without the consent of the original signers, vitiates the note as to the latter; otherwise, if the new party, through inadvertence or mistake, signed so as, prima facie, to indicate that his name was added in the character of maker, when in fact such was not the intention. Wallace v. Jewell, 21 Ohio St. 163. (1871.)

In a promissory note made payable one year after date, there was the following clause: "The above to be at ten per cent. interest annually:" Held, (1) That the word "annually," in this connection, is to be understood as relating to and defining the rate of interest, and is equivalent to the words per annum; and that the clause is not a stipulation for the annual payment of interest. (2) The interlining of the word "paid" before the word "annually" in the clause aforesaid, is a material alteration of the note. (3) Where such note had been signed by a surety, and was subsequently, without the knowledge or consent of the surety, so altered, before delivery, the payee being privy to such alteration at the time of delivery, and knowing that the surety had not assented thereto: Held, that no action can be maintained against the surety upon such altered note. Patterson v. McNeely, 16 Ohio St. 348. (1865.)

H having agreed with F to loan him $500, on his note, to be signed by B, as his surety, a note in the following terms was drawn up and signed by F: "We jointly and severally promise to pay H L H five hundred dollars on ten days' notice, at ten per cent." This note was sent to B for his signature, who, not having ink at hand, signed it in pencil and returned it to F, with a message, stating that he would, at any time, "ink over" his signature, if desired. F then presented the note to H informing him of B's promise, which he (F) agreed should be performed. H then said he wished the words "interest to be paid annually" were in the note, and at his request, those words were added at the end of the note, by F, who then delivered the note, and received the money, the parties intending no fraud upon B, and H supposing the note to be valid. B was not present, and knew nothing of this alteration. Some weeks afterward, H met B near the store of F, and requested him to "ink over his signature to that note," assigning as a reason for the request that the pencil signature might wear off. B went with him into the store of F, and in his presence, did trace over his pencil signature with ink, without reading the note or having any knowledge of the alteration which had been made. Upon a suit brought by the assignee of H against the surety B: Held, that the words added to the note were material, and that, under the foregoing state of facts, the note never became, in either form, the valid note of B. Boalt v. Brown, 13 Ohio St. 364. (1862.)

When a note, payable generally, is made and indorsed in blank for the accommodation of the maker, and at the time of its discount is altered without the knowledge or consent of the indorser by the interlineation of a particular place of payment, such alteration is material and discharges the indorser. Sturges v. Williams, 9 Ohio St. 444. (1859.)

Where L, at the request of S & Co. for the purpose of procuring from the plaintiff a loan for the benefit of S & Co., joined them in a note for $3,000, payable to the plaintiff ninety days after date, and left the note with S & Co. for negotiation, and the plaintiff, knowing that L was merely a surety, refused to discount the note at its face, but without the knowledge or consent of L agreed with S & Co. to loan them $2,000 upon it, and the same day wrote across the face of the note: "$2,000. This note was discounted for $2,000, which amount is due upon it. John H. Ebbert, cashier;" and the plaintiff, the note not having been paid at maturity, brought suit against all the makers, describing it as a note for $3,000: Held, (1) That the note, up to the time of its transfer and delivery by S & Co. to plaintiff, had no legal validity as a promissory note for any amount. (2) That the plaintiff having refused to discount the note at its face, it never became operative as a note for $3,000. (3) That the note, when thus delivered and indorsed, became and was in legal effect a note for $2,000, and no more. (4) That L, being merely a surety, and never having assented to the modification, was not liable upon it as a note for $2,000, nor the money loaned, as upon request. Portage Bank v. Lane, 8 Ohio St. 405. (1858.)

The material alteration of a written instrument, made by a stranger, will not avoid it. To have that effect, the alteration must be made by, or with the privity of, one claiming a benefit under the instrument, and (to give application to the doctrine upon that subject) after the instrument has been delivered and taken effect. In such case, a remedy is denied, and the instrument is destroyed, as a punishment for the fraud of the party claiming a benefit under it. Fullerton v. Sturges, 4 Ohio St. 530. (1855.)

A vendee of goods, subsequent to the purchase, gave his note for the price, but it was not received as payment. Afterwards the vendors, to whom it was payable, without any fraudulent purpose and under an honest mistake of right, materially altered it: Held, that such alteration did not, preclude a recovery upon the original cause of ac tion, the precedent indebtedness. Merrick v. Boury, 4 Ohio St. 60. (1854.)

The erasure of the name of a surety on a promissory note or bill of exchange, by agreement between the surety and the payee, is not such an alteration as will invalidate the instrument as against the principal. Where such alteration appearing on an instrument is not peculiarly suspicious, and beneficial to the person seeking to enforce it, the alterations will be presumed to have been made either before the execution of the paper or by the agreement of the parties afterwards. Huntington v. Finch, 3 Ohio St. 445. (1854.)

An erasure of the names of the guarantors of a note, while in the hands of the guarantee, cannot be objected to by a subsequent indorsee, nor by a prior indorsee. Logue v. Smith, Wright 10. (1831.)

The alteration of a promissory note by the maker thereof from "I promise" to "we promise," with the knowledge of the payee, but

without the knowledge or consent of the surety, is a material alteration and discharges the latter. Beach v. Julian, 1 O. S. C. D. 373 (34 Bull. 255).

(1895.)

A note drawing six per cent. interest, given in satisfaction of a claim, was deposited by the payee in bank and placed to his credit. Some officer of the bank, with the understanding that between the bank and the payee the note was to draw eight per cent., the payee having obtained a loan from the bank at that rate, innocently wrote the words "eight per cent." upon the note. At maturity, payment of the note was refused because of the alteration, and suit was brought against the maker by the payee upon the original claim: Held, that the note having been innocently altered, without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, he had a right to pay the bank the amount of the note, take it back, and bring an action upon the original claim. Tucker v. Hendricks, 25 O. C. C. 426. (1903.)

Alteration of a note from a non-negotiable to a negotiable note by inserting the words "or order," renders it void; but if clumsily done by inserting "or order," in the wrong place, would not render it negotiable or invalid or cut off equities between the parties. Carlisle v. Lamb, 9 Circ. Dec. 70 (16 R. 578). (1898.)

Changing a note by adding thereto the words "with all reasonable attorney fees," although of no force, is a material alteration. Kerr v. Iddings, 3 Circ. Dec. 607 (6 R. 604). (1892.)

Changing a note by adding "with all reasonable fees" when made by the principal with the knowledge and consent of the holder and owner, but without the consent of the surety, discharges the surety. Ib.

An erasure in the printed words "the order of" before the name of the payee, plainly visible on the face of the instrument and an insertion of the words "or bearer" after the name of the payee renders the note invalid, though in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value. Marshall v. Wilhite, 2 Circ. Dec. 500 (4 R. 203). (1889.)

Changing a note by inserting a place of payment without an accommodation indorser's consent or knowledge discharges him from liability thereon. Sturges v. Williams, 4 Re. 33.

Where notes after being executed and delivered were, without authority or consent of the defendant, fraudulently altered by inserting the words "from date payable annually" in each of them immediately before the signature of the defendant, no recovery can be had thereon. Wilhelm v. Snowden, Ohio Dec. (Dayt.) 435. (1872.)

SUBDIVISION 2.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.

Re-Subdivision 1.

FORM AND INTERPRETATION.

3175q (5023) [Bills of Exchange Defined.] A bill of exchange is an unconditional order in writing addressed by one person to another, signed by the person giving it, requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand or at fixed or determinable future time a sum certain in money to order or to bearer.

The discounting of a bill of exchange by the Kentucky Trust Company Bank, at Covington, in the state of Kentucky, and the loan of its notes of circulation thereon, with the understanding that said notes should be paid out in the northern part of the state of Ohio, in the purchase of produce, are not acts which fall within the prohibition or contravene the policy of the act of February 24, 1848, "to amend the act supplementary to the act to prevent unauthorized banking, and the circulation of unauthorized bank paper." Reznor v. Hatch, 7 Ohio St. 248. (1857.)

An order by the client upon his attorney to pay money out of any collected by him is not a bill of exchange. Crawford v. Cully, Wright 453. (1833.)

A draft drawn in Ohio upon a bank in New York and payable in New York is a foreign bill of exchange. Armstrong v. Bank, 6 O. F. D. 509. (1890.)

A bill of exchange ordered from Ohio to be drawn in Kentucky and indorsed and the money upon it to be paid there though accepted in Ohio, is governed by the laws of Kentucky and not of Ohio. Deposit Bank v. Turner-Looker Co. 3 Dec. 581. (1894.)

3175r (5024) [Bill Not an Assignment of Funds in Hands of Drawee.] A bill of itself does not operate as an assignment of the funds in the hands of the drawee available for the payment thereof, and the drawee is not liable on the bill unless and until he accepts the same.

3175s (5025) [Bill Addressed to More Than One Drawee.] A bill may be addressed to two or more drawees jointly, whether

they are partners or not, but not to two or more drawees in the alternative or in succession.

3175t (5026) [Inland and Foreign Bills of Exchange.] An inland bill of exchange is a bill which is, or on its face purports to be, both drawn and payable within this state. Any other bill is a foreign bill. Unless the contrary appears on the, face of the bill, the holder may treat it as an inland bill.

A draft drawn in Ohio upon a bank in New York and payable in New York is a foreign bill of exchange. Armstrong v. Bank, 6 O. F. D. 509. (1890.)

3175u (5027) [When Bill May be Treated as Promissory Note.] Where in a bill, drawer and drawee are the same, person, or where the drawee is a fictitious person, or a person not having capacity to contract, the holder may treat the instrument, at his option, either as a bill of exchange or a promissory note.

3175v (5028) [Referee in Case of Need.] The drawer of a bill and any indorser may insert thereon the name of a person to whom the holder may resort in case of need, that is to say, in case the bill is dishonored by non-acceptance or nonpayment. Such person is called the referee in case of need. It is in the option of the holder to resort to the referee in case of need or not as he may see fit.

Re-Subdivision 2.

ACCEPTANCE.

3175w (5029) [Acceptance; How Made, Etc.] The acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee of his assent to the order of the drawer. The acceptance must be in writing and signed by the drawee. It must not express that the drawee will perform his promise by any other means than the payment of money.

3175x (5030) [Holder Entitled to Acceptance on Face of Bill.] The holder of a bill presenting the same for acceptance may require that the acceptance be written on the bill, and if such request is refused, may treat the bill as dishonored.

Where the drawer of a check, before delivering it to the payee, has it certified as good by the bank upon which it is drawn, and the payee presents it in due season for payment, and gives due notice to the drawer of its nonpayment and the bank had failed at the time of