said to be a loan, was returned by the vendor | the land in dispute to his brother, John Jetus to the vendee. The petition does not allege that any time was fixed within which the socalled loan should be paid. The act of sale is alleged to have been passed on January 8, 1914, and the suit was filed July 20, 1920. Plaintiffs allege as a conclusion that, considered as a sale, said act of January 8, 1914, is a simulation, and they contend that they are entitled to prove the allegations of their petition by parol evidence, under the provisions of article 2239 of the Civil Code, as amended by Act No. 5, p. 12, of 1884. Article 2239, C. C., provides that forced heirs shall have the same right to annul absolutely and by parol evidence the simulated contracts of those from whom they inherit, etc. It is very questionable whether a sale made as alleged in plaintiffs' petition is such a simulated contract as was intended to be in cluded within the terms of the cited article. There is no doubt, for it is admitted, that the sale of January 8, 1914, was real and genuine. There was a consideration paid by the vendee to the vendor, and the written act was not a mere sham. Of what plaintiffs do in reality complain is that the act did not contain the whole and entire agreement between the parties, inasmuch as it did not stipulate the right of redemption, and for that reason they allege as a conclusion that it was a simulation. The purpose of the cited provision of article 2239, C. C., was to provide a remedy in favor of the forced heir to enable him to annul simulated contracts which were intended to wrongfully or fraudulently deprive him of his inheritance. It is not pretended or even hinted that the ancestor through whom plaintiffs claim had the remotest idea of depriving plaintiffs of their inheritance, and for that reason it is exceedingly doubtful whether the facts alleged by plaintiffs justify their recourse to the provisions of the artiIcle of the Code which they invoke. Walton on January 8, 1914, in consideration of the payment of those debts by the latter; that the price was fair and adequate, and that John Jetus Walton at once went into possession of the property. The land remained in the possession of John Jetus Walton and his children, and no demand was made for the return of the property, and no offer was made to reimburse the price which had been paid. Valuable minerals were discovered or supposed to have been discovered under the land in 1919, and though Tom Walton died thereafter, in December, he took no steps to exercise his alleged right of redemption. Several of the plaintiffs testified that their Uncle Jetus had recognized that he was under obligation to retrocede the land, and that he had even made a written memorandum in a little book entitled "Guide for Deacons” of the amount due him by Tom. Defendants on the other hand deny with equal tenacity the truth of the admissions alleged to have been made by Jetus. The testimony is conflicting, and is by no means sufficiently convincing to affect the authentic declarations made in the act of sale in January, 1914, at a time not suspicious and long before the discovery of minerals under the land. We believe the judgment appealed from does full justice between the parties, and for that reason our former decree is reinstated and made final. (156 La.) No. 26561. STATE v. MALONE. In re MALONE. (Supreme Court of Louisiana. June 2, 1924.) (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) Infants 65-Minors; act of minor, not. crime, does not become so by lapse of time. An act of a minor constituting a mere delinquency when done cannot become a crime merely because he attains an age such that the doing of the act would constitute a crime. [2] According to the note of evidence taken. on the trial of the case, however, parol evidence was admitted without objection to prove the allegations of plaintiffs' petition. and we therefore do not believe that there is any reason why we should rule upon the admissibility of that evidence. The sole objection we have been able to find was made while one Alvin Hall was on the witness stand, and after many other witnesses had testified on the subject-matter in dispute, and the door for the admission of parol evidence had with the consent of defendants remained wide open. It was then too late to urge the objection. [3] The salient facts as we gather them from the record are that Tom Walton owed several debts, one of which was in the shape 2. Infants 18-Minors; district court held without jurisdiction to try for offense which when committed constituted but a delinquency. Under Const. 1921, art. 7, §§ 52, 53, and is without jurisdiction to try one for a criminal subsequent juvenile legislation, district court offense who at the time of its commission was less than 17 years old; the act constituting but a delinquency, though at the time of trial he was 17 years old.1 George Malone was arraigned and pleaded of a judgment; that, being pressed, he sold guilty to a charge of burglary and larceny For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes (100 So.) committed while under 17 years of age, and Constitution of 1921, pages 53 and 54. This he applies for writs of certiorari and prohibi- was followed by Act 126 of 1921 (page 317) tion to review action of district court in affecting the parish of Orleans alone; Act denying his application for writ of habeas 83 of 1921 (page 128) affecting all parishes corpus. Proceedings of district court another than Orleans and Caddo; and Act 119 nulled, set aside, and quashed, and relator of 1922 (page 244) affecting only Caddo pardischarged. ish. Scheen & Blanchard, of Shreveport, for relator. L. C. Blanchard, Dist. Atty., of Shreveport, for the State. By the Whole Court. ST. PAUL, J. Relator was born on April 6, 1906. On the night of March 12, 1923 (being therefore under the age of 17 years at the time), he broke into the residence of one W. E. Brown, at Shreveport, and stole therefrom certain household goods of the alleged value of $1,300. On October 24, 1923 (being then over the age of 17 years), he was charged before the district court of Caddo parish with burglary and larceny. And on the same day he was arraigned and pleaded guilty. On November 7th he was sentenced to the state penitentiary. On December 1st he applied to the respondent for a writ of habeas corpus, setting up the want of jurisdiction over him of the district court aforesaid. The writ issued. but relator was denied relief on the ground that in State v. Ebardo, 143 La. 591, 78 South. 973, this court had held that "A person over 17 years of age must be charged and tried in the district court, although at the time of the commission of the offense he may have been under 17 years of age." Wherefore relator applies to this court for relief. I. Our learned brother of the district court was, of course, justified in following that case; but it behooves this court to correct its own error, especially when the error is such as (in effect) creates an offense where the law has said there shall be no offense. The Ebardo Case proceeds on the theory (as shown by the body of the opinion) that juveniles who violate a law of the state thereby incur the penalty fixed by that law; that the essence of the juvenile legislation of the state is simply to provide a separate tribunal fitted to the age of such offenders at the time of their trial, having authority (and being directed) to moderate such penalties, when the juvenile (being still a juvenile) is brought before it. But this is fundamentally erroneous. The Juvenile legislation of the state began with an amendment to the Constitution of 1898, afterwards incorporated in the Constitution of 1913 as article 118 thereof. Afterwards came sections 52 and 53 of article 7 of the On the other hand, relator, having/violated a law of this state when under 17 years of age, thereby became a delinquent child and subject to commitment by the juvenile court until his majority or complete reformation. The accidental arrival of the seventeenth anniversary of his birthday before his trial no more operated to deprive that court of jurisdiction over him than it operated to magnify his offense and subject him to the jurisdiction of the district court. The delinquent child is not to be punished, but he is nonetheless to be reformed; and that ref ormation is to be under the eye of the ju-! venile court. Hence we conclude that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is to be tested by the age of the child at the time of the commission of the offense and not by his age at the time of the trial. Gilmer & Cousin, of Shreveport, for appellees Wetherbee, Bliss, Chandler, and Collins. T. M. Milling and F. L. Hargrove, both of Shreveport, for appellee Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana. By Division C, composed of OVERTON, The case of State v. Ebardo is therefore ST. PAUL, and THOMPSON, JJ. overruled on all points; and Decree It is therefore ordered that all proceedings against relator in the district court of Caddo parish be annulled, set aside and quashed; and that relator be discharged from the custody of the sheriff of said parish; subject, however, to any proceedings which may be instituted against him in the juvenile court of said parish. (156 La.) Nos. 26506-26510. HOLLINGSWORTH v. POINDEXTER et al., and four other cases. (Supreme Court of Louisiana. May 5, 1924. Rehearing Denied by Whole Court June 7, 1924.) (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) Taxation 734 (2)-Inclusion in assessment by clerical error of land not claimed by plaintiff held not ground for setting aside tax sale. Where assessment, as corrected prior to tax sale, contained all the land claimed by plaintiff in action involving attack on tax sale, the inclusion of other land not claimed by plaintiff as result of apparent clerical error, offset by omission of tracts which he did own, held not ground for setting aside of tax sale as to land claimed by plaintiff. Appeal from Second Judicial District Court, Parish of Bossier; J. E. Reynolds, Judge. Suits by G. W. Hollingsworth against Miss Jane Poindexter and others, against Mrs. Ama Ford Vance, against J. W. Elston, trustee, and others, against T. F. Bell and others, and against Wetherbee & Bliss and others. Judgments of dismissal, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Murff & Mabry, of Shreveport, and Capps, Cantey, Hanger & Short, of Fort Worth, Tex., for appellant. Blanchard, Goldstein & Walker, of Shreveport, for appellees Poindexter, Vance, and others. Wilkinson, Lewis & Wilkinson, of Shreveport, for appellees Elston and others. Barksdale, Clark & Van Hook, of Shreve port, for appellees Bell and others. J. S. Atkinson and F. E. Greer, both of Shreveport, for appellee Gulf Retining Co. of Louisiana. THOMPSON, J. The plaintiff in these five consolidated. cases sues the several defendants to be decreed the owner of some 700 acres of land situated in sections 10, 16, and 17, T. 19, R. 11, west, in Bossier parish. As a condition precedent to plaintiff's recovery he asks the avoidance of what he styles a pretended tax sale made of said lands in 1892 under an alleged assessment for the taxes of 1891 in the name of the Succession of A. H. Hollingsworth, Deceased. The land was bought at the tax sale by R. B. Poindexter, and two of the defendants, Helen and Jane Poindexter, claim a part of the land by inheritance from the said tax purchaser who was their father. The other defendants separately claim different parcels or subdivisions of the land by transfers and successive deeds from the tax purchaser. The land originally belonged to A. H. Hollingsworth and his wife, Permilla Key Hollingsworth. They both died in the early '80's leaving as heirs, the plaintiff, P. D. Hollingsworth, J. B. Hollingsworth, A. H. Hollingsworth, and Lula Hollingsworth. last three name died without issue after the death of their parents, leaving the plaintiff and P. D. Hollingsworth as the sole heirs to the estate of their father and mother. The The succession of A. H. Hollingsworth and his wife appears never to have been administered, but the heirs accepted unconditionally and paid the debts of the succession, according to the allegations of the petition. In 1888 P. D. Hollingsworth sold to his brother, the plaintiff, his half interest in all of the lands belonging to the estate of his deceased parents; and this deed was placed of record, and, with the unregistered title by inheritance of the other half, constitutes plaintiff's muniment of title. None of the heirs ever had actual and corporeal possession of any of the lands, and they do not ap pear to have ever been assessed with or to have paid any taxes on the land before or since the tax sale of 1892 for the taxes of 1891. The nullities propounded against the tax sale are: (1) That the lands were not assessed to the plaintiff for the year 1891. (2) That plaintiff had no notice of any assessment of taxes, no notice of delinquency, or of said tax sale. (3) That if it should be held that the assessment upon the tax rolls of 1891 in the name of the Succession of A. H. Hollingsworth, was such an assessment as would justify the tax sale in the name of pe (100 So.) The judgment in the case referred to has become final. The finding of the court, both as to the facts and the law applicable, was eminently correct, and we see no sufficient reason for going over the same ground again. We may add, however, that all of the lands which the plaintiff claims in these suits were included in the assessment as corrected by the tax collector prior to the sale, with possibly one or two exceptions in which a subdivision was included which was not owned by the tax debtor, or a parcel of the land omitted which the tax debtor diu own. This fact is fully demonstrated by a comparison of the description of the lands now claimed with the description in the assessment as set out in plaintiff's petition. titioner and is binding on petitioner, then it | sessment made by the tax collector prior to is alleged: (4) That said assessment was too his, advertisement. vague, uncertain, and insufficient to describe and identify the property so assessed, and a sale thereunder is absolutely null and void. (5) That said assessment carried with it in section 6 the W. 1⁄2 of N. W. 4 of section 16, which did not belong to either the petitioner or the Succession of A. H. Hollingsworth, but to other persons to whom it was assessed for the year 1891, and the taxes paid thereon by other persons before said pretended sale to said Poindexter was made, being a dual assessment and payment of the taxes on a portion of said land so assessed and pretended to be sold. (6) That the land was assessed confusedly with lands of others, to wit, B. F. O'Neal, and was sold confusedly with other property belonging to other persons, with no separate appraisement. (7) That, if section 16 could be substituted for section 6 and the name of G. W. Hollingsworth could be substituted for the Succession of A. H. Hollingsworth by the tax collector, then there was still a dual assessment of part of the land assessed and pretended to be sold, which renders the whole absolutely null and void, because there was a dual assessment as to the W. 1⁄2 of the N. W. 4 of section 16; the same having been assessed the same year (1891) to B. F. O'Neal, who paid the taxes before the said sale. All of the defendants filed exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action founded on the peremptory bar by the lapse of three years, provided in article 233, Constitution of 1898, article 233, Constitution of 1913, and section 11, art. 10, Constitution of 1921. The pleas were sustained, the suits dismissed, and plaintiff appeals. Opinion. The tax sale, the subject of attack in these suits, is the same tax sale that was involved in the suit of this Same Plaintiff v. Mrs. W. L. Schanland et al., 99 South. 613, No. 25838 on the docket of this court, the opinion and decree in which suit was handed down on January 7 of the current year. The land claimed in that suit was in sections 15 and 17, and formed a part of the body of lands claimed in the instant suits. The same attack was made on the tax sale there as is made now, and the same grounds of nullity were asserted by the plaintiff as are urged in the present suits. A full discussion of these alleged nullities was made, and the authorities pertinent were cited and reviewed at length, with the result that the attack on the tax sale was held barred under the statutory limitations contained in the several Constitutions hereinbefore referred to, except as to 40 acres of the land claimed in that suit in section 15, which the court found was not included in the assessment which formed the basis of said sale, nor in the corrected as In the suit against the heirs of J. W. Elston the plaintiff claims the S. E. 4 of S. E. 14 of section 10, T. 19, R. 11; and in the suit against George W. Wetherbee et al. the plaintiff claims the S. W. 4 of S. E. 4 of section 10, same township and range. There was assessed and sold the S. 1⁄2 of S. E. 4 of section 10, T. 19, R. 11, which, of course, covered the land claimed by the plaintiff. In the suits against Mrs. Vance, T. F. Bell et al., and Wetherbee the plaintiff claims all of section 16 except the W. 1⁄2 of N. W. 14. All of said section was assessed and sold at the tax sale except the W. % of N. E. 4. The error in omitting from the assessment the W. 1⁄2 of N. E. 4, which plaintiff did own, and the inclusion in the assessment of the W. 2 of the N. W. 4, which plaintiff did not own, was, to say the least, an apparent clerical error of little importance to the validity of the assessment otherwise. It is certainly not such a serious error as to justify the setting aside of a tax sale, even when such sale is not protected by the lapse of the period of limitation of the right of action. The plaintiff owned 560 acres in section 16, and he was assessed with exactly that acreage with a correct description except as to the 80 acres mentioned. The assessment and sale may therefore be regarded as including all the land plaintiff owned in section 16. In section 17 the plaintiff in his suit against Wetherbee claims the N. 1⁄2 of S. E. 4 and E. 1⁄2 of N. E. 4 of N. W. 4, 100 acres. He had also sued for the S. E. 4 of N. W. 4 and the S. W. 4 of N. E. 4 and W. 1⁄2 of the N. E. 14 of S. W. 14 of section 17, making in all, claimed in section 17, 200 acres. The assessment contained exactly 200 acres in that section. After all is said, it appears very clear that the plaintiff claims in all of the suits, including the suit against Mrs. Schanland, 880 acres, which is the exact acreage included in the assessment, less the 40 acres in section 15, which the court found in the Schanland Case was not assessed, and leaving out of consideration 80 acres, being the S. 1⁄2 of S. E. 4 of section blank. There can be no question, therefore, that the assessment contained and intended to contain all of the lands owned and claimed by the plaintiff in these several suits. And the tax sale conveyed-and intended to conveyall of such lands, which were comprised in one body, except the 80 acres in section 10 and the 40 acres in section 15. We find, therefore, that, with the corrected name of the owner and the correction of section 6 by substituting the section 16, the assessment contains almost the exact acreage of land owned and claimed by the plaintiff, the correct section, township, and range, the correct description of the lands by governmental subdivisions, with but few clerical errors caused by the inclusion of one or two subdivisions which plaintiff did not own, but which is offset by the omission of an equal number of subdivisions that he did own. This was a sufficient description to identify the land belonging to the plaintiff and claimed in the suits under consideration and to furnish the legal basis for a valid tax sale. At all events, the errors complained of cannot be asserted after the lapse of three years under the articles of the Constitution hereto Mabry, Reaves & Carlton, of Tampa, for appellant. Shackleford & Shackleford, Shackleford & Parks, and Lunsford & Blake, all of Tampa, for appellees. March 22, 1922, by Gettis A. Henderson, alPER CURIAM. A bill of complaint filed leges, in substance: That he is the father of John A. Henderson and other children who inherited property in Hillsborough county, Fla. That complainant A. Henderson and the other children, and gave was appointed guardian of the estate of John in due form a general guardian's bond in the sum of $100 "upon which the defendant John A. Henderson has sued and exhausted said bond." That on July 7, 1909, complainant, as guardian of his said children, obtained an order from the county judge for the sale of certain property belonging to said children, and gave a special sales bond in $15,000 to secure a der with W. H. Kendrick and G. N. Benjamin proper accounting for the proceeds of said oras sureties. That no final settlement of said guardianship has ever been made or demanded, and that no accounting between complainant and his son, the defendant John A. Henderson, has ever been made. That in fact comsaid defendant nothing (the plainant owes but is willing to pay if on an accounting he is specifications for such conclusion being alleged), found to be due anything to the said defendant. That, notwithstanding the facts stated, the said John A. Henderson caused a suit to be brought against complainant and G. N. Benjamin and W. H. Kendrick upon said special sales bond given by complainant as said guardian. That subsequently the said John A. Henderson caused complainant and G. N. Benjamin and W. H. Kendrick to be notified that he (the said John A. Henderson) would dismiss that suit. That, notwithstanding this assurance by the defendant John A. Henderson, default and final judgment were entered in the cause against said Kendrick and Benjamin, and execution issued thereon, which judgment was vacated by the court; that when the execution was issued, the complainant residing in another state, the said Kendrick and Benjamin "conferred with the attorneys representing the said John A. Henderson and signed a letter prepared by said attorneys, which said letter reads as follows, to wit: "Tampa, Florida, June 4, 1919. "Shackleford & Shackleford, Attorneys at Law, Tampa, Fla-Gentlemen: In reference to the conversation which we had with you this day relative to the judgment which you recovered against us in the circuit court in and for Hillsborough county, Florida, in an account at law, wherein Sidney J. Catts, Governor of the state of Florida, for the use of John A. Henderson, was plaintiff, on the 14th day of May, A. D. 1919, we now beg to confirm what Appeal from Circuit Court, Hillsborough we have said in said conversation. In conCounty; F. M. Robles, Judge. Suit by Gettis A. Henderson against John A. Henderson and others. From an order denying motions for temporary injunctions, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded. sideration of your not having the execution which has been issued on said judgment levied upon our property and advertising the same for sale on the first Monday in July, A. D. 1919, we hereby promise to pay you the amount of said judgment and the cost of court by the |