ÆäÀÌÁö À̹ÌÁö
PDF
ePub

the need of construction when it says the transcript must be filed within 30 days after the perfection of the appeal, "and thereafter the appellate court shall have jurisdiction of the cause, but not otherwise."

The circuit court was utterly without jurisdiction to hear the cause on appeal. Its judgment is therefore void, and must be set aside and held for naught. The cause is remanded, with directions to the circuit court to dismiss the appeal from the decree of the county court.

(84 Or. 551)

Company, which soid and transferred it to Acme Mills Company, Incorporated, some time in the year 1910; that thereafter in 1911, the latter sold the same to plaintiff; and that he contends that it is the property of the Acme Mills Company and the Acme Mills Company, Incorporated. Then follow allegations of irreparable injury and of absolute ownership and possession in plaintiff for more than three years, and a prayer for a perpetual injunction. After some admissions and denials, the defendants set up an affirmative answer, wherein they pleaded the judgment of the defendant Connell against

GOLDEN ROD MILLING CO. v. CONNELL. the Acme Mills Company and the Acme Mills

et al.

(Supreme Court of Oregon.

1. PLEADING AMENDMENT.

April 24, 1917.) 261 CHANGE OF CASE

-

Company, Incorporated, the issuance of the execution; and that the sheriff levied upon the property described in the complaint by taking it into his possession. It is then alWhere original answer set up defense of leged that the sale of the property levied upviolation of Bulk Sales Law (L. O. L. §§ 6069-on was made in violation of the Bulk Sales 6072), the court had no power, under L. O. L. $ 102, to allow defendant to file an amended answer after trial, alleging actual fraud in the transfer that being a material alteration not allowable at such time.

Law, by reason of the fact that it was effected without notice to the defendant Connell, who was at the time a creditor of the Acme Mills Company to the extent of the judgment afterward obtained. On December 18, 1914, the cause was tried, and on Feb2. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES SALES IN BULK-LIABILITY OF BUYER-FIx-ruary 25, 1915, the court made and filed TURES STATUTE.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. §§ 794-800.]

43(1)

Tools and machinery in mill purchased by plaintiff in 1911. are not subject to execution to satisfy a subsequent judgment secured by creditor against seller, although no notice was given of the transfer; the Bulk Sales Law (L. O. L. § 6069 et seq.) before amendment in 1913 (Laws 1913, p. 537) not applying to that class

of property.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. §§ 95, 99, 100.]

Department 1. Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County; Wm. Galloway, Judge. Suit by the Golden Rod Milling Company, a corporation, against Joseph Connell and Tom M. Word, Sheriff. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and judgment entered for plaintiff.

findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the same day defendants filed an amended answer, containing a second further and separate answer, which alleged actual fraud in the transfer of the property from the Acme Mills Company, Incorporated, to the plaintiff. On March 25, 1915, a decree was entered in favor of defendants, from which plaintiff appeals.

Thos. G. Greene, of Portland (Bauer & Greene and A. H. McCurtain, of Portland, on the brief), for appellant. Chester A. Sheppard, of Portland (Sheppard & Brock, of Portland, on the brief), for respondents.

BENSON, J. (after stating the facts as above). [1] The sole issue upon which the trial of the cause was based was the question as to whether or not the sale of the property in question had been made in violation of the statute known as the "Bulk Sales Law." After trial the defendants sought to set up the additional defense of actual fraud in the transfer. This they were not entitled to do, and the trial court had no power to permit such amendment. Section 102, L. O. L.; Foste v. Standard Ins. Co., 26 Or. 449, 38 Pac. 617; Carnahan Mfg. Co. v. Beebe-Bowles Co., 80 Or. 124, 156 Pac. 584.

This is a suit to restrain proceedings under a writ of execution. The substance of the complaint is that on February 20, 1914, defendant Joseph Connell obtained a judgment against Acme Mills Company, Incorporated, a corporation, for a total of about $5,800, and on April 15, 1914, the defendant sheriff attempted to levy upon certain tools and machinery in plaintiff's mill and then used by it in the manufacture of cereal breakfast foods; that the sheriff placed a caretaker over such property and left the same in place as installed and operated in plaintiff's mill, but that defendants now threaten to tear out such machinery and appliances [2] We come then to a consideration of and remove the same for sale under said the defendants' right to prevail under the execution. It is then alleged that the claim provisions of the Bulk Sales Law. It will of defendant Connell is substantially to the be remembered that the sale involved in this effect that the property attempted to be lev- controversy occurred in 1911, before the ied upon was formerly a part of the plant aniendment of that statute. The original and property operated by the Acme Mills law (section 6069 et seq., L. O. L.) was

dedicator's successors in interest.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Dedication, Cent. Dig. § 114.]

10. ADVERSE POSSESSION

60(5)—STREETS-

amended in 1913 (Laws 1913, p. 537), and it [9. DEDICATION 48-PERSONS BOUND BY. has since been held by this court that prop- A completed street dedication binds the erty of the character described in the complaint was not affected by the act prior to such amendment. Rice v. West, 80 Or. 640, 157 Pac. 1105. Consequently, under the issues upon which the cause was tried, the plaintiff was entitled to the relief sought. The decree will therefore be reversed, and one entered here in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.

MCBRIDE, C. J., and BURNETT and HARRIS, JJ., concur.

(84 Or. 141)

McCOY v. THOMPSON. (Supreme Court of Oregon. May 1, 1917.) 1. DEDICATION 1-COMMON LAW.

Common-law dedications may be either express or implied.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Dedication, Cent. Dig. §§ 8, 10-12.]

2. DEDICATION 54-STATUTORY.

A statutory dedication generally operates as

a grant.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Dedication, Cent. Dig. $$ 96, 97.] 3. DEDICATION

28-WHAT CONSTITUTES.

An unsuccessful attempt at statutory dedication of a street, if followed by sales according to the plat, may result in a completed common-law dedication.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Dedication, Cent. Dig. § 61.]

4. DEDICATION 15-INTENT.

The dedicator's intent is the basis of all dedications and in statutory dedications is generally shown by the plat and writing.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Dedication, Cent. Dig. § 13.]

5. DEDICATION 15-COMMON LAW-INTENT. In common-law dedications, the dedicator's intent is gathered from his acts and conduct and what he said in making the dedication.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Dedication, Cent. Dig. § 13.]

6. DEDICATION 51 WHAT CONSTITUTES -PLAT-"STREET."

The intent to dedicate a "street" 40 feet wide is clearly indicated where the plat contains the words "street forty ft. wide.'

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Dedication, Cent. Dig. § 95.]

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Street.] 7. DEDICATION

ANCE.

31-NECESSITY OF ACCEPTNeither a formal acceptance by the county nor the immediate opening and improvement of a street is essential to an irrevocable dedication. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Dedication, Cent. Dig. §§ 64, 65.]

8. DEDICATION 19(5)-WHAT CONSTITUTES -SALE OF LOTS.

A landowner's action in filing a plat containing the words, "street forty ft. wide," and selling lots according to such plat, constitutes a completed dedication.

HOSTILE HOLDING.

The inclosure of a part of a street for some 17 years does not establish title by adverse possession under the 10-year statute, where the holding was permissive except for the last 6

years.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Adverse Possession, Cent. Dig. §§ 303-305.]

Department 1. Appeal from Circuit Court, Marion County; Wm. Galloway, Judge. Injunction suit by Alice McCoy against E. A. Thompson. Decree for defendant and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Alice McCoy is prosecuting this suit in an attempt to enjoin E. A. Thompson from inclosing and occupying a strip of land 40 feet in width, which the latter claims to own and the former asserts is a street. The

controversy arises out of the platting of an addition to the unincorporated town of Mill City. H. J. Hadley owned a considerable tract of land, which was bounded on the south by the Santiam river. Hadley platted the south end of the tract and left the remainder unplatted. The plat delineates 12 lots arranged in a single row extending east and west with lot 1 as the east end of the row. All the lots except lot No. 4 are 100 feet deep, and, with the exception of lot No. 4, all have a frontage of 50 feet on Front street. The Santiam river pursues a westerly course, and the entire space between the north bank of the Santiam river and the frontage of the 12 lots is labeled Front street. In brief, the plat portrays a row of 12 lots facing Front street which runs east and west, and is parallel with and next to the Santiam river. While the plat does not expressly state that it is drawn to a scale, it nevertheless appears to have been so drawn.

The land in controversy adjoins lot No. 1 on the east. It will be recalled that lot No. 1 is the east end of the row of lots. A single line is drawn on the plat to the east of, parallel with, and approximately the same length as the east side line of, lot No. 1. and the east side of lot No. 1 is labeled thus: The open space between this single line "Street 40 feet wide bears north.” The plat contains the caption: "Hadley's Addition to Mill City." The plat, together with a writing signed by Hadley and a jurat signed by a notary public, was recorded on February 14, 1889, by the county recorder. The writing signed by Hadley is here set out:

"Hadley's Addition, to Mill City. Laid out on my land Feb. 1. A. D. 1889. The southeast corner of lot No. 1 is on the north side of the Santiam river 47 links north and three chains and ten links west of the N. W. corner of the Mill lot, of the Santiam Lumbering Company, which N. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Dedication, W. corner aforesaid is on the W. side of secCent. Dig. $$ 35, 46.]

tion 30 T. 9 S. R. 3 E. Wil. Mer. The lots

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

are 50 by 100 feet and the first three are to the, cardinal points, No. 4 is fractional 64 feet next to the river and 342 feet, back end. The south ends of lots 4 to 12 have a bearing N. 73° 2 W. and their sides are at right angles thereto or N. 16° 58′ E. 100 feet. Front street oc cupies all the land between the lots and the river not more than 50 feet, situated in Marion county, state of Oregon. I herewith submit this plot and description for record."

The jurat bears date February 4, 1889, and reads thus:

"Personally came before me a notary public in and for the aforesaid county and state, the above-named H. J. Hadley, to me personally known to be the identical person who signed this instrument and who acknowledged to me that he executed the same freely and for the uses and purposes therein mentioned."

The plaintiff owns lot No. 1, and she traces her title through mesne conveyances to a deed made by Hadley. Under date of April 18, 1889, Hadley conveyed by warranty deed to Angus Scott Shaw "Lot No. 1 one in block No. 1 one in Hadley's addition to Mill City in the county of Marion and state of Oregon as it appears on the recorded plat of said Hadley's addition to Mill City in the recorder's office at Salem in said Marion county." Shaw and his wife moved on lot No. 1 in 1889 and lived there until 1899, when they sold the property and moved away.

The defendant claims title to the disputed land by virtue of a deed from James M. Wadsworth, who had previously purchased from Hadley. On April 29, 1904, Wadsworth received from Hadley a deed describing 106

acres and also lands described thus:

"The north half (%) of the southeast quarter of section thirty (30) in township nine (9) south of range three (3) east, except Hadley's addition to Mill City."

Subsequently, on March 27, 1915, Wadsworth executed and delivered to the defendant a warranty deed for lands described by metes and bounds including the disputed tract as well as other land.

At some time after he purchased lot No. 1, probably about 1893, Shaw went to Hadley and, according to the testimony of the latter: "He asked me, if I remember aright, if I thought there would be any objection, or if 1 objected to him putting a garden in there, and as near as I can remember the answer I gave him that I had no objections if nobody else had." Shaw constructed a fence across the south end of the 40-foot strip on the north line of Front street, but he also provided a gate so that a team and wagon could be driven in or out of the inclosure. This fence and gate were maintained continuously until about 1910, when both the fence and gate were torn down and removed. During the entire period beginning with about 1893 and ending with about 1910, Shaw and his successors used part of the 40-foot strip for garden purposes. The disputed strip remained open and uninclosed, or as one witness said, "It lay as waste land" from 1910 until July, 1914, when the defendant rented the disputed land from Wadsworth, erected on it a tent, in which he has since lived, and in

closed it by constructing a fence along the north line of Front street. After Thompson acquired his deed in 1915, he claimed that he was the owner of the 40-foot strip, and denied that the plaintiff or the public had any right to enter upon the disputed premises. The alleged street is of no direct benefit to any persons except the plaintiff, J. W. Jackson, who owns land immediately to the east, and possibly one other person. Some of the witnesses averred and others denied that the strip had been regarded by the public as a street. Two witnesses in addition to the plaintiff and her husband testified that they had used the premises as a street without asking permission from any one; but Wadsworth insisted that the witnesses first obtained permission from him. No part of the disputed strip has ever been improved as a road or street and no public officer has ever asserted or exercised control over it.

The complaint avers that Hadley dedicated the land as a street. The answer denies the alleged dedication, and avers that the defendant and his predecessors have had adverse possession for the requisite period of time, The trial court found that the land had never been laid off or platted as a street, and that the defendant owned the premises in fee simple. The decree followed the finding, and the plaintiff appealed.

W. H. Trindle, of Salem (C. Z. Randall, of Salem, on the brief), for appellant. John H. McNary, of Salem (L. M. Curl, of Albany, and McNary & McNary, of Salem, on the brief), for respondent.

HARRIS, J. (after stating the facts as above). Although the plaintiff contends that a street extends from Front street for a distance of 160 feet, or 60 feet beyond the rear or north end of lot No. 1, yet, since there is no evidence to sustain a finding that a street extends farther than 100 feet or the length of lot 1, we shall confine our attention to the question of whether a street 40 feet wide extends from Front street along the east side of lot No. 1. If Hadley did not, by his acts and conduct, dedicate the disputed strip as a street, then plaintiff cannot prevail, and therefore the first inquiry is whether there was a dedication.

The inquiry will not be influenced by the parol testimony given by Hadley to the effect that he intended to dedicate the land as a street. We do not undertake to determine whether that testimony was competent, since it is in no wise necessary to a decision of this suit; and, while there is a contrariety of judicial opinion concerning that character of evidence, we content ourselves by merely noting some of the relevant authorities and assuming that the evidence is incompetent. Hobson v. Monteith, 15 Or. 251, 256, 14 Pac. 740; Spencer v. Peterson, 41 Or. 257, 260, 68 Pac. 519, 1108; 1 Elliott on Roads and Streets (3d Ed.) § 173; Los Angeles v. Mc

[6] We now turn to the plat and the writing accompanying it for the purpose of discovering whether Hadley intended to dedicate the 40-foot strip next to lot No. 1 as a street. At the time of filing the plat Hadley owned all the land including the disputed premises. No street existed on any part of the Hadley land until the plat was filed. There is no evidence to indicate that the 40foot strip had ever been used as a right of way, or a road, or as a street at any time prior to 1889, and therefore the words "street 40 ft. wide" did not describe a street previ

Collum, 156 Cal. 148, 103 Pac. 914, 23 L. R. A. | Kuck v. Wakefield, 58 Or. 549, 555, 115 Pac. (N. S.) 378. 428; Jones v. Teller, 65 Or. 328, 332, 133 Pac. [1, 2] Dedications are of two general| 354; Parrott v. Stewart, 65 Or. 254, 259, kinds; statutory and common law. Nodine 132 Pac. 523; Eugene v. Lowell, 72 Or. 237, v. Union, 42 Or. 613, 616, 72 Pac. 582. Com- 143 Pac. 903; Harris v. St. Helens, 72 Or. mon-law dedications may either be express or 377, 143 Pac. 941, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 1073; implied. 1 Elliott on Roads and Streets (3d 8 R. C. L. pp. 890, 896; 4 Ency. of Ev. 110; Ed.) § 133. Generally by reason of the terms 13 Cyc. 452; 1 Elliott on Roads and Streets of the statute, a statutory dedication op- (3d Ed.) § 130. erates as a grant. 8 R. C. L. p. 897. Some authorities declare that common-law dedications always operate upon the principle of an estoppel, while others go no further than to say that such a dedication is of itself a distinctive common-law doctrine based upon principles analogous to those underlying estoppels. The theory usually accepted is: That to reclaim land would be a violation of good faith to the public and to those who have acquired private property with the expectation of enjoying the use contemplated by the dedication; and in case of the sale of a lot with reference to a plat there is the add-ously existing, but, on the contrary, they reed feature that an easement indicated by the fer to a street which in no way existed until plat constitutes a part of the consideration delineated on the plat. The space made by passing to the purchaser. 8 R. C. L. p. 906; the line drawn to the east of and parallel 13 Cyc. 437; 1 Elliott on Roads and Streets with the east line of lot No. 1, and the words (3d Ed.) § 125. "street 40 ft. wide" express in plain and un[3] Upon examination of the writing ac-mistakable terms an intent to make a street companying the plat it will be observed that of the 40-foot strip. The word "street" has there are no words of grant, and although a definite meaning. When the owner of land Front street is mentioned, no direct reference makes a plat and refers to a "street," he does is made to any other street. Obviously it not mean a private way; but the word signiwas the purpose of Hadley to comply with fies a public way in all that the term implies. the requirements at that time exacted by the 1 Elliott on Roads and Streets (3d Ed.) § 21; statute. The writing is not in the form City of Denver v. Clements, 3 Colo. 472; usually adopted, and it may well be the sub- Smith v. City of Goldsboro, 121 N. C. 350, ject of debate as to whether it constitutes a 28 S. E. 479. The plat and writing clearly perfect statutory dedication. We do not at- manifest an intention on the part of Hadley tempt to decide, however, whether the plat to dedicate the disputed land as a street; and writing as recorded produced a statutory and, indeed, the 40-foot strip appears upon dedication; but, for the purposes of this dis- the plat in such a manner as to be entirely cussion we shall assume, without deciding, inconsistent with any other theory. Oregon that a statutory dedication was not effected. City v. Ore. & Cal. R. Co., 44 Or. 165, 74 Pac. An unsuccessful attempt to dedicate land 924. under a statute if followed by sales with reference to the plat may result in a completed common-law dedication. 8 R. C. L. 893, 897; 13 Cyc. 441; 1 Elliott on Roads and Streets (3d Ed.) § 124.

[7] It is true that the disputed premises were never improved as a street nor formally accepted by the county; but the well-recognized rule is that neither a formal acceptance by the county nor the immediate opening and improvement of a street are essential to complete an irrevocable dedication. Car

[4, 5] The intent of the dedicator is the foundation and life of all dedications, and the intent must be clearly manifested. ter v. Portland, 4 Or. 340, 347, 348; Meier Where the dedication is statutory in char- v. Portland Cable Ry. Co., 16 Or. 500, 19 Pac. acter, the plat and writing generally furnish 610, 1 L. R. A. 856; Hogue v. Albina, 20 Or. the means by which to ascertain the intent, 182, 186, 25 Pac. 386, 10 L. R. A. 673; Spenand these, like all other writings, must be cer v. Peterson, 41 Or. 257, 260, 68 Pac. 519, construed by the terms contained in them. 1108; Oregon City v. Ore. & Cal. R. Co., 44 In the case of a common-law dedication, the Or. 165, 178, 74 Pac. 924; Christian v. Euintent is to be determined from what the gene, 49 Or. 170, 173, 89 Pac. 419; Oliver v. dedicator said in making the dedication and Synhorst, 58 Or. 582, 585, 109 Pac. 762, 115 by his acts and conduct; and the rule of Pac. 594; Moore v. Fowler, 58 Or. 292, 297, construction is to give effect to the intent 114 Pac. 472; Silverton v. Brown, 63 Or. 418, manifested. Christie v. Bandon, 162 Pac. 424, 128 Pac. 45; Harris v. St. Helens, 72 248; Carter v. Portland, 4 Or. 340, 343; Or. 377, 387, 143 Pac. 941, Ann. Cas. 1916D, Lewis v. Portland, 25 Or. 133, 134, 35 Pac. 1073; Barton v. Portland, 74 Or. 75, 79, 144 256, 22 L. R. A. 736, 42 Am. St. Rep. 772; | Pac. 1146; Nicholas v. Title & Trust Co., 79

Or. 226, 244, 154 Pac. 391, Ann. Cas. 1917A, | worth on April 29, 1904, expressly excepts 1149; Elliott on Roads and Streets (3d Ed.) §§ 124, 129.

[8] The offer made by Hadley to dedicate the street became a completed and irrevocable dedication when he delivered the deed to Shaw. The conveyance was made with express reference to the recorded plat, for lot No. 1 is described as being lot No. 1 "as appears on the recorded plat of said Hadley's addition to Mill City in the recorder's office at Salem in said Marion county." Portland v. Whittle, 3 Or. 126, 129; Carter v. Portland, 4 Or. 340, 346; Meier v. Portland Cable Ry. Co., 16 Or. 500, 19 Pac. 610, 1 L. R. A. 856; Steel v. Portland, 23 Or. 176, 184, 31 Pac. 479; Mutual Irr. Co. v. Baker City, 58 Or. 306, 321, 110 Pac. 392, 113 Pac. 9; Moore v. Fowler, 58 Or. 292, 297, 114 Pac. 472; Kuck v. Wakefield, 58 Or. 549, 552, 115 Pac. 428; Jones v. Teller, 65 Or. 328, 332, 133 Pac. 354; Spencer v. Peterson, 41 Or. 257, 260, 68 Pac. 519, 1108; Oregon City v. Ore. & Cal. R. Co., 44 Or. 165, 176, 74 Pac. 924; Christian v. Eugene, 49 Or. 170, 172, 89 Pac. 419; Hogue v. Albina, 20 Or. 182, 186, 25 Pac. 386; Nicholas v. Title & Trust Co., 79 Or. 226, 244, 154 Pac. 391, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 1149; 8 R. C. L. 890.

Usually the dedicator employs language to the effect that he dedicates all his interests in the streets shown by the plat, and an examination of the Hadley plat and writing will disclose that neither this nor equivalent language is used; but, as said in Oliver v. Newberg, 50 Or. 92, 96, 91 Pac. 470, 472:

"Even where such words of dedication are omitted, and the street is shown by the plat, the sale of lots by the proprietor with reference to such plat is sufficient to complete such dedication."

"Hadley's addition to Mill City," and therefore Wadsworth acquired no greater rights than Hadley owned; and Thompson, who purchased from Wadsworth, does not own more than his immediate grantor. The dedication, which was effected by the sale of lot No. 1 to Shaw on April 18, 1889, not only bound Hadley, but it also bound his successors in interest, Wadsworth and Thompson. Parrish v. Stephens, 1 Or. 75, 76; Portland v. Whittle, 3 Or. 126, 129.

[10] The defense of adverse possession relied upon by the defendant must fail. It is true that Shaw inclosed the premises and used the land for a garden, and this use was continued by his successors until about 1910. Hadley did not sell to Wadsworth until 1904. The testimony of Hadley demonstrates that the use made of the land by Shaw did not constitute adverse possession. If any person claimed the land adversely, it was only after Wadsworth purchased in 1904. The uncontradicted evidence is that the fence was torn down and removed in 1910, and after that time the premises "lay as waste land" until July, 1914. The evidence fails to show adverse possession for 10 years.

There is, however, an additional circumstance affecting the claim of adverse possession. In 1895 the Legislature declared that all streets in unincorporated towns were public highways, and jurisdiction over them was conferred upon the county courts of the various counties. Laws 1895, p. 57. At the same session of the Legislative Assembly an act was passed preventing the extinguishment of highways by adverse possession (Laws 1895, p. 57); the statute was re-enacted in 1903 (Laws 1903, p. 279), and is now codified as sections 6371 and 6372, L. O. L.

Hadley dedicated a strip 100 feet long and 40 feet wide as a street as shown on the plat, and the dedication became irrevocable when the abutting lot was sold to Shaw; and, since the completed dedication was not subsequently defeated, the plaintiff as the owner of lot No. 1 is entitled to use the disputed strip as a street. The decree is reversed.

Ordinarily the sale of a single lot completes the dedication, and more especially does the sale of a single lot effect a dedication of a street upon which the lot abuts; and consequently the sale of lot No. 1 to Shaw operated as an acceptance of the offer of Hadley to dedicate the adjacent land as a street, and rendered the dedication irrevocable. Roberts v. Mathews, 137 Ala. 523, 34 So. 624, 97 Am. St. Rep. 56; 1 Elliott on Roads and Streets (3d Ed.) § 128. [9] The deed delivered by Hadley to Wads- CAMANT, JJ., concur.

MCBRIDE, C. J., and BURNETT and Mc

« ÀÌÀü°è¼Ó »