EXCEPTIONAL CONDITIONS. See Circumstances and Conditions. EXPORT RATES. THROUGH.—It is essential that any method for making rates should be practicable, and not afford a cover for discrimination and injustice. The only practicable mode yet devised for making through export rates, as appears by past experience, is to add to the established inland rates from the interior to the seaboard the current ocean rates. New York Produce Exchange v. New York Central and Hudson Under the amendments of March 2, 1889, to the statute requiring ten days' Third Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission. EXPORT TRAFFIC. New Orleans Cotton Exchange v. Louisville, New Orleans and EXPRESS COMPANIES. STATUS OF, UNDER ACT TO REGULATE COMMERCE. First Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission. HOW RELATED TO THE ACT.-The mere fact that a common carrier does other business besides the transportation of passengers and property, or performs a further service than that of transportation in respect to the articles carried. Held, Not sufficient to exclude the carrier from the operation of the act so far as applicable to its business. In re Express Companies. The relation of express companies to interstate commerce considered, together with the extent and measure of their participation therein. The bringing them within the provisions of the act found practicable, and on some accounts desirable. (Ib.) Express business conducted as a branch of the business of a railroad company. Held, To be subject to the act. (lb.) Express business conducted by an independent organization acquiring transportation rights by contract. Held, Not to be described in the act with sufficient precision to warrant the Commission in taking jurisdiction thereof. (Ib.) See Second Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission. LIVE STOCK.--Unlawful Device. Shamberg v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company et al. See Preference or Advantage. EQUALITY IN. FACILITIES OF TRAFFIC. Chicago and Alton Railroad Company v. Pennsylvania Railroad Heck & Petree v. East Tennessee, Virginia and Georgia Railway The Kentucky and Indiana Bridge Company has the chartered powers of a common carrier and is such de facto. It is, therefore, under the act to regulate commerce, entitled to demand of railroad companies, whose lines are intersected by its tracks, the same reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of property that may be lawfully demanded by other carriers under that act. Kentucky and Indiana Bridge Company v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company. The Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company united with other companies having lines terminating on the Ohio River at or opposite Louisville in a contract, whereby it was agreed that all their business across the river at that point should be taken over the Louisville bridge. A new bridge being constructed over the river at this point, one of the railroad companies which had contracted to take all its business over the old bridge, transferred the business to the new bridge. The Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company thereupon refused to receive for transportation over its line any freights which had been brought over the new bridge in violation of the contract made with it. Held, That this refusal was unlawful. (lb.) A common carrier by rail to which property is offered for transportation can not in this indirect manner, and by refusal to perform obligations imposed by law upon it, enforce its contracts, but must for that purpose resort to the customary remedies. (Ib.) Nor can a common carrier, as a reason for refusal to afford to another common carrier the customary, reasonable, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic, assign the fact that such other common carrier supplies no public necessities, the public having been fully accommodated without it. All railroads created by competent public authority must be conclusively presumed to be public conveniences, and other common carriers can not refuse to exchange traffic with them on any suggestion or showing to the contrary. (Ib.) THROUGH ROUTES AND THROUGH RATES.-English legislation and the procedure thereunder in respect to applications by carriers to be admitted to through routes and to participate in through rates stated; and principles there applied explained. Little Rock and Memphis Railroad Company v. East Tennessee, The act to regulate commerce was probably intended to effect similar results, but in its present form and in the absence of the necessary machinery it is not adequate to afford the relief prayed in the petition. (lb.) Recommendations of second annual report for amendment of section 3 renewed. (Ib.) THROUGH ROUTES AND THROUGH RATES.-Continued. The national regulations prescribed are not in all respects coextensive with the power of Congress, and do not provide for ordering through routes and through rates. While it is the duty of a State carrier which engages in interstate commerce to forward traffic offered from a connecting line, there is no authority under the present act to compel the carrier to forward the traffic over a route not operated or selected by itself. Mattingly v. Pennsylvania Company. Through rates and through billing are matters of agreement among carriers engaged in interstate commerce, and, as was decided in the case of The Little Rock and Memphis and Railroad Company v. The East Tennessee, Virginia and Georgia Railroad Company (2 Inters. Com. Rep., 454, 3 I. C. C., Rep., 1), the Commission has no power under the statute to compel them against their consent to enter into arrangements for through rates and for through billing. Capehart & Smith v. The Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company et al. An aggregate through rate is itself an entirety, although made up of agreed percentages, proportions, or divisions, as the case may be, of the entire rate among the several carriers; and where the rail carrier makes a through rate from a point on a navigable river with a steamboat line, and refuses to make such through rate with another steamboat, the Commission can not compel the rail carrier to receive freight from or deliver it to the steamboat with which it has refused to make a through rate or to do through billing upon the prepayment of charges for an estimated proportion of the through rate equal in amount to that which the rail carrier receives from the steamboat line with which it has an arrangement for through rates and through billing. (Ib.) The common carriers named and referred to in the last clause of section 3 of the act to regulate commerce are such alone as are subject to the provisions of that statute. (Ib.) INTERCHANGE OF TRAFFIC. Third Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission. CONTRACT FOR USE OF TRACKS.—In the absence of statutory provision the rights of a railroad company under a lawful agreement for a specified use of the tracks of another railroad company are measured in respect to the track use by the terms of the contract, and the provisions of the act to regulate commerce apply to the situation created by the contract and add no authority for a different use of the tracks. Alford v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company. TO AND FROM LOCAL STATIONS.-The duty of a railroad company operating its own road or a road that it controls to serve the local stations on its line does not apply to a company that has only a running privilege for through trains to reach points on its own line over a part of the road of another company which it does not control. In such a case the company is not required to disregard the conditions of its agreement, and does not violate the provisions of the act to regulate commerce by not receiving and discharging traffic on the tracks of the proprietary company, the sufficiency of the local service rendered by the latter not being questioned. (Ib.) See Carriers. EXTRAORDINARY FACILITIES AND RIGHTS OF WAY GIVEN TO PRIVATE LIVESTOCK CARS.—(Ib.) See Through Routes and Through Rates; Preference or Advantage; Traffic. FAVOR IN TRANSPORTATION. TO SHIPPERS OVER ONE DIVISION OF A CONSOLIDATED LINE. Rice, Robinson & Witherop v. Western New York and Pennsylvania Railroad Company. TO COAL COMPANY, THE CAPITAL STOCK OF WHICH IS OWNED BY CARRIER.Coxe Brothers and Company v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Com pany. TO OWNERS OF LIVE STOCK CARS. Shamberg v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company et al. FEDERAL AUTHORITY. See Interstate Commerce. FINDINGS OF FACT BY COMMISSION. PRIMA FACIA EVIDENCE IN UNITED STATES. COURTS.— In re Alleged Excessive Freight Rates and Charges on Food CORRECTION AFTER REHEARING. ERROR IN. - Bates v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company et al. Proctor & Gamble v. Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railroad COMMISSION TO DETERMINE WHAT ARE REASONABLE RATES.— Coxe Brothers & Company v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Company. See Judicial and Administrative Questions. FIXED CHARGES. In re Alleged Excessive Freight Rates and Charges on Food See Reasonable Rates. FLOUR. Kauffman Milling Company v. Missouri Pacific Railway Com- In re Alleged Excessive Freight Rates and Charges on Food King & Co. v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad FOOD PRODUCTS. In re Alleged Excessive Freight Rates and Charges on Food FOREIGN MERCHANDISE. New York Board of Trade and Transportation Company et al. v. FOURTH SECTION. See Long and Short Haul Clause; Act to Regulate Commerce. FREE CARTAGE OF FREIGHT. INVESTIGATION CONCERNING.— Third Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission. WHEN UNLAWFUL. Stone & Carten v. Detroit, Grand Haven and Milwaukee Railway See Long and Short Haul Clause; Unjust Discrimination. FREIGHT. See Traffic; Continuous Carriage of Freights. FRUITS. Delaware State Grange, etc., v. New York, Philadelphia and Boston Fruit and Produce Exchange v. New York and New Eng- GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION. See Location. GOVERNMENT AIDED RAILROAD AND TELEGRAPH LINES. Report of Interstate Commerce Commission. GROUP RATES. Stone & Carten v. Detroit, Grand Haven and Milwaukee Rail- ON COAL.-Principles relating to, as stated in Rend v. Chicago and North-Western HEARING. WHEN PRECLUDED BY CONTRACTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES. Haddock v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company. WHEN NOT PRECLUDED BY CONTRACTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES. (Ib.) See Practice; Evidence. |