how with one consent publicists and politicians at home agreed that, whatever might occur, neither Cecil Rhodes nor Jameson could ever take part again in public life or even return to South Africa, I cannot but feel a personal satisfaction at having been one of a small number of writers who ventured to assert that the Raid might have been a mistake but was certainly not a crime; that the indignation at the Raid expressed in England, whether honestly or otherwise, was not shared in South Africa; and that the public career of Rhodes and Jameson in South Africa was, to use the words of the former, 'not ended, but only just beginning.' Cecil Rhodes had recovered the leadership of the Progressive party in the Cape before his untimely death; and Jameson is now Prime Minister of the Cape. It would be well, I think, if before his leaving England to return to his arduous task, some public recognition could be given to 'Dr. Jim' in reparation for the wrongs he sustained at the hands of British justice, and of the loyalty with which he has since served his country in South Africa. The British public is sometimes, as in the case of the Jameson Raid, carried away by prejudice and passion, but it is never in the long run unjust or ungenerous in its judgments.

EDWARD DICEY.

The Editor has received the subjoined letter from the office of the Newcastle Daily Chronicle: he prints it as it was received, though he considers it to be an erroneous interpretation of Mr. Fisher's words.

Westgate Road, Newcastle upon Tyne: 9th August, 1904.

DEAR SIR,-We have to draw your attention to an article which appears in the current number of the Nineteenth Century & After' entitled "Liberal Members & the Liberal Party," in which it is stated that "In Newcastle, that old pillar of earnest Radicalism, has gone, the Newcastle Daily Chronicle' having been squeezed out," &c. The writer evidently means the "Newcastle Daily Leader," which was bought up by the "Mail" at the end of last year. We shall be glad if you will make this correction in your next issue. I remain, yours truly

p. pro. Proprietors

JOSEPH REED.

The Editor of THE NINETEENTH CENTURY cannot undertake
to return unaccepted MSS.

Ar the period alluded to in the closing paragraph of Part I. of this article, the peace negotiations had begun to assume concrete form. China had throughout evinced a willingness to accede to reasonable demands, and towards the end of August 1900 Prince Ching and Li Hung-Chang were nominated as her co-plenipotentiaries. Views were actively interchanged between the Powers, and matters had progressed so far that in October the Chinese plenipotentiaries submitted a Memorandum for the consideration of the Diplomatic Corps at Peking. In this, among other things, China acknowledged her fault in laying siege to the Foreign Legations, and promised that it should never occur again; admitted her liability to pay an adequate indemnity; and showed a readiness to revise commercial treaties. Eventually, by the combined efforts of the Ministers of the Powers, a joint note was agreed upon and presented to the Chinese

VOL. LVI-No. 332

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Government, toward the latter part of December, embodying twelve demands, the fulfilment of which was deemed necessary for the restoration of normal relations between China and the Powers.

Russia was, of course, a party to all these proceedings, but she secretly cherished the idea of independently making a great stroke herself which was extremely well calculated to thwart and paralyse the concerted policy of the Powers in general in at least one portion of the Celestial Empire. This design crystallised into the so-called Manchurian Agreement.

The hole-and-corner arrangement which it was sought to carry through was actually entered into at Mukden by a subordinate of Tseng, the Tartar General stationed there-a person with no authority whatever to make such a treaty, as the Chinese Government rightly complained-with a representative of Admiral Alexeieff, viz. General Korostovitch, and the purport of it all was first disclosed to an astonished world by a telegram published in the London Times from its correspondent in Peking, dated the last day of 1900. It was an enumeration of conditions which were dictated, as is credibly reported, to the accompaniment of very significant threats from the Russian side, leaving absolutely no alternative for the Chinese but to acquiesce, and only upon compliance with which would Russia consent to allow the Tartar General and the Chinese officials to resume the civil government of Manchuria.

These new conditions, plus the concessions previously acquired, were tantamount to an annexation of Manchuria. It may be remembered that soon after the Chino-Japan war Russia seized the opportunity and, by successive machinations, partly by threats and partly by gilding the pills in many ways, chiefly at the cost of Japan and England, exacted from China, under the so-called Cassini convention and others, not only a concession of the right of constructing the Trans-Manchurian railway line, having no other credible object than a military one, right across Manchuria to Vladivostok, which she utilised in substitution of her own trans-Siberian line, but also a similar right of construction from Harbin down to Port Arthur and Talienwan, and also that of stationing all necessary troops nominally for the protection of these railways. Add to these the new concessions embodied in the Manchurian convention, and it could not amount to other than a consummation of Russia's long-cherished designs. Hence the next step taken by her was to seek to obtain recognition of the compact by the supreme authority at Peking, and to have it embodied in the form of a recognised treaty, and this demand was forthwith pressed upon the Chinese Government at the capital with all imaginable vehemence and persistency.

Diplomatic correspondence immediately followed the disclosure of Russia's secret endeavours, and the utmost alacrity was shown by the Governments of America, Britain, Germany, and Japan in dealing

with the question. The Russian Government pretended that the Agreement had no more than a local significance and application, but it was like trying to smother the electric light under a fold of crape, for the real meaning of the compact was always visible. The successive communications and replies that Russia made to the Powers in response to their protests were all alike. Here is one which Count Lamsdorff telegraphed to M. Iswolsky, then Russian Minister at Tokio :

You are authorised to deny most categorically the false reports about a treaty between Russia and China concerning an alleged protectorate in Manchuria. Negotiations which are yet to take place between the Russian and Chinese Governments will bear on the manifold questions relating to the installation of Chinese Administration in Manchuria and the establishment in this province of permanent order capable of insuring the tranquillity of our [Russia's] extensive borderland, as well as the construction of the railway, which is the object of a special Russo-Chinese Convention. As to the Agreement signed between the Chief of our [Russian] forces and the Dziandjiem of Mukden, it is but a temporary arrangement laying down rules for the relations between the local authorities and the Russian troops while those are still in Manchuria. The aforesaid false reports are particularly malignant at the present juncture, when the Russian Government is about to hand over Manchuria to China, in harmony with Russia's previous declarations.

There was, however, another and very pregnant allusion in this telegram, which was handed by M. Iswolsky to Mr. Kato, then Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, but as it bore upon a somewhat different branch of the subject, reference will be made to it later on.

Here is another, which was sent to the Marquis of Lansdowne by the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, and, with the full consent and cognisance of the Russian Government, presented at the time to the British Parliament:

Count Lamsdorff said that the Emperor had no intention of departing in any way from the assurances which he had publicly given that Manchuria would be entirely restored to its former condition in the Chinese Empire as soon as circumstances admitted of it. Russia,' he added, 'was in the same position with regard to fixing a final date for evacuating Manchuria as the allies found themselves with regard to the evacuation of Peking and the province of Pe-chi-li. When it came to the final and complete evacuation of Manchuria, the Russian Government would be obliged to obtain from the Central Government of China an effective guarantee against the recurrence of the recent attack on the frontier and the destruction of her railway, but had no intention of seeking this guarantee in any acquistion of territory or of any actual or virtual protectorate of Manchuria. . . . Manchuria would be restored to China, when all the temporary measures taken by the Russian military authorities would cease, and everything at Newchwang and elsewhere would be replaced in its former position.

All these asseverations and protestations of Russia were ostensibly genuine, but in reality they little corresponded with her actions. Remonstrances from the aggrieved nations continued, and China was herself by no means inclined to concede the Russian demands.

She sought the conjoint mediation between herself and Russia of America, Germany, Great Britain, and Japan. It was at this critical moment that the Emperor of China, ruler of a huge empire with 400,000,000 of inhabitants, made in an Imperial Edict the following truly pitiable avowal :

Russia proposes an Agreement of twelve articles. We have authorised our plenipotentiary to amend and modify them, so as to preserve our right of sovereignty. The foreign representatives also advise China not to accept them. But in reflecting upon the present situation, though we are grateful for the advice of the foreign representatives, it is impossible for China alone to incur the displeasure of Russia by remaining firm. This is not only a question for China to study with all possible care in order that it may be solved without any danger to her, but also a question in which the foreign Governments interested should maintain the balance of power.

Meanwhile the suggestion, or rather complaint, had been made by Count Lamsdorff that garbled versions of the Agreement made at Mukden were being circulated by the Chinese Government in order to create dissension between the Powers, but this was all a farce. The Emperor of China speaks in his solemn edict of the twelve demands of the Russians, and we have here in full the actual document as translated from the Chinese by no less an authority than Sir Ernest Satow, who succeeded Sir Claude Macdonald in Peking. He stated that the Chinese version had evidently been translated direct from the Russian text.

(1) The Emperor of Russia, being anxious to give evidence of his friendly feeling towards China, is willing to forget the hostile acts committed in Manchuria, and to hand back the whole of that country to China-its administration to be carried on as heretofore.

(2) Under Article 6 of the Manchurian Railway Agreement the Adminis tration is authorised to maintain troops for the protection of the line. The country, however, being at present in an unsettled condition, and such troops few in number, a body of soldiers must be retained until order is restored, and until China shall have carried out the provisions of the last four articles of the present Convention.

(3) In the event of grave disturbances the Russian garrisons will afford China every assistance in suppressing the same that lies in their power.

(4) In the recent attacks against Russia, Chinese troops having taken a prominent part, China agrees, pending the completion of the line and its opening to traffic, not to establish an army in those provinces. She will consult with Russia as to the number of troops she may subsequently wish to establish there. The importation of munitions of war into Manchuria is prohibited.

(5) With a view to safeguarding the interests of the territory in question, China will, on representations being made by Russia, at once deprive of office any military governor or other high official whose conduct of affairs may prove antagonistic to the maintenance of friendly relations.

A police force, consisting of mounted and unmounted units, may be organised in the interior of Manchuria. Its numbers shall be determined after consultation with Russia, and from its armament artillery shall be excluded. The services of the subjects of any other Power shall not be employed in connection therewith.