When Mr. Kurino made these representations, which could scarcely have been more explicit, to Count Lamsdorff, the Russian Minister said that he would fully explain the urgency of the matter on the occasion of his audience on the following Tuesday'; but things in reality were made to drag on, and the Russian preference for the game of diplomatic seesaw was exemplified to the full, until at last, on the 23rd of December, when three whole weeks had been frittered away, Mr. Kurino, reporting to Baron Komura an interview which he had just had with Count Lamsdorff, thus ended his despatch:

In conclusion, I stated to him that under the circumstances it might cause serious difficulties, even complications, if we failed to come to an entente, and I hoped he would exercise his best influence so as to enable us to reach the desired end.

On the 6th of January 1904 a Russian reply was handed at Tokio by Baron Rosen to Baron Komura, but in substance it amounted to little more than a repetition, save for mere changes of wording, of what had gone before, and the attitude of Russia, it was plain, had undergone no sensible alteration. Speaking candidly, there was an end to all hope; but the Government of Tokio, still willing to exert itself, and even to make some concession, again invited the Russian Government, on the 13th of January, to reconsider the matter, in terms which, though conciliatory enough, constituted practically an ultimatum. In the despatch conveying this decision to the Russian Government the subjoined phrase occurred:

The grounds for these amendments having been frequently and fully explained on previous occasions, the Imperial Government do not think it necessary to repeat the explanations. It is sufficient here to express their earnest hope for reconsideration by the Imperial Russian Government.

And again :

The above-mentioned amendments being proposed by the Imperial Government entirely in a spirit of conciliation, it is expected that they will be received in the same spirit at the hands of the Imperial Russian Government; and the Imperial Government further hope for an early reply from the Imperial Russian Government, since further delay in the solution of the question will be extremely disadvantageous to the two countries.

Even in the face of such earnest representations of the danger of procrastination Russia still dallied, and on the 23rd and 26th of January 1904 Baron Komura successively telegraphed to Mr. Kurino, pressing for a prompt response. In one of the telegrams Mr. Kurino was instructed to seek an interview with Count Lamsdorff and state to him, as a direct instruction received from the Japanese Government, that,

in the opinion of the Imperial Government, a further prolongation of the present state of things being calculated to accentuate the gravity of the situation, it is their earnest hope that they will be honoured with an early reply, and that they wish to know at what time they may expect to receive the reply.

On the 28th of January Mr. Kurino reported to Baron Komura his interview with Count Lamsdorff, in which he explains how

He (Count Lamsdorff) stated that the Grand Duke Alexis and the Minister of Marine are to be received in audience next Monday, and the Minister of War and himself on Tuesday, and he thinks an answer will be sent to Admiral Alexeieff on the latter day. I pointed out the urgent necessity to accelerate the despatch of an answer as much as possible, because further prolongation of the present condition is not only undesirable, but rather dangerous.' I added that all the while the world is loud with rumours, and that I hoped he would take special steps so as to have an answer sent at an earlier date than men. tioned. He replied that he knows the existing condition of things very well, but that the dates of audience being fixed as above mentioned, it is not now possible to change them'; and he repeated that he will do his best to send the reply next Tuesday (the 2nd of February).'

Upon this Baron Komura, still anxious beyond measure to avoid the risks attendant upon these indefinite conditions, again telegraphed, on the 30th of January, to Mr. Kurino to see Count Lamsdorff at the earliest opportunity and state to him that:

Having reported to your Government that the Russian Government would probably give a reply on next Tuesday, you have been instructed to say to Count Lamsdorff that, being fully convinced of the serious disadvantage to the two Powers concerned of the further prolongation of the present situation, the Imperial Government hoped that they might be able to receive the reply of the Russian Government earlier than the date mentioned by Count Lamsdorff. As it, however, appears that the receipt of the reply at an earlier date is not possible, the Imperial Government wish to know whether they will be honoured with the reply at the date mentioned by Count Lamsdorff, namely, next Tuesday (2nd of February), or, if it is not possible, what will be the exact date on which the reply is to be given.

On the evening of the 31st of January Mr. Kurino saw Count Lamsdorff, who said that he

fully appreciated the gravity of the present situation, and was certainly desirous to send an answer as quickly as possible, but that the question was a very serious one and not lightly to be dealt with. The opinions of the Ministers concerned and of Admiral Alexeieff had to be brought into harmony-hence the delay. As to the date of sending an answer, it was not possible for him to give the exact date, as it entirely depended on the decision of the Emperor, though he would not fail to use his efforts to hurry the matter.

It was not until the fifth day after this interview which Mr. Kurino had with Count Lamsdorff, and the third day after the reply had been promised to be given, namely, on the 5th of February 1904, at 2.15 P.M., that Baron Komura telegraphed to Mr. Kurino as follows:

Further prolongation of the present situation being inadmissible, the Imperial Government have decided to terminate the pending negotiations and to take such independent action as they may deem necessary to defend their menaced position and to protect their rights and interests. Accordingly, you are instructed to address to Count Lamsdorff, immediately upon receipt of this telegram, a signed Note to the following effect:

'The undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of his Majesty the Emperor of Japan, has the honour, in pursuance of instructions from his Government, to address to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of his Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias the following communication:

'The Government of H.M. the Emperor of Japan regard the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of Korea as essential to their own repose and safety, and they are consequently unable to view with indifference any action tending to render the position of Korea insecure.

'The successive rejections by the Imperial Russian Government, by means of inadmissible amendments, of Japan's proposals respecting Korea, the adoption of which the Imperial Government regarded as indispensable to assure the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire and to safeguard Japan's preponderating interests in the peninsula, coupled with the successive refusals of the Imperial Russian Government to enter into engagements to respect China's territorial integrity in Manchuria, which is seriously menaced by their continued occupation of the province, notwithstanding their treaty engagements with China and their repeated assurances to other Powers possessing interests in those regions, have made it necessary for the Imperial Government seriously to consider what measures of self-defence they are called upon to take.

'In the presence of delays which remain largely unexplained, and naval and military activities which it is difficult to reconcile with entirely pacific aims, the Imperial Government have exercised in the pending negotiations a degree of forbearance which they believe affords abundant proof of their loyal desire to remove from their relations with the Imperial Russian Government every cause for future misunderstanding; but, finding in their efforts no prospect of securing from the Imperial Russian Government an adhesion either to Japan's moderate and unselfish proposals, or to any other proposals likely to establish a firm and enduring peace in the extreme East, the Imperial Government have no alternative than to terminate the present futile negotiations.

'In adopting that course the Imperial Government reserve to themselves the right to take such independent action as they may deem best to consolidate and defend their menaced position, as well as to protect their established rights and legitimate interests."

Simultaneously with the presentation of this Note Mr. Kurino was instructed to address Count Lamsdorff in writing to the following effect:

The undersigned Envoy Extraordinary, &c., &c., has the honour, in pursuance of instructions from his Government, to acquaint H.E. the Minister for Foreign Affairs, &c., &c., that the Imperial Government of Japan, having exhausted, without effect, every means of conciliation, with a view to the removal from their relations with the Imperial Russian Government of every cause for future complications, and finding that their just representations and moderate and unselfish proposals in the interest of a firm and lasting peace in the extreme East are not receiving the consideration which is their due, have resolved to sever their diplomatic relations with the Imperial Russian Government, which for the reason named have ceased to possess any value.

In further fulfilment of the command of his Government, the undersigned has also the honour to announce to H.E. Count Lamsdorff that it is his intention to take his departure from St. Petersburg, with the Staff of the Imperial Legation.

These Notes were presented to Count Lamsdorff by Mr. Kurino on

the 6th of February, at 4 P.M., and on the same day Baron Komura conveyed a formal intimation to Baron Rosen, in Tokio, in the sense that

Whereas the Japanese Government had made every effort to arrive at an amicable settlement of the Manchurian question with Russia, the latter had not evinced any disposition to reciprocate this peaceful purpose. Therefore Japan could not continue the diplomatic conferences. She was regretfully compelled to take independent action for the protection of her rights and interests, and she must decline to accept the responsibility of any incidents that might occur in consequence.

A dispassionate perusal of all the foregoing despatches cannot fail to lead the student of history to the conclusion that repeated warnings were given by Japan in the successive stages of the negotiations, and that the last two despatches, dated the 5th of February, left absolutely no room for doubt that Japan had finally, though reluctantly, arrived at the conclusion that war was inevitable. The wording is polite, but who can doubt that it was a clear notice of war?

I must go farther than this; and it will, I think, be equally plain when I have finished that not only had Japan made up her mind upon this point, but that Russia by her actions-which 'speak louder than words'-conclusively manifested that her intentions were warlike too. First, let me mention that the day on which Count Lamsdorff had led Mr. Kurino to expect that the reply would be ready was Tuesday, the 2nd of February. The day on which negotiations were finally broken off was Saturday, the 6th of February. On the intervening Thursday the Russian fleet at Port Arthur suddenly emerged from harbour and steamed out for hours to the south-eastward, ultimately returning to port. For what purpose this cruise was undertaken could not be divined, but it created of necessity intense excitement and anxiety in Japan, where it was interpreted as the prelude to some desperate measure, and the activity of the Russian naval squadron, thus exemplified, is wholly inconsistent with the theory of unpreparedness. It should be remembered that for a long time before this Russia had been pouring regiment after regiment into Manchuria, her Cossacks had invaded Korea, warship after warship had been despatched from Western waters to reinforce the fleet which she already had in Far Eastern seas, and in her diplomacy she had displayed a persistent arrogance which contrasted strongly with the conciliatory attitude of Japan.

But this is not all. At the moment when Admiral Togo actually made his attack the Russian ships lay outside the harbour in a perfect battle array, in front of the shore forts and batteries of the fortress, a position that they had taken up on their return from their cruise to the south-eastward. Wherein was the unpreparedness? If the officers of the Russian ships were caught in an unguarded moment, blame must not be imputed to the Japanese. The cause must rather be sought in a misconception on the part of the Russians of the watchful

strategy which the situation demanded. The facts are, moreover, that the Russian ships had lain under a full head of steam for days off the Port Arthur entrance, had been continually using their searchlights as though they apprehended an attack, the battleships had their decks cleared for action, and the instant that the first torpedo was launched the Russians opened fire on the Japanese boats.

These remarks should alone suffice to show that Russia was not taken by surprise; but I will show a few well-authenticated figures in addition. Her warlike preparations in the Far East had been going on from the previous April, when she ought by right to have been completing the evacuation of Manchuria in accordance with her solemn pledges. In the remaining months of 1903 she despatched to Far Eastern waters

Seven other destroyers were sent by rail to Port Arthur and there put together, and two vessels of the 'Volunteer' Fleet were armed and hoisted the Russian naval ensign at Vladivostock.

On land the increase of the Russian forces was equally marked. The known augmentations, subsequent to the end of June 1903, were two infantry brigades, two artillery battalions, and a large force of cavalry. The total was continually being increased by troops being sent by train from Russia, up to 40,000, and plans were made for despatching over 200,000 more men. In October a train of fourteen cars was hurriedly sent off, laden with the equipment of a field hospital.

On the 21st of January two battalions of infantry and a detachment of cavalry were sent from Port Arthur and Dalny to menace the northern frontier of Korea. On the 28th of January Admiral Alexeieff gave to the Russian forces then stationed in the vicinity of the Yalu River orders to prepare for war. Troops were advanced in large numbers at the same time from Liao-Yang towards the Yalu. And on the 1st of February the military commandant at Vladivostock formally requested the Japanese Commercial Agent at that port, by order of the Russian Government, to notify Japan that a state of siege might be proclaimed at any moment. This was five days, be it observed, before Japan broke off diplomatic relations.

Sir John Macdonell says:

It [the first torpedoing the Russian vessels] was an attack of surprise. Was it a treacherous and disloyal act? The question must be put with the knowledge that a nation which is patient may be duped; that the first blow counts much; and that under cover of continuing negotiations a country unprepared might deprive another better equipped of its advantages.