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the need of construction when it says the Company, which sold and transferred it to transcript must be filed within 30 days after Acme Mills Company, Incorporated, some the perfection of the appeal, “and thereafter time in the year 1910; that thereafter in the appellate court shall have jurisdiction of 1911, the latter sold the same to plaintiff ; the cause, but not otherwise."

and that he contends that it is the property The circuit court was utterly without ju- of the Acme Mills Company and the Acme risdiction to hear the cause on appeal. Its Mills Company, Incorporated. Then follow judgment is therefore void, and must be allegations of irreparable injury and of abset aside and held for naught. The cause is solute ownership and possession in plaintiff remanded, with directions to the circuit court for more than three years, and a prayer for to dismiss the appeal from the decree of the a perpetual injunction. After some admiscounty court.

sions and denials, the defendants set up an

affirmative answer, wherein they pleaded the (84 Or. 651)

judgment of the defendant Connell against GOLDEN ROD MILLING CO. v. CONNELL. the Acme Mills Company and the Acme Mills et al.

Company, Incorporated, the issuance of the (Supreme Court of Oregon. April 24, 1917.) execution; and that the sheriff levied upon 1. PLEADING C261 CHANGE OF CASE

the property described in the complaint by AMENDMENT.

taking it into his possession. It is then alWhere original answer set up defense of leged that the sale of the property levied up violation of Bulk Sales Law (L. 0. L. 88 6069– 6072), the court had no power, under L. 0. L.

on was made in violation of the Bulk Sales § 102, to allow defendant to 'file an amended Law, by reason of the fact that it was efanswer after trial, alleging actual fraud in the fected without notice to the defendant Contransfer: that being a material alteration not nell, who was at the time a creditor of the allowable at such time. [Ed. Note.-For other cases,

Acme Mills Company to the extent of the

see Pleading, Cent. Dig. $$ 794-800.)

judgment afterward obtained. On December 2. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES

18, 1914, the cause was tried, and on Feb

43(1) SALES IN BULK-LIABILITY OF BUYER-Fix- ruary 25, 1915, the court made and filed TURES-STATUTE.

findings of fact and conclusions of law, and Tools and machinery in mill purchased by on the same day defendants filed an amend. plaintiî in 1911. are not subject to execution ed answer, containing a second further and to satisfy a subsequent judgment secured by creditor against seller, although no notice was separate answer, which alleged actual fraud given of the transfer; the Bulk Sales Law (L. in the transfer of the property from the O. L. & 6009 et seq.) before amendment in 1913 Acme Mills Company, Incorporated, to the (Lawso1913, p. 537) not applying to that class plaintiff. On March 25, 1915, a decree was of property.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Fraudulent entered in favor of defendants, from which Conveyances, Cent. Dig. S8 95, 99, 100.]

plaintiff appeals. Department 1. Appeal from Circuit Court, Thos. G. Greene, of Portland (Bauer & Multnomah County; Wm. Galloway, Judge. Greene and A. H. McCurtain, of Portland, on

Suit by the Golden Rod Milling Company, the brief), for appellant. Chester A. Shepa corporation, against Joseph Connell and pard, of Portland (Sheppard & Brock, of Tom M. Word, Sheriff. Judgment for de- Portland, on the brief), for respondents. fendants, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and judgment entered for plaintiff.

BENSON, J. (after stating the facts as This is a suit to restrain proceedings under above). [1] The sole issue upon which the a writ of execution. The substance of the trial of the cause was based was the quescomplaint is that on February 20, 1914, de- tion as to whether or not the sale of the fendant Joseph Connell obtained a judgment property in question had been made in vioagainst Acme Mills Company, Incorporated, lation of the statute known as the “Bulk a corporation, for a total of about $5,800, Sales Law.” After trial the defendants and on April 15, 1914, the defendant sheriff sought to set up the additional defense of attempted to levy upon certain tools and actual fraud in the transfer. This they inachinery in plaintiff's mill and then used were not entitled to do, and the trial court by it in the manufacture of cereal break-had no power to permit such amendment. fast foods; that the sheriff placed a care-Section 102, L. O. L.; Foste v. Standard Ins, taker over such property and left the same Co., 26 Or. 419, 38 Pac. 617; Carnahan Mfg. in place as installed and operated in plain-Co. v. Beebe-Bowles Co., 80 Or. 124, 156 tiff's mill, but that defendants now threaten Pac. 584. to tear out such machinery and appliances [2] We come then to a consideration of and remove the same for sale under said the defendants' right to prevail under the execution. It is then alleged that the claim provisions of the Bulk Sales Law. . It will of defendant Connell is substantially to the be remembered that the sale involved in this effect that the property attempted to be lev- controversy occurred in 1911, before the ied upon was formerly a part of the plant amendment of that statute. The original and property operated by the Acme Mills / law (section 6069 et seq., L. O, L.) was

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

amended in 1913 (Laws 1913, p. 537), and it [ 9. DEDICATION Om 48 PERSONS BOUND BY.. has since been held by this court that prop-. A completed street dedication binds the erty of the character described in the com

| dedicator's successors in interest.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Dedication, plaint was not affected by the act prior to

Cent. Dig. $ 114.) such amendment. Rice v. West, 80 Or. 640, 157 Pac. 1105. Consequently, under the is

10. ADVERSE POSSESSION Om 60(5)—STREETS

HOSTILE HOLDING. sues upon which the cause was tried, the The inclosure of a part of a street for some plaintiff was entitled to the relief sought. 17 years does not establish title by adverse posThe decree will therefore be reversed, and session under the 10-year statute, where the

holding was permissive except for the last 6 one entered here in accordance with the

years. prayer of the complaint.

[Ed, Note.-For other cases, see Adverse Pos

session, Cent, Dig. 88 303-305.) MCBRIDE, C. J., and BURNETT and HARRIS, JJ., concur.

Department 1. Appeal from Circuit Court, Marion County; Wm. Galloway, Judge.

Injunction suit by Alice McCoy against

E. A. Thompson. Decree for defendant and (84 Or. 141)

plaintiff appeals. Reversed. MCCOY V. THOMPSON.

Alice McCoy is prosecuting this suit in an (Supreme Court of Oregon. May 1, 1917.)

attempt to enjoin E. A. Thompson from 1. DEDICATION 1-Common Law.

inclosing and occupying a strip of land 40 Common-law dedications may be either ex-feet in width, which the latter claims to press or implied.

own and the former asserts is a street. The [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Dedication,

controversy arises out of the platting of an Cent. Dig. $$ 8, 10–12.)

addition to the unincorporated town of Mill 2. DEDICATION Om54STATUTORY. A statutory dedication generally operates as

City. H. J. Hadley owned a considerable a grant.

tract of land, which was bounded on the [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Dedication, south by the Santiam river. Hadley platted Cent. Dig. $8 96, 97.)

the south end of the tract and left the re3. DEDICATION C28WHAT CONSTITUTES. mainder unplatted. The plat delineates 12 lots An unsuccessful attempt at statutory dedi.

arranged in a single row extending east and cation of a street, if followed by sales according to the plat, may result in a completed com

west with lot 1 as the east end of the row. mon-law dedication.

All the lots except lot No. 4 are 100 feet [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Dedication, deep, and, with the exception of lot No. 4, Cent. Dig, $ 61.)

all have a frontage of 50 feet on Front street. 4. DEDICATION Cm15—INTENT.

The Santiam river pursues a westerly course, The dedicator's intent is the basis of all dedi

and the entire space between the north bank cations and in statutory dedications is generally

of the Santiam river and the frontage of the shown by the plat and writing. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Dedication,

12 lots is labeled Front street. In brief, the Cent. Dig. $ 13.]

plat portrays a row of 12 lots facing Front 5. DEDICATION O15COMMON LAW-INTENT.

street which runs east and west, and is In common-law dedications, the dedicator's parallel with and next to the Santiam river. intent is gathered from his acts and conduct While the plat does not expressly state that and what he said in making the dedication.

it is drawn to a scale, it nevertheless ap[Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Dedication,

pears to have been so drawn. Cent. Dig. § 13.)

The land in controversy adjoins lot No. 1 6. DEDICATION C51 - WHAT CONSTITUTES I on the east. It will be recalled that lot No. 1 -PLAT-"STREET." The intent to dedicate a "street" 40 feet

is the east end of the row of lots. A single wide is clearly indicated where the plat con line is drawn on the plat to the east of, tains the words "street forty ft. wide."

parallel with, and approximately the same (Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Dedication, length as the east side line of, lot No. 1. Cent. Dig. $ 95.)

The open space between this single line For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Street.)

and the east side of lot No. 1 is labeled thus:

"Street 40 feet wide bears north." The 7. DEDICATION 31–NECESSITY OF ACCEPT

plat contains the caption: "Hadley's AddiANCE. Neither a formal acceptance by the county

tion to Mill City.” The plat, together with nor the immediate opening and improvement of a writing signed by Hadley and a jurat a street is essential to an irrevocable dedication. signed by a notary public, was recorded on [Ed. Note.---For other cases, see Dedication,

February 14, 1889, by the county recorder. Cent. Dig. $$ 64, 65.)

The writing signed by Hadley is here set out: 8. DEDICATION 19(5)—WHAT CONSTITUTES "Hadley's Addition to Mill City. Laid out on --SALE OF LOTS.

my land Feb. 1. A. D. 1889. The southeast corA landowner's action in filing a plat contain

ner of lot No. 1 is on the north side of the Saning the words, "street forty ft. wide," and sell- tiam river 47 links north and three chains and ing lots according to such plat, constitutes a

ten links west of the N. W. corner of the Mill lot, completed dedication.

of the Santiam Lumbering Company, which N. [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Dedication, W. corner aforesaid is on the W. side of secCent. Dig. $$ 35, 46.)

I tion 30 T. 9 S. R. 3 E. Wil. Mer. The lots

Om For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

are 30 by 100 feet and the first three are to the, closed it by constructing a fence along the cardinal points, No. 4 is fractional 64 feet next north line of Front street. After Thompson to the river and 3442 feet, back end. The south ‘ends of lots 4 to 12 have a bearing N. 73° 2' acquired his deed in 1915, he claimed that he W. and their sides are at right angles thereto was the owner of the 40-foot strip, and or N. 16° 58' E. 100 feet. Front street oc- denied that the plaintiff or the public had cupies all the land between the lots and the river not more than 50 feet, situated in Marion any right to enter upon the disputed premiscounty, state of Oregon. I herewith submit es. The alleged street is of no direct benefit this plot and description for record."

to any persons except the plaintiff, J. W. The jurat bears date February 4, 1889, and Jackson, who owns land immediately to the reads thus:

east, and possibly one other person. Some "Personally came before me a notary public of the witnesses averred and others denied in and for the aforesaid county and state, the that the strip had been regarded by the public above named H. J. Hadley, to me personally as a street. Two witnesses in addition to known to be the identical person who signed this instrument and who acknowledged to me that he the plaintiff and her husband testified that executed the same freely and for the uses and they had used the premises as a street withpurposes therein mentioned."

out asking permission from any one; but The plaintiff owns lot No. 1, and she traces Wadsworth insisted that the witnesses first her title through mesne conveyances to a obtained permission from him. No part of deed made by Hadley. Under date of April the disputed strip has ever been improved 18, 1889, Hadley conveyed by warranty deed as a road or street and no public officer has to Angus Scott Shaw “Lot No. 1 one in block ever asserted or exercised control over it. No. 1 one in Hadley's addition to Mill City The complaint avers that Hadley dedicated in the county of Marion and state of Oregon the land as a street. The answer denies the as it appears on the recorded plat of said alleged dedication, and avers that the defendHadley's addition to Mill City in the record- ant and his prédecessors have had adverse er's office at Salem in said Marion county." possession for the requisite period of time, Shaw and his wife moved on lot No. 1 in The trial court found that the land had 1889 and lived there until 1899, when they never been laid off or platted as a street, and sold the property and moved away.

that the defendant owned the premises in The defendant claims title to the disputed fee simple. The decree followed the finding, land by virtue of a deed from James M. and the plaintiff appealed. Wadsworth, who had previously purchased

W. H. Trindle, of Salem (C. Z. Randall, from Hadley. On April 29, 1904, Wadsworth of Salem, on the brief), for appellant. John received from Hadley a deed describing 106 H. McNary, of Salem (L. M. Curl, of Albany, acres and also lands described thus:

and McNary & McNary, of Salem, on the “The north half (22) of the southeast quarter brief), for respondent. of section thirty (30) in township nine (9) south of range three (3) east, except Hadley's addition to Mill City."

HARRIS, J. (after stating the facts as Subsequently, on March 27, 1915, Wads- above). Although the plaintiff contends that worth executed and delivered to the defend- a street extends from Front street for a disant a warranty deed for lands described by tance of 160 feet, or 60 feet beyond the rear metes and bounds including the disputed or north end of lot No. 1, yet, since there is tract as well as other land.

no evidence to sustain a finding that a street At some time after he purchased lot No. extends farther than 100 feet or the length 1, probably about 1893, Shaw went to Hadley of lot 1, we shall confine our attention to the and, according to the testimony of the latter: question of whether a street 40 feet wide ex

"He asked me, if I remember aright, if I tends from Front street along the east side thought there would be any objection, or if I objected to him putting a garden in there, and of lot No. 1. If Hadley did not, by his acts as near as I can remember the answer I gave and conduct, dedicate the disputed strip as hin that I had no objections if nobody else had." a street, then plaintiff cannot prevail, and

Shaw constructed a fence across the south therefore the first inquiry is whether there end of the 40-foot strip on the north line was a dedication. of Front street, but he also provided a gate The inquiry will not be influenced by the so that a team and wagon could be driven parol testimony given by Hadley to the effect in or out of the inclosure. This fence and that he intended to dedicate the land as a gate were maintained continuously until street. We do not undertake to determine about 1910, when both the fence and gate whether that testimony was competent, since were torn down and removed. During the en- it is in no wise necessary to a decision of tire period beginning with about 1893 and end- this suit; and, while there is a contrariety of ing with about 1910, Shaw and his successors judicial opinion concerning that character of used part of the 40-foot strip for garden evidence, we content ourselves by merely purposes. The disputed strip remained open noting some of the relevant authorities and and uninclosed, or as one witness said, “It assuming that the evidence is incompetent. lay as waste land” from 1910 until July, Hobson v. Monteith, 15 Or. 251, 256, 14 Pac. 1914, when the defendant rented the dis- 740; Spencer v. Peterson, 41 Or. 257, 260, 68 puted land from Wadsworth, erected on it Pac. 519, 1108; 1 Elliott on Roads and a tent, in which he has since lived, and in- | Streets (3d Ed.) § 173; Los Angeles v. Me

are

Collum, 156 Cal. 148, 103 Pac. 914, 23 L. R. A. Kuck v. Wakefield, 58 Or. 549, 555, 115 Pac. W. S.) 378.

428; Jones v. Teller, 65 Or. 328, 332, 133 Pac. [1, 2] Dedications of two general | 354; Parrott v. Stewart, 65 Or. 254, 259, kiuds; statutory and common law. Nodine 132 Pac. 523; Eugene v. Lowell, 72 Or. 237, v. Union, 42 Or. 613, 616, 72 Pac. 582. Com- 143 Pac. 903; Harris v. St. Helens, 72 Or. mon-law dedications may either be express or 377, 143 Pac. 941, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 1073; implied. 1 Elliott on Roads and Streets (30 8 R. C. L. pp. 890, 896; 4 Ency. of Ev. 110; Ed.) § 133. Generally by reason of the terms 13 Cyc. 452; 1 Elliott on Roads and Streets of the statute, a statutory dedication op- (3d Ed.) 8 130. erates as a grant. 8 R. C. L. p. 897. Some [6] We now turn to the plat and the writauthorities declare that common-law dedica- ing accompanying it for the purpose of distions always operate upon the principle of an covering whether Hadley intended to dediestoppel, while others go no further than to cate the 40-foot strip next to lot No. 1 as a say that such a dedication is of itself a dis- street. At the time of filing the plat Hadley tinctive common-law doctrine based upon owned all the land including the disputed principles analogous to those underlying es- premises. No street existed on any part of toppels. The theory usually accepted is: the Hadley land until the plat was filed. That to reclaim land would be a violation of There is no evidence to indicate that the 40good faith to the public and to those who foot strip had ever been used as a right of have acquired private property with the ex- way, or a road, or as a street at any time pectation of enjoying the use contemplated by prior to 1889, and therefore the words "street the dedication; and in case of the sale of a 40 ft. wide” did not describe a street previlot with reference to a plat there is the add-ously existing, but, on the contrary, they reed feature that an easement indicated by the fer to a street which in no way existed until plat constitutes a part of the consideration delineated on the plat. The space made by passing to the purchaser. 8 R. C. L. p. 906; the line drawn to the east of and parallel 13 Cyc. 437; 1 Elliott on Roads and Streets with the east line of lot No. 1, and the words (3d Ed.) § 125.

"street 40 ft. wide" express in plain and un[3] Upon examination of the writing ac- mistakable terms an intent to make a street companying the plat it will be observed that of the 40-foot strip. The word "street" has there are no words of grant, and although a definite meaning. When the owner of land Front street is mentioned, no direct reference makes a plat and refers to a "street," he does is made to any other street. Obviously it not mean a private way; but the word signiwas the purpose of Hadley to comply with fies a public way in all that the term implies. the requirements at that time exacted by the 1 Elliott on Roads and Streets (3d Ed.) 8 21; statute. The writing is not in the form City of Denver v. Clements, 3 Colo. 472; usually adopted, and it may well be the sub- Smith v. City of Goldsboro, 121 N. C. 350, ject of debate as to whether it constitutes a 28 S. E. 479. The plat and writing clearly perfect statutory dedication. We do not at- manifest an intention on the part of Hadley tempt to decide, however, whether the platto dedicate the disputed land as a street; and writing as recorded produced a statutory and, indeed, the 40-foot strip appears upon dedication; but, for the purposes of this dis- the plat in such a manner as to be entirely cussion we shall assume, without deciding, inconsistent with any other theory. Oregon that a statutory 'dedication was not effected. City v. Ore. & Cal. R. Co., 44 Or. 165, 74 Pac. An unsuccessful attempt to dedicate land 924. under a statute if followed by sales with [7] It is true that the disputed premises reference to the plat may result in a com were never improved as a street nor formally pleted common-law dedication. 8 R. C. L. accepted by the county; but the well-recog893, 897; 13 Cyc. 441; 1 Elliott on Roads nized rule is that neither a formal acceptand Streets (3d Ed.) 8 124.

ance by the county nor the immediate open[4, 5] The intent of the dedicator is the ing and improvement of a street are essential foundation and life of all dedications, and to complete an irrevocable dedication. Carthe intent must be clearly manifested. ter v. Portland, 4 Or, 340, 347, 348; Meier Where the dedication is statutory in char- v. Portland Cable Ry. Co., 16 Or. 500, 19 Pac. acter, the plat and writing generally furnish 610, 1 L. R. A. 856; Hogue v. Albina, 20 Or. the means by which to ascertain the intent, 182, 186, 25 Pac. 386, 10 L. R. A. 673; Spenand these, like all other writings, must be cer v. Peterson, 41 Or. 257, 260, 68 Pac. 519, construed by the terms contained in them. 1108; Oregon City v. Ore. & Cal. R. Co., 44 In the case of a common-law dedication, the Or. 165, 178, 74 Pac. 924; Christian v. Euintent is to be determined from what the gene, 49 Or, 170, 173, 89 Pac. 419; Oliver v. dedicator said in making the dedication and Synhorst, 58 Or. 582, 585, 109 Pac. 762, 115 by his acts and conduct; and the rule of Pac. 594; Moore v. Fowler, 58 Or. 292, 297, construction is to give effect to the intent 114 Pac. 472; Silverton v. Brown, 63 Or. 418, manifested. Christie v. Bandon, 162 Pac. 424, 128 Pac. 45; Harris v. St. Helens, 72 218; Carter v. Portland, 4 Or. 340, 343; | Or. 377, 387, 143 Pac. 941, Ann. Cas. 1916D, Lewis v. Portland, 25 Or. 133, 134, 35 Pac. 1073; Barton v. Portland, 74 Or. 75, 79, 144 256, 22 L. R. A. 736, 12 Am. St. Rep. 772; | Pac, 1146; Nicholas v. Title & Trust Co., 79

Or. 226, 244, 154 Pac. 391, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 1 worth on April 29, 1904, expressly excepts 1149; Elliott on Roads and Streets (3d Ed.) “Hadley's addition to Mill City," and there $$ 124, 129.

fore Wadsworth acquired no greater rights [8] The offer made by Hadley to dedicate than Hadley owned; and Thompson, who the street became a completed and irrevoca- purchased from Wadsworth, does not own ble dedication when he delivered the deed to more than his immediate grantor. The dediShaw. The conveyance was made with ex- cation, which was effected by the sale of lot press reference to the recorded plat, for lot No. 1 to Shaw on April 18, 1889, not only No. 1 is described as being lot No. 1 "as ap- bound Hadley, but it also bound his succes. pears on the recorded plat of said Hadley's sors in interest, Wadsworth and Thompson. addition to Mill City in the recorder's office Parrish v. Stephens, 1 Or. 75, 76; Portland at Salem in said Marion county." Portland v. Whittle, 3 Or. 126, 129. v. Whittle, 3 Or. 126, 129; Carter v. Port (10) The defense of adverse possession re land, 4 Or. 340, 346; Meier v. Portland Cable lied upon by the defendant must fail. It is Ry. Co., 16 Or. 500, 19 Pac. 610, 1 L. R. A. true that Shaw inclosed the premises and 850; Steel v. Portland, 23 Or. 176, 184, 31 used the land for a garden, and this use was Pac. 479; Mutual Irr. Co. v. Baker City, 58 continued by his successors until about 1910. Or. 306, 321, 110 Pac. 392, 113 Pac. 9; Moore Hadley did not sell to Wadsworth until 1901. v. Fowler, 58 Or. 292, 297, 114 Pac. 472; The testimony of Hadley demonstrates that Kuck v. Wakefield, 58 Or. 549, 552, 115 Pac. the use made of the land by Shaw did not 428; Jones v. Teller, 65 Or. 328, 332, 133 constitute adverse possession. If any perPac. 354; Spencer v. Peterson, 41 Or. 257, son claimed the land adversely, it was only 260, 68 Pac. 519, 1108; Oregon City v. Ore. after Wadsworth purchased in 1904. The un& Cal. R. Co., 44 Or. 165, 176, 74 Pac. 924; contradicted evidence is that the fence was Christian v. Eugene, 49 Or. 170, 172, 89 Pac. torn down and removed in 1910, and after 419; Hogue v. Albina, 20 Or. 182, 186, 25 that time the premises "lay as waste land" Pac. 386; Nicholas v. Title & Trust Co., 79 until July, 1914. The evidence fails to show Or. 226, 244, 154 Pac. 391, Ann. Cas. 1917A, adverse possession for 10 years. 1149; 8 R. C. L. 890.

There is, however, an additional circumUsually the dedicator employs language to stance affecting the claim of adverse posses the effect that he dedicates all his interests sion. In 1895 the Legislature declared that in the streets shown by the plat, and an ex- all streets in unincorporated towns were pubamination of the Hadley plat and writing lic highways, and jurisdiction over them was will disclose that neither this nor equivalent conferred upon the county courts of the vari. language is used; but, as said in Oliver v. ous counties. Laws 1895, p. 57. At the same Newberg, 50 Or. 92, 96, 91 Pac. 470, 472: session of the Legislative Assembly an act

“Even where such words of dedication are was passed preventing the extinguishment omitted, and the street is shown by the plat, of highways by adverse possession (Laws the sale of lots by the proprietor with reference to such plat is suflicient to complete such dedi- 1895, p. 57); the statute was re-enacted in cation."

1903 (Laws 1903, p. 279), and is now codified Ordinarily the sale of a single lot com

as sections 6371 and 6372, L. 0. L. pletes the dedication, and more especially

Hadley dedicated a strip 100 feet long and does the sale of a single lot effect a dedica- | 40 feet wide as a street as shown on the plat, tion of a street upon which the lot abuts; and the dedication became irrevocable when and consequently the sale of lot No. 1 to the abutting lot was sold to Shaw; and, Shaw operated as an acceptance of the offer since the completed dedication was not subof Hadley to dedicate the adjacent land as a sequently defeated, the plaintiff as the owner street, and rendered the dedication irrevoca- of lot No. 1 is entitled to use the disputed ble. Roberts v. Mathews, 137 Ala. 523, 34 strip as a street. The decree is reversed. So. 624, 97 Am. St. Rep. 56; 1 Elliott on Roads and Streets (3d Ed.) & 128.

MCBRIDE, C. J., and BURNETT and Me [9] The deed delivered by Hadley to Wads- | CAMANT, JJ., concur.

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