That can hardly be called an expression of approval of the doctrine ascribed to Lord Kenyon. In this state of things, the 57 G. 3, c. 52, was passed, probably occasioned by the alarm created by such a construction of the former statute. MAULE, J.-In passing the 57 G. 3, c. 52, the legislature were not in any degree interfering with the construction of the 11 G. 2, c. 19; they were altogether dealing with the future. It is not treating the *legislature fairly to say that the [*490 language of the 57 G. 3, c. 52, leads to an inference that they thought that a power of re-entry was necessary to bring a case within the 11 G. 2, c. 19.] There had been two cases, in one of which it was decided, in the other assumed, that a proviso for re-entry was necessary under the 11 G. 2, c. 19; and then an act is passed extending the powers of the former act to cases where no right or power of re-entry should be reserved or given to the landlord in case of non-payment of rent. Lord Ellenborough evidently approves of Lord Kenyon's decision at all events, he acts upon it.

[CROWDER, J.-And its correctWILLIAMS, J.-For the purpose

ness is recognised by the legislature. of this argument, it must be assumed that they were justified. JERVIS, C. J.-The plaintiff objected at the trial, that a power of re-entry was necessary. I held not; but I reserved the point. The 57 G. 3, c. 52, had not then been adverted to. Then a further objection was made, that the proper statutes were not inserted in the margin of the plea; and I allowed the defendant to insert what he asked to have inserted, viz. the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84, s. 13, and 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 34. So far as regards the 57 G. 3, c. 52, I think you cannot have more than the costs of the rule.] The plaintiff went down to try a very different question from that which now presents itself. [MAULE, J.-A party has no right to say that he came down prepared to rest upon the precise words of the record. An amendment of the pleadings is one of the incidents of going down to trial. Now parties go down prepared for any amendment which the law allows; and the amendment may be made at any time. JERVIS, C. J.-The plea is defective in not inserting in the margin the statutes and the sections upon which the defendant must rely for his defence. I think they should now be inserted.] The report of the commissioners upon which the Common *Law Pro[*491 cedure Act, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, was founded, expounds the reason of the enactment of s. 222. The plaintiff now stands in a very different position from that in which he stood at the trial. It would lead to great abuse to allow amendment after amendment in this way, as each new difficulty may present itself. [CROWDER, J.-Was not the real question that you went down to try, whether or not the defendant was justified in turning you out?] No doubt it was. [JERVIS, C. J.-Would it not be gross injustice, that the defendant should pay you 401. and the costs, when he has a perfectly good defence to the action?] The object of the rule of court requiring the statutes to be mentioned VOL. XV.-43

2 F

in the margin of the plea, was, that the plaintiff should have specific information as to the nature of the defence which was intended to be set up. To allow any amendment in this respect, is departing from the spirit of the rule, which no one will in future observe, if it may thus be violated with impunity.

JERVIS, C. J.-It is unnecessary for us upon the present occasion to express any opinion as to the construction of the statute of 11 G. 2, c. 19, s. 16. But, in any view of the case, there are certain sections of the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84, which are not mentioned in the margin of the plea,— an omission which deprives the defendant of the opportunity of availing himself of his full defence. Under these circumstances, we are of opinion that he should be allowed now to insert them; for, we think it would indicate a very rude state of society, and be a great reproach to the administration of justice, if the plaintiff were to be permitted to have a verdict with 401. damages merely because the defendant has through ignorance or inadvertence of his advisers omitted to put two or three sections of an act of parliament in the margin of his plea. We therefore think that the *defendant should be allowed to amend *492] his plea by inserting therein the 57 G. 3, c. 52, and the 6th and 15th and any other sections he may be advised, of the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84, he paying the costs of the rule. And we further think, that, as the point is one of great importance, as to the jurisdiction of the city magistrates,--the matter should undergo another argument, by one counsel on each side.

The case was accordingly now argued for the second time.

Prendergast, for the plaintiff.-The power to view and to give the landlord possession of deserted premises, by means of a warrant directed to a police-constable, is, by the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84, s. 13, given to one police-magistrate, upon the request of the landlord made in open court: and there was good reason for exempting the police-magistrates from the duty of personally viewing the premises, inasmuch as they are required by the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, s. 12, to attend in their respective courts from 10 o'clock in the morning until 5 o'clock in the afternoon. But it is said that the like power is given to the justices of the city of London sitting at the Mansion-House and Guildhall, by the 6th and 15th sections of the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84. That, however, is not so. The 6th section, so far as is material to this question, enacts that "any two justices of the peace for the city of London and the liberties thereof, shall, within the said city of London and the liberties thereof, have all the powers, privileges, and duties which any one magistrate of the said police courts has while sitting in one of the said courts, by the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47 and 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, or either of them." The former of these is an act for improving the police in and near the metropolis," and the latter an act for "regulating the police courts in *the metropolis." Both contain provisions for duties to be performed.

*493]

in their respective districts by police-magistrates as well as by justices of the peace who are not police-magistrates; and the 75th section of the former act provides, that, " in the construction of that act, the word 'magistrate' shall be taken to mean and include every justice of the peace appointed to be a magistrate of the police-courts of the metropolis, and also every justice of the peace acting in and for any part of the metropolitan police-district for which no police-court shall be established." And s. 76 enacts "that every such magistrate shall be empowered summarily to convict any person charged with any offence against that act, on the oath of one or more witnesses, or by his own confession, and to award the penalty or punishment therein provided for such offence; and the matter of such complaint shall be heard and determined by one of the justices appointed to be a magistrate of the police-courts of the metropolis at one of the said police-courts; or, if the offence shall have been committed or the offender apprehended in any part of the metropolitan police-district for which no police-court shall be established as aforesaid, the matter of such complaint may be also heard and determined by any two or more justices acting in and for the county in which the offence was committed or the offender apprehended." The 1st section of the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84, reciting, that, by the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, it was amongst other things enacted, "that, in the construction of that act, the word magistrate' shall be taken to include every justice of the peace acting in and for any part of the metropolitan police-district for which no police-court shall be established, and that, if any offence against that act shall have been committed, or the offender apprehended, in any part of the metropolitan police-district for which no police-court shall be established as aforesaid, the matter of such *complaint may be also heard and determined by any two or more justices acting [*494 in and for the county in which the offence was committed or the offender apprehended,"-repeals those two sections: and then comes the 6th section, which gives to two justices of the peace having jurisdiction within the metropolitan police-district, while sitting publicly together in the court used for holding special or petty sessions (except in the divisions to be assigned to the police-courts), and to two justices of the peace for the city of London, all the powers, &c., which one police-magistrate has not, generally, but by the two recited acts of 2 & 3 Vict. cc. 47, 71. The statute in this respect is plain and free from ambiguity. Then the 15th section of the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84, enacts simply that any two justices of the peace for the city of London and the liberties thereof, having jurisdiction within the city of London and the liberties thereof, shall, within the said city of London and the liberties thereof, have all the powers, privileges, and duties which any two justices of the peace having jurisdiction within the metropolitan police-district have within the metropolitan police-district by virtue of this act.” But the power given to a police-magistrate by the 13th section of that

act, is not a power given to "any two justices" by virtue of that act: and there are many things which a police-magistrate sitting alone may do under that act, which two justices of the peace could not do. No argument can arise upon the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 34; for, it may be conceded, that, under that provision, the Lord Mayor or any one alderman sitting at the Mansion-House or Guildhall, may do all that could formerly have been done by any two ordinary justices of the peace for the city. The 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84, throughout, carefully distinguishes between "police-magistrates" and "justices of the peace."

*Byles, Serjt., contrà.-The 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 34, it is *495] conceded, enables the Lord Mayor of London, or any Alderman, sitting at the Mansion-House or Guildhall justice-rooms, to do alone any act which by any law now in force, or by any law not containing any express enactment to the contrary hereafter to be made, is or shall be directed to be done by more than one justice. The question is, has any one or more justice or justices of the peace power to view and give possession of deserted premises by warrant directed to a police-constable? All these statutes for the regulation of the police and the policecourts must be read together as forming one code. "Where there are different statutes in pari materia, though made at different times, or even expired, and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed together as one system, and as explanatory of each other:" Per Lord Mansfield, in Rex v. Loxdale, 1 Burr. 445, 448. The first question here is, what is meant by "justices of the peace," in the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84. Construed literally, it clearly includes police-magistrates." The 1st section of the Metropolitan Police Act, 10 G. 4, c. 44, empowers the Crown to establish a new police-office in the city of Westminster, and to appoint "two fit persons as justices of the peace of the counties of Middlesex, Surrey, Hertford, Essex, and Kent, and of all liberties therein, to execute the duties of a justice of the peace at the said office, and in all parts of those several counties, and the liberties therein." So, the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, s. 1, reciting that it is expedient to amend the several acts now in force for the more effectual administration of justice in the office of a "justice of the peace" in the several police-offices established in the Metropolis, enacts that the several police-courts now established (naming them) shall be continued, and that the several persons appointed to execute the duties of a justice of the peace *at the said courts, shall continue to execute the same *496] there, and shall be justices of the counties of Middlesex, Surrey, Kent, Essex, and Hertfordshire, the city and liberty of Westminster, and the liberty of the Tower of London, and magistrates of the said courts, during Her Majesty's pleasure." When the act gives power to justices of the peace to do certain acts, it gives them all the powers that any justices have. [CRESSWELL, J.-It may well be that policemagistrates have all the powers of justices of the peace: but it does

not follow that justices of the peace have all the powers of police-magistrates.] The true meaning of the 6th section of the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84, is, that any two justices of the peace having jurisdiction within the metropolitan police-district, and any two justices of the peace for the city of London, shall, within their respective jurisdictions, have all the powers, privileges, and duties which any one police-magistrate has, while sitting by, that is, under the authority of,-the two recited acts of 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, and 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71. Taking the 6th and 15th sections of the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84, together, it is impossible to give any effect to their language, unless it is held that the legislature intended to give to two justices in each of the two jurisdictions, all the powers conferred by that act as well as by the two acts therein recited.

Harcourt, in reply, submitted that, taking the whole of the statutes together, the power to view and deliver possession of deserted premises by warrant directed to a police-constable, was clearly created only in ease of the police-magistrate, and was not intended to be conferred upon any other description of justice of the peace. The 34th section of the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, cannot have the effect contended for on the other side; for that would be directly in the teeth of the 33d section, which provides that "nothing in the act contained *shall alter [*497 or affect in any manner whatsoever any of the powers, provisions, or enactments contained in the 10 G. 4, c. 44, 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, and 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84." [CRESSWELL, J.-To give the 34th section the effect contended for on the part of the defendant, would not necessarily be to alter or affect any of the powers, provisions, or enactments contained in the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84: it would be merely to superadd to it that what might under that act be done by two justices, may now be done by one alone sitting at the places named.]

JERVIS, C. J.-I am of opinion that this rule should be made absolute; though I much regret, that, after a careful consideration of the several acts of parliament to which our attention has been drawn, I feel compelled to arrive at that conclusion. Under the 11 G. 2, c. 19, s. 16, and 57 G. 3, c. 52, where premises were deserted, and there was no sufficient distress thereon to satisfy the arrears of rent, two magistrates upon personal view of the premises, and upon evidence of the arrears of rent, were empowered to put the landlord in possession. So stood the law down to the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84, the 13th section of which enables a police-magistrate to do this by means of a warrant directed to a policeconstable, instead of going in person. Many reasons might be suggested for not requiring a police-magistrate to go himself to view the premises: he is required by the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, s. 12, to be in attendance all day at his court. The question is, whether there is any provision which gives the like power to an alderman,-a justice of the peace for the city of London,-sitting at the justice-room at Gildhall. The clauses relied on by the defendant are the 6th and 15th of the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84, and