made by plaintiffs which were found in the hands of plaintiffs' customers in other states, notably in California and Virginia. In such action they took advantage of the absence from plaintiffs' hats of the union label, which by the state law of Connecticut the United Hatters. were authorized to affix to hats made under the supervision of their members. In these ways they caused the plaintiffs a great deal of damage, and (according to the complaint) limited and restrained plaintiffs' interstate trade in hats. It must be obvious from the foregoing recital that the defendants by the means therein described sought to curtail, and, if possible, destroy, the plaintiffs' production of hats at home, and, with the assistance of their friends, to curtail, and, if possible, destroy, the distribution of such product after it had become settled into the stock of goods in the hands of plaintiffs' customers in other states. There is no allegation which suggests that the means of transporting plaintiffs' product, or the product itself while being transported, were touched, handled, obstructed, or in any manner actually interferred with. There is no allegation that the defendants are in any way engaged in interstate commerce. The argument for the plaintiffs is that by entering into a scheme to curtail the production at home, and the distribution by customers abroad, the defendants have formed a combination to limit and restrain plaintiffs' trade between the two points, which is interstate trade, and that such restraint is the direct, positive, and inevitable result of the general scheme. The manufacture of the hats before they leave the factory in Danbury is not interstate commerce, nor are the hats themselves up to that time the subject of interstate commerce. The distribution of the hats from the hands of the customers in other states to the ultimate consumer is not interstate commerce, nor are the hats themselves during such distribution the subject of interstate commerce. The real question is whether a combination which undertakes to interfere simultaneously with both actions is one which directly affects the transportation of the hats from the place of manufacture to the place of sale. It is not perceived that the Supreme Court has as yet so broadened the interpretation of the Sherman act (Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 32001) that it will fit such an order of facts as this complaint presents. What it may do, if the matter comes before it, is, in my judgment, very uncertain. If the demurrer, in so far as it attacks the complaint as a whole, shall be overruled and the defendants put to their answer, a jury trial must follow in orderly sequence, and after a verdict the end would still be far away. A contested trial might consume weeks of time, and the expense, both to court and parties, would be enormous. It is deemed wise, for these reasons, to sustain the demurrer, and in this situation it is hoped that the court may be pardoned for not entering into an analysis of the contentions put forth by the opposing parties. Such contentions and the independent thoughts which they aroused were necessarily examined with care, in order that this present conclusion could be reached, and if, in making such examination, a further and final conclusion was reached, it would serve no useful purpose to make it known at this juncture. If the matter shall come back to me for further action, observations upon the questions advanced by the special grounds of demurrer would be gratefully read, and might tend to avoid. unreasonable delay and expense at a later stage of the proceedings. Let the complaint be dismissed. Ex parte OW GUEN. (District Court, D. Vermont. June 20, 1906.) 1. ALIENS-CHINESE-UNREGISTERED LABORERS-MERCHANTS. Chinese Exclusion Act May 5, 1892, c. 60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1321], provides that an unregistered Chinese laborer, if found in the United States by certain officers, shall be adjudged to be unlawfully there, and may be taken before a judge and ordered to be deported. Held, that such section did not prohibit an unregistered laborer from remaining in the United States until proceeded against, and hence, prior to the taking of such proceedings, he was entitled to become a merchant and to the immunities accorded to them. [Ed. Note.-Citizenship of the Chinese, see notes to Gee Fook Sing v. United States, 1 C. C. A. 212; Lee Sing Far v. United States, 35 C. C. A. 332.] Where, on the return of a Chinese person to the United States, 'his claim that he was a merchant at L. was not investigated by the immigration officers, but he was deported, because of his former status as an unregistered laborer, such decision was not conclusive against his right to again enter the United States by virtue of his being a merchant in L., established by two credible witnesses other than Chinese, as provided by Chinese Exclusion Act May 5, 1892, c. 60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1321.] 3. SAME--WAIVER. Where a Chinese person was entitled to re-enter the country by virtue of his being a merchant at L., the fact that, on his attempting to enter a second time after being deported, he put forward the unfounded claim that he was entitled to enter as a merchant at B., did not constitute a waiver of his rights based on the facts that he had been a merchant at L. On Habeas Corpus. Fuller C. Smith, for relator. WHEELER, District Judge. The relator is a Chinaman, and came to the United States about 1885, and in 1893 appears to have some interest with his uncle as a merchant in Boston, and for that reason did not become registered as a laborer. Afterwards he was for several years a laundryman at Lowell, till 1901, when he became a merchant there and was engaged wholly in that business, having over $1,500 capital of his own therein and three partners having in it $800, $700, and $500, respectively. In 1903 he went to China, leaving affidavits of two white witnesses as to his being a merchant at Lowell, and returned there for admission, and was refused on examination and appeal, and deported to China, because, although a merchant in fact, he was said not to be in law, as he had been a laborer and remained unregistered. He now came here again and applied for admission as a merchant in Boston under a different arrangement of his names, and, being recognized, at first denied, and then acknowledged, his former application. His claim as to being a merchant in Boston was investigated and found wanting, but not that as to being a merchant in Lowell, and he was ordered to be deported because he had been an unregistered laborer, as before, and this decision was affirmed by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor on appeal, and he applied for this writ. The relator insists that, being a merchant in fact in the United States, he had a right to return on compliance with the law, and that the decision of the immigration officers that his former status as a laborer excluded him is not final. The Government insists that while he was an unregistered laborer he could not lawfully remain here and become a domiciled merchant, under section 6 of Act May 5, 1892, c. 60, 27 Stat. 25 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1321], and that the decision of these officers is final here. This section 6, however, does not provide that an unregistered laborer should not remain in the United States, but only if found there by certain officers, he should be adjudged to be unlawfully there and might be taken before a judge and ordered to be deported. He would in fact be here and be entitled to all the rights of a resident alien till so proceeded against, adjudged, and ordered. He would have, among others, the right to become a merchant, and when he did so he had all the rights under the law, of a merchant. His right to return to this country was not investigated at all, as is now shown by the testimony of the inspector in charge of the case, but admission was denied because of his former status as a laborer. He was thereby restrained of his liberty as to this country until he appeared again, and then his claim of being a merchant at Lowell finally remained before the immigration officers and was ignored, although that of being a merchant in Boston was looked into. These rights were not so inconsistent that putting forward one would waive the other. He was still entitled to return on his right as a merchant of Lowell established by two credible witnesses other than Chinese, in full accordance with this section 6 of the Act of 1892 in question. The decision of the immigration officers is made and held to be final and conclusive of the right of a Chinese person to come into this country, but it is understood that the right must be passed upon to have the decision become so. U. S. v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, 24 Sup. Ct. 621, 48 L. Ed. 917; United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 25 Sup. Ct. 644, 49 L. Ed. 1040. Judgments of courts having jurisdiction generally draw in and conclude all questions necessary to their determination, but not others; and that others were not passed upon may be shown. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 24 L. Ed. 195. The effect of the decision of these executive tribunals would seem to be more limited, and their grounds more provable, especially in the broad inquiry provided for in habeas corpus proceedings. The relator has shown clearly by the same witnesses to his merchant papers of Lowell that he was and is entitled to return to the United States as such merchant, and that not this right, but only that of an unregistered laborer, has been passed upon. He therefore seems to be unlawfully restrained of his liberty for the purpose of deportation, and entitled to be discharged. Relator discharged. In re TUCKER. Ex parte NEW YORK COTTON EXCHANGE. (District Court, D. Massachusetts. March 3, 1905.) BANKRUPTCY-PROVABLE DEBTS-LOAN BY WIFE. A loan by a wife to her husband of stocks previously received by her from him as a direct gift, which gift was invalid under the law of the state and passed no title, does not afford basis for a claim against his estate in bankruptcy. In Bankruptcy. On reargument. For former opinion, see 131 Fed. 647. I. R. Clark, and John H. Sherburne, Jr., for appellant. LOWELL, Circuit Judge. A rehearing was granted, as suggested in the opinion heretofore filed, solely to permit Mrs. Tucker to urge that this case is governed by James v. Gray, 131 Fed. 401, 65 C. C, A. 385, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 321. In that case the Court of Appeals permitted a wife to prove in bankruptcy a debt which was unenforceable in the courts of Massachusetts at law, in equity, or in insolvency. The debt was based on a valuable consideration. In the case at bar counsel for Mrs. Tucker have argued that a court of bankruptcy, which does equity, should recognize the validity of a gift of personal property made directly from husband to wife, although the courts of Massachusetts treat the gift as invalid, both at law and in equity. That the English courts of equity recognize the validity of a gift like this appears probable, see Lucas v. Lucas, 1 Atk. 270; Mews v. Mews, 15 Beav. 529; Grant v. Grant, 32 Beav. 623. And it must be admitted that the reasoning of James v. Gray goes far to assert the binding force of these authorities upon a federal court of equity. Nevertheless, as a decision in favor of Mrs. Tucker would make altogether inoperative in the federal courts the law of Massachusetts governing the relations of husband and wife, I am not disposed to extend the reasoning of James v. Gray beyond cases in which the wife's claim is based upon a valuable consideration. The extension, if any is to be made, must be left to the Court of Appeals. No. 594. Ex parte TUCKER. 1. HUSBAND AND WIFE-GIFT FROM HUSBAND TO WIFE-MASSACHUSETTS STATUTE. Under Rev. Laws Mass. 1902, c. 153, §§ 1, 3, relating to transfers between husband and wife and the decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court of the state thereunder, a transfer of corporate stocks by a husband to his wife as a gift by surrendering certificates held by him to the corporation which by his direction issues new certificates to the wife is a transfer through a third person, and constitutes a perfect gift, good as against the husband and his subsequent creditors, in the absence of an actual intention to defraud. [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 26, Husband and Wife, §§ 250-252.] 2. BANKRUPTCY-LOAN BY WIFE-PROPERTY RECEIVED FROM HUSBAND AS GIFT. A member of a partnership, while solvent, transferred certain corporate stocks to his wife by way of gift, and she subsequently lent such stocks to his partner, who assigned her as security for their return a seat in Her husband witnessed the formal an exchange which was in his name. instrument executed by his wife and his partner covering the transaction, and in other ways indicated his assent to the loan of the securities by his wife, which loan was throughout in such form as to The stocks were used indicate that they were her absolute property. by the firm, which afterward became bankrupt, and the seat was sold by the trustee. Held that, even if the gift had not been originally perfect, it was rendered so by the transfer of the stocks to the partner and the substitution therefor of his obligation and security directly to the wife, under the circumstances described. [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 6, Bankruptcy, §§ 286, 291, 295.] Aldrich, District, Judge, dissenting. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts. For opinion below, see 131 Fed. 647. John H. Sherburne, Jr. (I. R. Clark on brief), for appellant. Before COLT, and PUTNAM, Circuit Judges, and ALDRICH, District Judge. PUTNAM, Circuit Judge. This is an appeal against a decree of the District Court for the District of Massachusetts sitting in bankruptcy. The bankrupts constituted a partnership known as "Frederick M. Tucker & Co.," stockbrokers, doing business at Boston, in the state of Massachusetts. Tracy H. Tucker, one of the bankrupt copartners, is the husband of Gertrude F. Tucker, the appellant. All parties resided in Massachusetts during the entire period to which this appeal relates, and the transactions involved were also within that state. There was one other bankrupt copartner, namely, Frederick M. Tucker, also of Boston, the two gentlemen named constituting the bankrupt partnership, which made an assignment for the benefit of its creditors 148 F.-59 |