for the municipality; that at the election a seal was duly adopted; that on May 1, A. D. 1923, a true and correct transcript of the proceedings of this meeting was duly filed and recorded by the clerk of the circuit court in and for Hillsborough county, Fla., as required by law. The plaintiff in error in his brief sets out what language he thinks should have been used to show that it was the intention of the electors present to establish a municipality within the boundaries published, and says "such words as these or other apt words to express the intention of the as- |