AMONG the foreign interests of the German people in 1904 the war in the Far East naturally occupied the foremost place. The unusual developments in the relations of the country with Russia, and the extraordinary steps taken by the Government to strengthen these, kept Russia continually in the foreground of public attention. In respect to the war two distinct currents of sympathy early manifested themselves. While the people at large have taken sides with growing enthusiasm for Japan, the Government, its closest political supporters, and to a less extent the financial and commercial classes, give their sympathies to Russia. The Government, however, has maintained a fair degree of neutrality in outward acts, notwithstanding its assiduous wooing of Russia's favor in matters having little direct connection with the war.

The Kaiser, indeed, has taken pains to show how he feels. Now it was an autograph letter sent to the Czar through a special commissioner, now a telegram declaring "Russia's sorrow to be Germany's sorrow," now a deputation of high officials sent across the frontier to convey his greetings to the Czar, now the distribution of money to a Russian frontier guard drawn up to salute him on one of his deer-stalking excursions, such are the forms that the Kaiser chose for the frank expression

of his sympathies. His attitude is doubtless partly dictated by family relationship, partly by personal pity for a friend in a distressing situation, partly by the traditional policy of protecting Germany on her western frontier through a strongly cemented friendship with Russia; but it is certainly affected also by his feelings toward Japan. It was the Kaiser who brought into vogue in Germany the expression, "the Yellow Peril." Nobody here is so thoroughly convinced as he that the rise of the Japanese race to the rank of a great power must ultimately give to it the mastery of the Far East. Moreover, the line of cleavage between Christian and heathen nations marks, in the Kaiser's mind, a difference that affects the political aspects of the present struggle in Manchuria.

The precarious character of Germany's foothold in China certainly has some part in determining the attitude of her rulers at this moment. German statesmen, from the Kaiser down, know that if the Japanese win a conspicuous success, and then take hold of China and modernize it in an economic and military sense, Kiao-Chau must inevitably be lost to Germany. Already Germans are troubled by the Japanese commercial invasion of the colony and its hinterland. It is Japanese merchants, not German ones, that are set

tling along the line of the new German railway extending from Tsingtau into the interior, and are winning the trade of the country with their cheap manufactures,

a result facilitated by the fact that the Chinese like their racial kinsmen better than they like the Germans.

Russia, on her part, has done little to make Germany feel comfortable in her Russophile policy; indeed, it has seldom occurred that the friendliness of one country seemed to be so ill requited by the other. It is not that Russia deliberately designed to snub Germany; but her bungling officers and officials unwittingly created the appearance of reckless contempt for Germany's rights on sea and land. The mails were carried off one German steamer, and another was captured by an auxiliary cruiser in the Red Sea; another German vessel sailing under a Japanese charter, and carrying a cargo not recognized as contraband by international law, was sunk by the Vladivostock squadron; and a German fishing schooner, the Sonntag, was fired upon by the Baltic fleet when that curious Armada was going forth, like Don Quixote, to seek adventures.

The last named incident, occurring just off the German coast, afforded a luminous view of German policy toward Russia. The Government apparently did not at first intend to make representations of any kind at St. Petersburg; such action, the word was given out at the Foreign Office, would depend upon whether the owner of the vessel asked the Ministry's aid in getting redress. Meanwhile, the press furnished a remarkable illustration of how German editors sometimes take their cue from the Government in matters of foreign policy. At the moment when the newspapers were printing columns about the Anglo-Russian difficulty growing out of the Dogger Bank affair, they quietly brushed aside the Sonntag case as of no importance whatever; only the Socialist press struck a sharp note of protest. In the Reichstag, Count von Bülow showed how small a matter the whole

thing was: "Nobody was wounded on board the Sonntag. .. Russia at once met our just demands;" and the owner of the schooner got his seven hundred and fifty dollars for torn nets and a damaged hawser.

In another direction, however, the relations with Russia caused profound discontent and gave occasion for repeated attacks upon the Ministry. For the purpose of coöperating with the St. Petersburg authorities in preventing Russian anarchists from establishing themselves at the Prussian universities, and continuing their propaganda at home from those centres, the Government allowed Russian detectives to enter Germany and keep a sharp surveillance upon the Czar's subjects. Naturally, where Russian officials could determine who was an anarchist, and could designate the subjects for expulsion, things happened that caused sharp controversy; for everybody knows that in Russia any opponent of the Government is likely to be classified as an anarchist. When, moreover, a minister admitted in the Reichstag that obnoxious Russians were transported across the Russian frontier, a still more serious aspect was given to the matter, and the public mind experienced a disagreeable shock; for this was equivalent to transforming the right of expulsion into that of extradition, even where no crime was charged. Also the Government's practice of returning to the Russian authorities military fugitives trying to evade service in Manchuria, except such as were provided with tickets to America by one of the German steamship lines, caused loud protest; and the practice had to be abolished under the pressure of public opinion.

The Government's defense of its policy of expulsion was not such as to satisfy people not committed to its support. A Prussian minister argued in the Reichstag in behalf of exceptional treatment of fugitive Russian liberals, upon the ground that the reforms they were seeking in Russia would have, if carried into effect, a reflex democratic influence in Ger

many. The Government's critics were also amazed to hear the Chancellor read from the unpublished records of the Government to prove that Bismarck had gone still farther than he, and had expelled Russians merely as a personal favor to the Czar.

The trial at Königsberg in July of seven Socialists for lèse majesté and high treason against the Czar was one of the most sensational events of the year, and was a curious piece of bungling for a country governed with so much system and efficiency as Germany. The accused persons had been arrested in the autumn of 1903 for smuggling literature of anarchistic tendencies into Russia. During the trial, however, it was shown that the pamphlets did not contain the incriminating sentence which the Russian Consul of the city had reported to the court in his "translation." A still graver matter was the discovery that the translation of Russian law paragraphs, which this official had supplied to the court to prove that Russia guarantees reciprocity of treatment in cases of lèse majesté, omitted some essential matter, so that the court was misled. An authentic translation cleared up this error; and an appeal to the Foreign Office brought the answer that no treaty guaranteeing reciprocity existed. Thus, after the trial had proceeded at great length and had attracted the attention of the country to an uncommon degree, the very basis on which it rested was destroyed at one blow. The accused got only light sentences for secret association contrary to German law.

The Government had to meet repeated assaults in the Reichstag and Diet in connection with this Königsberg affair. All political parties, except the Conservatives, joined in these attacks; and the Socialists in particular made much political capital out of the matter. The Prussian Minister of Justice frankly confessed that serious mistakes had been made, and the Government press admitted that the trial had damaged the reputation of Prussian courts, and had compromised more than

it had helped Russia. The impression left upon the country was that the Government had gone too far in its zeal to win Russia's good will, and had suffered a loss of dignity.

The state of feeling in England toward Germany has remained such as to give grave concern to German statesmen and publicists. The behavior of the German press toward England has visibly improved within the past two years; nevertheless, the English windows that it smashed during the Boer War have never been repaired. Indeed, the attitude of several leading English newspapers and magazines creates the impression in Germany that they are deliberately trying to transform a popular antipathy into an inextinguishable hatred, which may have grave practical results. Their suspicion of Germany took some queer forms of expression last year. They found it easy to believe that Germany was plotting against British interests in Thibet; and when several damaged Russian vessels, fleeing before the victorious Togo, took refuge in Tsingtau, they saw fresh proof of their theory that a secret treaty exists between Germany and Russia. The fact that Japan declared herself satisfied when Germany ordered the vessels to be disarmed and detained till the close of the war, made little difference to these London political critics; they were more Japanese than Japan. The English Government went even farther at the time of the Dogger Bank incident. Downing Street actually believed that Germany had instigated the gallant attack of the Baltic squadron upon the Hull fishermen! Could anything illustrate more strikingly how an international hatred "doth work like madness in the brain"?

This frenzied state of the English mind toward Germany is all the more noteworthy when it is considered that France has already succeeded in completely mending the windows which its press had broken during the South African War. The German press certainly behaved no worse than the French at that time; yet

Count von Bülow still finds it necessary to protest in the Reichstag, and in the English press itself, that he entertains none of the sinister designs against England attributed to him. The conclusion of the Anglo-French agreement last spring awakened curious sensations here. The feeling that Germany had been ignored in a matter that closely affected her interests was widely expressed; and even the saner organs of public opinion thought it was a most inopportune occasion for Count von Bülow to "lay his flute on the table and withdraw from the concert," as he once said. The assumption that he made no music merely because the concert was not to his liking was rejected by wiser people than the Pan-Germans. The latter, of course, were ready with a quixotic proposition: Germany should immediately seize a part of Morocco as a compensation! What has become, they asked, of the Kaiser's utterance that no important decision could be taken anywhere in the world without Germany's assent?

The attitude of the German Government and people toward the United States, it is pleasant to note by way of contrast, has continued to grow more friendly. The Kaiser's cordial good will for us has found frequent expression, and our President's overtures for the negotiation of an arbitration treaty with Germany led to a speedy result. Germany also readily accepted the President's tentative proposal of a second peace congress. It is pleasant to record here that the Berlin Government is more favorably disposed toward a second congress than it was toward the first; its skepticism toward a permanent arbitration court has been overcome by the practical efficacy of the Hague Tribunal, and it is convinced that the latter is capable of further development in the service of the world's peace.

The President, moreover, is himself one of the chief influences in Germany making for a better appreciation of our country. Many stalwart patriots, indeed, saw an intentional affront to the Empire in the unfortunate delay in setting up the

statue of Frederick the Great; but even these were appeased by Mr. Roosevelt's tactful speech at the unveiling, which seemed to atone for a multitude of American sins. His message, too, while many moralists thought that his ethical flights were too heavily weighted with cannon, pleased the German commercial classes at its most radical point, its frank declaration of police authority over delinquent debtor - states in South America. The President has undoubtedly touched a most sympathetic chord among all classes here, notwithstanding what they regard as his excessive imperialism. The interest in him as a man is growing, the German public clearly wants to know better this strong American who dares to have high ideals in the midst of what it traditionally regards as our sordid and corrupt politics. Various newspapers have been running translations of his books as serials; and a complete edition of his works has been announced by a publishing house.

The visits of Germans to our shores last year assumed far larger proportions than ever before. Many business and professional men who had long wanted to see what is called here "the great republic," availed themselves of the St. Louis exhibition to gratify their wishes. The columns of the newspapers have been filled with the impressions of these travelers. It is a significant fact—one that is not very flattering to our national pride — that few of these writers point their countrymen to our experience in government, still fewer to our conduct of general politics, and none at all to our management of municipal affairs, as examples for imitation at home. What interested our visitors chiefly was material things, — our methods of producing and distributing goods, and social and labor questions as affecting these. And on this plane, what was the impression made? A favorable one, indeed, but far from the overwhelming impression that our vast economic self-esteem would have expected. What expert technical writers saw at St.

Louis and in their travels about the country tended rather to diminish their awe for the "American Danger" than to enhance it. One of the foremost of these gave the following summary of his impressions: "Our well-known pessimists, who shudder whenever a ton of American iron is landed at Ruhrort, should be compelled to visit St. Louis. Let them here study the actual state of technical development, especially let them inform themselves as to the effects of the protective tariff and the trusts upon technical progress; let them also study the ever increasing friction between capital and labor, then, if they are acquainted with conditions at home, they must relegate the ostensible 'American Danger' to the realm of fable."

It is probable that new commercial treaties with various continental countries will have been ratified by the Reichstag before this article appears in print. These arrangements will take effect January 1, 1906, and will continue in force twelve years. In view of the near approach of the time when Germany's commercial relations shall be placed upon a new tariff basis, no little concern is felt as to the future of the country's trade with us. The importance of removing all uncertainty about the matter is fully realized; and it has been asserted repeatedly in the press and in the Reichstag that it is more important for Germany to get a satisfactory commercial treaty with the United States than with her immediate neighbors. It may be easily understood, therefore, that there is much amazement here that our Government seems wholly to ignore the seriousness, from the American standpoint, of the situation that will exist after January 1, 1906. I outlined that situation in this magazine one year ago; and all that was said then has equal force to-day. Our commercial people who are interested in the export trade with Germany should lose no time in convincing Congress that the "stand-pat" policy is an extremely unwise one, so far as Germany is concerned. If that policy is to continue, I can

see no other result than that all our exports to Germany shall be placed under the German general tariff duties, while those of our competitors will come in at greatly reduced treaty rates.

The uprising of the Hereros, and later of the Witboi Hottentots, in German Southwest Africa has given the country a most unwelcome reminder of the dangers and uncertainties of colonial possessions. This little negro war has proved to be very troublesome to the Government, and equally so to the Imperial finances, which are otherwise in an unsatisfactory state. Worse than the heavy cost in money has been the sacrifice of human life, the German troops having lost heavily from malarial diseases. Some features of the struggle are of interest to us, in view of our position in the Philippines and our perennial negro question at home. It is highly interesting to note that the dwellers in Southwest Africa — although the Germans have little of social repugnance to the negro as we know it - have adopted a view of that race hardly less favorable than prevails in the most anti-negro sections of the South. The settlers who wrote letters to the newspapers at home, and the deputation of farmers who came to Berlin to seek financial aid from the Government, were of one mind as to the régime of ex-Governor Leutwein; it was too mild for negroes, who must be made to feel the stern hand of authority. Some of his critics complain that he permitted the blacks to appeal to police and courts in protecting their rights against the whites; and they are now demanding that the lands of the natives be confiscated, even those of the tribes remaining friendly to Germany, and that they be reduced to a state of quasi-slavery till they learn to work.

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Various causes for the uprising have been put forward. The local authorities laid it largely to the extortion of wandering traders who went about the country enticing the natives to buy goods on credit, and seizing their cattle later and selling them to secure payment. The Imperial Government lays little stress upon this