imposed by their Government, give sufficient proof that they are not altogether the devotees of peace that they have been supposed to be; and, though they have been stigmatised as cowards because, when armed with bows and arrows, spears and matchlocks, they made but a feeble stand against Enfield rifles and shrapnel shell, it is conceivable that, in similar circumstances, the men of Crécy and Agincourt would not have made a much better show.

And in the realm of commerce the wonderful success of the Japanese seems to foreshadow what may be achieved by a kindred people, differing in many respects, but with much in common-a similar ingenuity, a similar artistic taste, a similar keenness in business. Here surely are possibilities that-if we may use the French expression-- donnent à penser furieusement.'

And Russia? To all present appearance it is Russia that threatens to engorge China. It is possible, even as the Manchus did; but such an end might even intensify the foregoing prognostics. China would still be China; Mongols would be Mongols; but instead of forming part of an Empire whose traditional policy has been peace, they would become subjects of the most grasping Empire that the world has known. What will be the future of Russia, of Asia, of Europe, if the Russian Government has the absolute command of some five hundred millions of people who, in the most literal sense, do not care half a depreciated dollar for their lives. And the trade? Up to the present our experience of Russian methods is not promising. With an extension, such as is here supposed, these might be changed; but the whole subject becomes much too vague for further speculation. The only thing certain is that enormous changes may be expected, but in what direction or by what agency produced-whether by a revivified and autonomous China, by a Russianised China, or by a China broken up into spheres of influence and partitioned among the Western Powers-we will not prophesy till we know.

So far we have been considering the Pacific solely in its relation to the Asiatic fringe, and it is unquestionably this that gives the subject its present absorbing interest; but the part that Great Britain is to play there in the future may be expected to depend not so much on herself as on the continental dominion in North America, on the island-continent in the South Pacific, and on the relations which the several colonies of Australia and New Zealand bear to the mother country and to each other. During

these last years Australasia has loomed very large in the domestic politics of the Empire. The noble part which the colonies have taken in the war-now happily ended-has brought their names prominently before even those people who prefer to stand aloof from politics, as matters with which they have no concern. But to those who believe that the proper study of mankind is man,' and that the history of the present, illustrated by the history of the past, is the study of man, to them the colonies during the past two years have been most attractive as living studies in constitutional history, which it is impossible to avoid comparing or contrasting with those other great colonies from which we so wretchedly parted company five quarters of a century ago. And there are many, perhaps the majority, of our countrymen, who, without troubling themselves too much about the political details, have still been conscious that our great colonies in Australia were passing through a crisis in their history, that the crisis was happily past, that the Prince of Wales-or rather the Duke of Cornwall and York-had visited them in state to launch them on their new course, and that they now form a federated, self-governing, and practically independent unit of the British Empire.

To those who, with little practical knowledge of geography, know Australasia only from the map, it was and is a matter of much wonder that there should have been any difficulty in forming a union between the different colonies, and that eventually New Zealand refused to join that union. In the first place, they do not realise the size of Australia, and the enormous distances which separate the colonies; that the distance from Sydney to Perth, for instance, in a straight line, exceeds the distance from London to Constantinople; that the distance from Sydney to New Zealand exceeds that from London to Gibraltar. With these great distances are associated differences in climate, as between temperate Tasmania and tropical Queensland; differences in soil, in products, in social and economic relations, all giving rise to differing interests and to political questions of the greatest importance.

The geography of Australia and, in connection with it, the several causes of these differing interests and separating tendencies, are, perhaps, better and more clearly explained by Mr. Colquhoun than has ever been done in anything like the same space. In Australia itself, and in Tasmania with it, these difficulties have been overcome for the time being,

and we may feel sure that many of them, by force of habit, will eventually cease to appear as difficulties; others may tend rather to increase than to diminish, and may possibly give much trouble in the future. In New Zealand they could not be overcome; that colony has remained apart from the union, and will probably continue to do so. The case is thus summarised by Mr. Colquhoun :

As regards the political side of the question, it has been decided by New Zealand that she has nothing to gain and much to lose by union with the Commonwealth. Neither as regards legislative independence, finance, postal and telegraph services, the administration of justice, agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests, nor the social condition of the working classes and coloured labour, would New Zealand be assisted by federation. She would, moreover, suffer by the enforced absence for six months of the year of some of her abler citizens, who would be attending the Commonwealth Parliament. Politicians in the colonies are a professional class by themselves, as a rule, and the number of really capable men is very limited in such a young community.'

He passes on to speak of two considerations which have been thought to render the correctness of her decision doubtful. The first is that of defence:

'It is obvious that New Zealand is weakened strategically in the case of attack by her isolated position, but in answer to this the New Zealanders make two points. First, while they remain in their present status, they are entitled to the protection of the British fleet, and are therefore spared the expense, hardly to be borne by such a community, of providing warships of their own. So long as Britain retains her maritime supremacy they feel safe. Secondly, in case of an attack on New Zealand, Australia would for her own sake, as well as by reason of ties of kinship, afford her every help and protection. Lest this should seem a selfish policy, New Zealand expresses her readiness— of which she has given practical proof during the South African war -to help in the work of imperial defence, and she expresses an equal willingness to assist Australia in any difficulty, her interests being bound up with those of the Continent.

The point is, of course, one that has to be considered, if only in deference to vulgar apprehensions; but it cannot be overlooked that until the downfall of Britain is an accomplished fact that is, till some other nation or coalition has obtained the command of the sea -no serious attack on

*It may be necessary to say that 'command of the sea' is defined to be that absolute superiority which permits the party having it to send out comparatively defenceless expeditions without fear of their being interrupted.

either Australia or New Zealand is possible, though there may be casual raids, which the local forces of any one of the colonies ought to be, and we believe would be, quite capable of dealing with. The other consideration, that of the Federal tariff, appears to us of more practical importance, though Mr. Colquhoun thinks, or at least hopes, that it may not prove so.

'The freedom of intercolonial commerce is of great importance to New Zealand, whose principal Australian trade is with Sydney, which has been for some years past a free port. The Federal Ministry, divided upon many questions, is unanimous in its determination to maintain a protectionist tariff outside the Federation. The tariff is not a hide-bound system on the American pattern, but rather a compromise between that and one desired purely for revenue purposes. The whole question is one that is likely to be keenly fought in the future, since New South Wales has a strong party of ardent free-traders. It is to be hoped that the statesmen of Australia will not be blinded by the apparent exigencies of the moment to the advantages of that wide and generous policy which has been the characteristic of British trade in all quarters of the globe.'

But in Australia itself, among the federated States of the Commonwealth, there are at least two questions which, from the very beginning, tend to disintegration. The first is the construction of a trans-continental railway from Sydney to Perth, the pro and contra of which appear in very different lights to West Australia and South Australia. By reason of its magnificent harbour and its position on the east coast, where no other can at all compare with it, Sydney is the natural outlet for Australian trade in the Pacific. Hence the importance of the railway to Western Australia.

'There are difficulties in the way, however, for this railway is opposed by some of the Eastern States and South Australia. If a line be made from Perth to Sydney across the continent, it is apparent that Adelaide must suffer very considerably; indeed, the raison d'être for its existence would almost disappear. Now the Commonwealth Act forbids the Federal authority to build a railway in any State without its consent. South Australia is very unlikely ever to give its consent unless some compensating advantage can be found, and the position is therefore certain to become more and more strained. . . . On the other hand, the Western Australians threaten to break up the Federal Government unless they get their railway and are thus brought into close contact with the rest of the Commonwealth, and this view is likely to become much stronger as the value of the Pacific becomes realised. . . . The difficulty is, therefore, a very serious one, and is likely to test the Federal Government severely.'

That it will be surmounted we have no doubt, though the

States may be for a time like some newly-married couples, who have to learn, with more or less friction, the limits of yielding, compromise, and self-assertion, and then live happy for ever afterwards. The labour question seems to us really far more serious. In Queensland white men cannot work effectively, and coloured labour has been and is largely employed. There are there no fewer than twenty thousand coloured aliens -Chinese, Japanese, Hindus, and Polynesians -none of them desirable as colonists, though sorely needed as labourers. But the labour party in the Southern States is very strong, and opposes the introduction or the presence of coloured aliens.

'Despite the very strong planter interest brought to bear from Queensland, and the impossibility of fully developing that country without outside coloured aid, the Australians are determined to preserve their continent from what they call the contamination of the yellow and black races. The Pacific Island Labourers Bill prohibits islanders from entering the Commonwealth after March 31, 1904, and only allows their immigration meanwhile under licence. No agreement between employers and Pacific Island labourers is to remain in force after December 31, 1906; any islanders found in Australia after that date are to be deported. Already restrictions on Chinese and Japanese immigration have been greatly increased, while steps are to be taken against natives of India by means of an education test. As the Hindus are British subjects, this is sailing rather near the wind, and it is difficult to see how such measures can receive the sanction of the Imperial Government. Japan is not likely to acquiesce in the restrictions against Japanese, and she may adopt retaliatory measures.'

Difficulties with the Japanese there may possibly be, and to the annoyance of the Home Government, but we conceive there is not and cannot be any objection to the Australians protecting themselves from an undue immigration of Hindus or any other coloured British subjects-Houssas, for instance, or Kaffirs. The real difficulty, as it appears to us, will lie among the Australians themselves, and we do not think that Mr. Colquhoun overstates the case in saying: The diverging interests-between the Federal 'Government, dependent on the white labour party, and 'North Australia, dependent on coloured labour-constitute ' a serious danger to the unity of the new Commonwealth.'

6

The most serious danger of all, however, not to the colonies only, but to the Empire, lies in the not improbable difference of opinion or in some misunderstanding between the Commonwealth and the mother country. For such differences or misunderstandings do occur. Our politicians