such provision as this is not adopted, the question of altering and reforming the constitution will be agitated at every annual election: and eventu ally, at every session of the legislature, members from different parts of the state will come prepared with their various projects or propositions of reform, to offer, and each claim an equal right to be heard, and have their propositions considered; and by this means the state will, in all probability, be compelled to keep up a perpetual legislature at the expense of the people.

I believe that the amendments we have made, and are about making, will cost the people of the commonwealth enough to satisfy them for at least ten years. But, sir, if the people should not be satisfied, and should wish an immediate alteration, this amendment will not prohibit them from calling another convention (such as we are,) to alter and amend the constitution in any manner they may see proper. But I do not fear that result, nor do I fear the action of the people on any amendment the legislature may propose; but where, I ask, is the necessity, or what will be the particular advantage of this continual legislation on constitutional reform! Sir, if this amendment is rejected, I would not at all be surprised to see members who now occupy a seat on this floor, pressing forward to a seat in your legislative halls for the express purpose of offering, advo cating, and carrying through the legislature many of the numerous propositions that have been here offered, and rejected by this convention. And others who have here acted the conservative, and opposed all the amendments we have made, may be elected for the purpose of having the constitution altered back to what it originally was in 1790. Again, I am exceedingly anxious to have the experiment fairly tried how the tenure of the judiciary for a term of years will operate, before that part of the constitution can be altered. I want to know whether making the judges accountable will have a tendency to make them dishonest or incapable of filling their offices with honor and integrity.

I want to see whether the people can't elect and re-elect as good justices of the peace as have been generally appointed by the governor. Sir, if this proposition should be agreed to, the legislature will then know that they have nothing to do with the constitution until the year 1850, and the people will know at what session the legislature will have the power to submit amendments for their adoption or rejection, and they can then elect such men as they believe will carry their wishes into effect.

I wish gentlemen to bear in mind that we have cut out a great deal of work for the legislature, in addition to the ordinary business of that body. Sir, I wish it distinctly understood that in offering this amendment I have no interested, selfish or sectional feelings on the subject. I have no other feelings at heart than that of the general prosperity of the people of the commonwealth;-that I believe it entirely a matter of economy and state policy, and I firmly believe that, if adopted, it will in ten years save enough money to make a hundred miles of canal or rail-road. I do hope the convention will, as I do, see the necessity of agreeing to this amendment. I ask for the yeas and nays.

A division of the amendment was called for by Mr. MEREDITH, the first division to be as follows, viz: By inserting after the word “ repre sentatives," in the second and third lines, the words as follow, viz: "In

the year one thousand eight hundred and fifty, and at the expiration of each succeeding term of ten years thereafter."

Mr. EARLE said, he hoped the gentleman from Jefferson, and others, would look well to the principles of this amendment. It was, in his opinion, unsound, because it proposed either to deprive the people of the enjoyment of their natural and inalienable right to alter the constitution when they should think fit, or to drive them to violent and extraordinary measures, as the only means of altering it, at certain times, when the necessity of alteration might be deeply felt. Alterations made under the spur of excitement occasioned, by the consciousness that they must be then made, or no convenient opportunity will occur for years to come, as well as alterations made in an irregular and unprescribed manner, will be less likely to be moderate and judicious, than those made under a system, like that reported by the committee on future amendments, accessible at all times, but involving great caution and deliberation in the process.

We have only to recur to our own history, to show the pernicious tendency of the principle now proposed to be introducad. The old constitution of Pennsylvania, made in 1776, provided a mode of amendment through a council of censors, to propose and publish amendments, and then a convention, chosen by the people, to act upon such propositions. This method involved considerable caution and safeguards against rash innovation, and against alterations of the government in violation of the popular will. But, unfortunately, this opportunity of amendment occurred but once in seven years; and this circumstance was made the pretext for the violent act of the legislature of 1789, by which it caused a convention, as well as for the acts of that convention itself, in altering the constitution, without giving the people any opportunity, directly or indirectly, to pass upon the question of adoption or rejection of the alterations.

If gentlemen will examine the bill of rights, as now existing, and as we propose also to retain it in the constitution, they will observe its declaration, that the people "have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform or abolish their government, in such manner as they may think proper." Now, it strikes me as somewhat inconsistent, in profession, to make such declarations, and at the same time provide that what we have fixed upon as the proper and convenient mode for the exercise of this power of changing the government by the act of the peo. ple, shall only be put in use once in ten years. The inevitable tendency of such policy, is to produce violent revolution. When the people feel the need of a change, and see in your constitution the assertion of their right to make such change, whenever they may deem fit, they will not always wait five or nine years, for the opportunity of doing it in a particular mode. They will be likely at some time to resort to other means, which may raise a storm in which there will be danger of the wreck of the ship of state. Search all history, and you will find the prominent cause of violent revolutions, both those which have, and those which have not terminated in despotisms, has been the feeling of the people, that they were loaded with shackles, like those which you now propose to put upon them; and that they could get relief only by violent remedies.

If you make the constitution and laws at all times subject to the con

trol of the people, through a prudent and cautious mode of exercising their power, expressly pointed out and regulated, you produce a trebly advantageous effect. First: You make the people contented in the consciousness of their power and authority. Second: You check the rash propensity to change, by the consciousness that you can make a change when you please, and hence there is no urgency for doing it hastily or inconsiderately. Third: You secure the people against the dangers of despotism, which always attend the making of changes in an irregular and undefined manner.

To give to the people the sovereignty, with a peaceable and orderly mode of its exercise at all times, is the most certain, if not the only method, to preserve peace, order, and republican government. All history shows, that the attempts to combine the opposites of the government of the people, on the one hand, and the chaining down of the people on the other, have introduced discord, and ended in failure.

He would call the attention of the convention to the case which arose under the United States constitution, of the contested election in congress between Jefferson and Burr, for the presidency. No man among the people had intended to vote for Burr, as president: yet under the provisions of the constitution, as framed originally, congress had a right to choose him; and there was actually a tie vote between him and Jefferson, on many ballotings. This led to the adoption of the amendment, by which the mode of election was changed. How unreasonable would it have been, that the people, having perceivel and felt the defect, should have been obliged to submit to it for ten years longer, before they could obviate it. Had congress actually chosen Mr. Burr, it might have produced a bloody revolution, especially if there had been no mode provided for a prompt change of the constitution, Such provision would have been in that case, as in many others which might arise, the best safeguard against commotion and civil war.

And if we examine the history of the republics of Southern America, we may find, among the prominent causes of revolution and disorder, the fact, that their constitutions, while they profess to give the sovereignty to the people, actually withhold it from them, through long terms of office, and through obstacles thrown in the way of quiet changes in the form of government, as the people may desire them.

Would the gentleman from Jefferson go so far as to say, that however much the people may suffer from defects in the constitution, they shall not be at liberty to remove them, until a certain distant period of time? What is this but the doctrine of monarchy-the doctrine that the people are not capable of self-government? Some gentlemen, unwilling to put the matter on this ground, have alleged that much inconvenience might be felt by the people, from giving permission to the legislature frequently to submit propositions for amendment. He (Mr. E.) did not apprehend any difficulties of this sort. All history-all experience shows, that the people and their representatives are more disposed to submit to inconveniences while sufferable, than to make rash changes in their constitutions. If you give the mere majority of the legislature the power to alter the constitution at pleasure, without submitting the change to the ratification of the people, there would be, I admit, great danger; for all experience proves the general disposition of the majority, in such select

bodies, to abridge the rights of the people at large; but when it is requisite that the propositions for amendment shall pass both houses of two successive legislatures, and then be ratified or rejected by a vote of the people themselves, the real difficulty will be found, not in the proposing of too many alterations, but in the omission to propose those which ought to be made. The legislature will not submit anti-democratic alterations, because they will know that the people will reject them: they will not often submit democratic changes, unless driven to them by the urgency of the people's demand-for legislative bodies are rarely inclined, of their own will, to make such alterations. The experience of our sister states, where changes can be at any time proposed, shows that there is no danger of their too great frequency. In Rhode Island, where the constitution may be changed at any time, it stands precisely now as it did one hundred and fifty years ago: In New Jersey, where the alteration may be at any time made by the legislature, there have been but two changes, and those inconsiderable ones, in the space of sixty years.

Self-conceit the imagining of themselves to be wiser than any who would come after them (said Mr. E.) was the besetting sin of representative bodies, like this convention. Hence, they were apt to endeavor to prevent posterity from exercising the same right of change which they exer. cised themselves. For us to adopt this proposition, would be a manifes tation of this conceit in us. It would be, in effect, to declare that this single body, on a matter in which it was without experience, was wiser than the combined wisdom of two senates, and two houses of representatives, enlightened by experience. We would suppose ourselves capable of introducing wisely, into this constitution, features which we have never tried but that the concurrent judgment of four legislative bodies, chosen by the people, as we have have been chosen, would be incompetent to decide, after actual experiment, whether those changes had worked so well as to preclude the expediency of suggesting to the people further modifications. Being satisfied that the proposition before the convention was alike unreasonable and pernicious, he hoped it would fail.

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Mr. PORTER, of Northampton, could not give his vote for the amendment of the delegate from Jefferson. He concurred, for once, in what had fallen from the gentleman from the county of Philadelphia (Mr. Earle) in regard to the amendment. He, like him, was averse to tying up the hands of the people. If they should think the constitution required amending before 1850, or at any other time, they ought not to be debarred from having their wishes carried into effect.

Mr. HOPKINSON said, he understood the gentleman from the county of Philadelphia to say, that the legislature of New Jersey passed the amendments to their constitution themselves. The amendments were not submitted to the people.

Mr. EARLE explained, that he had said the people of New Jersey had altered their constitution by an act of the legislature. His (Mr. E.'s). first impression was, that the legislature did it themselves without asking the consent of the people. In the state of Rhode Island, where the legis lature is almost omnipotent, the constitution has not been altered at all.

Mr. BROWN, of Philadelphia county, said, that he had observed the other day, that the legislature of New Jersey submitted the amendments:: to the people. The learned judge (Mr. Hopkinson) says they did not

submit them. He (Mr. B.) was entirely opposed to the amendment, because it looked to the introduction of new principles into our govern ment, and was an improper interference with the rights of the people. He saw no necessity, whatever, for going into committee of the whole, and opening the whole subject anew. He believed that a majority of the convention was satisfied with what had already been done. All that now remained to be done was, to make verbal amendments. He fully coincided with the gentleman from Northampton, that the people ought to be left free and at full liberty to make amendments to their constitution whenever they may deem them necessary.

Mr. REIGART, of Lancaster, said that if any one thing was more apparent than another, it was a feeling on the part of the people of Pennsyl vania to obtain stability and security for their institutions. It struck him that the gentleman from Jefferson (Mr. Hastings) had given more attention to this important subject than most gentlemen had done. He approved of the amendment, and thought it would have the beneficial operation described by the delegate. It would prevent the subject of amendments from being everlastingly agitated, and would keep out of the legislature political demagogueism. If the proposition should be adopted, as he sincerely hoped it would, the legislature would be spared from being annually pestered and worried about making amendments to the constitution.

He thought the gentleman from the county of Philadelphia had fully illustrated the propriety of adopting this amendment, by the instance he had cited in relation to the contest between Burr and Jefferson. The constitution of the United States had then been fourteen years in operation, and required alteration. Now he would ask if this constitution could be fairly tested without ten years' experience. There were no petitions presented for amending the constitution of Pennsylvania of 1790, until eighteen or twenty years after its adoption.

Looking, then, at these effects, he could not but think that the amendment of the delegate from Jefferson must strike every reasonable mind as being one that should meet the approbation of this body. One of the good effects that would result from its adoption would be, to prevent political demagogueism in the legislature by any party. Besides, it required at least the time allowed by it, to test the operation of the constitution. The people would then be safe from the machinations of polit ical demagogues, and their fundamental law would be undisturbed.

Mr. BROWN said, that he did not like to hear this everlasting cry of political demagogueism. He did not understand it. Who, he asked, were these political demagogues? Were all the people of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania political demagogues? Had they lost their judgment and reason, and called for reform when it was not needed? He repeated, that he could not understand it. He was at a loss to define what was meant by this everlasting distrust of the people, and desire to keep them out of the hands of political demagogues. He believed that the people were able to take care of themselves, without any constitutional amendment to that effect. He could not see any danger of amendments being adopted which would operate to their danger, & in opposition to their welfare, because none could be adopted except by the people themselves,