Hearings, Reports and Prints of the Senate Committee on Government Operations

1 each activity, program, and project of the United States 2 Government contained therein (including outlays for the 3 payment of contracts and outlays from trust funds, and 4 whether or not an appropriation is required for such activity, 5 program, or project) the total amount of outlays that may 6 be made with respect to such activity, program, or project 7 for such fiscal year. The total amount of outlays provided in 8 such measure, when added to the amount of outlays previ9 ously specified and made effective with respect to such 10 fiscal year, shall not exceed the total amount of outlays established for the United States Government with respect

to such fiscal year and in effect at the time such measure 13 is reported. Any such reported measure which exceeds such 14 total amount in effect at such time shall not be considered 15 in either House, except pursuant to the provisions of sec16 tion 6.

OUTLAY ESTIMATES IN COMMITTEE REPORTS

SEC. 8. (a) The report accompanying each bill or 19 joint resolution of a public character reported by any com20 mittee of the Senate (except the Committees on Appropri21 ations of the two Houses of Congress) shall contain an 22 estimate, made by such committee, of the outlays that 23 would be made in carrying out such bill or joint resolution 24 in the fiscal year in which it is reported in the ensuing 25 fiscal year immediately following such fiscal year, and in

1 the four fiscal years immediately following the ensuing

2 fiscal year.

(b) It shall not be in order in the House of Representa4 tives or the Senate to consider any such bill or joint resolu5 tion if the report of that committee which reported such 6 bill or joint resolution does not comply with the provisions 7 of subsection (a) of this section.

(c) For the purposes of this section, the members of 9 the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy who are Members 10 of the Senate shall be deemed to be a committee of the 11 Senate, and the members of that joint committee who are 12 Members of the House of Representatives shall be deemed 13 to be a committee of the House.

IMPOUNDMENT OF FUNDS

SEC. 9. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of 16 this section, the President shall have no authority or power 17

(1) to reserve any amount of obligational authority pro18 vided by appropriation Acts, or (2) to reserve from expenditure any amounts of any such obligational authority, and 20 any provision of law construed to give the President such 21 authority or power shall have no force or effect. 22 (b) The President is authorized to reserve any such 23 amount only if the amount to be so reserved (1) is not 24 necessary for the efficient operation of the activity, program, or project for which the obligational authority was made

1 available, and (2) the activity, program, or project can

2 and will continue to be fully carried out without the amount

so reserved.

5 authority" includes loan authority.

EXERCISE OF RULEMAKING POWERS

7 SEC. 10. The provisions of this section and sections 8 4(a)-(d), 5, 6(a), (d), 7, and 8 are enacted by the 9 Congress

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking powers of the

11 Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, or of that House to which they specifically apply; and

121

such rules shall supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change such rules (so far as relating to the procedure in such House) at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any

other rule of such House, except that such House may change the provisions of such sections with respect to

that House only by a vote of two-thirds of the Members

of that House present and voting.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR STEVENSON OF ILLINOIS ON THE INTRODUCTION OF S. 905

(February 19, 1973)

Mr. President, I am today introducing legislation designed to assure that Congress will review the budget and set priorities in a fiscally responsible manner. The legislation establishes a system for Congressional determination of an annual outlay ceiling, provides for an omnibus appropriations process through which Congress can rationally determine fiscal priorities, and prohibits the President from irresponsibly impounding funds appropriated by Congress through this new mechanism.

The need for Congressional action to bring about fiscal responsibility and reordered priorities has never been greater. Fiscal responsibility will be required if we are to avoid the threat of a new round of inflation. Reordered priorities are necessary if we are to meet our pressing public needs while still keeping government spending under control. And Congressional action appears mandatory if we are to preserve the Constitutional separation of powers and checks and balances which the founding fathers rightly deemed indispensable to a viable democratic form of government.

In the last session the President proposed that the Congress establish a ceiling on spending and then delegate to him its Constitutional responsibility to determine how Federal funds would be allocated within that ceiling. The Congress came perilously close to giving up its fundamental power of the purse.

It would be better if Congress preserved its power and exercised it well.

In broad terms, under my proposal, Congress would be required to set an absolute ceiling on spending (budget outlays) at the beginning of each year. That ceiling would be based on the President's budget, the condition of the economy and projected revenues. Congress would then be prohibited from passing any measures which breached the ceiling. Since there would be an absolute ceiling on the amount of Federal outlays, it would not be possible to provide funds without regard to overall fiscal impact.

Each Appropriations Committee would be required to report out only one appropriations bill containing all appropriations. The bill would not only specify the amount to be appropriated, but the permissible outlay during the fiscal year for each activity. The present procedure of reporting out and considering individually more than 10 separate appropriations bills makes it difficult for Congress to rationally set priorities. Under the procedue which I propose, Congress would be compelled to weigh the cost and benefits of one program against those of another.

The omnibus appropriations bill could be amended on the floor of the House or Senate, but any amendment which increased appropriations for one Federal program would have to provide for cuts in other programs at least equal to the increase. The proposal includes provisions to ensure enough flexibility to take account of unforeseen emergencies and sudden changes in economy.

The President would be prohibited from impounding funds for any other than technical fiscal management reasons. Under no circumstances could he impound funds if it meant that, as a result of the impoundment, the activities for which appropriations had been granted would not be fully carried out.

In short, the bill would establish a firm and carefully calculated ceiling on spending. It would then establish a process by which the Congress could rationally determine the nation's fiscal priorities within that ceiling. And it would prohibit Presidential frustration of responsible Congressional action.

I do not claim that this is a perfect bill, or the only possible means of reforming the Congressional budgetary process. It is, at least, a good beginning. If enacted, I believe it would go a long way toward claiming for the Congress its rightful powers and assuring that they are exercised well.

Let me now explain this proposal in greater detail.

Prior to receipt of the President's budget, the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation (a joint committee consisting of members of the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committees) would hold hearings and make estimates of tax revenues available for the coming fiscal year. The estimates would be based on the best available economic projections and advice.

Then, no later than 10 days after receiving the President's budget, the Joint Economic Committee would hold hearings on the President's budget, and, using the revenue projections prepared by the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, make recommendations concerning the Federal budget surplus or deficit, if any, appropriate for economic growth and stability.

No later than 10 days after receiving the recommendations of the Joint Economic Committee, the appropriations committee in each. House would consider the JEC's recommendations, hold hearings and report out a bill establishing the total permissible outlays for the Federal government during the next fiscal year.

The setting of the outlay ceiling would represent an act of great importance for the economy and a significant assumption of responsibility by Congress. At the present time, Congress considers the macroeconomic impact of the Federal budget only through non-legislative hearings of the Joint Ecomonic Committee.

Clearly, the Committee responsible for considering and reporting out an outlay ceiling will assume a vitally important function. Many have sugested a joint committee consisting of selected members of the Appropriations Committees, Ways and Means, and Finance. I have rejected this proposal for two reasons. First, such a mechanism was attempted during the abortive legislative budget effort in 1948 and found unwieldy and unworkable. Second, I do not believe Congress should delegate such an important function of all members to a body which would essentially be a committee of only the most senior members of the most powerful committees.

It would be more reasonable and consistent with present, workable Congressional procedures to consider an outlay ceiling through the present Appropriations Committees which, after all, are the committees charged with providing the budget authority which results in outlays. The membership of these Committees has become increasingly

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