speaking and publishing of which said words, the plaintiff had been greatly injured in his said trade and business, &c.

Plea, not guilty; whereupon issue was tried.

At the trial, before Jervis, C. J., at the sittings in London after last term, the plaintiff's contract with the board of ordnance, and the due performance thereof by him, were proved, as also was the speaking of the words by the defendant, as alleged in the declaration. His Lordship merely left it to the jury to say whether the words were proved, and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, with 40s. damages.

J. H. Hodgson now moved for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection. The words charged not being actionable in themselves, the Lord Chief Justice should have told the jury that the defendant was not liable unless it was proved that he knew the nature of the contract between the plaintiff and the Ordnance Office. He should have asked the jury, not only whether the defendant spoke the words, but whether he spoke them in the sense imputed to them in the declaration. [Maule, *J.-The innuendo imputes an intention to the speaker in using *362] them. The plaintiff was bound to prove, and it is not suggested that he did not prove, that the words were spoken on an occasion and under circumstances which satisfied the jury that the defendant meant to impute to the plaintiff that which the innuendo conveys.]. The innuendo gives the words a larger meaning than they naturally bear. [CROWDER, J.-The meaning imputed to the words by the innuendo, is no more than the natural inference.]

Per Curiam.-There is no ground for a rule. The innuendo does not enlarge the sense of the slanderous words, but merely shows the intention of the speaker. Rule refused.

GITTINS v. SYMES. Nov. 24.

The rule for a writ of injunction,-as, to restrain a defendant from infringing a patent,-under the Common Law Procedure Act, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, s. 82, is a rule to show cause only, in the first instance.

The same relief may be had under the Patent Law Amendment Act, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 83, s. 42.

THE 82d section of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854,—17 & 18 Vict. c. 125,-enacts "that it shall be lawful for the plaintiff, at any time after the commencement of the action, and whether before or after the judgment, to apply ex parte to the court or a judge for a writ of injunction to restrain the defendant in such action from a repetition or continuance of the wrongful act or breach of contract complained of, or the committal of any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract, or relating to the same property or right; and such writ may be granted or denied by the court or judge

upon such terms as to the duration of the writ, keeping an account, giving security, or otherwise, as to such court or judge shall seem reasonable and just, and, in case of disobedience, such writ may be enforced by attachment by the court, or, when such court shall not be sitting, by a judge: provided always *that any order for a writ of injunc[*363 tion made by a judge, or any writ issued by virtue thereof, may be discharged or varied or set aside by the court, on application made thereto by any party dissatisfied with such order."

An action having been brought against the defendant for the infringement of a patent obtained by the plaintiff for an improved money-till, on the 7th of January, 1853,

Miller, Serjt., upon an affidavit that the plaintiff was the true and first inventor of the patent till, that the defendant had infringed his patent, and that due notice of the motion had been given, applied for a writ of injunction, under the above statute, to restrain the defendant from further infringing the patent right. [JERVIS, C. J.-This might more conveniently be done under the Patent Law Amendment Act, 1852,-15 & 16 Vict. c. 83,-s. 42.(a)] It may also be done under the Common Law Procedure Act. [MAULE, J.-Is the plaintiff in such a position that he might have obtained an injunction in Chancery?] He is.

JERVIS, C. J.-The practice in equity is, to direct an action at law to try the right, and that an account be taken in the mean time, and to grant an interloctory injunction until the cause is determined. We must do *here as nearly as possible as the court of equity would do. A rule nisi may go, and we may mould it on cause being shown.

[*364

Miller, Serjt., on a subsequent day, prayed that the rule might be drawn up to show cause at Chambers.

JERVIS, C. J.-This being the first motion upon the subject, and the rule not having yet been promulgated in any of the courts, it would hardly be right to send it to a judge at Chambers to settle the practice. Rule nisi accordingly.(b)

(a) Which enacts, that, "in any action in any of Her Majesty's superior courts of record at Westminster and in Dublin for the infringement of letters-patent, it shall be lawful for the court in which such action is pending, if the court be then sitting, or, if the court be not sitting, then for the judge of such court, on the application of the plaintiff or defendant respectively, to make such order for an injunction, inspection, or account, and to give such direction respecting such action, injunction, inspection, and account, and the proceedings therein respectively, as to such court or judge may seem fit."

In the Matter of ELIZABETH, the Wife of

Nov. 21.

LEGGE.

The court allowed a commission for taking the acknowledgment of a married woman in Australia under the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 74, s. 83, to go out with a blank for the Christian name of the husband, which (the marriage having taken place there) was unknown here.

BREWER moved that a commission might go to Australia to take the acknowledgment of a married woman there, a blank being left therein for the Christian name of the husband. It appeared by affidavit that the lady had married there a person named Legge, but that there was no person to be found in this country who knew his Christian name. He referred to In re Apperton, 1 C. B. 447 (E. C. L. R. vol. 50), where the court allowed a commission to go to Sydney with a blank for the Christian name of the lady, under precisely similar circumstances. Per Curiam.-In re Apperton is a stronger case than this. Let the commission go. Fiat.

*365]

*IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER.

DALBY v. THE INDIA AND LONDON LIFE-ASSURANCE

COMPANY. Dec. 2.

The contract of life-assurance is a mere contract to pay a certain sum of money upon the death of a person in consideration of the due payment of certain annual premiums during his life. It is not a contract of indemnity.

Where a policy effected by a creditor on the life of his debtor, is valid at the time it is entered into, the circumstance of the interest of the assured in such life ceasing before the death does not invalidate it, by reason of the provisions of the 14 G. 3, c. 48. Godsall v. Boldero, 9 East, 72, overruled.

THIS was an action upon a policy of assurance effected by the plaintiff, on the 9th of January, 1847, for and on behalf of the directors of the Anchor Life-Assurance Company, in the sum of 10007., on the life of His Royal Highness, Adolphus Frederick, Duke of Cambridge, for the whole term of such life, in consideration of the sum of 122l. 158. 10d., and an undertaking to pay the like sum yearly during the life of the duke.

The declaration, after setting out the policy, which was subject to the following, amongst other, conditions, "The funds or property of the company for the time being remaining unapplied and undisposed of, and inapplicable to prior claims and demands, in pursuance of the powers, trusts, and authorities of the company's deed of settlement, and of the provisions of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, shall alone be answerable for any claims. under the policy,"-averred, that the said Adolphus Frederick, Duke of Cambridge, lived beyond the said first period of twelve calendar 465, 52 Am 135, 139, 142, 255: 108 Pa 13!

3744756,

months, and until a certain day, to wit, the 8th of July, 1850, when the said Adolphus Frederick, Duke of Cambridge, died; and that, during the life of the said Adolphus Frederick, Duke of Cambridge, and at the expiration of the said last-mentioned period, and of each and every subsequent period of twelve calendar months during the life of the said Adolphus Frederick, Duke of Cambridge, he, the plaintiff, for and on behalf of the Anchor Life-Assurance Company as aforesaid, did pay to the said first-mentioned company the further sum or *premium of 1227. 15s. 10d. for and in respect of the then next suc[*366 ceeding period of twelve calendar months; and the said policy remained and was in force, to wit, from the making thereof until and at the time of the death of the said Adolphus Frederick, Duke of Cambridge: That afterwards, and after the death of the said Adolphus Frederick, Duke of Cambridge, to wit, on the 28th of November, 1850, the death of the said Adolphus Frederick, Duke of Cambridge, was duly notified by the plaintiff to the directors of the said company, and proof thereof then made to the satisfaction of the directors of the said company: That everything averred by him, the plaintiff, in the said declaration or statement in the said policy of assurance recited and mentioned, was true: That, at the time of the making of the said policy, and thence until the death of the said Adolphus Frederick, Duke of Cambridge, the Anchor Life-Assurance Company aforesaid was interested in the life of the said Adolphus Frederick, Duke of Cambridge, to the amount so insured thereon as aforesaid: That the plaintiff and the Anchor Life-Assurance Company had respectively complied with, observed, and performed all things in the said policy and conditions contained on his and their part and behalf to be complied with and observed and performed, according to the form and effect of the said policy of assurance: That, although three calendar months since the making of such proof as aforesaid of the death of the said Adolphus Frederick, Duke of Cambridge, had long since elapsed, and the funds and property of the India and London Life-Assurance Company aforesaid remaining unapplied and undisposed of, and inapplicable to prior claims and demands, according to the form and effect, true intent, and meaning of the said policy, were at all times during, and at the expiration of, the said last-mentioned period of three calendar months, and had been from hence hitherto, and still were, sufficient and available for payment of the said sum of 1000l., and *were subject and liable to pay the same to the plaintiff, accord[*367 ing to the defendants' said deed of settlement,—of all which said premises the said company then had notice: Yet that the defendants (although often requested so to do) did not nor would, within three calendar months after such proof as aforesaid so made as aforesaid of the death of the said Adolphus Frederick, Duke of Cambridge, or at any time afterwards, pay to the plaintiff, or to the said Anchor LifeAssurance Company, the said sum of 1000l., or any part thereof; but

had hitherto wholly refused and neglected so to do, and had therein wholly failed and made default, contrary to the form and effect of the said instrument or policy of assurance, and of their said covenant by them in that behalf made as aforesaid, &c.

The defendants pleaded, that the said Anchor Life-Assurance Company was not interested in the life of the said Adolphus Frederick, Duke of Cambridge, in manner and form as the plaintiff had above thereof in the declaration in that behalf alleged. Issue thereon.

The cause came on for trial before Cresswell, J., at the sittings in Middlesex after Michaelmas Term, 1851, when, a point being reserved for the opinion of the Court of Common Pleas involving a question as to the propriety of the decision of the case of Godsall v. Boldero, 9 East, 72, it was, after several arguments, at the suggestion of that court, agreed that the facts should be stated for the opinion of the court of error in the shape of a bill of exceptions, which was accordingly done in substance as follows:

Before the date of the policy in the declaration mentioned, certain persons calling themselves the Anchor Life-Assurance Company had granted to the Rev. John Wright four several policies of insurance on the life of the Duke of Cambridge, to the amount of 3000l. Three of these policies were dated the 18th of October, *1843, and one *368] the 3d of November, 1843,-two of them being for 1000l. each, and the other two for 500l. each. These four several sums of money were by the terms of the policies to be paid by the Anchor Life-Assurance Company to Wright on the death of the Duke. The Anchor Life-Assurance Company being desirous to secure and indemnify themselves, to the extent of 1000l., against their liability for the 3000l. payable according to the last-mentioned policies to Wright on the death of the Duke, the plaintiff, as one of the members and directors of the said. company, by the authority and on behalf of the said company, effected the policy in the declaration with the defendants for 1000l., by way of a cross or counter assurance to that amount, on the life of the Duke, against the policies so effected by Wright with the Anchor Life-Assurance Company.

By a deed bearing date the 1st of December, 1848, in consideration of the surrender to them by Wright of the four policies above mentioned, and of the sum of 3251., the directors of the Anchor Life-Assurance Company granted to Wright an annuity of 1201., during the joint lives of himself and his then wife, and of 801. for the life of the survivor. Upon the execution of this deed, the said four policies were delivered up by Wright to the company to be cancelled, and were cancelled accordingly. All the premiums which according to the terms of the said policies had become due previously to or at the time of the delivery up of the said policies, had been paid by Wright to the Anchor Life-Assurance Company.