tion of a debt of a greater amount. [ALDERSON, B.-You may give a negotiable note in satisfaction of an unliquidated debt or demand of a greater amount, but you cannot give money!] In Sibree v. Tripp, Mr. Baron Alderson observes that a "man may give in satisfaction of a debt of 1007. a horse of the value of 5l., but not 5l." In Mitchell v. Cragg, 10 M. & W. 367,† to a declaration against the acceptor of a bill of exchange for 167. 128., drawn by F. & G., and endorsed [*826 by them to the plaintiff, the defendant pleaded,-first, that, after the bill became due, F. & G., being then the holders, applied to the defendant for payment of the bill; that the defendant paid them 71. 28., which, together with the price of a horse which the defendant had sold to F. & G., and the price of which it was agreed between them should be set off and allowed against the defendant's acceptance, F. & G. accepted in satisfaction and discharge of the bill; and that the bill was not endorsed to the plaintiff until after the said satisfaction and discharge, and after it became due,-secondly, that, before the bill came into the possession of the plaintiff, it was endorsed in blank by F. & Co. to C. & Co.; that, after it became due, it being then in the hands of C. & Co., F. & Co. gave C. & Co. another bill, accepted by them, for the same amount, which C. & Co. received on account of the first-mentioned bill, and which was paid by F. & G. at maturity; that, after the second bill was so given, the defendant paid to F. & G. 77. 28., which together with the price and value of a horse which the defendant had sold to F. & G., and the price of which it was agreed between them should be set off against the defendant's acceptance, F. & G. accepted in satisfaction and discharge of the bill; that, at the time of the giving of the second bill by F. & G. as aforesaid, and at the time of the said settlement between the defendant and F. & G., the bill in the declaration mentioned remained in the hands of C. & Co., and was not endorsed to the plaintiff until after the giving of the second bill by F. & G., nor until after it became due. It was held, that the pleas were bad in substance, because they did not show that the sum paid by the defendant, together with the price of the horse, equalled the amount of the bill of exchange,-Parke, B., saying: "It is left uncertain whether the horse was *sold for a fixed price, or upon a quantum valebat. It is [*827 consistent with the statements in the pleas, that the horse was sold for 5. if that was the case, that sum, together with the 77. 28. would not equal the amount of the bill, and consequently would not be any satisfaction." That case shows that the mere introduction of another matter the value of which is uncertain, does not amount to satisfaction. [PARKE, B.-I cannot see why this is not a good plea. The value of the defendant's giving up the question in the action in the county court cannot be ascertained. In dealing with a plea of this sort, the court does not enter into a consideration of the value of the satisfaction, if the plaintiff agrees to accept it. The advantage to the

plaintiff of the defendant's giving up the plea of infancy in the county court, though an untrue one, might be great.] It is material that one should know the true value of Down v. Hatcher. [PARKE, B.-Assuming this to be a liquidated demand, is the plea bad?] Supposing this were an action for a liquidated demand of 45l., the plea shows no answer. The plea amounts to this, that 451. being due at the time, an action is brought against the defendant in the county court for 50l., and in that action the defendant pleaded infancy at the time the cause of action arose, and that, before trial, it was agreed between the plaintiff and defendant, that the latter should pay the former 301. and the costs incurred in the county court, and that the plaintiff should receive the 307. and the performance of the defendant's agreement in satisfaction of the causes of action, and that the 30l. and costs were accordingly paid. Everything done in the county court sounds in a money payment. [PARKE, B.-The defendant gives up the plea of infancy, and the chance of the plaintiff's failing to recover in the county court.] There is nothing said about the withdrawal of the plea of infancy; nor is there any allegation that the *costs in the county court *828] equalled the difference between 30l. and 457. All that the plea shows, is, that the defendant avoids the payment of the 451. by the payment of 301. and an uncertain amount of costs.

Welsby, for the defendant, was not called upon.

PARKE, B.—The fifth plea is clearly a good plea of accord and satisfaction. The decision of the Court of Common Pleas was quite right. Whenever the question may arise as to whether or not Down v. Hatcher s good law, I should have a great deal to say against it: but, this being a good plea of satisfaction, assuming the demand to be liquidated, t is unnecessary to say anything about that case. The plaintiff, besides the 301., gets rid of the plea of infancy, and also gets what it was before uncertain whether he would get, viz. the costs. It seems to me that that is a perfectly good satisfaction. The court cannot enter into a consideration of the value of the satisfaction, which upon the face of it is uncertain.

MARTIN, B.-I shall always be ready to concur in such a judgment as tends to allow parties to contract for themselves what engagements they please.

ALDERSON, B.-I entirely concur in the soundness of that principle. The rest of the court concurring,

Payment and acceptance of a less sum than is due is not a good accord: Johnston v. Brunnan, 5 Johns. 271; Dederick v. Lehman, 9 Johns. 333; Seymour v. Minturn, 17 Johns. 169;

Judgment for the defendant.

Jones v. Bullitt, 2 Litt. 49; Eve v.
Moseley, 2 Strobh. 203; Hardey v.
Coe, 5 Gill, 189; Daniels v. Hatch, 1
New Jersey, 391; Warren v. Skinner,
20 Conn. 559.

42

INDEX

ΤΟ

THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS.

A copy (unstamped) of the Act Book of the I. Of Service of Writ of Ejectment,-See EJECT-
Ecclesiastical Court is admissible in evidence
under the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, s. 14. Dorrett
v. Meux,