one hour for troops of the Sixteenth Army Corps to pass and take the advance as ordered, we having left them three miles in the rear the night previous. The march during the 8th was attended with great success, the men marching in good order. At 4 p. m. I received orders from General Smith to go into camp at Saint John's Creek, the advance under the immediate supervision of the general proceeding to Boeuf Creek, five miles farther. On the morning of the 9th I received orders to march my division up and join the advance at Boeuf Creek, which I did at 12 m., proceeding through their camp and taking the advance directly on the road to Mount Sterling, but was ordered into camp, and at midnight received orders to return with my command to Saint Louis, the cavalry and artillery to go direct by turnpike and the infantry to Washington, where I was to ask for transportation by rail, and here, colonel, I may be allowed to state that the disappointment of many of my officers and men was very great at being obliged to countermarch at a time when they supposed there was a prospect of soon meeting and punishing the invaders of our State and homes. However, at 9 a. m. on the 10th, the troops of General Smith having passed on to the front, the First Division, Enrolled Missouri Militia, took up the line of march east to Washington Cross-Roads, where the infantry marched to the left and the cavalry and artillery proceeded toward Union, arriving in Saint Louis on the 13th, the infantry under my command encamping on the evening of the 10th on Saint John's Creek, ten miles south of Washington. On the 11th I moved into Washington and encamped, assuming command of the post, which had been evacuated that morning by the Fifty-fourth Regiment Enrolled Missouri Militia, Col. D. Q. Gale commanding. I immediately reported as ordered to Brig. Gen. Thomas Ewing, jr., commanding Saint Louis District, for orders. Meantime, receiving order from department headquarters to send one brigade to Jefferson City, on the 13th, I ordered Brig. Gen. C. D. Wolff to embark with his command on the steamers Bright Star, Zephyr, and Jeannie Roberts, and on the 14th they left.

On the 14th I was ordered from department headquarters to select proper ground and at once proceed to fortify a supply depot at Washington. I selected the ground about one-quarter of a mile below the town and immediately made requisition for the necessary intrenching and other tools, which were promptly forwarded. On the 16th, however, the order to fortify was countermanded, and I was ordered to use my command to protect and forward promptly all supplies received at the post for the front. On the 18th the cavalry and artillery of my command reported back from Saint Louis and went into camp at Washington. On the 23d of October, the railroad being repaired and cars running through to Hermann, all supplies were sent to that point, and I ordered Brig. Gen. George F. Meyers to detail one company of infantry to garrison Washington and proceed with cavalry, artillery, and remaining infantry, consisting of six companies of the Eleventh Regiment Enrolled Missouri Militia, to Hermann and assume command at that place, which he did on the 24th, and on the same day I removed my headquarters to Franklin and, pursuant to orders from General Ewing, assumed command of all the troops on the line of the railroad from Hermann to Franklin and detachments at bridges on southwest branch Pacific Railroad. I remained in command at Franklin until the 31st ultimo, when my division, except the cavalry and artillery, was relieved from service by telegraphic orders. I immediately ordered General Meyers to turn over the command at Hermann to Capt. S. H. Julian, Battery I, Second Missouri Artillery Volunteers, and proceed with

the balance of his command to Saint Louis. I turned over the command at Franklin to Col. D. Q. Gale, commanding Fifty-fourth Regiment Enrolled Missouri Militia, and on the 1st instant arrived in Saint Louis with my staff and Company A, First Battalion Cavalry.

For detailed report of the operations of the militia of this district under Generals Miller and Wolff while detached from my command, I respectfully refer to their returns at district headquarters United States. In closing this report of a brief and hastily inaugurated campaign of the militia under my command I cannot mention in terms of too high praise the valuable assistance rendered me by the following officers: Brig. Gen. George F. Meyers; Lieut. Col. L. F. Fix, volunteer aide-decamp; Col. John Knapp, aide-de-camp to the Governor; Maj. Julius Pitzman; Capt. Gustav Cohrs, assistant provost-marshal. Many others are worthy of all praise, and I am sure that if my division had been so fortunate as to meet the enemy all would have done nobly.

Very respectfully,

E. C. PIKE,

Brig. Gen., Comdg. First Mil. Dist., Enrolled Missouri Militia. Col. JOHN V. Du Bois,

Chief of Staff.

No. 64.

Report of Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis, U. S. Army, commanding Depart

ment of Kansas.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF KANSAS,

Fort Leavenworth, January, 1865. GENERAL: I present a general and full report of the circumstances connected with my recent campaign against the rebel General Sterling Price, believing the dangers, incidents, conflicts, and final success deserve a special record.

The former conflicts I have had with Price's force made me familiar with his purpose, often declared to his followers, of making another effort to establish himself on the Missouri River. His recent success on the Red River and at Camden, in Arkansas, inspired him with new energies and induced him to attempt this design, by following up his campaign through Louisiana and Arkansas by operating through Missouri and Kansas. He therefore moved northward through Arkansas with an army of about 15,000 men and twenty pieces of artillery, aug. menting his forces by conscripting, and by voluntary acquisitions, induced by prospect of plunder and revenge. His force was all mounted, and, except his conscripts, very well equipped. I had taken most of my troops far west of the Missouri border, where I had been in pursuit of Indians on the plains; and I had ordered Major-General Blunt to continue the search beyond Fort Larned, returning myself to these headquarters on the 17th of September, 1864. Most of my forces were therefore engaged in active operations several hundred miles west of the portion of Kansas threatened by Price's movements. On the day of my arrival I telegraphed yourself, General Rosecrans, and Governor Carney the substance of the dispatches concerning Price's movements which I found on my table, from General Thayer and others, on the Arkansas, "that General Price, with 15,000 men, had crossed the Arkansas River near Dardanelle," and suggested to the Governor that I might

"again have to ask the militia of Southern Kansas to aid in checking rebel approaches." Some field-works had been erected on the eastern border of Kansas, and I directed these to be armed and others immediately constructed, making the towns of Lawrence, Olathe, Paola, and Fort Scott much more secure against raids, and therefore allowing me to use volunteers and militia that would otherwise be needed to guard these places against bushwhackers. I also sent orders to General Blunt to stop his pursuit of Indians and come with all possible speed with such troops as could be spared to Council Grove, so as to be available against rebel invasion. The Second Colorado Regiment, stationed in the edge of Missouri, headquarters at Kansas City, had been ordered to report to me, but at the request of General Rosecrans, and in view of their convenient location, I allowed them to remain where they were. The Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Eleventh Kansas Regiments Volunteer Cavalry and fractions of the Third Wisconsin were distributed in Southeast Kansas, convenient for concentration at any time and place. The battalion of Colonel Drake, 100-days' men, whose time was nearly out, and a portion of a new negro battery, all amounting to about 4,000 men, was all the available volunteers that I could command. Fortunately I had a large number of mountain howitzers attached to my cavalry regiments, and also three or four batteries of field guns, which were ordered forward and in readiness, so that, in view of the coming crisis, I had upward of thirty pieces of artillery ready for any field and so equipped as to move with the usual rapidity of cavalry. Heavy siege guns were distributed and well arranged at Fort Leavenworth, Leavenworth, Lawrence, Olathe, Paola, and Fort Scott. These preparatory arrangements were in full progress when I received your dispatch of the 24th of September, directing me that all my available force not required against Western Indians should be thrown south on the Fort Scott routes, and adding "large re-enforcements have been sent to the Arkansas to cut off the enemy's retreat." My reply to you, dated the 26th of September, informing you that "my main dependence must be on militia if Price's force come westward," was predicated on the well-founded supposition that I could not draw troops from the remote districts of my command (Upper Arkansas, Colorado, or Nebraska) in time to meet the probable crisis arising from Price's march. Fortunately I had, through the active exertions of Governor Carney, secured and distributed arms and equipments for a large portion of the militia. But another difficulty presented itself. The whole country was engaged in the great National and State political campaign, the very crisis of which seemed to culminate with Price's progress through Missouri. Motives, measures, and men were all distrusted. The Senators, Governor, and people, commanding, composing, and controlling this militia reserve were all fiercely engaged in this political strife. No time for using the militia could be more unfavorable. The ballot-box, not the bayonet, was the weapon sought by the militia, and it required the greatest exertions to draw attention of officers and men from the political to the military necessities of the hour. The work of organizing, arming, and mobilizing an army in thirty days under these circumstances was therefore a most difficult and perplexing duty, requiring the exercise of responsibilities which I hope will receive the approval or indulgence of my superiors, to whom I reported by telegraph almost daily. The enemy steadily advanced from his crossing of the Arkansas on the 8th of September, moving northeast through the State, striking the rich valley of Black River, where he increased and improved his forces by devastating that region 30 R R-VOL XLI, PT I

of country. Following up that valley through Pocahontas, he entered Missouri near the southeast corner, and moved north through the Iron Mountain defiles, meeting no resistance until he reached the vicinity of Pilot Knob, Mo. Here, on the 28th [27th] of September, he met a gallant resistance by General Ewing, who repulsed his attack on the fort at Pilot Knob, but subsequently evacuated and fell back, allowing Price to move on to Franklin and Washington, striking the Missouri River at the latter place. This intelligence of the progress of the enemy came to me through Major-General Rosecrans, commander of the Department of the Missouri, General Thayer, who commanded at Fort Smith, Ark, and also from scouts sent out by Colonel Blair, who commanded at Fort Scott, keeping me fully informed. During the period to which I have referred I was annoyed by a rebel approach under General Gano, who came within seventy miles of my southern line with a large force and captured a large train at Cabin Creek belonging to General Steele's department. The Indians on the plains also continued to occupy my troops on the overland routes and alarm the people throughout the Territories and western portion of Kansas. As the enemy at Washington, on the Missouri, had reached the turning point of his northern movement (crossing the Missouri not being rational), leaving most of our Federal forces in his rear and right flank, his movement westward toward my department seemed inevitable. General Rosecrans was re-enforced by troops under General Mower, General Smith, and 100-days' regiments from Illinois, but all these being on the other side of Price the greater the number the more certain and expeditious would be the movement toward my department. The crisis as to the direction of the enemy's movement occurred about the 2d of October, and I telegraphed Colonel Ford, who occupied the district of Kansas City (and therefore my front, in view of the approach of the enemy), to send forward scouts and keep in constant intercourse with General Brown, whose district extended down the Missouri, on the south side of the Missouri River. On the same day I was informed that General Fisk had moved from the north side with a considerable force, to save Jefferson City from the enemy. On the 4th I received the following dispatch from General Brown:

Major-General CURTIS:

JEFFERSON CITY, October 4, 1864-2.50 p. m.

The rebels are on the road between me and Saint Louis, and have cut off all communications. They attacked Hermann last evening and had three pieces of artillery. They have captured railroad train and three locomotives. It is said they also captured four steam ferry-boats. If you support me it must be by direct movement down the river as quickly as possible. Am doing all I can to be ready to defend the place, but the situation is bad. I want infantry and artillery. The rebels have a large force. The appearances are that the enemy are moving up the river.

E. B. BROWN,
Brigadier-General.

At 3.55 p. m. he added that General Fisk's command are moving to my support. When he arrives I shall have 6,000 men and eight small pieces of artillery. I telegraphed this intelligence through various routes to General Rosecrans, but lines being down, could get no intelligence through. I took the liberty to suggest to General Brown that

Price should be checked at the Gasconade River. Bridges and boats on the Gasconade and Osage should be beyond all possible use to him. Destroying an eastern span of railroad bridge may be necessary. River too low, and boats too scarce for my movements. Rains will raise streams and Price must be captured. Do not allow your force to be captured. If too small better fall back, but stand as long as you can safely.

On the 5th of October, learning that Price had crossed the Gasconade, I wrote the Governor of Kansas, urging the immediate call of the militia, which letter was subsequently made part of his proclamation and will be set out in this report.

CHAPTER II.-MOVEMENT TO FEEL AND EMBARRASS THE ENEMY.

General Fisk advised me of his junction with General Brown at Jefferson City on the 5th of October, and also desired me to send him a battery. On the 6th he reported his advance in skirmishing had met with some loss, and the enemy was coming forward. General Rosecrans telegraphed as follows:

Maj. Gen. S. R. CURTIS:

HEADQUARTERS, Saint Louis, October 6, 1864.

You will wish to know our latest [news]. Ewing blew up Pilot Knob and made good [his] retreat to Rolla with his battery, losing only killed, wounded, and stragglers by the way. Price was reported crossing the Gasconade yesterday on the old stage road to Jefferson City. McNeil and Sanborn finding their aim moved [with] their mounted force to Jefferson City and will hurt Price directly.*

W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major-General.

Col. Chester Harding, with 450 men, arrived from Saint Joseph or steamer West Wind, and I directed Maj. S. S. Curtis to take the steamboat Benton and assist in the effort to get this force forward, reconnoiter the country, and bring away stores from Lexington. All boats were directed to protect their pilot-houses and engineer rooms, and these boats were especially guarded and directed to move with great caution if they proceeded below Kansas City, which they did. This movement was retarded by low water, and rebel force in front checked their farther progress at Glasgow, where Colonel Harding took the command and tried to hold the position. Meantime, the enemy moving west of Glasgow, Major Curtis with the Benton and a few soldiers and the crew fought their way back, reporting the position and progress of Price's army. The report of Major Curtis, marked A, shows the thrilling incidents of this expedition, when several of the enemy were killed and wounded and we saved the boat and crew with only one man wounded. On the 7th I received the following from General Fisk:

Major-General CURTIS:

JEFFERSON CITY, October 7, 1864.

We have fought the enemy sharply from the Moreau bridge on the Bolton Ferry road, doing them considerable damage. Our loss as yet inconsiderable. We are withdrawing into the trenches; a large force investing; no news of re-enforcements. Will give them the best fight we can and may God give us victory.

CLINTON B. FISK,
Brigadier-General.

On the 8th I wrote Governor Carney urging the proclamation calling out the militia. He had personally urged the reasonable probability that the force under General Rosecrans would be sufficient to overwhelm Price before he could reach us, and very earnestly hoped that the great expense and inconvenience of a general call of the Kansas people might be averted. But the advance of Price continued, leaving

*As sent by Rosecrans this last clause reads-Will hurt Price decidedly.
+ See p. 530.