discussion of propositions for amendment, until the necessity of considering them shall be actually forced upon their minds by the action of public opinion. Experience has proved this to be so. In all those states of the Union where this amendatory clause has been adopted, we cannot find an instance in which time has been uselessly expended in the discussion of propositions to amend the constitution. Sir, this is the old doctrine of throwing every possible obstacle in the way of the people reforming their own government-the old doctrine of binding the people down to the cars of government as established by the old regime-the old doctrine, in short, of opposing all beneficial reforms-all changes which are to benefit the people, and to enable them to govern themselves as a free people should do.

Mr. President, we are here about to adopt a new form of government; and we are told by a large number of the members of the convention, that it is not as good as that which we are about to abandon. If this should turn out to be the fact, it is still more essential that we should lay before the people every proper facility for a return to the constitution of 1790. If, on the contrary, it should turn out that the new constitution is better adapted to the wants and wishes of the people, than the old one, it is important that we should give all proper opportunity to the people to go still further in their reforms, if it should be for their interest to do so.

The gentleman from Lycoming (Mr. Fleming,) has intimated his preference for the two-third principle. What is that? What is it, I ask, but to make one man equal to two-because the one happens to think that the existing form of government is a good one? Thus making one man, who may happen to be a conservative, equal to two men who may happen to be reformers. For my own part, I am entireiy willing that these propositions for amendment, should be left with the legislature-always, of course, reserving the right of the people to give their final vote upon them, to say whether they will accept them or not. The people of this commonwealth think it no trouble to attend at the polls, and give their votes upon matters affecting their government; nor do I think that they would ever regard it as a trouble, if they were called upon to give their votes upon the adoption or rejection of every law which the legislature might enact;-thus giving a double sanction to that law. I think we should leave it to a majority of the legislature to say whether they will, or will not, propose any amendments to the people; and that we should leave it to the legislature to say, whether they will, or will not, give their sanction to such changes. As I have intimated before, if I can not get a proper clause, I will at least do nothing to put a clog upon the people, but will leave them to act in their own way and at their own time. I believe that the legislature could at all times have proposed amendments to the people, and that if the people had accepted them, they might at once have been made a part of the constitution —And this is the plan which we should adopt for the future time. Look at the state of New Jersey. The legislature there, in the absence of any amendatory clause in the constitution, deem that they have a right to propose amendments to the people. They have done so, and the people have accepted of them-and thus they are a part of the fundamental law of the land. The right to propose amendments is regarded there in this point of view; I have no doubt it is a good one, and I would leave it so here, rather than do any thing to clog the people.

I shall, therefore, vote against every proposition requiring the assent of petitioners to enable the legislature to enter upon the cosideration of these matters. I shall do so, because I believe that to adopt such a provision, would be to trifle with the rights of the people. I, for one, can never consent to do so.

Mr. CHAMBERS, of Franklin, said, that if he correctly understood the argument of the gentleman from the county of Philadelphia, (Mr. Brown) it was that he was opposed to the amendment as a clog upon the people; and the convention had again been called upon to listen to those loud professions of regard for the people and the rights of the people which they had so often before heard in the course of their deliberations here.

What (continued Mr. C.) is the real nature of this proposition? Is the object of it to abridge the rights of the people? Not at all. But it is for the protection of the people against the agitation of radicals and innova. tors-be they whom they may. It is proposed that the demand for amendments to the constitution should originate, with whom? Why, with the people--where, of right, they ought to originate; not with a member of the legislature, who is sent into that body to legislate under the constitution, and who has certain powers and duties delegated and limited to him by the fundamental law. It is no part of his duty to propose these amendments; it is a subject for the consideration of the people. If there are grievances felt and experienced under the government, they are grievances felt by the people, and it is for them, therefore, to complain; and if the legislature is to act, their action ought to be at the instance of the people.

The gentleman from the county of Philadelphia tells us also, that we allow the legislature to act, without petition, upon many of the most grave and important matters touching the interests of our people. Why is it that we do so? It is because in acting upon the matter alluded to, they are only acting upon those things which come within their proper and legitimate jurisdiction; they are only acting upon matters delegated to them under the constitution. They are, in short, only exercising the ordinary duties of legislation. But when it is attempted to change the fundamental law of the land, by which all the departments of the government are created; when it is proposed to dissolve that government into its original elements, I say that the movement should come from the peoplethat all propositions for amendment should originate with the people. So far, then, from this requirement of the assent of a certain number of petitions being, as the gentleman from the county of Philadelphia designates it, a clog upon the rights of the people, it is in fact their strong protection.

But the gentleman has also professed to feel a great regard for the legislature. He is now willing to trust the legislature with all the power over these most important matters; yet only one short week ago, that body was not to be trusted even with the power to regulate the number of the justices of the peace in a township or ward. I confess myself at a loss to account for this strange inconsistency.

Mr. BROWN, of Philadelphia county, asked leave to explain. He did not wish the gentleman from Franklin (Mr. Chambers) to place to his (Mr. B.'s) credit, things which did not belong to him. I am not in favor

(continued Mr. B.) of giving power to the legislature to alter the constitution, but only to consider propositions for amendment, and then, if they should think such amendments expedient, to submit them to the approbation or rejection of the people. This is the extent of my argument in favor of the legislative power. Mr. CHAMBERS resumed.

The gentleman is willing to repose in the legislature a power over the constitution, without there being any petition before them praying for a change. He is willing, I say-for he told us so over and over again— that the legislature should act upon these matters without having been petitioned by the people. This is the amount of his position. Now, I too. am willing that the legislature should act; but I want them to act, not upon their own impulses or their own responsibility, but upon the de mand of the people, and in such reasonable numbers as to entitle their propositions to the respectful consideration, not only of the legislature, but of the great mass of the people of the commonwealth. I should prefer that the number of petitioners should be greater than that proposed by the gentleman from Susquehanna (Mr. Read);-three thousand is, to my mind, altogether too low a number. I am opposed, therefore, to that proposition. It is to be borne in mind that there may be a local feeling of excitement pervading some particular portion of the commonwealth, and not extending beyond it, under the influence of which the names of three thousand might readily be secured, and thus the legislature might be required to act upon a proposition for amendment which might be in direct opposition to the wishes of nine-tenths of the people of the state. I think we should obviate the possibility of such a state of things. We should fix upon a higher number of petitioners, so that the names cannot be got up in any particular district; and if a demand for amendment should in such a manner be made, it will then be entitled to the consideration and respect of the legislature as the organ of the people-and, after having been acted upon there, can be finally laid before the whole body of the people, for their approval or rejection.

It seems to me that the proposition of the gentleman from Union, (Mr. Merrill) is preferable to any other which may go to fix definitely the number of the petitioners, because the number ought to be apportioned to the taxables and the voters of the commonwealth. If there are grievances which the people wish to be redressed, or changes which the people be lieve will be conducive to their happiness or their welfare, it is not to be doubted that the number of one twentieth of the voters, as proposed by the gentleman from Union, can be procured for the purpose of petitioning the legislature. If there is a feeling pervading the minds of the people against their form of government, in any of its features, and asking for reform, that feeling will surely express itself by the number of one twentieth. If, on the contrary, that number can not be had, the manifest and irresistible inference is, that there is no such call on the part of the body of the people for revision and amendment of the constitution, as would render it necessary or proper for the legislature to enter upon the discussion of such propositions, and to submit them to the ratification or rejection of the people. To my mind, nothing could furnish more fair or more conclusive evidence of the true state of the public mind, than the method here proposed. It is preferable, therefore, that the number should be left

this way, dependent on the taxables and the population, as it may from time to time increase, rather than that we should fix it down to a precise number; because if one twentieth or one tenth of the voters should be considered a reasonable number at the present time, it may not be so in the course of ten or twenty years, in which space of time our taxables and our population may have been doubled. Let the number of petitioners, therefore, be in proportion to the number of taxables and the mber of voters.

The gentleman from the county of Philadelphia asks us further, how we are to determine as to the number of those who voted. There surely cannot be any great obstacle here; I should suppose that any school.boy who knows the rule of three could determine this question without diffialty. It is simply to take a number equal to one twentieth part of those whose votes were polled at the then next preceding election for governor. That is all. This number, I think, is not too great. I feel strongly disposed to require that there should be some shield of this kind interposed by us, in order to protect the legislature, as well as the people, against being harrassed by frivolous and vexatious propositions for amendment.

It has been said by another gentleman in the course of this discussion, that it is not to be supposed that any member of the legislature will harmass that body with amendments, against the will of a majority of its members. What does our own experience teach us-I mean, the experience which we have had here upon this floor? Do we not know that it is in the power of gentlemen to tax a deliberative body with the consideration and discussion of measures which it is known have not the sanction of one third of the members? Have we not had such measures here? We have had no less than one hundred and forty various schemes of amendment, and we have had them discussed day after day, and yet, when the question came to be taken, there were many of them in support of which not a vote of one third could be obtained; and it is a fact not to be controverted, that one half of our whole time has been taken up in the discussion of frivolous amendments and propositions. It is, therefore, as I have said, for the purpose of protecting the legislature as well as the people, that some such shield as this should be interposed by the action this convention.

For these reasons, I approve decidedly of the amendment of the genteman from Union, and shall vote for its adoption. I believe that it will prevent the legislature from improperly consuming their own time. I believe that it will place a wholesome check upon the impulsive movements of our young politicians, who will step forward to propose amendments to the constitution, as the hobbies upon which they may themselves ide into publie favor. I would not indulge them with the power of doing 30, unless the changes they desire to make should be based upon the petations of such a number of the voters of this commonwealth, as will give a fair indication that public opinion is in favor of them.

Mr. CHANDLER, of Philadelphia, said:

I concur, Mr. President, in all that has been said as to the importance of the proposition before the convention, and I desire, therefore, to offer very few words upon it.

When the gentleman from Susquehanna (Mr. Read) offered his first proposition fixing the number of petitioners at three thousand, I had my doubts whether or not he could be in earnest. Three thousand voters! It is exactly the whig majority of Philadelphia, and it is about equal to the number of other voters in the whole city. Now, either party who might be disappointed, could rub up that number of petitioners any week in the year, and could present themselves before any legislature with petitions sufficient to draw from them legislative action. Much as I dislike and am opposed to the provisions of this new constitution, I am much more opposed to this method of obtaining legislative action. If we should adopt the amendment fixing the number at three thousand, I should feel particularly desirous that these three thousand should be in some way qualified, so as to prevent them from disturbing the people. They ought to know the causes which have operated in the introduction of certain amendmen's now about to be offered to the people.

But, sir, is it our object to have the people continually agitated on the subject of amendments to the constitution? Have we not in this convention, from the vast expense which has attended it as well as from other causes-have we not, I ask, already given the people sufficient cause of dissatisfaction? Is it not known that we, who are the conservatives of this body, are founding our hopes of keeping the old constitution on the disgust which the people feel at our proceedings? I believe that they will be so dissatisfied and disgusted with our amendments, that they will reject them. But should the fact turn out otherwise, should they after all adopt these amendments. I believe that the good sense of the peoplǝ will be sufficient to prevent any very serious harm resulting from their effects. I, for one, am too democratic in all my notions and feelings, to have the whole people of Pennsylvania disturbed and agitated by the appeals of three thousand voters-democrats though they may be. They are likely to be so.

Why, then, should we endanger the whole superstructure? Why should we put in continual jeopardy all that is dear to us, by gratifying the desire for perpetual change? I have somewhere read that the people of a country in the east contrived, by continual beating upon the ground, to move a weighty superstructure from the place on which it rested. And let me say that, with us, the effect of this continual cry for change will be, that all we consider democratic in our constitution will be torn away, until not a vestige is left.

The gentleman from the county of Philadelphia (Mr. Brown) has referred to the state of New Jersey, and has discoursed eloquently of the facilities with which amendments may be made to the constitution. It is to be borne in mind that New Jersey is a very small state, and that she was a hundred years ahead of us in her form of government. Every thing there depended upon the good action of the government, and not upon the broad precepts found in the constitution. The people of that state are good and quiet; they go on attending to their duties from time to time, and there the constitution stands. Hence, though a single legislature may propose amer.dments to the people, few are offered. Such, I fear, will not be the case in Pennsylvania, if similar facilities for constitutional amendment should be given. On the contrary, I believe we shall find it a very easy matter to stop the whole progress of legislation