On July 17, 1912, Lake Moore, without consideration, executed his quitclaim deed describing said land to C. T. Huddleston. On August 12, 1912, Morris Barnett, the purported guardian of the plaintiff, who had refused to execute a deed to Huddleston pursuant to the order of the county court of July 8th, confirming said sale, was, for that and other reasons, cited to appear before said court and show cause why he should not be removed from office. On September 18, 1912, Huddleston sold said lands to the defendant Haynes, a negro real estate dealer of Boley, Okl., and his stenographer, Scottie Herriford; the latter appearing as sole grantee in the conveyance. Thereafter, on September 21, 1912, Morris Barnett was induced to execute his deed as guardian to Huddleston; the consideration being $2.000. In the guardianship proceedings subsequent to May 6, 1912, the law firm of which defendant Huddleston was a member appears as attorneys of record for the guardian, and Huddleston was allowed by the court and paid by such guardian the sum of $200 for his services. We quote from the brief of defendants Huddleston and Herriford relative to the facts in the case as follows: "In 1912, and while this land was in this condition, Polly Barnett and James Barnett, the father of the plaintiff in error, came to Lake Moore and wanted to borrow the money. Lake Moore then informed them that, if C. T. Huddleston would say the title to the land was all right, he would make them a reasonable loan, but at no time did he contemplate making any thing like the purchase price; and the said Lake Moore, Polly Barnett, and James Barnett came into the office of C. T. Huddleston and asked him to look over the title, and, after investigation, the said C. T. Huddleston informed them that the probate proceedings were very irregular, having been carried through by some negro lawyers at Boley, and the said Lake Moore, Polly Barnett, and James Barnett then informed the said C. T. Huddleston that Elnora Barnett would be of age shortly, but the enrollment records were not produced, and the said attor ney had no opportunity to ascertain whether she was of age or not, but said attorney advised them that, if they desired to straighten this title, the best way to do so would be for Polly Barnett to make a quitclaim deed to Lake Moore, and Elnora Barnett also make a deed to Lake Moore in order that the plaintiff in error, who was about to become of age, could not cloud the title while these proceedings were being carried through, and that, when the land was sold, all the outstanding clouds against their title would be in Lake Moore, and the announce ment would be made at the sale that whoever purchased this land before they paid any money should have a quitclaim deed from Lake Moore. "In pursuance to this agreement, deeds were executed by plaintiff in error and Polly Barnett to Lake Moore, and the land was duly and regularly sold through the county court for Okfuskee county, Okl., and sold to the highest bidder at public auction, at the front door of the courthouse, where several persons were present and where $7,000 worth of land was sold at the same time, and at the request of Lake Moore, who was absent, the said C. T. Huddleston at said time bid said land off for Lake Moore for the sum of $1,000. The announcement then and there being made to the public that any party who desired to bid on the said land, before he paid any money, would be entitled to a quitclaim deed from Lake Moore, thereby clearing up the title." Lake Moore, a witness on behalf of defendants, testified as follows: woman. * * * claim deed from Elnora Barnett and Polly Bar"Q. Mr. Moore, at the time you took a quit nett and had a bid placed here in your name, was it, or was it not, to take title to yourself, or did you intend to take it and convey to Polly all of us that I was to convey to the negro Barnett? A. It was the understanding between Q. You did not pay Elnora Barnett anything for the deed? A. No, sir; my recollection is that Jim Barnett handled all of those matters. Barnett, the quitclaim, and the agreement was I got the deed from Polly when the land sold for $1,000 she wanted the tract, and the land was to go to her, and afterwards a man raised the bid to $2,000, and Jim 000 to let it go, and somebody else bid that for Barnett agreed that if they got it raised to $2,it. Q. You say it was the purpose for taking these deeds from Polly Barnett and Elnora Barnett to convey it back to Polly Barnett? A. Yes, sir; as I remember it, it was this: Just to tell the whole thing as I understood it, it was not known whether Elnora Barnett was of age; it was in dispute, and they wanted to get the land for $1,000. She already had some kind of probate proceedings, and the idea was to put in a good bid and buy at that price for her. After the bid was raised to considerable more than that, Jim Barnett agreed that if he could get $2,000 he would let it go, and they were going to make a quitclaim deed to whoever bought it, and my recollection is Mr. Huddlesit was understood when you took these quitton bought it. Q. Do you mean, when you say claim deeds from Polly Barnett and Elnora Barnett, that you were to convey it back to them? A. Yes, sir. that was to get the title to the Elnora Barnett Q. Your purpose in doing land clear and in good shape, wasn't it? A. Yes, sir; now do not misunderstand me that I was bidding on it philanthropically. I was wanting two tracts. Jim was helping me, and The land went so high I I was helping Jim. got an opportunity to draw out." On December 20, 1912, Scottie Herriford executed her deed of conveyance reciting a consideration of $1,280, to C. H. Dixon, describing 40 acres of the land involved; on January 22, 1913, she executed a second deed for the recited consideration of $1,280 to said C. H. Dixon, describing another 40 acres of said land; and on February 1, 1913, she executed a third conveyance reciting a consideration of $1,320 to Porter Grimes describing an additional 40 acres of said land. February 8, 1913, T. M. Haynes executed a quitclaim deed to C. H. Dixon describing one of the tracts embraced in the former deed of Scottie Herriford. On It is alleged in the petition that the deed from the plaintiff to Lake Moore was fraudulently obtained and without consideration. In our opinion the evidence sustains this allegation. Defendants in error assert as the origin of their title: (1) The guardian's deed of date of September 21, 1912, to Huddleston; (2) guardian's deeds of December 2, 1911. to Polly Barnett and D. J. Turner; and (3) |tion was but a scheme to exploit the estate the deed from the plaintiff to Lake Moore. of plaintiff by denuding her of her land, to With regard to the claim of title under the the profit of others. purported guardian's deed to Huddleston, it may be said that plaintiff reached her majority on January 16, 1912; that thereafter the county court of Okfuskee county was without jurisdiction to authorize or confirm the sale of her lands in the guardianship proceedings, and therefore such proceedings and the deed to Huddleston pursuant thereto were void, and ineffectual to convey title. [1, 2] From the foregoing it is clear that defendants had notice of circumstances sufficient in themselves to excite attention, and put a reasonably prudent person upon inquiry as to the particular facts establishing the fraud with which the entire transaction, culminating in the deeds to Huddleston, was tainted. Having failed to exercise ordinary diligence in the pursuit of such inquiry, defendants are chargeable with the actual knowledge they should otherwise have received. They were not purchasers in good faith and without notice. By section 2926, Revised Laws 1910, it is provided: "Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact, and who omits to make such inquiry with reasonable diligence, is deemed to have constructive notice of the fact itself." In Cooper v. Flesner, 24 Okl. 47, 103 Pac. 1016, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1180, 20 Ann. Cas. 29, it is held: As against plaintiff, the defendants all rely upon the proceeding in the county court, of which they had notice, the records of the office of the register of deeds, and the enrollment records of the Commissioner to the Five Civilized Tribes. From these sources It was apparent upon the most casual investigation: (1) That, as shown by the record made conclusive evidence of her age by congressional enactment, plaintiff was an adult when the proceedings in the county court looking to the second sale of her allotment, and in which defendant Huddleston participated as attorney for her guardian, and also as purchaser at the guardian's sale, were begun. (2) That 120 acres of this same allotment had been sold for the sum of $3,440 in a former guardianship proceeding some months previous. (3) That Lake Moore, to whom plaintiff had executed a deed describing her entire allotment of 160 acres on May 6, 1912, and which deed appeared of recorded with ordinary diligence, would lead to acat the time of the pretended second sale of such land in the guardianship proceedings, did not regard such deed as operative to convey title to the same, inasmuch as the return of sale disclosed that said land was sold to him at the second guardian's sale upon his bid in the sum of $1,000, and that thereafter upon confirmation of the sale to Huddleston he executed a quitclaim deed to Huddleston describing said land, for the recited consideration of $1. (4) That from his purchase of the land upon an increased bid at the time of the confirmation of the sale, obvious-transaction or management might, with ordinary ly Huddleston did not regard the deed of the plaintiff to Lake Moore as a conveyance of her title. (5) That the court and no one connected with the matter considered the original guardian's sales to Polly Barnett and Turner as valid, in the light of the attempted resale in the guardianship proceedings. 1. "The words 'actual notice' do not always mean in law what in metaphysical strictness of facts and circumstances sufficiently pertinent they import. They more often mean knowledge in character to enable reasonably cautious and prudent persons to investigate and ascertain as to the ultimate facts, One who purchases land with knowledge of such facts as would put a prudent man upon inquiry, which, if prosecut tual notice of rights claimed adversely to his In Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 141, 25 L. 2. "Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the party on his guard and call for inquiry is notice of everything to which has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, such inquiry might have led. When a person he shall be deemed conversant of it.' Kennedy v. Green, 3 Myl. & K. 722. The presumption is that if the party affected by any fraudulent care and attention, have seasonably detected it, he seasonably had actual knowledge of it.'" The trial court found: "That the said plaintiff, Elnora Barnett, after she arrived at her majority, accepted and used part of the proceeds of the funds of the sale of said land, and that she had knowledge at the time that said money was used by her that it was a part of the proceeds of said sale of said land. Therefore she is estopped from setting up the invalidity of said deed." These are some of the circumstances which would irresistibly have led an ordinarily prudent person to further inquiry, which would If the facts as found could operate as an have disclosed the uncontroverted fact that estoppel (and this question it is unnecessary no consideration was ever paid by the gran- to determine), the evidence, in our opinion, tee in any deed in chain of title relied upon does not sustain the finding; such evidence by defendants, save that executed to Hud- being, in substance, that Morris Barnett, dleston by a person whose authority as who purported to act as guardian received guardian had ceased, and made pursuant to $2,000 from Huddleston as the purchase an order of a court without jurisdiction; price of the land in question, and of this that it was never contemplated that the deed amount he loaned $1,000 upon real estate executed by plaintiff should operate as a con- security to the father of the plaintiff, and veyance of her land; that the entire transac-this without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, and that the report of Morris Barnett as guardian disclosed that from September 21, 1912, until October 11, 1913, he paid out for the maintenance and education of the plaintiff a sum slightly in excess of $200, leaving a balance due him from plaintiff in the sum of $86.63. Evidence of the value of the land involved was offered, and there appears a diversity of opinion among the witnesses in this regard. The contention of defendant that $2,000 was approximately the full value of the land if material in any respect does not impress us favorably in the light of the fact that Huddleston sold the same to Haynes and Scottie Herriford three days before he obtained the guardian's deed, at a profit of $1,000, and that Scottie Herriford, in less than five months, had sold 120 acres thereof for the sum of $3,880. It is unnecessary to consider the questions of misrepresentation and fraud presented by the cross-petitions of Dixon and Grimes against the defendants Haynes and Herriford. The rights of these parties may be determined upon subsequent proceedings. It follows that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed, with directions to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff below, canceling all of the deeds mentioned in her petition and quieting in her the title to the land involved. PER CURIAM. Adopted in whole. (63 Okl. 187) ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. CO. v. CANTRELL. (No. 6335.) Record examined, and held that no prejudicial error, depriving defendant of any constitutional or statutory right, having occurred and the trial having resulted in substantial justice, the judgment is affirmed. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 4032, 4066, 4454, 4540.] Error to District Court, Sequoyah County; John H. Pitchford, Judge. Suit by C. A. Cantrell against the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed. Thomas B. Pryor, of Ft. Smith, Ark., and W. L. Curtis, of Sallisaw, for plaintiff in error. T. F. Shackelford and Roy Frye, both of Sallisaw, and Joe Bailey Allen, of Oklahoma City, for defendant in error. HARDY, J. C. A. Cantrell, as plaintiff, sued the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company as defendant, for damages alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, as will hereinafter appear. The parties will be referred to as they appeared in the trial court. [1] Plaintiff was constable of district No. 5, Campbell township, in Sequoyah county, and about the 15th of November, 1912, went to the depot of defendant in the town of Gore to meet a train, which was due at such station at 9:54 p. m., for the purpose of searching the same and apprehending two persons for whom he had a warrant of ar (Supreme Court of Oklahoma. March 20, 1917.) rest, charging them with the crime of lar Where a constable, with the express permission of the employé of a railroad company, whose duty is to assist passengers to alight from and to board its passenger train, goes upon said train for the purpose of arresting and taking therefrom persons charged with the commission of a felony, the company is bound to hold its train a reasonable length of time to permit him to make such arrest and alight therefrom, and to exercise ordinary care for his safety, and if such officer is injured by reason of the negligent failure of the railroad company to exercise ordinary care for his safety, the company will be liable in damages for any injuries resulting from such negligence. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1103, 1107, 1108, 1115, 1116.] 2. DAMAGES 187 EXPERT TESTIMONY ceny. Upon the arrival of the train, plaintiff notified the employé of defendant who was assisting the passengers to alight that he had a warrant and of his purpose to board the train and requested such employé to hold the train until he could search it, to which the employé assented. After the passengers had alighted plaintiff went aboard the train for the purpose of searching it, when it was almost immediately started up. After completing his search, in attempting to alight, plaintiff fell and was injured. The principal question presented is based upon the instructions given by the court and in refusing certain requests by defendant, defining the duty owing by defendant to plaintiff under the circumstances. Defendant objected to the introduction of any evidence under the petition, and demurred to the plaintiff's evidence at the close thereof, and requested the court to instruct a verdict in its favor, and duly excepted to instructions given, defining the measure of duty owing by it to plaintiff, and reserved exceptions to the refusal of the court to give certain requests offered. It is the contention of formed defendant's employé that he desired to go aboard the train and arrest two persons charged with the commission of a felony, and that said employé consented that he might do so, and agreed to hold the train until it could be searched and plaintiff could alight therefrom. defendant that the circumstances show that plaintiff was a trespasser or, at most, a mere licensee, and that the measure of its duty to him was to refrain from wanton and willful injury, while it is the contention of plaintiff, and the jury were so instructed by the court, that defendant owed to plaintiff the duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid In a number of cases it has been held that injury to him. In support of defendant's a police officer who, in the discharge of his contention it is argued that the warrant un- duties, enters a building in the nighttime for der which plaintiff was acting was insuffi- the purpose of inspecting the premises, and cient in law and that because the parties for who falls down an unguarded elevator well whom he was searching had not committed which is required by ordinance to be protectan offense in his presence, he was not enti- ed, is, in such cases, rightfully upon the tled to make an arrest without a warrant. premises, and that the duty imposed upon the We deem it unnecessary to discuss this ques- master to protect elevator wells, hoistways, tion, for the reason that plaintiff's presence and similar openings is intended for his benupon the train was with defendant's knowl- efit, as well as other persons rightfully enedge and permission and in accordance with tering the premises, and for a failure of the an agreement to hold the train until he could owner to properly protect such openings remake search and disembark. In the dis-sulting in injury to the officer, he is entitled charge of his duty as an officer, he was au- to recover (Parker v. Barnard et al., 135 thorized to arrest persons whom he had rea-Mass. 116, 46 Am. Rep. 450; Learoyd v. Godsonable grounds to believe had committed a frey, 138 Mass. 315; Ryan v. Thomson, 38 N. felony, and who were seeking to escape upon defendant's train, without a warrant (section 5654, Rev. Laws 1910) and in entering said train for that purpose he was not a trespasser. Y. Super. Ct. 133; Racine v. Morris et al., 201 N. Y. 240, 94 N. E. 864), and under similar conditions it has been held that a customs or revenue officer, who is required by his duties to go upon the premises of another and while there suffers injury by reason of the defec tive condition of the premises resulting from the negligence of the owner, is there by the implied invitation of the owner, and is entitled to recover for damages occasioned by the injuries resulting from such negligent condition (Anderson & Nelson Dis. Co. v. Hair, 103 Ky. 196, 44 S. W. 658; Luddington v. Miller, 36 N. Y. Super. Ct. 1.; Wilson v. Union Works Dry Dock Co., 167 Cal. 539, 140 Pac. 250, 51 L. R. A. [N. S.] 361). In Creeden v. Boston, etc., Ry. Co., 193 Mass. 280, 79 N. E. 344, 9 Ann. Cas. 1121, which is relied upon by defendant as supporting its contention, the facts were that plaintiff's intestate, who was an officer, on the night of the accident had entered a train of defendant to look for persons whom he had reason to believe were criminals and were escaping from the city; that he found one of such persons on the train, and left the train, which had stopped on a bridge across the Merrimac river, together with the person Where a quarantine guard whose duty it he had arrested; that when on the bridge and is to prevent unauthorized persons from passmaking his way towards the station, plain-ing a "quarantine line" across railroad tracks tiff's intestate hit his foot against a project- was injured by the negligence of the railroad ing plank on the bridge and fell to the street company within a few feet of the line, and and was killed. The court held that deceas- where the company knew of his presence, the ed was at most a mere licensee, and that the jury are authorized to find that he was upon company was not liable. Attention was call- the premises of the defendant by invitation ed to the fact that the petition contained no or right (Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Goulding, allegation that plaintiff's intestate entered 52 Fla. 327, 42 South. 854), and 'where emthe train for the purpose of serving a war- ployés of a city are required by their duty rant for the arrest of any person whom he to go upon the premises of another in the believed to be there, nor that he had reason-performance of certain duties imposed upon able ground to believe that a breach of the them, such employés are entitled to maintain peace or other crime was committed thereon, an action for damages resulting from injunor that there were upon said train persons ries occasioned by the negligent failure of who had committed an offense for which it the owner to keep his premises in a reasonwas lawful to make an arrest without a war-ably safe condition (Finnegan v. Fall River rant. The facts in that case are so dissimi- Gas Works Co., 159 Mass. 311, 34 N. E. 523; lar to the facts here that we do not regard it Toomey v. Sanborn, 146 Mass. 28, 14 N. E. as controlling. Here plaintiff had a warrant 921); and, in a case where a street car comfor the arrest of certain persons charged |pany, by arrangement with the post office dewith the commission of a crime; and, while partment, collected mail in boxes attached to the warrant is conceded not to be legally suf- its cars to be taken therefrom at its barn by ficient, that is a question of which the de-a postal carrier, it was held that such street fendant cannot take advantage; but if this be car company was bound to provide safe acnot true, the evidence shows that plaintiff in- cess to such cars, and that a postal carrier upon the premises for the purpose of taking therefrom mail which had been collected by the street car company, and who was injured by reason of the negligent failure of the street car company to discharge its duty in this respect, was entitled to recover for his injuries. Young v. People's Gas & Elec. Co., 128 Iowa, 290, 103 N. W. 788. A rule which is applied to a state of facts more nearly analogous to those presented than any which we have cited is that, where a person goes upon a train in conformity with a practice adopted or acquiesced in by a carrier, for the purpose of rendering assistance to a passenger; and in such cases this court has held that the carrier, in permitting such persons to enter with knowledge of his purpose, is presumed to agree that he may execute it and is bound to hold the train a reasonable time therefor, and that if such person is injured by reason of a sudden starting of the train or the omission to give the customary signals, the carrier will be liable. St. L. & S. F. R. Co. v. Lee, 37 Okl. 545, 132 Pac. 1072, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 357; C., R. I. & P. R. Co. v. McAlester, 39 Okl. 153, 134 Pac. 661; St. L. & S. F. R. Co. v. Isenberg, 150 Pac. 123. The employé from who plaintiff obtained permission to enter the train was the flagman to whom was intrusted the duty of seeing that all passengers had safely alighted and those intending to depart had entered the cars; and it appears from the evidence of the conductor that he always permitted officers, when known to be such, to enter and search his train for persons charged with crime, who were supposed to be thereon. The flagman was requested by plaintiff to permit him to enter the train for the purpose of searching it, and he gave his consent thereto. After all the passengers had alighted plaintiff boarded the train, and within about a minute thereafter the flagman gave the signal to the conductor to start. We believe the facts of this case bring it within the rule applied in the cases where a person goes aboard with the consent of the carrier for the purpose of assisting a passenger, and that under the circumstances, irrespective of plaintiff's right as an officer to make the search, where defendant agreed that he might board the train and search same, it was its duty to hold the train a reasonable time therefor, and to permit plaintiff to alight, and that if plaintiff was injured by reason of the sudden starting of the train or of the omission of the defendant to give the customary signals that the train was about to start, defendant would be liable. The question of contributory negligence was a question of fact for the jury, and was properly submitted to them by instructions which were not excepted to; and, having been so submitted and determined against plaintiff, we will not disturb the verdict. injured by receiving a great gash in his head over the right ear, that his right arm, side, and leg were bruised and injured and partially paralyzed, and that his hearing had been greatly damaged, and that he had been rendered almost totally deaf. The evidence upon the part of the plaintiff reasonably tended to prove these allegations. Exceptions were taken to the instructions defining the measure of damages upon the ground that there was no evidence authorizing the submission to the jury of certain items of recovery therein enumerated. The proof was that plaintiff was a farmer 49 years of age, and that previous to the accident he was in good physical condition, and was an able-bodied man. It showed, however, that he had been suffering somewhat from impaired hearing for which he had been treated by a physician at Muskogee. At the time of the trial his right arm, side, and leg were paralyzed to such an extent that they were almost entirely useless, and the sense cf hearing in his right ear was almost totally destroyed. The verdict of the jury was for $600. Since the appeal has been filed in this court, plaintiff has died, but whether as a result of the injuries received does not appear. It having been shown that plaintiff's arm, side, and leg had been rendered useless by the accident, and the sense of hearing in his right ear greatly impaired, it was proper to instruct the jury to take into consideration, in estimating plaintiff's damages, his future inability to attend to his usual business or to perform the kind of labor to which he was fitted. Fisher et al. v. Jansen, 128 Ill. 549, 21 N. E. 598. The character and extent of his injuries were described by him and by a physician, and the effect thereof in disabling him from manual labor was also stated by him to the jury, and they were of such a character that the jury could judge whether and to what extent he would be permanently disabled, and while Dr. Eichling expressed his opinion that the injuries were total and permanent, the testimony of physicians as to the permanent impairment of a person's ability to labor in a case of this character is not, of necessity, required to enable such person to recover for permanent disability. M. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Fowler, 61 Kan. 320, 59 Pac. 648; 1 Joyce on Damages, § 248; 13 Cyc. 217. [3] There are various other assignments of error urged, some of which involve the ruling of the court upon a motion to make the petition more definite and certain, and others upon the admission of evidence. The ruling upon the motion to make more definite and certain according to the view we take of this case is immaterial. The assignments based upon the action of the court in the admission of evidence do not set out the evidence with the specific objection thereto, as required by rule 25 (137 Pac. xi), and |