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them after so qualifying themselves was en-gjury could not consider that fact in determining titled to great or little or no weight is a mat- the physician's want of care. ter with which, as suggested, a reviewing
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trial, Cent.
Dig. & 603.) court, in the very nature of the case cannot
6. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS 14(2)--MALconcern itself. These observations apply as
PRACTICE-FOLLOWING PARTICULAR SCHOOL well to the argument that, since the only OF MEDICINE. testimony in favor of the defendants upon
Each school of medicine is entitled to practhe question of value was given by the de- tice in its own way, and because one does not
use the other's methods will not constitute malfendants themselves, who were directly inter-practice, and it is enough if the treatment emested in the result of the trial, such testi-ployed has the approval of at least a respectamony is not dependable.
ble minority of the profession, since only the  The defendants were competent to tes: gence is required.
exercise of reasonable skill, learning and dilitify as witnesses in their own behalf, and [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Physicians whether they were influenced in their opin and Surgeons, Cent, Dig. $ 22.] ions on value by the fact that they were in-7. TRIAL 252(8)-MALPRACTICE-INSTRUCterested parties was a matter entirely for TIONS-INAPPLICABLE TO ISSUE. the determination of the jury and the trial “when a cause is shown which might produce
Instruction given in a malpractice case that court.
an accident in a certain way, and an accident The order appealed from is afirmed.
happens in that manner, it is a warrantable presumption, in the absence of showing of other
cause, that the one shown was the operative We concur: CHIPMAN, P. J.; BUR
agency in bringing about the result" held erroNETT, J.
neous, since there was no accident and patient
died either from disease, removal, or malprac(95 Wash. 513)
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trial, Cent. ENNIS v. BANKS et al. (No. 13921.)
Dig. $ 603.] (Supreme Court of Washington. April 6, 1917.) 8. APPEAL AND ERROR Om 263(1)–EXCEPTION 1. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS Cw18(9)—MAL
TO INSTRUCTIONS-NECESSITY. PRACTICE QUESTION FOB JURY - CAUSE OF
Although an instruction was not as complete DEATH.
as it should have been, it will not be considerIn action for malpractice for death resulting ed, where no exception was taken. from administering soft toast and poached egg
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and to a typhoid patient, where death.might have re- Error, Cent. Dig. § 1516.) sulted either from that cause or from the disease 9. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS 18(10)-MALitself, or from removing the patient, the ques PRACTICE-INSTRUCTION. tion of cause of death was for the jury.
In an action against a physician for mal[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Physicians practice in changing diet of a typhoid patient, and Surgeons, Cent. Dig. § 44.]
substance of proper instructions covering the is2. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS m18(9)—MAL- sues stated.
PRACTICE-QUESTION FOR JURY-CHANGE OF [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Physicians DIET.
and Surgeons, Cent. Dig. $ 45.) The question of whether a physician was guilty of malpractice in changing diet of a very
Department 2. Appeal from Superior sick typhoid patient from beef broth to soft Court, Lewis County; A. E. Lewis, Judge. toast and poached egg, where patient seemed to Action by Cora S. Ennis against Rush be improving on the former diet, and where Banks and others. Judgment for plaintiff, there was medical testimony showing that the toast and egg diet was improper, under the cir- and defendants appeal. Reversed and recumstances, was for the jury.
manded. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Physicians
Geo. C. Congdon, of Seattle, and Herman and Surgeons, Cent. Dig. § 44.) 3. APPEAL AND ERROR Om 1195(1)-LAW OF
Allen, of Chehalis, for appellants. C. D. CunTHE CASE-DECISION ON FORMER APPEAL. ningham and Wedmark & Grimm, all of Cen
Decisions on a former appeal become the law tralia, for respondent. of the case, and will govern when the same questions arise on a retrial.
MOUNT, J. This is the second appeal in [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and
this case. Error, Cent. Dig. $ 4661.)
When it was here before, on ap4. TRIAL C251(8) — MALPRACTICE-INSTRUC
peal from a judgment for $1,500 in favor of TIONS–GENERAL NEGLIGENCE.
the plaintiff, it was reversed because of the Instructions given in a malpractice case, re- admission of certain evidence, and the giving garding general negligence not within the issues of certain instructions to the jury. It was reand in effect stating that for want of ordinary care, the physician was liable, where the only manded for a new trial. 88 Wash. 237, 152 act complained of was a change of diet, and the Pac. 1037. The issue in the case was whethjury were led to believe they could consider any
er the appellant was guilty of malpractice in other negligent acts, held erroneous.
giving a diet of poached egg and toasted [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trial, Cent. bread to a typhoid fever patient. Upon this Dig. & 593.)
issue, the case was retried to the court and 5. TRIAL 252(8)—MALPRACTICE-INSTRUCTIONS-ADVANCED STATE OF PROFESSION. a jury, and resulted in a verdict and jụdg
Instruction given in a malpractice case that ment against the defendants for $9.000. The in determining ordinary skill and diligence, defendants have appealed from that judgthe "advanced state of the profession at the
ment. time" might be considered held misleading; there being no evidence relating thereto, and the [1, 2] The facts are substantially as fol
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
lows: The defendant Rush Banks is a peal, and the case was remanded for a new physician, practicing his profession in the trial, we are satisfied that there is merit in city of Centralla. On December 22, 1914, he these points. was called to the home of Donald Ennis, The evidence very conclusively shows that whom he found suffering with typhoid fever. the patient, during the time he was under the On the next day, Mr. Ennis was removed to a charge of Dr. Banks, was a very sick man. hospital, which was being conducted by Dr. Whether the feeding of this toast and egg was Banks. From that time on until January 14, the primary cause of his death is open at 1915, Mr. Ennis was treated by Dr. Banks. least to very serious doubt. The evidence Mr. Ennis was attended by a nurse, who shows that Mr. Ennis' death may have been cared for him constantly during that time. due to one of three causes: First, the disFrom the time Mr. Ennis was taken to the ease itself; second, the carrying of the pahospital until the 14th day of January, 1915, tient from the hospital to another place; and, he was a very sick man. Gas would ac- third, the change of diet. But, under the cumulate, almost constantly, in his stomach rule established when the case was here beand bowels, and, on the 11th day of January, fore, we are constrained to hold it was for the Dr. Banks called in consultation two other jury to determine which of these causes redoctors. It was then concluded that an oper- sulted in his death, and whether the doctor, ation was necessary, in order to remove the in administering the toast and egg, as here gas, but Mrs. Ennis, the plaintiff in this case, inbefore stated, was guilty of malpractice. and the patient's mother would not consent The evidence upon this trial was substantialto the operation. The patient, before this ly the same as upon the other trial, and upon time, had been fed upon a milk diet, which the other appeal we used this language: apparently did not agree with him, and sub "The appellant urges that the trial court sequently had been fed upon beef broth. should have granted his motion for a nonsuit at
the close of the respondent's case. There was, This latter diet seemed to agree with him however, evidence that the toast and egg diet better than the milk diet. On the 12th and was, under the circumstances, an improper treat13th of January, the patient seemed to be ment. Dr. Blair so testified. This was evisomewhat improved. On the 14th, the doctor dence that the specific act alleged was negligent, caused to be prepared a slice of bread, about and this evidence should have been submitted to
the jury under proper instructions." three inches square, from which the crust
 So it is plain that the facts shown upwas removed, and which was toasted, soaked in boiling milk until the toast was soft; and on this trial were sufficient to take the case an egg was broken in some hot water and ment of the rule became the law of the case.
to the jury. In other words, that stateallowed to coagulate. This egg was then placed upon the soft toast, and this toast and Pattison v. Seattle, Renton & Southern Railegg was given to the patient. The patient R.A. (N. S.) 660; Provine v. City of Seat
way Co., 64 Wash. 370, 116 Pac. 1089, 35 L. ate about two-thirds of the egg and toast. tle, 70 Wash. 326, 126 Pac. 927; HendrickAbout three hours thereafter, an eggnog was prepared, and given to the patient. When the 137 Pac. 444; City of Chehalis v. Cory, 64
son v. Simpson Logging Co., 77 Wash. 276, eggnog was administered, the patient vomit. Wash. 367, 116 Pac. 875. ed the eggnog and the egg and toast which
[4, 5] The appellants also argue that the had been administered three hours before.
instructions were erroneous. The court, aftThe patient, at that time, seemed to be worse.
er defining the issues, instructed the jury as Mrs. Ennis then became dissatisfied with the
follows: treatment of Dr. Banks, and ordered the pa
"(Instruction No. IV. With the issues thus tient removed to her home, about a block made up I instruct you that before the plaintiff away. The patient was taken from his bed can recover in this case she must establish by a at the hospital, carried out of the room, preponderance of the evidence that the defenddown a flight of stairs to the street, placed in the treatment of the case, or that he did not
ant Rush Banks was either guilty of negligence on a stretcher, and taken home. Another exercise ordinary skill and competence in the doctor, practicing the homeopathic method of treatment thereof, and that such negligent acts medicine, was called, and treated the patient or omissions or said want of proper and ordi
nary skill, or both, were the proximate cause of two days, when he died, on January 16, 1915. the death of said Donald Ennis.) Afterwards, this action was brought. The "Instruction No. V. The court instructs you basis of the action is malpractice, alleged to that the implied contract of the defendant when
he assumed charge of the treatment of plaintiff's be the cause of the death of Donald Ennis, injuries was that he possessed and would employ by reason of the feeding of the poached egg in the treatment of the case such reasonable and toast.
skill and diligence as were ordinarily exercised The appellants very forcibly argue that the that in which he practiced, by the members as a
in his profession at and in localities similar to trial court should have granted a judgment body; that is, the average of the reasonable skill notwithstanding the verdict, for the reason and diligence ordinarily exercised by the prothat the verdict of the jury is based upon tralia. Regard is to be had in determining this
fession at the time and in places similar to Censpeculation and conjecture, and that if the ordinary skill and diligence to the improvement appellant, Dr. Banks, made any mistake, it and advanced state of the profession at the time was an error of judgment, and not a negli- the case was treated.
"Instruction No. VI. I charge you, members of gent act. But for the fact that these same the jury, that when the defendant Rush Banks questions were presented upon the other ap-I undertook as a physician and surgeon to treat
and care for Donald Ennis, the deceased husband | tened the death of Donald Ennis, then I charge of the plaintiff, the law required of him no more you that he is liable to the plaintiff in damages. than that he should exercise that degree of "Instruction No. XI. In connection with the knowledge, skill, and care which physicians and last-mentioned instruction I desire to charge surgeons practicing in this vicinity and similar you that the rule of law is in such cases as this, localities ordinarily possess (and if you should as follows: 'When a cause is shown which might find from the evidence that in his treatment of produce an accident in a certain way, and an acthe said Donald Ennis, the defendant Rush cident happens in that manner, it is a warrantaBanks did not use and exercise as bigh a de- ble presumption in the absence of showing of gree of knowledge, skill, and care as is ordinarily other cause that the one known was the operaused and possessed by physicians and surgeons tive agency in bringing about the result.'” practicing in this and similar localities, and as a result thereof the said Donald Ennis was in These instructions were clearly erroneous. jured and from those injuries he died, your ver- The evidence in this case shows that Dr. dict must be for the plaintiff). "Instruction No. VII. While it is true that a
Banks was known as an allopathic doctor. physician is not liable for what is commonly One of the doctors who testified that the called a mistake in judgment or a mistake in treatment given by Dr. Banks was improper diagnosis (yet if you should find from a fair preponderance of the evidence in this case that the
was a physician of the homeopathic school defendant Rush Banks failed to exercise his of medicine, and admitted that his system best judgment, that is, the judgment which a of treatment was different from that of Dr. physician of ordinary care, skill, and intelli: Banks, or the allopathic school. gence in the same or similar localities would have used under like circumstances, then I
The first of these last-quoted instructions charge you that the defendant cannot escape his told the jury, in substance, that, if Dr. Banks negligent acts because of his failure to use his did not follow the practice recognized by best judgment, and if you should find that the other physicians in good standing in that act, or acts, of the said defendant Rush Banks when he failed to use his best judgment, as I locality, and, as a result thereof, hastened have hereinabove instructed you, approximately the death of Donald Ennis, the respondent contributed to the death of Donald Ennis, then was entitled to recover, which, of course, is your verdict must be for the plaintiff).”
not the law. Each school of medicine is enThe parts of these instructions which we titled to practice in its own way, and be have indicated by parentheses should not cause one does not use the methods of the have been given, because they are instruc-other is no reason for holding the one for tions upon general negligence, not within malpractice. In the case of Dahl v. Wagner, the issues of the case, and, in effect, tell the 87 Wash. 492, 151 Pac. 1079, we said: jury that, for want of ordinary care gener “It has been the uniform holding of this court ally, the doctor is liable. When the case that where doctors of equal skill and learning, was tried before, the court admitted evi- being in no way impeached or discredited, dis
agree in opinion upon a given state of facts, dence of other acts, which were claimed to that the courts cannot hold a defendant in a be negligent, and which acts were not within malpractice suit to the theory of the one to the the issues, and, for that reason, the case Brydges v. Cunningham, 69 Wash. 8, 124 Pac
exclusion of the other. This is the logic of was reversed. The act constituting mal- | 131. It is enough if the treatment employed practice, complained of here, and the only have the approval of at least a respectable miact complained of, was the administering of nority of the medical profession who recognized
Lorenz milk toast and soft-poached egg. No other v. Booth. 84 Wash. 550, 147 Pac. 31. The rea
it as a proper method of treatment.' negligence is alleged. Under these instruc- son is obvious. A man who is called upon to extions, which we have quoted above, the jury ercise professional judgment is bound only to were led to believe that they might consid- the exercise of reasonable skill and learning
and diligence. “He is not liable for mistakes if er any acts of negligence, or general acts, he uses the method recognized and approved by and make up their verdict outside the is- those reasonably, skilled in the profession' (citsues of the case. Instruction No. V, above ing authorities).” quoted, is subject to another objection, name So, it is apparent that this instruction was ly, that the part underscored, to the effect
erroneous and misleading. that in determining ordinary skill and dil
Instruction No. XI, to the effect that, igence, the advanced state of the profession when a cause is shown that might produce at that time might be considered. There was
an accident in a certain way, and an accino evidence in the case that there was any dent happens in that manner, it is a waradvanced state of the profession at that rantable presumption, in the absence of showtime, and, of course, the jury were not au-ing of other cause, that the one shown was thorized to take that fact into consideration the operative agency in bringing about the in determining want of care on the part of result, had no place in this case. There the physician. That part of the instruction was no accident here. Mr. Ennis either died was misleading.
from natural causes, or from being removed [6, 7] The court, at instructions Nos. X from the hospital, or he died from malpracand XI, used the following language: tice. There was no occasion, therefore, for
"Instruction No. X. You are instructed if you giving this instruction.
 The appellants contend that instrucfollow such established practice in the case and tion No. XX, with reference to the effect to treatment of the deceased, Donald Ennis, as is be given to the testimony upon hypothetrecognized, adopted, and followed by other physi-ical questions, was erroneous. We are satcians and surgeons in good standing, practicing in this and similar localities, and as a result isfied that the instruction was not as comthereof the said Rush Banks contributed or bas- plete as it should be, but, since no excep
tion was taken to the instruction, we shall
(95 Wash. 489) not consider it further.
NEWMAN et al. v. VAN NORTWICK et al.  The instructions, taken as a whole,
(No. 13856.) were voluminous. There were 24 instruc- (Supreme Court of Washington. April 3, 1917.) tions, covering 11 pages of typewritten mat- 1. MORTGAGES Cw468(2)—FORECLOSURE-REter. They were long and cumbersome, and CEIVERSHIP PROCEEDINGS. had a tendency more to mislead, than to Where the mortgage did not provide for de enlighten, the jury. The issue in the case less than the face of the mortgage, and the re
ficiency judgment, but the property was worth was a simple one. It ought to have been ceiver appointed had received in rents almost covered in, at most, a half dozen instruc- the amount of delinquent taxes which then drew tions, to the points that unless the jury a 15 per cent. penalty, order discharging receivcould say that the patient died solely from entitled to his services for preservation of the
er was properly refused; the mortgagees being the effect of the soft toast and egg which estate. was administered to him, and not from the (Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Mortgages, disease, or from being carried from the hos- Cent. Dig. & 1375.] pital, at the stage of the disease he was 2. MORTGAGES Omw 473 - FORECLOSURE — REthen in, there could be no recovery; that
CEIVERSHIP PROCEEDINGS. there could be recovery only in case the giv- permission to pay the taxes from the rents.
It was proper for the receiver to apply for ing of the toast and egg was the prime cause (Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Mortgages, of the patient's death, and the doctor knew, Cent. Dig. § 1384.] or should have known, such result would fol. 3. MORTGAGES 473 MAINTENANCE low. Before the respondent would be en PROPERTY "NECESSARY CHARGES" -"CURtitled to recover for malpractice, the jury
RENT EXPENSES. ought to have been told that they must find sary charges" and "current expenses" properly
Taxes upon mortgaged property are "necesthat Dr. Banks did not use his judgment in chargeable against the income of the property. administering the egg and toast, under the [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Mortgages, circumstances, but was guilty of malprac- Cent. Dig. 1384. tice in administering such toast and egg at
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, that time. A few simple instructions upon Necessary Charges.]
First and Second Series, Current Expenses ; these questions, in addition to those ordi. narily given, were sufficient for the jury.
Department 1. Appeal from Superior The appellants further argue that the Court, King County; Mitchell Gilliam, Judge.
Suit by Hannah Hill Newman and others court erred in not granting a new trial because of misconduct of the jury, in arriv. against Bernice Van Nortwick and others. ing at their verdict, for the reason that the From an order refusing to discharge a reresult of the verdict was a quotient verdict, ceiver, the defendants appeal. Affirmed. and not based upon the judgment of the ju Weter & Roberts, of Seattle, for appellants. rors, and for the further reason that the Walter S. Fulton, of Seattle, for respondents. verdict and judgment are excessive. There is merit in both these contentions, but, in MORRIS, J.  Appeal from an order review of the fact that a new trial must be fusing to discharge a receiver in an action to granted for errors in the instructions, we foreclose a mortgage on real property. The shall not discuss them.
conceded facts are: That the property is The judgment is reversed, and the cause worth less than the amount due on the mortremanded for a new trial.
gage; that there is no provision for any de
ficiency judgment; that the receiver has co!. HOLCOMB and PARKER, JJ., concur. lected $1,465.01 from rentals; that the propELLIS, C. J., concurs in the result.
erty is well rented and well cared for; that the owners of the property had permitted delinquent taxes to accumulate to the sum of
$1,712.09 now drawing interest at 15 per cent. 700)
per annum. With these facts before it the CALHOUN, DENNY & EWING v. WHIT- lower court denied a motion to discharge the COMB. (No. 12844.)
receiver. As stated by appellant, the ques. (Supreme Court of Washington. April 3, 1917.) tion to be determined is:
En Banc. Appeal from Superior Court, "Are delinquent taxes alone a proper ground King County.
for the appointment of a receiver in the foreOn rehearing. Judgment affirmed.
closure of a mortgage, it being admitted that the
security is inadequate to discharge the debt and For former opinion, see 90 Wash. 128, 155 that no deficiency judgment can be taken ?" Pac. 759.
Our answer is in the affirmative. Appel
lant relies upon Norfor v. Busby, 19 Wash. PER CURIAM. Upon a rehearing en 450, 53 Pac. 715. Nothing in that case susbanc, a majority of the court still adhere to tains the negative of appellants' query. It the opinion heretofore filed herein as report was there held that insufficiency of property ed in 90 Wash. 128, 155 Pac. 759; and, for to pay a mortgage indebtedness was not of the reasons there stated, the judgment is itself sufficient ground for the appointment
of a receiver in order to secure the applic:i
FoFor other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
tion of rentals to the discharge of a mort  It will hardly be questioned but that gage debt.
taxes are "necessary charges" and "current  The same rule was recently announced expense" upon real estate. Under his conin Gerber v. Heath, 92 Wash. 519, 159 Pac. tract the mortgagee could only look to the 691, where it was said that the property, property for the satisfaction of the debt, but and not its income, is the security for the he had the right to look to all of the propmortgage debt, and that the mortgagor is erty and the right to have it preserved in under no obligation to apply the income of the hands of a receiver and not have it submortgaged property to either the principal or ject to a paramount lien against which he interest of the mortgage debt. That would could not protect himself without the pay. mean, as applied to this case, that notavith- ment of additional money upon a property standing the inadequacy of the property to already overburdened with debt. The law pay the mortgage debt, the receiver could gave this right and equity will preserve it. not apply the rentals in payment of the The mortgagor could not add to the burden amount due on the mortgage. We have no assumed by the mortgagee in payment of the doubt such is the law in this state, but that mortgage debt. Neither could the mortgagee is not the case here. So far as the record add to the burden of the mortgagor in obgoes there is no intention on the part of the taining a satisfaction of that debt. receiver to apply the rentals to the debt. He Judgment is affirmed. did, however, ask leave to apply the rentals in payment of the delinquent taxes. This, we
ELLIS, C. J., and CHADWICK, MAIN, and think, was a proper request. In Euphart v. WEBSTER, JJ., concur. Morrison, 39 Wash. 311, 81 Pac. 695, and Collins v. Gross, 51 Wash. 516, 99 Pac. 573, it was
(95 Wash, 510) held that it is the proper procedure in this STATE ex rel. SWAN v. SUPERIOR COURT state under section 741, Rem. Code, to appoint FOR CLARKE COUNTY et al. (No. a receiver where it appeared that the property
14027.) was in danger of being lost or materially injured or where in the discretion of the court (Supreme Court of Washington. April 4, 1917.) it was necessary to secure ample justice to MANDAMUS 44-CHANGE OF VENUE-Disthe parties. Such was the situation here. CRETION OF COURT. When taxes on real property are permitted to judge of a superior court shall try any proceed
Rem. Code 1915, $ 209—1, provides that no become delinquent and accumulate an added ing when it is shown that such judge is prejuburden of 15 per cent. per annum, there is diced against any party or attorney in such danger of material injury to the property. cause, and that he shall forthwith transfer the The payment of taxes is necessary to the action to another department of the same court,
or call in a judge from some other court or appreservation of the property. “Equity de- ply to the Governor to send a judge to try the volves it upon him who has the use; not to case, or if the convenience of the witnesses or pay them is waste." The failure of the own
the ends of justice will not be interfered with ers of this property to pay the taxes and al- acter that a change of venue may be ordered, he
by such course, and the action is of such charlow them to become delinquent “was casting may send the case for trial to the most convena burden upon the mortgaged estate which | ient court. Relator, who was attorney in three equity demanded the mortgagor should dis- cases, filed affidavits that the presiding judge
of the superior court of the county was prejucharge." Winkler v. Magdeburg, 100 Wis. diced against him, whereupon the presiding 421, 76 N. W. 332. In an earlier case, Schrei-judge entered orders changing the venue to anber v. Carey, 48 Wis. 208, 4 N. W. 124, the other county, the orders reciting that the consame court said it was a want of good faith venience of witnesses and the ends of justice
would not be interfered with. Held that, as on the part of a mortgagor not to pay the there are several alternatives given the presidtaxes upon mortgaged property and yet re- ing judge in case of prejudice, his discretionary main in possession and appropriate all the ruling that a change of venue to another counprofits of the property to his own purpose. witnesses or defeat the ends of justice cannot,
ty would not interfere with the convenience of Similar observations are made in Philadel- there being only one department of the superior phia Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Oyler, 61 Neb. court in the county, be interfered with by a writ 702, 85 N. W. 899, and in Philadelphia Mort-of mandate to vacate the order. gage & Trust Co. v. Goos, 47 Neb. 804, 66 N.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Mandamus,
Cent. Dig. 88 90, 91.) W. 843. In Gerber v. Heath, supra, after saying that the mortgagor was under no ob Department 2. Original application by the ligation to apply the income of the property State of Washington, on the relation of Edgar to the payment of the mortgage debt, the Swan, for a writ of mandate against the Sucourt added that “a receiver is sometimes perior Court for the State of Washington, appointed to collect the income of property and County of Clarke, and R. H. Back, Judge and apply the same to necessary charges thereof. Application denied. pending the foreclosure proceedings in order Henry Crass and Edgar Swan, both of to protect the property,” continuing to the Vancouver, for relator. James O. Blair and effect that current expense is a proper charge L. M. Burnett, both of Vancouver, for reagainst the income of property.
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes