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Schedule of principal offenses—Continued.
Drunkenness on duty, absence without leave, neglect of duty, conduct to the
prejudice of good order and discipline, using provoking and disrespectful language toward another person in the Navy, conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman..
ing to the destruction of good morals.
lawful order of the Secretary of the Navy.
Total... Acquitted. Disapproved.
Absence without or over leave...
cipline, scandalous conduct tending to the destruction of good morals.
Tous conduct tending to the destruction of good morals...
bezzling, misappropriating, or otherwise defrauding the Government of stores
or funds)... Suffering a prisoner to escape.
Total. Acquitted. Disapproved..
8 22 19 7 3 1 94 2 2
6 2 1 81 2 1 2 1 1 3 13
Comparative analysis of more frequent offenses by enlisted men tried by general court-martial.
DISPOSITION MADE OF ENLISTED MEN CONVICTED BY GENERAL
Of the 1,628 enlisted men convicted by general courts-martial during the past year there were 1,028 whose offenses were of such a nature as to necessitate their confinement either as prisoners or as detentioners. Of this number 274 were placed in detention direct, 697 in naval prisons, and 57 in State prisons; the remaining 600 were placed on probation in the service at large without undergoing either imprisonment or detention.
Data concerning men tried by general court-martial and placed on probation in the service
at large under the provisions of General Order 110 of July 27, 1914.
Number of men placed on probation in the service at large under the
provisions of General Order 110, during fiscal year 1915... Disposition;
In good standing in the service at large June 30, 1915.
Number unsuccessful on June 30, 1915 (discharged because of
Data concerning general court-martial prisoners and detentioners.
REPORT OF THE MAJOR GENERAL COMMANDANT OF THE
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS.
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE Corps,
Washington, October 6, 1915. From: Major General Commandant. To: Secretary of the Navy. Subject: Annual report of the condition and service of the United
States Marine Corps.
INCREASE OF PERSONNEL.
1. The paramount need of the Marine Corps is an increase of officers and men. As at present constituted it is inadequate to perform its varied and important duties.
2. The duties of the Marine Corps may be classified as follows:
(2) On board capital ships now in reserve, in ordinary, or under construction, whenever it becomes necessary for them to join the active fleet.
(6) As the technical companies constituting the fixed defense force assigned the duty of seizing, fortifying, and defending advance bases.
(c) As a mobile force consisting of infantry and artillery
(1) For duty in supporting the fixed defense forces in the defense of advance bases.
(2) For expeditionary duty, such as that performed at Vera Cruz in 1914, and now being performed in Haiti.
(d) As military garrisons to provide guards for navy yards, naval magazines, and other plants vital to the upkeep and efficiency of the fleet, both in peace and in war.
(e) As recruits under training.
(f) As detachments for duty at target ranges, recruit depots, United States legations abroad, naval prisons, naval hospitals; as details for the recruiting service and for administrative purposes.
3. The marine detachments of the active fleet are habitually kept at their full strength. There are, however, no men who would be available for duty on board the capital ships now in reserve, in ordinary, or under construction, in case an emergency should arise requiring those vessels to join the active fleet. Approximately 1,400 additional men are needed for this duty.
4. The companies of the fixed defense force are required to perfect themselves in their specialties. The most important of these specialties are the handling of submarine mines; the landing, transporting, mounting, and manning heavy batteries, together with the establishment and management of the fire-control system connected therewith; the manning of aero-defense batteries; the handling and control of portable searchlights; and the many other branches of technical work which have been referred to in the reports which from time to time have been made to the department.
It is manifest that the companies assigned the difficult task of preparing themselves to carry out these special duties should always be kept up to their full strength; that a sufficient number of such companies should be assigned to these duties, and, being so assigned, that they should not be diverted from their highly technical training in order to provide mobile forces for expeditionary duty, detachments for navy yards, or for other purposes. Approximately 500 additional men are needed to furnish sufficient companies for the fixed defense force and to bring all such companies up to the required strength.
5. Each year since the war with Spain the Marine Corps has been called on to furnish mobile forces for expeditionary duty. These forces have varied in size from a battalion to a brigade of over 3,000 men. It has frequently been found necessary in order to provide the number of men called for by the exigencies of the then situation to temporarily withdraw marines from the fleet, to divert the fixed defense companies from their technical training, and to transfer practically the entire detachments and garrisons stationed as guards at navy yards, naval magazines, etc. Indisputably this is not only a poor makeshift, but furthermore its continuance will interfere materially with the efficiency of the fleet and of advance base work, and will endanger the safety of the navy yards, naval magazines, etc.
Mobile forces of adequate size should be stationed on each coast, in order that the frequent calls for troops for emergency expeditionary duty can be met without depleting or diverting to this duty the organizations required elsewhere for the safety and efficiency of the naval service.
Based on the experience gained from many expeditions, I am strongly of the opinion that a mobile force of not less than 3,500 men should be maintained on this coast, and one of not less than 1,200 men on the west coast. These forces would also be in readiness at all times for service as a part of the garrison of advance bases, acting as supports to the fixed defense force by protecting the base from hostile landing forces. This duty is of very great importance, as fortified harbors are very vulnerable to this form of attack. Approximately 3,000 additional men are needed for this purpose.
6. Under date of February 9, 1914, the department fixed the complements of the marine detachments assigned to duty as garrisons for guarding the navy yards, naval magazines, etc. Since that time, and especially during the last few months, the most urgent recommendations for the increase of these detachments have been made by the commandants of stations, inspectors of ordnance, and other officers responsible for the safety of these plants. Small increases in a few detachments have been authorized by the department, but owing to the lack of officers and men sufficient increases could not be made, and all of these detachments are still of inadequate strength. It is unquestionably in line with the soundest military policy to provide adequate military guards for these important plants, as, in the event of war, their destruction or serious injury would so cripple the fleet as to jeopardize the success of its operations. Approximately 1,500 additional men are needed for this purpose.
7. About 10 per cent of the enlisted personnel of the Marine Corps is habitually undergoing training at the recruit depots. When the
Marine Corps is increased, the percentage of recruits under training remaining the same, their number will, of course, be correspondingly increased. If the increase outlined in the preceding paragraphs be authorized, approximately 600 additional recruits will be under training
8. There is now available just about a sufficient number of men to perform the miscellaneous duties enumerated in paragraph 2 (f) of this report. It is evident that if an increase of the corps be authorized, the number of men required for administration, for the recruiting service, for recruit depots, and for target ranges, would be correspondingly increased. The number now engaged is about 4 per cent of the total strength, and if the Marine Corps be increased as outlined in the preceding paragraph, approximately 200 additional men will be required for this purpose.
9. For the reasons above quoted, it is apparent that, in order to properly perform the duties which have been assigned to it, the Marine Corps should be increased by approximately 7,200 men. In this connection the department's attention is invited to the fact that in the event of an emergency the Marine Corps has no means of expansion other than by enlisting and training recruits. Eight months is believed to be the minimum time required in which to fit men for their duties, if they be assigned to new organizations; and, ordinarily, before the expiration of this period, the questions at issue will have been decided, and the emergency will have terminated.
10. Even though the needs of the service are as above outlined, yet as the department, upon the recommendation of the General Board, has adopted as its general policy the maintenance of the Marine Corps at one-fifth of the Navy, my recommendation for an increase will be based upon this policy.
Therefore, having been informed that the department will recommend an increase of 7,500 enlisted men for the Navy, I advise, and earnestly urge that the department approve my recommendation that the Marine Corps be increased by 1.500 enlisted men at this session of Congress. In this connection the department's attention is invited to the fact that, if these increases be authorized, the enlisted personnel of the Marine Corps will still be 380 men less than 20 per cent of the enlisted strength of the Navy.
11. In addition to the absolute necessity, as described in this report, for an increase of the personnel of the corps, I believe it to be pertinent to invite the department's attention to the fact that the Marine Corps has demonstrated conclusively, in the maneuvers at Culebra, in the military operations at Vera Cruz, and in Haiti, as well as in other important expeditionary duty, that it is a remarkably efficient organization, and that its officers and men possess extraordinary versatility; for, in addition to being trained as infantrymen, its officers and men are required to man a part of the battery on board vessels of the fleet; to act as Field Artillery, and as Signal, Engineer, and Coast Artillery troops; to handle boats, to mount guns of large caliber on shore, etc. The field of usefulness of the Marine Corps is, therefore, a very broad one; and for this reason, as well as on account of its efficiency, and the economy of its administration, I believe that it would, in addition to the necessity, be most advantageous to the Government to enlarge it by the addition of the officers and men recommended in paragraph 15 of this report.