execution of treaties and the prompt payment of all debts. The Spaniards made a somewhat similar demand. The French demanded a lump sum of 12,000,000 piastres (about 1,500,000l.), and the loyal and immediate execution of the Jecker contract.

In 1856 Miramon, in sore want of money, had contracted a loan with M. Jecker-a Swiss banker-for the nominal amount of 3,000,000l. M. de la Gorce states that M. de Morny, the half-brother of Napoleon, and the President of the French Chamber, had a corrupt interest in the loan. M. Ollivier, whose friendship for M. de Morny is apparent in many passages of his book, says that he is not in a position either to affirm or to deny the truth of the story; but that he can give a formal assurance that the Emperor never gave a minute's consideration to the Jecker loan. However that may be, it is certain that M. de Saligny included in the French demands the loyal and immediate execution of the Jecker contract; and that the British and Spanish representatives protested against the claim, and declared that it was 'shameful.'

It was one thing to formulate demands of this character; it was another to enforce them. It is true that the allied troops were at Vera Cruz. But their presence there did not enable them to procure any money, and the men were already beginning to melt away with fever. It was, in fact, becoming plain either that the troops must be moved to some higher and healthier part of the country, or that the expedition must be abandoned. The allied forces, however, were not strong enough to venture into the interior; they found themselves, in consequence, forced to negotiate with Juarez, and they concluded the Convention of La Solidad. Under this treaty Juarez gained the great advantage of recognition by the allies; he was even permitted to fly his flag at Vera Cruz. In return, the French were allowed to establish themselves at Tehuacan; the Spaniards at Orizaba and Cordova. The commandant of the British contingent preferred to embark his men on board his vessels, and keep them, under healthier conditions, at sea.

Before the news of this convention reached Europe, the Emperor, a little jealous of the numerical superiority of the Spanish force, decided on reinforcing his own troops; and, early in 1862, he despatched General Lorencez with 4,000 additional men to Mexico. With this new force came General Almonte, the natural son of Morelos, the hero of the Mexican war of independence-a man who had been

selected by Miramon to represent him at Paris, and who had persuaded the Emperor that there would be no difficulty in overthrowing Juarez's government, and establishing monarchical institutions in its place. General Almonte's presence accentuated the difficulties of the situation. He came with the object of overthrowing Juarez's government; and he found that the allies had just made a solemn treaty with that government, under which French troops were moving into healthier quarters at Tehuacan, and Juarez's own flag was flying at Vera Cruz. He found, too, that every suggestion which he made for interference in the internal affairs of the country increased the tension between the commanders of the allies. The differences between the allies became so acute that the British, who, in pursuance of their instructions, were rigidly refusing to intervene in the internal politics of Mexico, resolved to withdraw from the expedition. The Spaniards, with some hesitation, followed their example. The French were thus left alone to carry out the ambitious projects of their Emperor, which were slowly becoming manifest.

It is satisfactory to note that, in recording these proceedings, French historians are agreed in according praise to both the policy and the conduct of the British Government. Neither M. de la Gorce nor M. Ollivier has any special liking for Lord Russell, who in 1862 held the seals of the British Foreign Office. But M. de la Gorce calls his criticism of the French policy singularly wise; and M. Ollivier defends M. Thouvenel from any charge of dishonesty by affirming that in his heart he thought with Lord Russell. We may assume, therefore, that the only criticism which French historians have to offer on our withdrawal from the expedition is an expression of their regret that their own Government did not follow our example. The French, in fact, were surrounded with difficulty. The treaty of La Solidad had apparently made an attack on Juarez impossible; and General Almonte could not carry out his own views, or perhaps even Napoleon's instructions, without destroying Juarez's power. The French, accordingly, under General Almonte's inspiration, set themselves, as a first step, to tear up the convention to which they had just agreed, and they charged Juarez, in a document-which M. Ollivier says he blushes to copy-with a breach of its

* 'Au fond, l'honnête Thouvenel pensait comme Russell.' Vol. iv.

p. 381.

stipulations. A miserable and unworthy excuse-which the French troops themselves are said to have resented-was made the basis of an unworthy and unjustifiable war.

Success in military matters occasionally is held to justify the unjustifiable. If the French, however, had entered on a war without excuse, they commenced it in a state of ignorance which is almost inconceivable. General Lorencez declared at the very outset of the campaign that the French were so superior in race, in organisation, in discipline, and in other qualities, that at the head of 6,000 men he was master of Mexico. Within a month this soi-disant master of Mexico had been foiled in an attack on Puebla-an open town-and forced to retire with a loss of 500 men.

News of this disaster reached Paris in June 1862, and the Emperor, to do him justice, at once roused himself to the necessities of the situation. He hurried off reinforcements to Mexico; he raised the grand total of the French troops to 27,000, and ultimately to 34,000 men; and he selected General Forey, who had served under his orders in Italy, for the supreme command. General Forey arrived in Mexico in August 1862, but he did not find himself in a position to open the campaign till February 1863. Puebla, the scene of General Lorencez's defeat, was only taken after a two months' siege, at the end of March. Mexico, the capital of the country, was occupied in June. Juarez hastily retired into the more inaccessible portions of the Republic. A provisional government was instituted, which took for its title "The Regency of the Empire,' and the French persuaded themselves that Mexico had reached the limit of its trouble, and that they themselves had come to the end of the war. General Forey, made a marshal, was recalled, and the command was entrusted to his chief lieutenant, General Bazaine.

The conviction that the war was at an end, that Mexico (to use General Bazaine's phrase) was conquis, pacifié,' induced the Archduke Maximilian to accept the crown, which the Emperor had from the first contemplated he should receive. But the war was not at an end. Juarez, though he had abandoned his capital, still maintained his authority in the more inaccessible portions of the territory. He called on his fellow-countrymen to unite in a great effort to save their independence. The country, at his orders, was covered with bands of guerillas, who intercepted the convoys and cut the communications of the French. In such a struggle the Mexicans had many advantages. True,

their men were badly trained, badly clothed, badly fed, badly armed, and, in many cases, forcibly taken from their homes against their will; but they were brave, temperate, tired by no exertion, and, mounted on lean but wiry ponies, they had a mobility which the French did not possess. The very women aided their cause. They followed their husbands to the field, watched over the transport and commissariat, and, when a halt was ordered, prepared the food.

Thus, if General Forey in the summer of 1863 had returned to France with the conviction that he had, in the language of his successor, conquered and pacified the country, that successor, General Bazaine, soon found that he was in the presence of a guerilla war which was much more trying than the regular warfare with which General Forey had dealt. It is only fair to add that he carried out the work with energy and skill. Towards the end of 1863, or nearly two years after the commencement of the war, three-fourths of the territory and four-fifths of the population were acquired for the Empire. In the beginning of 1864, two years after the first expedition had sailed, only some detached commandos--as we should call them to-day -kept up the semblance of organised resistance. 'Every 'day it was announced that they were scattered to the 'winds, and every morrow saw them re-appear as numerous as ever.'

,

The more cheering reports, which continued to arrive in Europe, encouraged the Archduke Maximilian to embark on his fatal expedition. And in June 1864 the unhappy Prince, and his still more unhappy wife, landed at Vera Cruz. He may, perhaps, be forgiven for inferring from what he saw that General Bazaine's boast that the country was 'conquis, pacifié was justified. The resistance which the French were still meeting seemed gradually weakening, and measures were in progress to ensure its more rapid collapse. General Bazaine was organising a great movement-it would be called to-day a great drive-by which he hoped to clear the whole of Northern Mexico from the Juaristes, and to drive Juarez himself across the frontier. His complete success induced him to repeat the same operation in Southern Mexico, where he gained a similar advantage. The beginning of 1865 was the most prosperous period in the French occupation, and the culminating point in Marshal Bazaine's career. Fortune had apparently smiled on the Commanderin-Chief. He might almost have been compared to Alexander in Dryden's famous poem. He had even the lovely Thaïs'

at his side in the person of a Mexican lady, whom he had married in Mexico.

At this point, however, we part company with M. Ollivier, whose narrative has not yet been brought down to the final issue, and we must turn to other sources for a brief summary of the difficulties in which Marshal Bazaine was about to be involved, and which were ultimately to lead to the withdrawal of the French, and to the defeat, the capture, and the execution of Maximilian.

These difficulties arose from two causes. In the first place, even the Emperor Napoleon-dreamer as he waswould have never embarked on the Mexican campaign if the existence of civil war in the United States had not made it certain that he had no reason for fearing American intervention. During the three years of warfare the Americans had stood sullenly aloof, powerless to take any steps in opposition to a policy diametrically opposed to the Monroe Doctrine. In the spring of 1865, however, when the Mexican war was entering on its fourth year, the resistance of the Southern States collapsed. Large bodies of armed men, disbanded in the States, were only too ready to embark on some fresh enterprise, and Juarez's partisans had no more difficulty in securing recruits in Texas than the Fenians at the same time encountered in raising recruits for an attempt on Ireland. The Juaristes enjoyed, however, an advantage which the Fenians did not share. Texas 'marched' upon Mexico; bands of guerillas could easily cross the frontier; and the Government of the United States declared that it would require all the cavalry of Europe and America to prevent their doing so. But the action of the United States was not confined to a passive toleration of armed incursions from their own country. Freed from the pressure of civil war, they rejected with disdain a proposal of the French Government that they should recognise Maximilian; they emphasised their refusal by accrediting a diplomatic agent to Juarez himself.

Those persons who are fond of speculating on the 'what 'might have been' may perhaps interest themselves in discussing whether, if General Lee had not surrendered in 1865, Maximilian might have established his dynasty. Practical men will be satisfied with observing that the surrender at Richmond necessitated surrender in Mexico. But the Emperor's own policy had made retreat as difficult as advance. By destroying Juarez's government and substituting Maximilian he had deprived himself of any respon