to create two new Slav vice-consulships at Mitrovitza and Prisrend respectively. The project, however, had to be abandoned, temporarily at all events, owing to the attitude of the Albanians, who declared in unequivocal terms their intention to kill both the vice-consuls, if they came to take up their posts. In the face of these facts we find it hard to accept without reserve the assurances repeatedly given by Russian and Austrian statesmen of their mutual anxiety to abstain from all action calculated to disturb the equilibrium of the relative positions held by the two Powers in the Near East. The latest authoritative statement to that effect was made by the Emperor of Austria in his Address to the Delegations on May 7, and was subsequently echoed at greater length by his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Goluchowski, in the Budget Committee of the Austrian Delegation. Both Emperor and Minister agreed in emphasising the beneficial results of the St. Petersburg compact of 1897, one of which is the abandonment of the perilous 'system of the so-called Policy of Prestige in the Balkan 'Peninsula' and the initiation of a policy of perfect disinterestedness: formerly,' the Minister is reported to have said, 'distrust of the self-seeking aims of the other country 'weighed heavily both upon Austria and Russia; but it was 'bound to disappear immediately it was authoritatively 'established that neither of them aspired to any territorial acquisition in the Near East.' This is an admirable text, viewed by itself; but it will hardly bear a scrutiny in the light of contemporary events. These tell a totally different tale. At the best the Minister's profession of faith may be taken as an illustration of Cæsar's dictum, 'Libenter homines 'id quod volunt credunt.'

In Southern Albania, or Epirus, we find, in contrast to the efforts of Italy, the Hellenic influence strong with the strength which long historic association can only impart, and which owes little or nothing to the artificial methods of a political propaganda. This influence is partly the outcome of religious sympathy-all the southern Christians being members of the Greek Church-and partly of community of speech. The Greek language is universally understood. In the larger towns, as Jannina, it is the mother tongue of all the citizens, irrespective of creed; and even in some of the country districts, where Albanian is the idiom in everyday use, Greek is employed in writing, or if, as it rarely happens, a Tosk wishes to use Albanian as a medium of communication, he employs the Greek characters.

The

training schools, due to the munificence of one individual alone (Zographos), within the last twenty years have furnished teachers to over two hundred Albanian villages, including altogether a population of some sixty thousand. In short, Greek holds among the Southern Albanians pretty nearly the position which English holds in the Highlands of Scotland and in Wales, and, not unlike the Scotch and the Welsh, the Tosks entertain a kind of sentimental affection for their vernacular, although for all literary, religious, and commercial purposes they find Greek a more practical, as well as more dignified, vehicle of thought. From community of religion and language to community of national sentiment it is but a short step, and, as might have been anticipated, the Christian Albanians of the south-the Epirots -nourish the same aspirations as the inhabitants of other districts similarly situated. They look upon themselves as inseparable members of the Hellenic race, and wish for nothing better than to be allowed to share in its fortunesa sentiment fostered by the numerous Albanian colonies settled in the free kingdom, and, naturally enough, encouraged by all the inhabitants of that kingdom.

It was not to be expected that Greece should long remain an impassive spectator of the scramble for the possession of Albania. An Albanian League was formed at Athens, the Proclamation of which to the brethren in Albania figures at the head of this article. The document is an eloquent, though necessarily somewhat biassed, appeal to their common origin, traditions, and struggles. It contains a programme for what is termed in it New Albania, and advocates the course of a rapprochement between the two ancient and autochthonous races of the Balkan Peninsula. It is, appropriately enough, signed by Sechos, Botzaris, and Tzavellas, names two of which at least are famous in modern Græco-Albanian history, and calculated to arouse in the breasts of many Albanians memories of heroic and not very distant times when Greeks and Albanians shed their blood on many a common battlefield and for a common object. For some mystic reason, however, the pamphlet, though prettily printed and arrayed in a blue garment of unimpeachable purity, is written in an artificial vulgar idiom and spelling which to the Southern Albanian, who has even a smattering of Hellenic culture, will be distasteful if not bewildering; while to his brother of the north, who is not acquainted with the Greek language in any shape or form, it will be utterly meaningless. The idea advocated in this publication is not

quite new. Ali Pasha, the notorious tyrant, and yet one of the three great men produced by modern Albania, at the beginning of the nineteenth century conceived the plan of erecting an independent Albano-Grecian State under his own rule. Had his reputation for perfidy been less wide-spread or less well founded, he would probably have succeeded in carrying out his scheme. He failed because none of those interested gave him credit for sincerity. The fact, however, that he made the proposal shows that it was a plausible one. At a later date, in 1846, the insurgent chief Guleka made similar overtures to the Greek Minister Coletti, inviting Greece to join in the struggle, or to assist the Albanian insurgents with arms and ammunition. The Minister's death brought the negotiations to a premature conclusion. Still later, during the Congress of Berlin, in 1878, the Albanian Committee of Prisrend, in a memoir to Lord Beaconsfield, refer to the possibility of 'doubling the defensive resources of 'Albania by an alliance with Greece, who sees in the Slavs a dangerous enemy and is convinced that her interests are 'identical with ours.'

The proposal, briefly stated, is to form a joint AlbanoGrecian State on the model of Sweden and Norway or Austria-Hungary, or of Moldavia and Wallachia before those two principalities were incorporated into what is now the kingdom of Roumania. The two States together, it is urged, could easily check the progress of the Slavs and keep them out of Macedonia, as in olden times Philip of Macedon assisted by the Illyrians-the ancestors of the modern Albanians-succeeded in repelling the barbarians of the north. Greece would gain much from such an alliance. The Albanians are warriors born and bred. Their existence for centuries past has been a continuous fight-now against the Turks, now against the Slavs. When in want of foreign foes they keep themselves in training by their internal feuds. To Greece such allies would be invaluable. In return for this service the Albanians would profit by the Greek aptitude for a seafaring life. Their coast would be defended by the Greek fleet, and Greek enterprise would also develop the commercial possibilities of the country. Moreover, the civilisation of the Greeks would enable Albania to lay the foundations of a national education and of a political organisation. The idea, so far as it has been promulgated, seems to have met with a favourable reception among the brethren.' There is a strong racial affinity between the Greeks and the Albanians. The national customs, dress, and folklore of the

latter are very closely akin to, indeed in many cases identical with, those of the Greeks. This relationship is proved by the ease with which the two elements mix together and assimilate each other under normal conditions. The Southern Albanians, at all events, have for ages sided with the Greeks, and played a leading rôle in the war of independence, some of the most distinguished chiefs in the struggle being actually natives of Souli and other parts of South Albania. In Greece itself there are large tracts inhabited by Albanians. The islands of Hydra and Spetzai and the opposite coast furnished during that war many a renowned sea hero; the island of Andros is also partly occupied by Albanians. There are Albanian villages at the very gates of Athens and Corinth, Megara and Argos, such as Amarousi, Kharvati, Menidi, &c. The Albanians settled in the free kingdom are computed at four hundred thousand, that is, at about onefifth of the entire population. They form a majority in the army and in the navy, both royal and mercantile, while many representatives of the race fill important posts in the Government service; many are distinguished members of the learned professions and of the manufacturing and commercial classes. These Albanians, who still retain in a large measure their native speech, form a strong link of connexion between the two races, and it is they who have originated the Albanian League at Athens.

What does the Sultan think of all these conflicting endeavours on the part of outsiders to divide his property while he still counts himself among the living? Any other Power would undoubtedly have resented such acts, or at least would have regarded them as 'unfriendly.' Turkey and Turkish statesmanship are not to be judged by ordinary standards. What to any one else would have been a source of weakness and annoyance is to the Sultan a source of strength and unalloyed satisfaction. Sad indeed would be his plight, if the Albanians were a race united among themselves and free from foreign interference, or subject to only one foreign influence. Brave and reckless and resourceful as they are, they would lose no time in turning their rocks into impregnable fortresses and his Valis and Kaimakams into vagrants-as in fact they often do. But, fortunately for the Sultan, they are torn by incessant dissensions: every chief's hand is against every other chief, and every clan looks upon every other clan as either an actual or a potential enemy. The Gheg hates the Tosk, the Mohammedan suspects the Christian, the Roman Catholic

detests, and is detested by, the Greek Orthodox. As if these causes of dissension were not sufficient, oil is thrown into the fire by the foreign emissaries from Austria and Italy on one hand, and Russia on the other. So long as this state of things prevails the Sultan feels safe: the very multitude of his foes is a guarantee of their failure. However, he does not allow himself to be lulled to sleep by his sense of security. He makes capital out of the rivalries of the various native chiefs, and, by offers of lucrative posts in the palace and other advantages, he lures the most powerful among them to Constantinople, where it is easy for him, through his legions of spies, to keep an imperial eye on their movements. Now and again one of these deluded and penitent birds finds a way out of the gilded cage, and the world hears of it. In North Albania itself, Abdul Hamid encourages the Mohammedan Ghegs to prey upon the Christians, and connives at the war of extermination which they wage against the Slavs of the vilayet of Monastir and the district known as Old Servia. Things are thus kept in a state of unstable equilibrium partly through the venality of the Albanian chieftains, who find it more convenient to do the Sultan's work and earn the Sultan's wages than to play the unremunerative game of patriotism; partly through the policy of the Sultan himself, who displays the most nervous solicitude to avoid all causes of friction with the hardy mountaineers who profess the Prophet's faith, though after a fashion of their own. Of course, this policy, judged by Western standards, is suicidal. It provides for the present by exposing the future to even greater dangers. But the maxim of the Oriental statesman has always been Enough for the day the evil thereof.' When things have reached an impasse; when the knot is tangled beyond the possibility of loosening, then it is cut in the manner of which Turkish history furnishes only too many examples, such as the Bulgarian, Armenian, and other periodical atrocities. Could the Sultan be brought to realise his true interest, he would know that an honest policy is in this case the only good policy. He would see that the Imperial and the Albanian interests are identical. Instead of encouraging anarchy, and by so doing furnishing self-seeking outsiders with an ever-present excuse for intervention, he would hasten to satisfy the aspirations of the Albanian people— aspirations which do not in any way militate against the interests of his empire. By erecting an autonomous Albania he would render the bulwark which that country