ner's argument seems to me to consist in his supposing, that, by allowing this claim, we shall be assessing the land in question at its future improved value. That, however, is not so. We cannot, consistently with the facts found by the revising barrister, come to any other conclusion than that the present value of the land far exceeds 40s. per annum. CROWDER, J.-I also think that the facts stated by the revising barrister show conclusively that this plot of land is worth more than 40s. a year. The purpose for which the owner may use it is wholly immaterial. The question is, what is its value. Our judgment proceeds, not on the assumption of any speculative or prospective value, but upon the value clearly and unequivocally stated in the case. The appeal must be allowed. Appeal allowed, with costs. END OF REGISTRATION CASES. CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS AND IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER, IN Michaelmas Cerm, IN THE EIGHTEENTH YEAR OF THE REIGN OF VICTORIA. 1854. The judges who usually sat in banco in this term were: JERVIS, C. J. MEMORANDA. WILLIAMS, J. On the first day of this term, Peter Erle, Esq., of the Middle Temple, and Edmund Beckett Denison, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn, who had in the course of the last vacation been appointed Her Majesty's Counsel learned in the Law, took their seats within the Bar. On the same day, Thomas Phinn, Esq., and Robert Porrett Collier, Esq., both of the Inner Temple, who had respectively received patents of precedence, the former to take rank next after Peter Erle, Esq., the latter to take rank next after Edmund Beckett Denison, Esq.,also took their seats within the Bar accordingly. *BLACK v. GREEN. Nov. 3. [*262 By the 11th section of the Common Law Procedure Act, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, the original writ of summons is declared to be in force only "for six months from the day of the date thereof, including the day of such date," but it is enacted, that, if any defendant therein named may not have been served therewith, the writ may be renewed, "at any time before its expiration, for six months from the date of such renewal, and so from time to time during the currency of the renewed writ," by being sealed with a seal to be provided for that purpose. Quare, whether the six months for which the renewed writ under this section is to be available, are to be reckoned inclusively or exclusively of the date of the renewal? The officer, assuming the former to be the proper construction of the statute, having declined to seal a writ which upon that assumption was tendered a day too late,-the Court, without expressing any opinion as to whether or not he had rightly construed the act, directed him to seal the writ nunc pro tune. AN original writ of summons was issued on the 23d of August, 1851, and was duly kept in force by renewals in February and August, 1852. The Common Law Procedure Act, 1852,-15 & 16 Vict. c. 76,-came into operation on the 24th of October, 1852. On the 11th of November following, the writ in this action was renewed under the provisions of that act, ss. 11, 12: and it was again duly renewed on the 5th of May and 3d of November, 1853, and on the 1st of May, 1854. On the 1st of November, 1854, the plaintiff's attorney applied at the proper office to renew the writ, according to the provision contained in the 11th section of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, which enacts that "no original writ of summons shall be in force for more than six months from the day of the date thereof, including the day of such date; but, if any defendant therein named may not have been served therewith, the original or concurrent (s. 9) writ of summons may be renewed at any time before its expiration, for six months from the date of such renewal, and so from time to time during the currency of the renewed writ, by being marked with a seal bearing the date of the day, month, and year of such renewal, such seal to be provided and kept for that purpose at the offices of the masters of the said superior courts, and to be impressed upon the writ by the proper officer of the court out of which such writ issued, upon *delivery to him by the plaintiff or [*263 his attorney of a præcipe in such form as has heretofore been required to be delivered upon the obtaining of an alias writ; and a writ of summons so renewed shall remain in force and be available to prevent the operation of any statute whereby the time for the commencement of the action may be limited, and for all other purposes, from the date of the issuing of the original writ of summons."(a) (a) The 12th section enacts, that, "where any writ of summons in any such action shall have been issued before, and shall be in force at, the commencement of this act, such writ may, at any time before the expiration thereof, be renewed under the provisions of, and in the manner directed by, this act; and, where any writ issued in continuation of a preceding writ, according to the provisions of the 2 W. 4, c. 39, shall be in force and unexpired, or where one month next after the expiration thereof shall not have elapsed at the commencement of this act, such continuing writ may, without being returned not est inventus, or entered of record according to the provisions of the said act of 2 W. 4, c. 39, be filed in the office of the court within one month next after the expiration of such writ, or within twenty days after the commencement of this VOL. XV.-25 R The officer refused to seal the writ, conceiving that the six months from the date of the last renewal expired on the 30th of October. Application was thereupon made to Cresswell, J., at Chambers, to direct the officer to affix the seal; but, the point being a new one, his lordship referred the matter to the court. Willes, accordingly, on the first day of this term, *moved that *264] the officer might be directed to impose the seal nunc pro tunc. By the 11th section of the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, the original writ of summons is declared to be in force only "for six months from the day of the date thereof, including the day of such date;" but it may be renewed at any time before its expiration, "for six months from the date of such renewal," by being marked with a seal bearing date the day, month, and year of such renewal. When the section is dealing with the renewal of the original writ, the six months are declared to be inclusive of the day of the date of the writ; but those words are not repeated in the provision for the renewal of a second or subsequent writ: and the general rule of law for the computation of a period of time, unless the contrary is expressed, is, to reckon it exclusive of the first and inclusive of the last day. [JERVIS, C. J.-Does it not by the re-sealing become a renewed writ? and, is not its vitality as such limited as before to six months?] That, it is submitted, is not the true effect of the language the legislature has used. [JERVIS, C. J.-I think the whole is overridden by the first provision in the section. MAULE, J.-The original writ is to be in force for six months from its date, including the day of such date,—that is, a writ issued on the 1st of January expires on the 30th of June. The section then goes on, but, if any defendant named therein may not have been served therewith, the original or concurrent writ of summons may be renewed, at any time before its expiration, for six months from the date of such renewal, and so from time to time during the currency of the renewed writ." Is not the renewed writ to be in force until the last moment of the 30th of December, and no longer?] There is nothing in the section to take it out of the general rule of computation. There are two periods of six months mentioned: one is expressed to be inclusive of the day of *265] the date; the other is not. [MAULE, J.-I should infer that the legislature meant that the two periods should be computed in the same way. They have not said so: and, at all events, the question is open to argument, and the officer of the court should not be permitted, by refusing to stamp the writ, to bar the plaintiff's right for ever. A somewhat similar, though infinitely more hopeless, question act; and the original writ of summons in such action may thereupon, but within the same period of one month next after the expiration of the continuing writ, or within twenty days after the commencement of this act, be renewed under the provisions of, and in the manner directed by, this act; and every such writ shall after such renewal have the same duration and effect for all purposes, and shall, if necessary, be subsequently renewed in the same manner as if it had originally issued under the authority of this act." arose in Davies, dem., Lowndes, ten., 7 M. & G. 762 (E. C. L. R. vol. 49), 8 Scott, N. R. 539, where, the demandant in a writ of right having sued out a new writ by "journeys accounts" after the abatement of the original suit by the death of the (sole) tenant, the court refused to set aside the writ of grand cape, the return thereto, the count, and subsequent proceedings, though they expressed a strong opinion as to the informality thereof,-seeing that their decision against the demandant would finally determine his right, without any power of appeal. And Lord Lyndhurst, C., had previously,-see 7 Scott N. R. 215,refused a motion to quash the writ itself; saying, "I strongly incline to think the writ cannot be sustained; and, if it were necessary to decide the question on this motion, I should so determine. But, as the plaintiff would in that case be without remedy, and could not bring the subject under the review of any other tribunal, I think I ought not, having regard to the nature of the question, to interfere in this stage of the proceedings, but leave the defendant to raise the objection on the record in the court in which the suit is now depending." The same reason, it is submitted, will induce the court to accede to this application. [JERVIS, C. J.-In M'Kellar v. Reddie, 5 Scott, N. R. 192, a pluries writ of summons issued under the 2 W. 4, c. 39, s. 10, in continuation of a pluries writ, on the 8th of January, 1842, and consequently would expire on the 7th of May; and this court permitted a second pluries issued to continue the preceding writ, and bearing date *the 7th of June, to be entered of record, valeat quantum. And the same course was adopted in a subsequent case of Campbell v. Smart, 5 C. B. 196 (E.C. L. R. vol. 57).] [*266 Cur. adv. vult. JERVIS, C. J., now said.—We have considered this matter, and have consulted my Brother Cresswell; and we think we could not determine the question without hearing the other side. Under these circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that the better course will be to direct the officers to affix the stamp upon the new writ nunc pro tunc, leaving the plaintiff to the consequences if it should turn out that it was tendered too late. Order accordingly.(a) (a) Adopted and acted upon by the Court of Queen's Bench, in Anonymous, 24 Law Journ. N. S., Q. B. 23. BLOOR v. HUSTON. Nov. 20. A. obtained judgment against B. in a county court, and issued execution. C. claiming the goods, the high-bailiff took out an interpleader summons, and ultimately C.'s claim was disallowed, and C. was ordered to pay the costs of the interpleader proceedings. The high-bailiff paid the amount of the levy into court, deducting the fees and expenses incident to the levy, but not the costs of the interpleader, and the balance was paid out of court to A. :-Held, that the high-bailiff could not maintain an action against A. for the interpleader costs. Whether he could have deducted them from the amount of the levy, under the above order, quære. |